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Continuity of Diplomacy in the 
Democratisation Process
Harold Nicolson, a British diplomat who became a member of the House 
of Commons, argued in his classic work Diplomacy:
The function of diplomacy is the management of the relations 
between independent States by processes of negotiation. The 
professional diplomatist is the servant of the sovereign authority in 
his own country. In democratic countries, that soverign authority 
is represented, in the first place by a majority of the House of 
Commons, and in the second place by the Government or Cabinet 
to whom that majority accords executive powers.1
Diplomacy is a form of foreign policy, and while foreign policy includes 
defence policy and the use of military force, diplomacy is negotiations 
between nations. A state’s diplomacy with foreign counterparts requires 
continuous policy and human interaction to ensure unwavering trust.
However, two factors threaten the consistency of diplomacy. First, 
diplomacy in a democracy is prone to inconsistency due to regime changes. 
Democracy in a modern state is an indirect one and takes the form of party 
politics. Opposition parties often criticise the ruling party’s diplomacy as 
soft and against the national interest and try to change the diplomacy 
when they come to power. Today, with the development of diverse media, 
the phenomenon of populism is common even in developed countries. 
It is not infrequent for politicians to manipulate the media to incite the 
masses or pander to public opinion and appeal to extreme foreign policies. 
Second, in countries in the process of democratisation, the military often 
comes to power and intervenes in foreign affairs. In countries on the verge 
of democratisation, such as modern Japan and contemporary South-East 
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Asia, coups d’état have often occurred, and the military has taken over 
the reins of power. Since the military, which has taken control of the 
country, also meddles in diplomacy, changes in civil–military relations 
have a significant impact on foreign policy.
Thus, the question of how to maintain the continuity of diplomacy 
while developing democracy without military intervention is an old 
and new issue. The challenge can be described as a dilemma between 
democracy and diplomatic coherence. This dilemma is not unique to the 
twenty-first century; it has been a constant challenge to the development 
of democracy. In non-Western countries, democratisation originated 
in  the nineteenth century and has had many successes and failures. 
After the Russo-Japanese War, political parties began to take power in 
Japan, replacing the military-backed forces represented by Army General 
Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922). The president of the Rikken Seiyūkai, 
Hara Takashi (1856–1921), who became prime minister in 1918, formed 
the first full-fledged party cabinet by appointing all ministers from the 
party except for the ministers of war, navy and foreign affairs. In the late 
1920s, party politics with the two major parties—the Rikken Seiyūkai 
and the Minseitō—reached its peak in Japan. However, party politics in 
prewar Japan did not last long, and the military dominated politics from 
the Manchurian Incident in 1931 until the defeat in the Pacific War in 
1945. The rise of militarism in Japan in the 1930s and early 1940s led 
to the collapse of party politics, but democracy was restored in the late 
twentieth century.
Who Is Shidehara and Why Is He 
So Important?
The best embodiment of diplomacy in Japan’s emerging democracy—the 
development of parliamentary democracy and mass-based democracy—
is Shidehara Kijūrō (1872–1951), who served as foreign minister from 
1924 to 1927 and from 1929 to 1931, and was prime minister from 1945 
to 1946. As a diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shidehara 
had long grappled with the issue of how to ensure diplomatic coherence 
in modern Japan, which was becoming increasingly democratic. 
Although Shidehara succeeded to some extent in promoting diplomacy in 
cooperation with the US and the UK under party politics, the rise of the 
military after the Manchurian Incident forced him to retire for a period. 
3
INTRODUCTION
‘Manchuria’ is the former name for China’s north-eastern region, covering 
the three provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, and part of the 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. However, after the Pacific War, 
Shidehara became prime minister of the US-occupied Japan and attempted 
to restore cooperative diplomacy under party politics. Shidehara came to 
the conclusion that the way to achieve both democracy and diplomatic 
coherence was through nonpartisan diplomacy towards peace. This book 
examines the tension between diplomacy and democracy, focusing on 
Shidehara’s life and exploring modern Japan’s footsteps.
Shidehara was undoubtedly one of Japan’s most important diplomatic 
figures. Along with Mutsu Munemitsu (1844–1897) and Komura Jutarō 
(1855–1911), he is considered one of the representative foreign ministers 
of the nation’s modern era. Even in the twentieth century as a whole, 
only diplomatic figures like Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967) or Shigemitsu 
Mamoru (1887–1957) made comparable contributions. Today, ‘Mutsu 
diplomacy’ has become a household term. Yet, it was Shidehara who was 
the first to have his name associated with a particular form of diplomacy—
‘Shidehara diplomacy’. Such is the extent to which he drew both praise 
and censure.
Shidehara’s diplomatic career began in the era of the Russo-Japanese War 
(1904–05). After an initial posting to Incheon, followed by Busan and 
London, Shidehara served as the vice-minister for foreign affairs and then 
as Japan’s ambassador to the United States. From 1924 to 1927, as well as 
from 1929 to 1931, Shidehara served as foreign minister, and his policies 
were commonly referred to as ‘Shidehara diplomacy’. Although he left 
office following the Manchurian Incident (1931), he served as prime 
minister during the US occupation of Japan, working to preserve the 
emperor system as well as helping draft the new constitution. Shidehara 
also appeared in court during the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East or the Tokyo Trial. At the time of his death in 1951, he was 
serving as the speaker of the House of Representatives.
Shidehara was an internationalist who advocated cooperative diplomacy 
with the US and the UK. At the same time, he regarded the annexation 
of Korea in 1910 as a natural occurrence and was critical of China’s 
abolition of unequal treaties. In this sense, Shidehara’s diplomacy was a 
confluence of internationalism towards the West and imperialism towards 
Asia. Shidehara is attracting new attention today. The reason for this 
is the issue of whether Prime Minister Shidehara was the originator of 
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Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, which stipulates the renunciation 
of war and the non-preservation of military power, as constitutional 
revision has become a real issue in Japan in recent years. Further, as 
speaker of the House of Representatives in his final years, Shidehara was 
more enthusiastic than Prime Minister Yoshida about maintaining the 
US military presence in Japan after independence. These facts indicate 
the necessity of following in Shidehara’s footsteps when considering 
contemporary international security.
Literature Review
A significant amount of research has focused on Shidehara’s time as foreign 
minister. I will examine this research in more detail in the following 
chapters. However, biographical research has lagged behind. Currently, 
the most reliable source is Shidehara Kijūrō, edited by the Shidehara Peace 
Foundation and published in 1955. It is a thorough work for its time and 
one that has retained its value as a historical resource. However, it does 
not utilise important documents, including the records of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. It is also significantly limited by its laudatory approach.
Studies published in Japanese in recent years include the following: 
Taneine Syūji, Shidehara Kijūrō (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2021); 
and Kumamoto Fumio, Shidehara Kijūrō (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 
2021). Although these make use of Japanese historical sources, they are 
aimed at a general readership rather than an academic audience. Hence, 
until now, properly rigorous biographical research has not been conducted. 
Only one biography of Shidehara has ever been published in English: 
Klaus Schlichtmann, Japan in the World: Shidehara Kijūrō, Pacifism, and 
the Abolition of War, 2 vols (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009). However, 
it does not utilise important documents, including the original records 
of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hence, until now, properly 
rigorous biographical research has not been conducted in English.
In addition to the records of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
this study uses documents of the US (Record Group 59, 331, National 
Archives), the UK (FO 228, 371, 800, National Archives) and 
Taiwan (Record of the Foreign Ministry, 03.25.25.31.1). Besides the 




This work is not intended to serve only as a biography in the narrow 
sense. Can Shidehara’s life and career be adequately traced without also 
depicting the historical trajectory of Japan in the twentieth century? 
Certainly, it must be noted that Shidehara died in 1951. Therefore, at 
the very least, he cannot be said to occupy a central position in twentieth-
century history. In fact, the opposite could be argued: Shidehara is, 
in a way, a peripheral figure.
In support of the above claim, let us briefly consider the other leading 
figures in Japan’s modern diplomatic history. Beginning with Ōkubo 
Toshimichi (1830–1878), we would proceed to mention Itō Hirobumi 
(1841–1909), Yamagata Aritomo, Inoue Kaoru (1836–1915), Mutsu 
Munemitsu, Komura Jutarō, Hayashi Tadasu (1850–1913), Hara Takashi 
and Tanaka Giichi (1864–1929). Moving forward, we would have to 
mention Hirota Kōki (1878–1948), Tōgō Shigenori (1882–1950), 
Shigemitsu Mamoru, Yoshida Shigeru, Kishi Nobusuke (1896–1987), 
Satō Eisaku (1901–1975), Fukuda Takeo (1905–1995), Ōhira Masayoshi 
(1910–1980) and Nakasone Yasuhiro (1918–2019). When comparing 
Shidehara with such diplomatic figures, we might say that one of his 
characteristics was a certain kind of weakness. That is to say, by Shidehara’s 
time, a wide range of foreign affairs mechanisms were already in place, 
and Japan was increasingly receptive to democratic forms of governance. 
What this new era needed was talented officials; it was no longer the age 
of daring diplomatic officers.
For this reason, in this book I consider not only Shidehara’s policies and 
general outlook on foreign affairs but also his personal relationships. 
I speak of his connections with figures such as Komura Jutarō, Henry 
Willard Denison (1846–1914), James Bryce (1838–1922), Sir Edward 
Grey (1862–1933), Katō Takaaki (1860–1926), Debuchi Katsuji (1878–
1947), Saburi Sadao (1879–1929), Yoshida Shigeru, William Richards 
Castle (1878–1963), Shigemitsu Mamoru, Joseph Grew (1880–1965), 
the Shōwa emperor, Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) and Ashida 
Hitoshi (1887–1959). In the presence of such strong personalities as 
these, Shidehara could not help but be overshadowed.
Such is the fate of a person whose life and career coincided with such 
tumultuous historic events. Yet, I would like to suggest that Shidehara’s 
peripheral position in this period is itself symbolic of Japan’s own 
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trajectory. There are four reasons why Shidehara was a peripheral figure. 
First, although Shidehara was a vice-minister for foreign affairs during 
World War I, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ position had declined 
because the Japanese army had led the Siberian Intervention. Second, in 
1927–28, against Shidehara’s policy, the Tanaka Giichi cabinet sent troops 
to the Shandong Peninsula, and the Japanese Kwantung Army assassinated 
Zhang Zuolin, a Mukden warlord. Third, in 1931, when Shidehara was 
a foreign minister, the Japanese army caused the Manchurian Incident, 
destroying Shidehara’s diplomatic solution. Fourth, although Shidehara 
was prime minister from 1945 to 1946, it was not Shidehara who led 
the Japanese constitution’s enactment, but the US occupation forces, who 
held absolute power. Therefore, while I make Shidehara the main focus 
of this book, I also provide a brief historical overview. More concretely, 
I divide the twentieth century into three periods, on which I overlay 
Shidehara’s own steps. These periods are the Meiji and Taishō eras, the 
prewar Shōwa era and the postwar era.
In the Meiji and Taishō eras, Japan won the First Sino-Japanese War 
(1894–95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) and secured its 
position as a ‘Great Power’ through the Paris Peace Conference (1919) 
and the Washington Naval Conference (1921–22). This is also the 
period that saw the establishment of party-based politics in Japan and 
the formation of the Katō Takaaki cabinet in 1924 (the thirteenth year 
of Taishō). The Katō cabinet was a cross-party cabinet consisting of 
members of the Kenseikai, the Rikken Seiyūkai and the Kakushin Club 
(‘Reformist Club’); it was also referred to as the ‘three-party coalition 
cabinet of constitutional protection’. It was as part of the Katō cabinet 
that Shidehara first served as foreign minister.
However, prewar Shōwa-era Japan stumbled as a result of the China 
policies adopted by the cabinet formed by Tanaka Giichi of the Seiyūkai. 
Following the Manchurian Incident and the May 15 Incident, party-
based politics collapsed. Japan was now on a path to catastrophe. After his 
reappointment as foreign minister in the cabinet formed by Hamaguchi 
Osachi (1870–1931), Shidehara also served as foreign minister in 
Wakatsuki Reijirō’s (1866–1949) second cabinet. Subsequently, however, 
he became a forgotten figure. Shidehara’s residence in Sendagaya was 




Yet postwar Japan, undergoing a period of reform under the occupation 
of the Allied forces and a subsequent era of rapid economic growth, 
eventually grew into an economic power. Serving as prime minister 
during the occupation, Shidehara was directly involved in the reforms of 
the period, beginning with the establishment of the constitution. In fact, 
it was Shidehara who prepared the English version of the Shōwa emperor’s 
‘Declaration of Humanity’. Shidehara also took to the witness stand at 
the Tokyo Trial and worked tirelessly to maintain the integrity of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his final years, as speaker of the House of 
Representatives, he endeavoured to find a way to achieve reconciliation 
with foreign countries through nonpartisan diplomacy.
If we were to briefly summarise these three periods, it might be said that 
Japan experienced a time of glory during the Meiji and Taishō eras, rising 
to the status of a first-class power; a time of breakdown in the prewar 
Shōwa era, beginning with the Tanaka cabinet; and an eventual recovery 
with the reconstruction of the postwar period. As it happened, only 
Shidehara served as a cabinet minister during all three of these periods. 
Long-serving figures such as Yamagata Aritomo and Hara Takashi did 
not live to see the Shōwa years, while conversely, others such as Yoshida 
Shigeru and Shigemitsu Mamoru remained peripheral to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs until the end of the Taishō era. Put simply, when it comes 
to representing Japan internationally during these three periods, and 
while having a career that reflected and embodied the successive changes 
that took place in Japan, no one surpasses Shidehara.
If those long-running threads of Shidehara’s career that influenced 
foreign diplomacy could be thought of as the ‘warp’, then it is the cross-
threads, the ‘weft’, that constitute the central focus of the present book. 
In short, a look at Shidehara’s career allows us to consider the age-old 
tension between foreign diplomacy and democracy. This work asks: 
how did Shidehara understand the relationship between foreign policy 
and party-based politics, and how did he act accordingly? During 
Shidehara’s time as a diplomat, party-based politics took shape and then 
collapsed. In this historical context, Shidehara attempted to preserve 
a  certain consistency in foreign policy by separating domestic politics 
from diplomacy. In this sense, Shidehara is the clearest embodiment of 
orthodox Kasumigaseki-style (i.e. Japanese government bureaucracy-style) 
diplomacy.
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However, once Shidehara was forced into opposition with the formation 
of the Tanaka cabinet, he became involved in the development of the 
Minseitō’s policies. Then, in the postwar period, political parties naturally 
started once more to shoulder diplomatic responsibilities. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs could no longer centrally manage foreign relations. 
These significant changes between the prewar and the postwar periods 
are also reflected in Shidehara’s words and actions. Moreover, starting 
in the postwar period, Shidehara devoted himself to the restoration of 
party-based politics. Thus I suggest that Shidehara’s arguments remain 
instructive for us even today, when looking at the relationship between 
diplomacy and democracy.
Structure and Arguments
This book consists of three main parts and an epilogue. The three sections 
correspond to the three periods outlined above: Part I covers the period of 
Meiji- and Taishō-era glory, Part II examines the breakdown of the prewar 
Shōwa period and Part III focuses on the postwar recovery.
Starting with Part I, Chapter 1 looks at Shidehara’s background. Here 
I will outline the stages of his early life, from his birth in the town of 
Kadoma, where he was raised in a privileged environment, until he joined 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Chapter 2 covers Shidehara’s early career as a member of the diplomatic 
service. I will trace Shidehara’s initial posting to the consulate of Incheon 
as a consular assistant following the end of the First Sino-Japanese War; his 
rise to the position of consul at Busan during the Russo-Japanese War; 
his  role as vice-minister for foreign affairs during World War I; and, 
finally,  his performance at the Washington Naval Conference as the 
ambassador plenipotentiary to the US.
Chapter 3 focuses on Shidehara’s first stint as foreign minister, from 
1924 until 1927. As foreign minister, Shidehara played a crucial role in 
orienting Japan towards the US and handling a China that was moving 




Proceeding to Part II, and Chapter 4, I turn to Shidehara’s status during 
his time in political opposition. He was ousted from office because his 
political stance differed from that of the Seiyūkai, which had secured 
executive power with the formation of the Tanaka Giichi cabinet. At this 
point, Shidehara aligned himself with Hamaguchi Osachi’s party, the 
Minseitō, and even debated Prime Minister Tanaka during Diet sessions.
Chapter 5 covers Shidehara’s second stint as foreign minister, from 
1929 to 1931. While Shidehara’s diplomatic efforts resulted in success 
at the London Naval Treaty Conference in 1930, they were eventually 
undermined by the fallout from the Manchurian Incident.
Chapter 6 looks at the period from the start of the Second Sino-Japanese 
War in 1937 to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. This was a time 
when Shidehara was once more in political opposition. Nevertheless, as 
we shall see, he was able to make pertinent judgements on the unfolding 
global situation, and he called for a peace accord to bring an early end to 
the Pacific War. This chapter concludes Part II and the prewar Shōwa era.
Next, in Chapter 7 and the beginning of Part III, I discuss Shidehara’s 
actions during the initial period of the US military occupation of Japan. 
At this time, Shidehara became the prime minister. His time in office was 
brief, lasting only half a year. Nevertheless, as prime minister, Shidehara 
had an extremely important role, working, for example, to secure the 
survival of the emperor system and establish the new constitution.
In Chapter 8 I outline some of the important details of Shidehara’s 
career in the final years of his life. At this point, Shidehara was no longer 
prime minister, instead becoming a minister of state and cabinet minister 
without a portfolio in Yoshida Shigeru’s cabinet. He finally became 
speaker of the House of Representatives. As well as appearing in the Tokyo 
Trial in this period, Shidehara searched both for a nonpartisan approach 
to conducting diplomacy and a way to secure the integrity of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.
In Chapter 9, I review some of the criticisms and discussions of Shidehara 
that took place after his death, and look at Japan’s path in the years 
following the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951. This chapter 
concludes Part III and my examination of the postwar era.
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Finally, in the conclusion, I look back upon Shidehara’s legacy and the 
currents of Japan’s diplomatic history, while reflecting upon the nature of 
the relationship between diplomacy and democracy.
Thus, this book seeks to place the reader at the crossroads of Japanese 
diplomacy from the perspective of Shidehara, providing a view of his 
repeated attempts to negotiate the nature of the relationship between 
foreign affairs and party-based politics. What I aim to show is that, by 
looking at Shidehara’s life and career, we can learn much about Japan’s 
twentieth-century history, and about the interlinkage of democracy and 
diplomacy within that history.
Endnotes
1  Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown 
University, 1988), 41.
Part I. 





Path to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs
The Lineage of the Shidehara Family
The forty-fourth prime minister of Japan, Shidehara Kijūrō, was born 
in the village of Kadoma, Osaka, on 11 August 1872.1 Today, the village 
of Kadoma has become a city. While it now flourishes as the home of 
the Panasonic Corporation, it was originally a wetland. Even today, there 
remain various places within the city limits where vestiges of lotus root 
fields can be seen. As a wetland area, Kadoma has long suffered from 
flooding. In fact, the flood of the nearby Yodogawa River in 1885 dealt 
the Shidehara family a particularly heavy blow.
These circumstances delayed the development of Kadoma considerably. 
It was not until 1910 that the Keihan Train Line opened between 
Tenmanbashi in Osaka and Gojō in Kyoto. By 1912 (the beginning of the 
Taishō era), however, electric lighting began to be installed, and the Great 
Consolidated Electric Company constructed a transformer substation at 
Osaka. Finally, in 1933, Panasonic opened its headquarters and factory 
at Kadoma.
The Shidehara household, which accrued its wealth through farming, 
became the most prosperous in the village. The family lineage could be 
traced back at least as far as the eighteenth century. It is said that they were 
originally located in nearby Kyoto and later moved to Kadoma.2 Various 
records about the Shidehara household remain at the Kadoma City 
Historical Archive, comprising some 520 documents. These include crop 
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production records, ledgers, notebooks, and other documents pertaining 
to village administration, household affairs, construction, family register 
(koseki) population, etc. The majority of these documents are from 
modern times. For this reason, there are not many that relate directly to 
Kijūrō. Nevertheless, these records on the Shidehara household remain 
valuable for understanding Kijūrō’s roots.3
While the home of Kijūrō’s birth no longer exists, a street corner of 
Kadoma City, Ichiban-cho, bears a plaque dedicated to Kijūrō’s oldest 
brother, Taira, and to Kijūrō’s siblings. The plaque is signed by Kijūrō’s 
junior at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Yoshida Shigeru, another future 
prime minister. Given the lineage of the Shidehara household, Kijūrō’s 
future life and career might seem quite surprising. Kijūrō, after all, came 
from a farming family in an underdeveloped area. How did such a child 
go on to reach the very top of Japanese politics?
Home Environment
The key to unlocking this mystery is Kijūrō’s home environment. 
His  father, Shidehara Shinjirō, had married into the family from the 
Ichikawa household of Shimoshima-gashira, also located in Kadoma. 
Kijūrō’s mother was Shidehara Kuichirō’s eldest daughter, Shizu. As Shizu 
was the only child of Kuichirō, a large landowner, Kuichirō adopted 
Shinjirō. Shinjirō was also the primary assistant of the head of the village. 
While responsible for managing a wealthy farming household, Shinjirō 
was also extremely committed to the education of his two sons, Taira 
and Kijūrō, and two daughters. In this regard, Shinjirō’s wife, Shizu, was 
also supportive. Taira, who was two years older than Kijūrō, was a quiet, 
bookish child, regarded as intelligent from a young age. He would go 
on to study national history at the Imperial University of Tokyo. After 
becoming principal of the Yamanashi Prefectural Junior High School and 
a professor at the Higher Normal School in Tokyo, Taira would eventually 
be appointed as the library bureau director for the Ministry of Education.
Here I would like to speak about Taira in more detail. This is because he 
was the individual who eventually laid the foundations for the colonial 
education system in Korea and Taiwan. As a parliamentary councillor on 
educational policy for the Korean government, Taira strived to establish 
a system of education in Korea in the middle of the decade following 
15
1. PATH TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1900. When Taiping Imperial University was established in 1928, Taira 
was appointed the first president. After the war, during the US occupation 
of Japan, Taira also decided upon changes to the constitution in his role 
as privy councillor. As an individual who was highly conversant with 
issues surrounding national borders, he also argued in a 1951 paper titled 
‘Tsushima Mondai’ (The Tsushima problem) that Tsushima Island ‘was 
part of Japanese territory from long ago’.4
Taira also authored numerous publications on topics such as East Asian 
history and colonial education. One of these is titled Daitōa no Seiiku 
(The development of Greater East Asia). The preface to this text was 
written by Ishibashi Tanzan (1884–1973), the fifty-fifth prime minister of 
Japan. While Ishibashi was originally from Tokyo, he attended elementary 
and middle school in Yamanashi prefecture. According to the preface, 
when Ishibashi attended Yamanashi Prefectural Junior High School 
in Kofu City, ‘my former teacher, Shidehara sensei’, arrived to serve as 
school principal. Afterwards, Ishibashi would have the opportunity 
to meet with Shidehara Taira at the middle school alumni association 
known as the Tachibana Society. He writes that he found Taira’s manner 
of speaking engrossing and that Taira displayed a deep knowledge of the 
various problems regarding Japan’s overseas territories. Ishibashi, deeply 
impressed by these qualities, urged Taira to put together a lecture. This 
is how Ishibashi came to help Taira publish his book Daitōa no Seiiku 
through Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha. At the time, Ishibashi was the president 
and chief executive officer of the company.5
Taira and Kijūrō also had two younger sisters, Misao and Setsu. Misao, 
who was a midwife, had her husband, a doctor, take her family name, and 
together they opened the Shidehara Clinic in Kadoma. Misao was also 
involved with social welfare. After her husband died, it was her younger 
sister, Setsu, who took over the Shidehara Clinic. Setsu was actually the first 
female doctor in Osaka Prefecture. However, it was not easy to be a female 
doctor in conservative Kadoma. Setsu eventually became disillusioned, 
left Kadoma, and set up a new clinic in Mikagekishimoto, in Kōbe City. 
Setsu’s mother, Shizu, died young due to complications after giving birth. 
Setsu, therefore, treated her older sister Misao almost like a mother. Setsu 
never married, focusing instead on her work as a doctor and later adopting 
Misao’s grandchild. After she died, the Shidehara Clinic closed.
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The Diplomatic Service Exam
So, we come to Kijūrō himself. Compared to his older brother, Taira, 
young Kijūrō was an unruly child. According to their father, Shinjirō, 
while Taira would diligently study the Chinese classics, Kijūrō preferred 
‘the new subjects’. He wrote:
The school principal also held out great hopes for their futures 
and expended a great deal of energy on their behalf. After 
graduating from elementary school, he helped Taira enter the 
junior and senior high school that was in Osaka Otemae at that 
time, at the recommendation of [Confucian scholar] Fujisawa 
Nangaku sensei.6
Kijūrō followed in his older brother’s footsteps, attending Osaka 
Middle School.
Osaka Middle School was known for its English-language education. 
Matsui Keishirō (1868–1946), who would later serve as foreign minister, 
was Kijūrō’s senior at the school. Eventually, Osaka Middle School would 
be renamed the Third Higher Middle School, one of the top-level schools 
in Japan at the time, which fed students into the Imperial University of 
Tokyo and careers in the bureaucracy. While Shidehara was still attending 
the school, it was relocated from Osaka to Kyoto. The future politician 
Izawa Takio (1869–1949) and future prime minister Hamaguchi Osachi 
(1870–1931) were also attending the school at this time.7 Kijūrō would 
go on to study law at the Imperial University of Tokyo. Nevertheless, 
although Shinjirō was a wealthy farmer, it was remarkable that he sent 
both Taira and Kijūrō to university. Although today it is common to see 
parents so dedicated to their children’s education, at the time he must 
have been regarded as quite odd.
There is an episode that illustrates Shinjirō’s devotion to his children’s 
education. In later years, when Kijūrō was appointed vice-minister for 
foreign affairs, a reporter for the Osaka Asahi Shimbun came to interview 
Shinjirō. As the reporter described it, the father made his appearance 
supported by Misao and Setsu. A bony-looking figure, he was already 
70  years old at that time and spoke while stroking his white beard. 
As Shinjirō recalled, some around the family had been unsupportive of his 
efforts, saying that ‘commoners didn’t need a fancy education’. Shinjirō, 
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however, ‘was prepared to dedicate the entirety of his finances to the 
education of his four children, in the hope that they would be of use to 
the nation’.8
Being raised in such a fortunate environment, Shidehara Kijūrō ‘had hoped, 
since his school years, that he could one day become a diplomat’. It so 
happened that, while he was at the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1893, 
an exam system for the diplomatic service was established by individuals 
including Hara Takashi, the head of the International Trade Bureau at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and future tenth prime minister of Japan. 
However, Shidehara was diagnosed with thiamine deficiency in his fourth 
year of university and was unable to take the exam. Thus, following his 
graduation in 1895, Shidehara initially worked at the Bureau of Mining at 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. This work, however, did not 
reflect his real interests. The following year he took the fourth diplomatic 
service exam. He was one of only four individuals to pass the exam at 
that time. Thus, Shidehara realised his long-held ambition of entering the 
diplomatic service.9
Fellow successful candidates included Koike Chōzō, who would later 
become director-general of the Political Affairs Bureau at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. In fact, there were numerous important diplomatic 
figures who passed the exam around this period. For example, the seventh 
cohort of successful candidates included Honda Kumatarō (1874–1948), 
Tanaka Tokichi (1877–1961), Hanihara Masanao (1876–1934) and 
Obata Yūkichi (1873–1947). Later, Matsudaira Tsuneo (1877–1949) 
and Debuchi Katsuji would pass the eleventh exam, Saburi Sadao and 
Satō Naotake (1882–1971) would pass the fourteenth exam, and Hirota 
Kōki and Yoshida Shigeru would pass the fifteenth exam. Arita Hachirō 
(1884–1965) and Shigemitsu Mamoru would pass the eighteenth and 
twentieth exams, respectively.
Thus, Shidehara graduated from the Imperial University of Tokyo in 
1895—the twenty-eighth year of Meiji. His alumni association, the 
Nihachi-kai (literally the ‘2–8 Club’), borrowed the reign date of that 
year for their name. Members of the association included Izawa Takio, 
the political scientist Onozuka Kiheiji (1871–1944), future governor-
general of Taiwan Kamiyama Mitsunoshin (1869–1938), bureaucrat 
and politician Shimooka Chūji (1870–1925), campaigner and social 
statistician Takano Iwasaburō (1871–1949), Tanaka Seijirō (1872–
1954), future prime minister Hamaguchi Osachi and Shidehara himself. 
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Shidehara also took on the role of organising the association. These 
kinds of personal connections would become significant for Shidehara 
before long.10
It is said that Shidehara was devoted to his family and always made sure 
to attend the Buddhist memorial services held at Gantokuji temple in 
his hometown, even during his extremely busy years in the diplomatic 
service. How did such an individual start out as a diplomat? The following 
chapter outlines the first stages of Shidehara’s career as a newly minted 
member of the diplomatic service, just before his initial appointment to 
the office of foreign minister.
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War, World War I 
and the Washington 
Naval Conference
Towards the Commencement of the 
Russo-Japanese War
First Steps in the Diplomatic Service
After passing the diplomatic service exam, in September 1896, Shidehara 
was posted to the Japanese consulate in Incheon, Korea, where he served 
as a consular assistant.1 Later, when the Russo-Japanese War erupted in 
February 1904, Shidehara was at the Busan consulate and even played 
a diplomatic role in the events that unfolded. After returning to Japan 
from Busan, he was appointed to roles such as the director of the 
Telegraph Division. Later, during and just after World War I, he assumed 
positions such as vice-minister for foreign affairs and ambassador to the 
US. His most important work at this time was his participation in the 
Washington Naval Conference as the plenipotentiary and ambassador 
to the US, which began in 1921 and stretched into the following year. 
During this period, therefore, Shidehara reached a position where the 
policies he enacted could potentially influence the direction of Japan’s 
diplomatic efforts. This was also a time where he acquired the etiquette 
expected of a diplomat and developed his own principles.
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There are four topics that I wish to focus on while giving an overview of 
this quarter century. The first regards the formation of Shidehara’s own 
thinking. What is particularly important here is his understanding of an 
‘open door policy’. It is said that, in general, Shidehara proactively adopted 
an American-style open door policy. Certainly, Shidehara did accept an 
open door approach as a guiding principle. On the other hand, it should 
be recalled that, at this time, Japan had ‘special interests’ in Manchuria 
in north-eastern China. These special interests in China would have 
been on Shidehara’s mind. We should ask, therefore, how these different 
considerations or orientations came together in Shidehara’s diplomatic 
outlook. Further, what did having an economic ‘open door’ really mean 
to Shidehara? To begin with, it should be noted that the term ‘open door’ 
itself is ambiguous. For the original ‘open door notes’ issued by the US, 
there were actually two meanings. It is necessary, therefore, to clarify the 
specific nuance that this term held for Shidehara.
To state the conclusion to this line of questioning in advance, while 
Shidehara was enthusiastic about adopting an ‘open door’ approach as 
a general principle, he also attempted to restrict its practical application. 
He utilised this concept in a restricted sense and thereby was able to find 
a compromise regarding Japan’s ‘special interests’ in China. In this chapter, 
I will explain this accommodation in Shidehara’s thinking through analysis 
of his response to matters such as the New Four-Power Consortium 
and the Washington Naval Conference. As I shall show, Shidehara’s 
commitment to the principle of ‘open door’ economics did not simply 
mean an adoption of US policy. Rather, he was initially receptive to these 
ideas in the context of agreements such as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
(1902–23) and the Franco-Japanese Treaty (1907).
Meanwhile, Shidehara saw Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910 as a natural 
development. This might appear to run counter to the perception that he 
was internationally minded. One anecdote about Shidehara holds that 
he used to sit with a copy of Webster’s Dictionary at hand and memorise 
Shakespeare. Such accounts might tempt us to think of Shidehara as 
cut from a different cloth than other Japanese diplomats. However, it 
should be remembered that this was only one side of the man. Shidehara 
fully identified with the mindset the Japanese people had at that time. 
Like them, he worshipped the imperial household, and he was a great 
admirer of Count Nogi Maresuke (1849–1912), the Imperial Japanese 
Army general who participated in the capture of Port Arthur from China 
in 1894.
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Following the above consideration of the formation of Shidehara’s own 
thinking, the second topic I wish to examine with respect to this 25-year 
period is Shidehara’s diplomatic style. Here, the impact of Henry Willard 
Denison—adviser to the Foreign Ministry when Shidehara was director 
of the Telegraph Division—was considerable.2 Up until his time at 
the Busan consulate, Shidehara showed no discomfort with the use of 
diplomacy backed up by the threat of military force. Indeed, he went as 
far as to support the launching of the Russo-Japanese War. However, his 
encounter with Denison would become a turning point. From then on, 
Shidehara would become a member of the committee for revising Japan’s 
unequal treaties with Western powers and would also become highly 
familiar with matters of international law. However, even while Denison 
initiated him in the subtler arts of diplomacy, Shidehara was no passive 
recipient. A clearer view of Shidehara’s approach is available by looking 
at how he handled the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the 
Washington Naval Conference.
It is also important to situate the handling of public relations with 
respect to the topic of Shidehara’s diplomatic style.3 Shidehara has been 
understood as having been largely indifferent to matters of public relations. 
His intense dislike of Japan’s mass media emanates from the pages of his 
memoir, Gaikō 50 Nen (Fifty years of diplomacy). In reality, however, 
Shidehara also had his own form of public relations diplomacy. Here, 
too, the Washington Naval Conference provides an excellent opportunity 
for analysis.
The third topic that I will focus on for this period is Shidehara’s personal 
relationships. As is well known, Shidehara and Katō Takaaki were 
brothers-in-law. Shidehara also had close relationships with individuals 
such as Komura Jutarō, Chinda Sutemi (1857–1929), Ishii Kikujirō 
(1866–1945) and Hara Takashi. Shidehara’s personal connection with 
Komura is the most deserving of close attention. At first glance, it may seem 
as though Komura and Shidehara were polar opposites, given Komura’s 
fierce promotion of continental policy aimed at Japan’s domination of 
North-East Asia. However, Shidehara supported Komura in areas such 
as the revision of the unequal treaties and the annexation of Korea. This 
point will no doubt be instructive when comparing the Russo-Japanese 
War and the diplomacy of the 1920s.
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What was actually problematic for Shidehara was when his brother-in-law 
Katō, then foreign minister, drafted the Twenty-One Demands issued to 
China in 1915. I will also consider Shidehara’s relations with diplomats 
such as Moroi Rokurō (1872–1940), Kawashima Nobutarō (1880–1957), 
Saburi Sadao, Honda Kumatarō, Hirota Kōki, Debuchi Katsuji, Tani 
Masayuki (1889–1962) and Ishii Itarō (1887–1954).
The final topic concerning this quarter century is how the various nations of 
the time viewed Shidehara’s statements and actions. Naturally, diplomatic 
negotiations are important for our purposes here. However, the role of 
the diplomat is not restricted to negotiations alone. The acquaintances 
and relationships of trust a person has formed also reveal much about 
them. Because Shidehara’s time as ambassador to the US marked the 
point at which his position rapidly strengthened, my examination of this 
topic will focus mainly on this period. In particular, though, Shidehara 
formed a number of relationships during his time as the plenipotentiary 
and ambassador to the US, around the time of the Washington Naval 
Conference. These include Shidehara’s relationships with figures such as 
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes (1862–1948), Plenipotentiary 
Elihu Root and John Van Antwerp MacMurray (1881–1960), the chief 
of the State Department’s Division of Far Eastern Affairs. I have explored 
these relations in a previous work.4
For this reason, I also wish to touch on some other more practical and 
specialised individuals with whom Shidehara interacted. These include 
Stanley Washburn, Root’s secretary at the Washington Naval Conference; 
Roland S. Morris (1874–1920), the US ambassador to Japan; Norman H. 
Davis (1878–1944), undersecretary of state; DeWitt Clinton Poole, chief 
of the State Department’s Division of Russian Affairs; Nelson Trusler 
Johnson, official at the State Department’s Division of Far Eastern Affairs; 
Eugene H. Dooman (1890–1969), first secretary at the US embassy in 
Japan; and Edward Thomas Williams (1854–1944), chief of the State 
Department’s Division of Far Eastern Affairs during World War I.
The International Situation Following the 
First Sino-Japanese War
In September 1896, Shidehara passed the fourth diplomatic service exam. 
Alongside Shidehara, the four individuals who passed included Koike 
Chōzō, who would later participate in the issuing of the Twenty-One 
Demands during his time as director-general of the Political Affairs 
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Bureau. The following month, Shidehara was appointed consular assistant 
at Incheon, Korea. This was the first step of his initial diplomatic career, 
which would take him to locations such as London, Antwerp and Busan.
What was the international situation at that time? When Shidehara 
began his diplomatic career at the end of the nineteenth century, the 
reverberations of the ‘Triple Intervention’ still lingered. In 1895, when the 
Sino-Japanese peace treaty was signed at Shimonoseki, the three nations 
of Russia, France and Germany intervened. Although Japan was the 
supposed victor of the war, it was forced to return the Liaodong Peninsula 
to China. Naturally, the locus of East Asian international politics at this 
time was Korea. Following the conclusion of the First Sino-Japanese 
War, a series of influential figures served as Japan’s ministers in Korea, 
including Inoue Kaoru, Komura Jutarō, Hara Takashi and Hayashi 
Gonsuke (1860–1939). While Incheon and Busan were not on the same 
level as Korea’s capital Hanseong—then known in Japanese as ‘Keijō’ and 
today known as Seoul—they were nevertheless considered important. 
According to Hayashi Gonsuke, who served as consul at Incheon before 
the First Sino-Japanese War, ‘even though it was the Incheon consulate, 
at the time it was akin to the consulate for the whole of Korea’.5 It was 
surely no coincidence that Shidehara was sent to Incheon, given that he 
was expected to have a promising career.
When Shidehara arrived at his post in Incheon in January 1897, he earned 
the favour of the consul, Ishii Kikujirō. When Ishii finally transferred to 
Beijing, Shidehara assumed the role of the acting consul until the arrival 
of the new consul, Ijūin Hikokichi (1864–1924). Shidehara reflected 
that while Ijūin ‘was not particularly skillful’, he nevertheless ‘possessed 
a certain kind of special magnetism that drew me to him’.6 While it may 
sound surprising, from his time in Incheon onwards, Shidehara was 
a  heavy drinker. The branch chief of a local mercantile company with 
whom he was on good terms would often appear with high-quality Nada-
brand spirits, whereupon Shidehara would close the door of his official 
residence, and together they would drink the night away.7
At that time, Japan was seeking to preserve its policy of Hokushu-Nanshin, 
literally ‘defend the north and advance to the south’. At the same time, 
it was attempting to establish a position in Korea that would put it on 
an equal footing with Russia. In May 1896, a memorandum between 
Japan and Russia was signed in Hanseong by Komura and Karl Ivanovich 
Weber (1841–1910). In June of the same year, the Yamagata–Lobanov 
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Agreement was signed in Moscow. The Komura–Weber Memorandum 
sought the return of the king of Korea, who had sought refuge in the 
Russian legation. The Yamagata–Lobanov Agreement stipulated that 
Japan and Russia would jointly provide assistance for Korea’s public 
budget. The Komura–Weber Memorandum and the Yamagata–Lobanov 
Agreement were still of importance in 1901, when Shidehara returned 
to Korea to serve as consul in Busan. This was because they included 
a provision for the management of the telegraph lines between Hanseong 
and Busan that was advantageous to Japan. Further, the Nishi–Rosen 
Agreement, signed in Tokyo in 1898, recognised Korea’s independence 
and declared that the respective parties would refrain from interfering in 
the internal politics of the country. Even Shidehara’s memoirs feature an 
idyllic account of the Incheon of this period, with the warship captains 
of both nations sharing drinks.8
In May 1899, Shidehara was assigned to London. When he arrived at his 
post in August, he began to polish his English. The effort he put into this 
study would become an important asset in his future career. In December 
1900, he was transferred once more, this time to the position of consul in 
Antwerp. Located in the north of Belgium, Antwerp was one of Europe’s 
most important trading ports. However, not long afterward, in September 
1901, Shidehara was ordered to return to Korea. This time, he assumed 
the office of consul in Busan. He remained in Busan until March 1904 
and the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War. These events comprised 
Shidehara’s formative experience as a diplomat.
During this period, Russia’s foreign minister, Aleksei Borisovich 
Lobanov-Rostovskii, and its finance minister, Sergei Yulievich Witte, 
were making progress with their policies for containing Japan. In 1896, 
they signed a secret military alliance with the Chinese politician and 
general Li  Hongzhang. On the basis of this pact between Russia and 
the Qing dynasty, work on the Chinese Eastern Railway began in 1898. 
The Chinese Eastern Railway would cross the length of Manchuria 
when completed. Another major incident at this time was the outbreak 
of the Yihetuan Movement (Boxer Rebellion) in China. The rebellion 
was suppressed in 1900 by a coalition army of eight nations, including 
Japan. In the following year, the European Great Powers, Komura Jutarō, 
and Li Hongzhang signed the Boxer Protocol. This agreement gave Japan 
reparations and the right to station troops in China. Regarding Komura 
Jutarō’s performance at the Yihetuan Movement peace conference, 
Shidehara wrote: ‘Komura-san’s farsightedness was on display’.9
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Komura Jutarō and Hayashi Tadasu
At that time, Komura Jutarō was the driving force in Japanese diplomacy. 
Komura successively filled the roles of ambassador to Korea, vice-minister 
for foreign affairs, ambassador to the US, ambassador to Russia and 
minister to China. In 1901, he became the foreign minister in the first 
Katsura Tarō cabinet.
The common view is that Japan at this time had two basic orientations 
or policies.10 First, Katō Takaaki and Komura Jutarō promoted Man-
Kan Fukabun, the position that Japan’s interests in Manchuria and Korea 
could not be dealt with separately but were intertwined. Second, Itō 
Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru and a number of other figures promoted Man-
Kan Kōkan, the position that influence in Manchuria could be ceded to 
Russia in exchange for Japan having control over Korea. The first of these 
two positions favoured the obstruction of Russia’s southward advance by 
strengthening Japan’s relationship with the UK. The second promoted 
the formation of an entente between Japan and Russia. The first prevailed 
within Japan’s diplomatic circles, and, as a result, negotiations towards an 
Anglo-Japanese alliance soon began.
The initial alliance was signed in January 1902. According to the first 
article of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, both nations recognised each other’s 
special interests in Qing-dynasty China, while the UK also recognised 
Japan’s special interests in Korea. The second article stated that if either 
nation were to go to war, the other would maintain neutrality. The third 
article stated that if a third nation joined that conflict against the allied 
partner, the other partner would assist the ally. This was the birth of the 
defensive alliance.
It was Hayashi Tadasu who would directly experience from his postings the 
sequence of events that led from the Triple Intervention to the signing of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Hayashi’s formative experience as a diplomat 
was the Triple Intervention of 1895. It was Hayashi who, as vice-minister 
for foreign affairs, received the Triple Intervention memorandum from 
the ministers of Russia, Germany and France.11 On that occasion, Foreign 
Minister Mutsu Munemitsu had come down with tuberculosis and was 
receiving treatment in the town of Maiko, Hyogo Prefecture.12 Under 
the command of Foreign Minister Mutsu, Vice-Minister Hayashi, the 
director-general of the Political Affairs Bureau, Katō Takaaki, and the 
director-general of the International Trade Bureau, Hara Takashi, were 
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jointly referred to as the ‘Mutsu Triumvirate’. Originally the governor of 
Hyogo Prefecture, Hayashi was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs by the previous foreign minister, Enomoto Takeaki (1836–1908), 
before he was promoted further by Mutsu.
Hayashi, shocked by the Triple Intervention, went himself as the minister 
to China to sign the Liaodong Peninsula Return Agreement and conclude 
the negotiations for the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. 
This treaty, signed in July 1896, was a typically unequal treaty. Hayashi 
also attended the First International Peace Conference at The Hague as 
minister to Russia. Hayashi would go on to become Japan’s minister to 
the UK, negotiating with Foreign Secretary Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 
Lord Lansdowne, and signing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Of course, 
Hayashi was also critical of Itō Hirobumi’s promotion of a Russo-Japanese 
entente. Later, in 1905, the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance would also 
be signed by Hayashi and Petty-Fitzmaurice.13
Naturally, Shidehara was also critical of the Triple Intervention. As he put 
it, ‘the Triple Intervention amounts to a diplomatic conspiracy’, with the 
secret treaty signed between China and Russia ‘exposed during the course 
of the Washington Naval Conference of 1922’.14 In Shidehara’s view, it 
was necessary for Japan to ‘endure the bitterness of the Triple Intervention, 
enduring hardship so that it might slowly develop its national power, and 
then within a decade push Russia out of south Manchuria’.15 He added 
that, ‘in the end, trickery will not determine the fate of the nation’s next 
hundred years’.16
Towards the Beginning of the  
Russo-Japanese War
Shidehara left for his new position as consul in Busan in October 1901. 
Busan and Japan have a historically significant connection. In the Edo 
period, Busan contained a Japanese trading settlement called Waegwan 
(Wakan in Japanese), which covered some 330 square kilometres. 
Waegwan’s internal affairs were originally managed by the head of the 
Tsushima domain and functioned as a gateway to Korea, which at that time 
was ruled—like Japan—according to a policy of national isolation.17 With 
the opening of ports following the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1876, Busan 
would come to play an increasingly important role in events between the 
two countries. It was not only foreign settlements and boards of trade that 
shaped it. Busan was also of strategic importance for transport.
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The year that Shidehara assumed this new posting saw the establishment 
of the Keifu Railway Company, with Shibusawa Eiichi (1840–1931) as 
the chairman. The Keifu Railway Company linked Hanseong and Busan 
together (the characters for ‘Keifu’ [京釜] mean ‘Capital’ and ‘Busan’) 
and opened at the height of the Russo-Japanese War. Meanwhile, the 
shipping company Nippon Yūsen had already expanded its sea routes to 
Busan and Incheon before the First Sino-Japanese War, concentrating its 
efforts on Korea. Nippon Yūsen had also acquired the coastal right of 
passage through Korean waters from the Korean government at the time 
of the First Sino-Japanese War.18 Following the end of the Russo-Japanese 
War, another shipping company, Sanyō Kisen, commenced services from 
Shimonoseki to Busan. Once the Shimonoseki-Busan line was connected 
to the Sanyō railway line and the Keifu railway line, it became possible to 
travel from Tokyo to Hanseong within 60 hours.19 Before long, the railway 
network of the Korean Peninsula was joined to the South Manchuria 
Railway, creating a main artery for operations on the continent. Alongside 
this development, Busan would develop into a major city, second in Korea 
only to Hanseong.
As it happened, as consul in Busan, Shidehara had an offer of marriage. 
His future wife, Masako, was the youngest of the four daughters of Iwasaki 
Yatarō (1835–1885). Iwasaki Yatarō was the founder of the Mitsubishi 
financial conglomerate (zaibatsu). In fact, Masako and Shidehara’s 
relationship had already begun when Shidehara was stationed in London. 
They were married in Tokyo in January 1903. Their matchmaker 
(nakōdo) was Ishii Kikujirō, Shidehara’s good acquaintance from his 
time in Incheon. Through his marriage with Masako, Shidehara become 
brother-in-law to Katō Takaaki. This was because Mrs Katō, Harumi, was 
the eldest daughter of Iwasaki Yatarō.20
Katō Takaaki would serve as Japan’s foreign minister on several occasions: 
first in the fourth Itō cabinet and later in the first Saionji cabinet and 
the third Katsura cabinet. Each appointment, however, would last 
only a short time. It was his later service as foreign minister in the 
second Ōkuma cabinet that would put his name in the history books. 
In particular, the Twenty-One Demands he issued to China in 1915 are 
notorious. Eventually, Katō would come to lead the Kenseikai party, 
forming a government as prime minister in 1924. The foreign minister 
in this cabinet would be none other than Shidehara.21 In any case, after 
the wedding, Shidehara returned to his post at Busan. In the fall of 1903, 
his first son, Michitarō, was born. Yet Shidehara had no time to enjoy 
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the life of a newlywed because the Russian situation was becoming more 
and more serious. Japan and Russia exchanged alternative propositions 
regarding Manchuria’s territorial integrity and the neutral zone in Korea. 
As negotiations bogged down, Japan began preparing for war. It would 
finally come in February 1904.
Hostilities began when the Japanese navy fired upon a Russian fleet 
outside of the port of Lushun. At the same time, the Japanese army also 
began to mobilise, advancing northwards through the Korean Peninsula, 
defeating the Russian army in a battle at Liaoyang and capturing Lushun. 
In March 1905, the Japanese army secured a victory at the battle of 
Mukden (present-day Shenyang) and the navy won a sea battle in May. 
In September that year, a peace treaty was signed near Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire, mediated by the US. Shidehara was no mere spectator during 
the Russo-Japanese War; he had his own role to play.
It was 6 February 1904. Leaving for work early in the morning as usual, 
Shidehara saw an unusual sight as he surveyed the port of Busan from 
the consulate. A Japanese warship had captured a Russian steamship, 
the Mukden, belonging to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company. 
This incident would draw a note of protest from the Russian consulate. 
According to international law, capturing an enemy nation’s vessel was 
illegal if it was encountered in the territorial waters of a neutral country. 
Shidehara, however, rejected Russia’s protest, commenting: ‘Given the 
current discontinuation of diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia, 
I am in no position to enter into negotiations with the Russian consulate, 
regardless of the circumstances’.22 Admittedly, this was quite an obstinate 
position for Shidehara to take. Certainly, war loomed in the atmosphere. 
The Katsura cabinet had cut off diplomatic relations on 4 February. 
However, it was not until two days after the capture of the steamship, 
on 8 February, that the Japanese navy would fire upon the Russian fleet 
at Lushun. The day after that, on 9 February, two Russian warships were 
sunk in a naval battle off the coast of Incheon. War was formally declared 
on 10 February.23
In fact, before the war began, Shidehara had received Foreign Minister 
Komura’s permission to support the Japanese navy’s occupation of the 
telegraph offices at Busan and Masan. As a result, the Russian consulate 
in Busan was unable to receive coded telegrams from its minister and was 
driven into a corner. Hayashi Gonsuke, Japan’s minister to Korea based 
in Hanseong, also cooperated with Shidehara in closing down Russia’s 
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telegraph-based communication.24 On 23 February, Hayashi signed the 
Japan–Korea Protocol, permitting the free movement of Japanese troops 
within Korea’s borders. This paved the way for the annexation of Korea 
through the three Japan–Korea agreements.
Diplomacy in the Aftermath of the 
Russo-Japanese War
Shidehara’s Encounter with Denison
Shidehara was ordered to return to Japan in March 1904, following the 
commencement of the Russo-Japanese War. His next appointment would 
be to oversee the Telegraph Division. The Telegraph Division was in 
charge of the drafting and decoding of encrypted telegrams, as well as 
the sending and receiving of various other telegram messages. The then 
director of the Telegraph Division, Ishii Kikujirō, was also put in charge 
of the International Trade Bureau, leaving Shidehara as the de facto 
Telegraph Division director.
In November 1905 Shidehara was officially promoted to director. He would 
continue in this role for some time, even after becoming the director of 
the Investigation Division and the director-general of the Investigation 
Bureau. The Investigation Division was established to examine domestic 
and foreign laws, as well as international law. Shidehara would continue 
to hold these two offices concurrently until his assignment in 1912 as 
a counsellor to Japan’s embassy in the US.25
At that time, the individual who would train Shidehara in the writing of 
diplomatic telegrams was Henry Willard Denison, then adviser to Japan’s 
Foreign Ministry. Denison had originally stayed in Japan as the assistant 
to the US consul general, who was based in Yokohama. He was then 
hired as an adviser to Japan’s Foreign Ministry on the recommendation 
of US minister John A. Bingham. Denison would remain employed in 
Tokyo as an adviser for the Foreign Ministry from 1880 until his death 
from illness in 1914. It was rumoured that Denison had memorised all of 
Japan’s diplomatic precedents since the period of the Meiji Restoration.26 
Shidehara’s official residence was very close to Denison’s lodgings. 
Almost every morning, Shidehara would take 30–40-minute walks with 
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Denison around the area of the Imperial Palace, learning much from their 
conversations. Denison was also an astute judge of politicians. When the 
Katsura cabinet was formed in 1901, Denison was inwardly pleased.27
Shidehara was particularly impressed by Denison’s anecdotes about little-
known episodes of diplomacy concerning the start of the Russo-Japanese 
War. According to Denison, in July 1903 Foreign Minister Komura 
ordered Denison to draft telegraphic instructions to be addressed to the 
Japanese minister in St Petersburg Kurino Shinichirō (1851–1937), which 
requested negotiations with Russia. For Komura, ‘Russia’s aggressive 
actions in the Manchurian and Korean regions had recently reached 
the stage where they could no longer be overlooked’. When Denison 
suggested to Komura that the instructions include the statement that 
‘we must recognize the importance of avoiding war at all costs’, Komura 
replied: ‘I have been told that whether it ends in war shall be determined 
by the results of the negotiation’. As Denison told Shidehara, ‘I could tell 
that the [Japanese] government was determined … and so I was able to 
get right to work drafting the instructions’.28
Shidehara was not satisfied with this account. He asked Denison whether 
the instructions should not differ depending on whether the government 
was determined to go to war. Denison replied that if the policy was to 
avoid war then threatening the other party could still be a valid strategy. 
If, however, one was determined to go to war, then it was better to use as 
temperate language as possible, so that after hostilities commenced, the 
diplomatic papers could be made public in order to gain international 
sympathy. According to Shidehara, actions such as making diplomatic 
papers public after hostilities commenced was ‘now something that 
practically all the great powers have done in order to gain support for 
their positions’.29 It was also Denison who would teach Shidehara the 
various formats for writing such diplomatic papers as notes, verbal notes 
and memoranda.30
The Treaty of Portsmouth—the Ceding of South 
Sakhalin and the Korean Provision
The main theatre of the Russo-Japanese War was Manchuria, with Lushun 
and Mukden the scenes of hard-fought battles. There were no significant 
engagements in Korea. Around the time Shidehara returned to Japan 
from Busan, the Japanese navy was struggling to close off the entrance 
to Lushun harbor. Even after the Japanese army landed on the Liaodong 
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Peninsula, it was not until January 1905 that they managed to defeat 
the Russian forces holding Lushun fort. Third Army Commander Nogi 
Maresuke directed the assault on Lushun. The Japanese army would also 
go on to occupy Mukden in March. However, its forces in the area were 
exhausted, preventing it from decisively defeating the Russian army. 
While the navy later secured a victory in the Sea of Japan in May, Japan 
nevertheless felt compelled to seek an early peace. It was then that US 
President Theodore Roosevelt stepped forward as a peace mediator. This 
was when Foreign Minister Komura travelled to the US.
Following peace negotiations with Russia, Japanese Foreign Minister 
Komura and Minister to the US Takahira Kogorō (1854–1926) signed 
a peace treaty to conclude the Russo-Japanese War. The treaty was signed 
on 5 September 1905, near Portsmouth, New Hampshire. On the Russian 
side, the representative empowered to sign the treaty was former finance 
minister Witte and then Ambassador to the US Roman Romanovich von 
Rozen (1847–1921). The instruments of ratification were exchanged on 
25 November. The Treaty of Portsmouth included a number of important 
articles for Japan, including the recognition of Japan’s hegemony over 
Korea (Article 2); the devolution of the leaseholds of the Chinese ports of 
Lushun and Dalian to Japan (Article 5); the transfer to Japan of the rights 
to the South Manchuria Railway (Article 6); and the ceding to Japan 
of the southern part of Sakhalin Island, below the 50th parallel north 
(Article 9). Further, according to the first of the additional conditions, 
Japan and Russia would recognise their respective rights in Manchuria to 
station 15 soldiers per kilometre of railway as guards. This led to Japan 
stationing two divisions of troops under the command of the governor-
general of the territory of Kwantung. This would eventually become the 
Kwantung Army. However, Japan was not able to receive reparations 
from Russia.
With respect to Article 9 and the ceding of the southern part of Sakhalin, 
Shidehara hints at something. According to his memoirs, the day before 
the meeting of the Imperial Council in the second half of August, another 
meeting was held at the official residence of the lord president of the 
council. A number of government leaders attended, including the lord 
president of the council himself, Itō Hirobumi; Prime Minister Katsura 
Tarō; Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonbē (1852–1933); Army Minister 
Terauchi Masatake (1852–1919); and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Chinda Sutemi (1857–1929). Shidehara served as secretary of the 
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proceedings. According to Shidehara, when Yamamoto argued in favour 
of the demand that Russia cede part of Sakhalin, Itō directed Shidehara to 
put together the diplomatic instructions accordingly.
As it happened, when Chinda returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
after attending the Imperial Council the following day, he unexpectedly 
ordered Shidehara to send a telegram instructing the diplomatic staff 
to remove the request for reparations and the ceding of territory on 
Sakhalin. Shidehara had no choice but to send the telegram as Chinda 
instructed. Just afterwards, some good news arrived from the UK. Claude 
M. MacDonald, the British minister to Japan, informed International 
Trade Bureau Director-General Ishii that the Russian emperor was open 
to accepting the cession of southern Sakhalin. Acting on this information, 
Shidehara ‘took personal responsibility’ and sent a telegraph requesting 
that the execution of the previous instructions be delayed.31 After receiving 
this message, Komura made excuses in order to ask the Russian side to 
postpone the meeting. Prime Minister Katsura was then able to visit the 
Imperial Palace and receive permission to revise the previous instructions 
so that they would once more request that Japan demand the cession 
of southern Sakhalin. This was how Shidehara recalled these events.
If Shidehara’s memory is correct, it would mean that his quick thinking 
in postponing the removal of the Sakhalin cession request allowed Japan 
to gain southern Sakhalin as territory. However, it is rather difficult to 
imagine Shidehara making such a request of his own accord, given that, 
at this time, he was only the surrogate director of the Telegraph Division. 
Rather, what is most important in this story is the role of International 
Trade Bureau Director-General Ishii. By relaying Russia’s thinking 
as heard from MacDonald, he was able to propose to Prime Minister 
Katsura that Japan should not abandon its request for Sakhalin territory 
after all. Following his report to Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Chinda, 
Ishii had Shidehara send the telegram instructing that a demand be made 
for the ceding of southern Sakhalin.32 The then director-general of the 
Political Affairs Bureau, Yamaza Enjirō (1866–1914), who also travelled 
to the US with Komura, attributed the acquisition of southern Sakhalin to 
Komura’s skill.33 However, while Yamaza was expected to succeed Komura 
and become foreign minister one day, this was not to be. In fact, Yamaza 
passed away suddenly in 1914 while he was Japan’s minister to China. 
This was three years after Komura’s death.
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Of course, the Treaty of Portsmouth included more than just the cession 
of southern Sakhalin. Article 2 included the following clause with respect 
to Korea:
The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan 
possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical 
interest, engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures for 
guidance, protection and control which the Imperial Government 
of Japan may find necessary to take in Korea.34
What did Shidehara think of this clause on Korea? In his own words, 
he wrote:
Because at the time, our government sought to root out the 
source of trouble in the Far East, and foresaw that this could well 
necessitate the step of annexing Korea, but knew that it would not 
be appropriate to state so explicitly in the text of the treaty, it was 
necessary to use more abstract language and request that Russia 
recognise Japan’s right to give ‘guidance, protection, and control’ 
to Korea.35
In other words, the section of the clause noting Japan’s right to take 
measures to give necessary ‘guidance, protection, and control’ can 
be understood as having been included with an eye towards a future 
annexation of Korea by Japan.
In fact, it was Denison who had instructed Shidehara in the use of such 
language. Denison had told Shidehara that:
It was a normal trend for measures to guide sooner or later 
becoming measures to protect, and for protection to sooner or 
later become an incentive for shifting towards control.36
In reality, Japan–Korea relations began with the Japan–Korea Protocol 
of February 1904, followed by three Japan–Korea agreements, and 
culminated in the conclusion of the Korea Annexation Treaty in August 
1910. Watching over this process in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Shidehara thought that, ‘at the time, his [Denison’s] prediction in the case 
of Korea was coming true step by step’.37 Shidehara also thought that the 
section in Article 2 of the Portsmouth Treaty on ‘guidance, protection, 
and control’ should be used in Article 3 of the Second Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance that was signed in August 1905. However, in the editing process, 
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these terms were mistakenly transposed to read: ‘guidance, control, and 
protection’. This error was not discovered until after the treaty was signed, 
much to Denison’s regret.38
After signing the Treaty of Portsmouth, Komura suddenly fell ill and had 
to postpone his return to Japan.39 When he finally returned in October 
1905, Shidehara went to Yokohama to greet him. When the party 
arrived at Shinbashi Station, Prime Minister Katsura and Navy Minister 
Yamamoto boarded the train and supported Komura by both arms to help 
him dismount. The public mood in Japan was volatile. Yet, as Shidehara 
put it, Katsura and Yamamoto felt that ‘if they would die, they would 
die together with Komura’.40 What was on Shidehara’s mind was the 
scene when Komura was dispatched to Portsmouth. At that time, crowds 
had come to cheer Komura as he departed as Japan’s plenipotentiary 
representative. Komura, however, remained composed and whispered 
to Shidehara:
The crowd that cheers our party departing today may in the 
future turn against us and become a cursing, violent mob. At the 
very least, then, we should cheerfully accept this demonstration 
of good will while it lasts.41
In other words, according to Shidehara, even before journeying to the 
US, Komura anticipated that the peace treaty would be poorly received 
by the Japanese public. And indeed, at the end of September 1905, tens 
of thousands of demonstrators in Tokyo’s Hibiya Park protested the 
perceived shortcomings of the Treaty of Portsmouth, such as the lack of 
reparations. Moreover, mobs rampaged through Tokyo, attacking and 
setting fire to locations such as the Kokumin Shimbun Company, the 
official residence of the home secretary, and numerous police stations. 
The riots, which lasted two days, led to the deaths of 17 people, with 
hundreds wounded. This was known as the Hibiya Incendiary Incident. 
The government responded with a declaration of martial law. At one 
point, even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was surrounded by a mob. 
Shidehara watched the police fighting the rioters from the ministry 
windows. Shidehara was clearly sympathetic to Komura. This incident 
may well have been a catalyst for his own understanding of the proper 
distance to be kept from popular sentiment when it came to diplomacy.42
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Treaty Revision and Continental Policy—
Supporting Komura Diplomacy
While public opinion had turned against Komura, Japanese politics itself 
entered a period of stability. The leading party in the Diet, the Seiyūkai, 
supported the Katsura cabinet’s peace policy. The Seiyūkai was formed 
in 1900 by figures such as Itō Hirobumi and Hoshi Tōru (1850–1901) 
of the Kenseitō party. At the time of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Saionji 
Kinmochi (1849–1940) was the president of the Seiyūkai. However, the 
Seiyūkai’s support of the peace treaty negotiated at Portsmouth came at 
a cost. In exchange, they received the promise that the Katsura cabinet 
would transfer administrative power to the Seiyūkai. Hara Takashi of the 
Seiyūkai conducted the manoeuvring to help secure this agreement. Hara 
had multiple meetings with Prime Minister Katsura during the course 
of the Russo-Japanese War. With the formation of the Saionji cabinet 
following the transfer of power, Hara himself was appointed minister 
of home affairs.43 This development indicated that the Seiyūkai was 
increasingly being recognised as a political party in the establishment by 
the older domain-based (Hanbatsu or Meiji oligarchy) cliques of figures 
such as Yamagata Aritomo.
Political power was subsequently passed from the first Saionji cabinet to 
the second Katsura cabinet, the second Saionji cabinet, and to the third 
Katsura cabinet. This state of affairs continued until 1913 and the collapse 
of the third Katsura cabinet. Today, this era is referred to as the ‘Kei-En’ 
(桂園) era. The term ‘Kei-En’ combines the character for Katsura (桂) 
and the middle character of Saionji (西園寺). With the formation of the 
first Saionji cabinet in January 1906, Katō Takaaki, and later Hayashi 
Tadasu, became foreign minister. Nevertheless, Shidehara and Komura’s 
relationship continued. When the second Katsura cabinet was formed in 
July 1908, Komura returned to the post of foreign minister. As director 
of the Investigation Division, Shidehara had been ordered to participate 
in the Treaty Revision Preparatory Committee. He would now play 
a role in supporting both the treaty revision and the continental policy 
advocated by Komura.
In October 1908, Foreign Minister Komura officially announced the 
formation of the Treaty Revision Preparatory Committee. Assuming the 
role of committee chairmen, Komura nominated Minister of Home Affairs 
Hirata Tosuke, Minister for Agriculture and Forestry Ōura Kanetake 
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and Former Ambassador to Germany Inoue Katsunosuke (1861–1929) 
as vice-chairmen. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Minister 
Ishii Kikujirō, Political Affairs Bureau Director-General Kurachi 
Tetsukichi (1871–1944), International Trade Bureau Director-General 
Hagiwara Shuichi (1868–1911), Counsellor to the Chinese Legation 
Abe Moritarō, Investigation Division Director Shidehara and Secretary 
Moroi Rokurō were appointed as committee members. The committee 
also contained a number of individuals from outside of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, including Cabinet Legislation Bureau Director-General 
Yasuhiro Tomoichirō (1859–1951), Vice-Minister of Home Affairs Ichiki 
Kitokurō (1867–1944), Vice-Minister of Finance Wakatsuki Reijirō, and 
Secretary for the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce Tsurumi Sakio 
(1873–1946).
Some readers may be puzzled at the participation of Finance Ministry 
bureaucrats in the process of treaty revision. However, this is not unnatural. 
Treaty revision has a significant impact on internal affairs. If, for example, 
Japan could succeed in restoring its own customs autonomy, then this 
would be of great interest to the Finance Ministry. This is why Prime 
Minister Katsura took the unusual step of also assuming the role of finance 
minister and assisting Foreign Minister Komura’s initiative. Komura 
also nominated Vice-Minister of Finance Wakatsuki as the chairman 
of the special committee on general tariffs. For the chiefs of the special 
committees on conventional tariffs, land ownership and perpetual leases, 
he appointed Ishii, Yasuhiro and Ichiki, respectively. International Trade 
Bureau Director-General Hagiwara Shuichi, who was personally selected 
for this role by Hayashi Tadasu, was also engaged in revitalising trade with 
China while he was engaged in the work of treaty revision.44
Shidehara’s role on the committee was to examine the issues of perpetual 
leases and land ownership rights for foreigners. He was also responsible 
for liaising with Denison. Under Shidehara, investigations were pursued 
by Moroi Rokurō, Kawashima Nobutarō and Itō Nobufumi.45 Shidehara 
had a particularly close relationship with Moroi. Previously, Moroi had 
succeeded Shidehara’s old posting in London and Antwerp. According 
to diplomat Kimura Eiichi, Moroi studied economics assiduously while 
assigned to the consular post in Antwerp. This diligence served him 
well after he returned to Japan, with Moroi becoming the manager of 
the Treaty Revision Preparatory Committee. Later in his life, Shidehara 
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would propose a memorial for Moroi and sign the condolence book. 
Sitting with his desk alongside Moroi was Kawashima Nobutarō. 
Kawashima’s presence was heartening for Shidehara, given his familiarity 
with international trade policy. In February 1911, with the conclusion of 
agreements such as the new Japan–US Commerce and Navigation Treaty, 
Japan regained its tariff autonomy.46
Other diplomatic issues included Japan’s relationship with Korea. 
However, this issue would also gradually be resolved, as Japan received 
consent from the other world powers to turn Korea into a protectorate. 
In October 1909, the moderate-faction member and lord president of 
the council, Itō Hirobumi, was assassinated in Harbin by An Chung-
gun, a member of the Korean independence movement. This incident 
had the effect of accelerating the annexation of Korea the following year. 
With this development, the locus of international politics in the region 
shifted from Korea to Manchuria. As noted above, Shidehara understood 
the clause on Korea in the Treaty of Portsmouth as already anticipating 
the future annexation of Korea. As Shidehara wrote:
Our government has recognized that in order to reform the 
administration of Korea and establish peace in the Far East, it is 
necessary to take the decisive action of annexing Korea. Therefore, 
in August in 1910, the governments of both nations concluded 
the treaty of annexation.47
In other words, he saw the annexation of Korea as a natural outcome. 
In Shidehara’s mind, internationalism and imperialism coexisted.
This view of foreign relations was hardly unique to Shidehara. 
For  example, Kurachi Tetsukichi, who had previously served as private 
secretary to Itō Hirobumi when he was resident general in Korea, has left 
similar comments in his own written recollections of the time. According 
to Kurachi, when he was made director-general of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ Political Affairs Bureau, under Foreign Minister Komura, Komura 
ordered the drafting of a basic policy with respect to Korean annexation. 
On the basis of this draft, the cabinet meeting of July 1909 decided to 
move ahead with Korean annexation when the appropriate time arose. Ishii 
Kikujirō reflected similarly that ‘the annexation of Korea was absolutely 
unavoidable for the sake of establishing a general peace in the East’.48
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Upon annexing Korea, the Japanese government announced that it would 
impose tariffs for a 10-year period. Nevertheless, it was not long before 
Japan removed the import duty on Korean rice. According to Kawashima 
Nobutarō, this was Shidehara’s decision. In June 1911, Shidehara received 
a set of gold cups for his role in the annexation of Korea. Later, as vice-
minister for foreign affairs, he naturally displayed no particular reaction 
when the Ministry of Home Affairs reported the imprisonment and 
other sentences against Korean independence activists.49 When Komura’s 
second term as foreign minister ended in July 1911, Shidehara was ordered 
to serve as director-general of the newly formed Investigation Bureau. 
Then-diplomat (and future prime minister) Ashida Hitoshi (1887–1959) 
would later reflect that ‘at that time the Investigation Bureau was a new 
bureau that carried out the roles of today’s Research Bureau and Treaties 
and Conventions Bureau’.50
Komura, who pursued a shrewd continental policy, is often considered 
to have had a style antithetical to Shidehara’s, who was generally very 
rationalistic. Certainly, for their respective periods as foreign minister, this 
framing of their differences is understandable. From among the diplomats 
of that period, Honda Kumatarō’s trajectory is instructive here. Previously, 
Honda had accompanied Foreign Minister Komura as a private secretary 
for the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth. He deeply admired Komura. 
He would later be at the forefront of those criticising Shidehara’s own 
diplomatic efforts and would assume the position of ambassador to China 
under the Wang Jingwei regime in 1940.51 That said, it is not true that 
Shidehara was antagonistic towards Foreign Minister Komura. In fact, 
Shidehara lent Komura practical support. It must be added that Shidehara 
had his own critics within the department. According to Mushanokōji 
Kintomo (1882–1962), a group based in the Political Affairs Bureau, 
including Ariyoshi Akira, Yoshizawa Kenkichi (1874–1965), Hirota Kōki 
and Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946), together with Nakamura Takashi 
of the International Trade Bureau and Honda Kumatarō of the secretary 
office, ‘formed an increasingly passionate anti-Shidehara clique’.52 In his 
view, their opposition to Shidehara was rooted in envy at his success. 
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Table 1: Prime ministers and foreign ministers, 1900–21
Prime Minister Foreign Minister
Itō Hirobumi (1900–01) Katō Takaaki
Katsura Tarō (1901–06) Komura Jutarō
Saionji Kinmochi (1906–08) Katō Takaaki
Hayashi Tadasu
Katsura Tarō (1908–11) Komura Jutarō
Saionji Kinmochi (1911–12) Uchida Yasuya
Katsura Tarō (1912–13) Katō Takaaki
Yamamoto Gonbē (1913–14) Makino Nobuaki
Ōkuma Shigenobu (1914–16) Katō Takaaki
Ishii Kikujirō
Terauchi Masatake (1916–18) Terauchi Masatake (temporary concurrent)
Motono Ichirō
Gotō Shinpei
Hara Takashi (1918–21) Uchida Yasuya
Note: With the exception of the period of the Terauchi cabinet, I have omitted temporary 
periods during which the prime ministers also took on the role of foreign minister.
Japan–US Relations and the End of the 
Meiji Era
Denison’s Will
In May 1912, Shidehara was transferred from director-general of the 
Investigation Bureau to the role of counsellor at the Japanese embassy 
in the US. At this time, Denison was going to the US for a vacation. 
Shidehara decided to travel with Denison as far as Washington, DC, and 
the two began preparing for their departure simultaneously.
When helping to clean out Denison’s drawers in the office, he found 
several drafts of telegrams addressed to Minister Kurino, who worked 
under Foreign Minister Komura, relating to diplomacy surrounding the 
start of the Russo-Japanese War. Each of the telegram drafts was written 
in Denison’s hand, and they amounted to 14 or 15 revisions of a single 
message. For Shidehara, ‘those drafts amounted to a perfect model for 
studying the writing of diplomatic papers, while also being valuable 
historical documents for understanding Japan’s diplomatic efforts’.53 
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For  this reason, Shidehara asked if he could keep the drafts. Denison, 
after thinking it over for a moment, suddenly threw the documents into 
the fireplace and burned them.
Denison turned to a dumbfounded Shidehara and calmly explained. 
He  had burned the documents because others might have the wrong 
impression after reading them. The success of the diplomacy surrounding 
the commencement of the Russo-Japanese War belonged to Foreign 
Minister Komura. However, these documents could be misread 
as indicating that Denison had masterminded the Russo-Japanese 
negotiations behind the scenes. Shidehara was greatly moved by Denison’s 
words. Denison felt that the publicly released diplomatic documents of 
the Japanese government had helped improve Japan’s international image. 
For Shidehara, Denison’s consideration in this regard ‘impressed upon me 
greatly the extent of his good character, such that I was struck silent’.54
There was another reason in the back of Denison’s mind, however. He was 
66, had served the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for over 30 years and was 
considering retirement. Shidehara had no way of knowing it, but Denison 
felt that he did not have much longer to live. Thus, in July 1912, he 
prepared his will. He bequeathed his golden cups, granted by the emperor, 
to Ishii Kikujirō. Moreover, he left his entire personal library, of which he 
was quite proud, to Shidehara. Denison kept the writing of his will a close 
secret, never mentioning it to Shidehara. This was the last thing he did 
for Shidehara, who had admired and followed him so earnestly. However, 
because of Denison’s official duties, he was unable to depart for the US on 
the same boat as Shidehara. This would be their final parting, as Denison 
died less than two years later.55
The End of the Meiji Era—a Favourite Book: Nogi
At the end of July 1912, just before his visit to the US, Shidehara learned 
of the death of the charismatic Meiji emperor. When Shidehara arrived 
in Washington in mid-September, he learned of yet another shocking 
occurrence: the suicide of Nogi Maresuke and his wife following the 
funeral of the Meiji emperor (an old samurai practice known as junshi). 
Nogi had been to the frontline during the Russo-Japanese War as Third 
Army commander, and deeds such as his supervision of the capture of 
Lushun were still fresh in Shidehara’s memory. In 1907 Nogi became 
the president of Gakushūin School and oversaw the education of young 
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Prince Hirohito. The suicide of Nogi, who had directed fighting in the 
Russo-Japanese War, seemed to symbolise the end of the Meiji era. As an 
entire era ended, hardly a soul in Japan was not deeply touched.56
Yet it was not only the Japanese who were shocked to hear of Nogi’s suicide. 
One foreigner who was deeply affected by it was US journalist Stanley 
Washburn. Washburn had been attached to the Japanese army during 
the Russo-Japanese War as a freshly minted foreign correspondent. Nogi 
left a deep impression on young Washburn in that period. Upon hearing 
of Nogi’s suicide, Washburn quickly began writing down his memories 
of Nogi. He completed a manuscript in English for a book that would 
simply be titled Nogi, recounting incidents such as the capture of Lushun 
and Mukden by the Third Army, under Nogi’s command. Washburn’s 
Nogi was published in New York in February 1913. The work depicted 
Nogi as a brave figure who remained resolute even in the face of his own 
son’s death in battle. It could even be considered an elegy.57
There was one Japanese reader who deeply enjoyed reading Nogi, 
recommending its Japanese translation to his friends. That was Shidehara, 
then counsellor to the Japanese embassy in the US. How Shidehara came 
to read this book is quite interesting. One day in 1913, when Shidehara 
was visiting the US State Department, a surprise gift was waiting for him. 
A temporary employee at the State Department, Hamilton Wright, had 
given Shidehara a copy of Nogi, which had been written by his brother-in-
law. Shidehara later stated that he ‘devoured the whole thing all at once’ 
and ‘never tired of reading it’.58 His own copy of Nogi, however, became 
misplaced at some point while on loan to one of his friends.
Several years later, Shidehara had the opportunity to meet with Washburn 
while serving as ambassador to the US. When participating in the 
Washington Naval Conference as Japan’s ambassador plenipotentiary, 
Washburn was working behind the scenes as secretary to plenipotentiary 
representative Root. The member of the Japanese side who dealt 
with Washburn most directly was not Shidehara but plenipotentiary 
representative Hanihara Masanao. Shidehara was able to make contact 
with Root starting from before the conference.59
On his impression of Washburn, Shidehara wrote:
His genius extended beyond the literary world. Both his ideals and 
his insight were remarkable. I realized that it was no coincidence 
that he came to admire General Nogi from his daily contact 
with that man.60
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At that time Washburn presented Shidehara with a newly revised 
edition of Nogi. Shidehara ‘kept that book beside him at all times, and 
after returning to Japan, showed it to his old schoolmate Mr. Meguro 
Masumi’.61
According to Meguro, Shidehara ‘suggested that I try reading this book. 
He believed that young adults and students of our nation would benefit 
from it and that I too would surely find myself moved’.62 After receiving 
permission from his publishing company to have the book translated, 
Washburn informed Shidehara via Hanihara, the then ambassador to the 
US. This is how Washburn’s Nogi came to be translated into Japanese by 
Meguro and published in 1924. Shidehara himself supplied the foreword, 
which stated:
In recent years there are many in our nation who are quite 
unreasonably infatuated with the latest ideas from abroad. Yet in 
foreign countries there are actually more than a few individuals 
who can interpret, understand, and respect the mind of one such 
as General Nogi, that model of the Japanese samurai of old … 
Nogi examines the tendencies of the minds of us modern people. 
It is a particularly fascinating work.63
Although Shidehara tends to be interpreted as an unemotional rationalist, 
he venerated Nogi’s idealism. Shidehara and Washburn’s relationship 
would continue until his second term as foreign minister.
The 1913 Alien Land Law
In the fall of 1912, Shidehara assumed the position of counsellor at the 
Japanese embassy in the US. What was the relationship between Japan and 
the US like at that time? To answer this question, I would like to return 
briefly to the period of transition represented by the Russo-Japanese War. 
Japan’s victory over Russia in that conflict inevitably influenced the Japan–
US relationship. When a developing nation seeks a bigger role on the world 
stage, it cannot help but attract more critical attention. As Japan’s world 
prominence grew, some in the US sought to exclude Japanese immigrants. 
At the root of this was prejudice against Asians. In 1906, San Francisco 
passed a resolution that segregated Japanese schoolchildren. Meanwhile, 
the state legislature of California attempted to prohibit Japanese people 
from owning land, but this move was prevented by Republican President 
Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft.
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However, a turning point came under Democratic President Woodrow 
Wilson. Two alien land laws were passed in California. With the 1913 
Alien Land Law, foreigners who were unable to naturalise as US citizens 
were forbidden from owning land. Despite the Japan–US Gentlemen’s 
Agreement of 1908—which saw Japan voluntarily restrict the number 
of immigrants to the US—this law was clearly targeted at Japanese 
immigrants. Then the 1920 Alien Land Law prohibited even the leasing 
of land.
Japan did not simply remain silent when these laws were enacted. In fact, 
Shidehara was deeply involved in the reactions to both—as embassy 
counsellor in the case of the first law, and as ambassador to the US in 
the case of the second. Who were some of the key individuals staffing the 
Japanese embassy when the 1913 Alien Land Law was presented to the 
state legislature of California? Alongside then counsellor Shidehara was 
Ambassador Chinda Sutemi and Second Secretary Okabe Saburō, Third 
Secretary Ōta Tamekichi (1880–1956), Third Secretary Kawashima 
Nobutarō, Probationary Diplomat Okabe Nagakage (1884–1970), 
Probationary Diplomat Hiroshi Saitō and Embassy Clerk Imai Tadanao.64
Naturally, Ambassador Chinda and his colleagues protested the enactment 
of this law. President Wilson also dispatched Secretary of State William 
J. Bryan to California. However, they were not able to change the minds 
of the members of the state legislature. Nevertheless, Shidehara admired 
Ambassador Chinda and his willingness to engage Bryan in debate. 
Of Chinda, he wrote: ‘His arguments were always perfectly reasonable, 
devoid of any disorder or anger, and expressed in inoffensive language. 
Yet  the will he thereby expressed was extremely firm’.65 Shidehara also 
thought of Chinda as a master of the English language. Conversely, 
Shidehara was much harsher in his assessment of Bryan, whom he 
considered an eloquent yet inexperienced diplomat, unaccustomed to 
writing official documents. This evaluation was very typical of Shidehara.
The Republican Party held the majority in California’s state legislature. 
If the Wilson administration could not convince them, nothing could 
be done. Even after Shidehara left the US, Chinda remained as the 
ambassador. He continued his negotiations with Bryan in an effort to 
prevent the establishment of similar laws in other states. Meanwhile, with 
the coming of World War I, the Wilson administration began to have 
doubts about Japan’s opportunistic politics with respect to China.66
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The Influence of Ambassador Bryce
Shidehara’s tenure as counsellor at the Japanese embassy in the US would 
last only a year and two months. Nevertheless, it was long enough for him 
to be influenced by James Bryce, a British historian and then ambassador 
to the US. Bryce was already in his mid-70s, yet he took the time while 
he was ambassador to the US to revise his 1888 work, The American 
Commonwealth, for which he was well known in the country.67
What left a particular impression upon Shidehara was how Bryce 
deliberately refrained from challenging the Panama Canal Passage Tax Bill 
as it made its way through the US Senate. This Bill was disadvantageous 
to the UK, yet Bryce foresaw that the US would eventually come to regret 
it. For the same reason, Bryce admonished Shidehara for persisting in 
his protests against the Alien Land Law. According to British Foreign 
Secretary Sir Edward Grey: ‘At Washington the personal position of 
Mr. Bryce was less that of an Ambassador than of a distinguished man 
of letters and knowledge’.68 With respect to the Panama Canal, Grey also 
seemed to have anticipated that sooner or later, the US would come to 
observe the agreements existing between the two nations and abolish the 
discriminatory canal passage tax.
According to the recollections of Ōta Tamekichi, then third secretary 
at the Japanese embassy in the US, Shidehara was also instructed about 
diplomatic affairs by individuals such as the counsellor at the British 
embassy. Upon hearing that ‘the British do not have the practice of 
pushing their own countrymen to one side’, Shidehara decided not to 
press strongly  for the right of Japanese to naturalise as Americans.69 
In November 1913, Shidehara was relieved of his posting as embassy 
counsellor and ordered to a new posting in the UK. After spending 
time in a number of roles, including that of vice-minister for foreign 
affairs, he eventually returned to the US in November 1919, this time as 
Japan’s ambassador.
In 1921, in Washington, Shidehara met Bryce again for the first 
time in several years. At this time Bryce was untitled. Shidehara took 
the opportunity to remark, somewhat wryly, that while the Panama 
Canal Passage Tax had been abolished, to the UK’s benefit, the US’s 
anti-Japanese  laws did not appear to be going anywhere. Upon hearing 
this, Bryce glared at Shidehara, admonishing him once more not to be too 
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eager for success. ‘Do you not recognize’, he asked, ‘that the fate of nations 
is timeless?’70 Shidehara understood Bryce to mean that it was important 
to be prudent and avoid excessive appeals, entrusting developments to 
the US’s own reform efforts. As it happened, Bryce was visiting the US 
to give a series of lectures. The topic of those lectures was international 
relations, and, while cautious, they called for coexistence with what was 
then called the ‘colored races’ of the world.71 Bryce would pass away the 
following year, making this exchange the last with Shidehara. It may also 
have been, I suggest, an exchange that Shidehara slightly misunderstood. 
In other words, Bryce’s point was surely not to promote a straightforward 
attitude of forbearance.
Grey’s Enlightenment, News of Denison’s Death—
Counsellor to Japan’s Embassy in the UK
In December 1913, Shidehara arrived in London to assume his role 
as embassy counsellor. It had been 13 years since he was last in that 
country. By that point, the relationship between Japan and the UK 
had already begun to come under strain. The cause was Japan’s railway 
policy in the Yangtze Valley.72 The ambassador to the UK at that time 
was Inoue Katsunosuke. Other embassy staff included Second Secretary 
Yoshida Isaburō, Third Secretary Sawada Setsuzō, Third Secretary Okabe 
Nagakage and Probationary Diplomat Yano Makoto.
After being influenced by Bryce in the US, Shidehara was now positioned 
to be influenced even further by British-style diplomacy. In this case, the 
instructor was none other than Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir 
Edward Grey. Although Shidehara stayed in London for only half a year, 
Grey’s thinking had a profound impact. It would not be an exaggeration to 
say that, for Shidehara, Grey came to represent the ideal foreign secretary. 
Grey served as foreign secretary for over a decade, from 1905 until 1916. 
Thus, when Shidehara arrived in the UK, Grey had already been at that 
post for eight years.
What particularly impressed Shidehara was Grey’s response to the 
murder of a British citizen in Mexico. Initially, the UK wanted to send 
a warship to the region. The US, however, adopting the viewpoint of 
the Monroe Doctrine—which held that the US and Europe should each 
refrain from intervening in the other’s sphere of influence—was opposed 
to this action. In response, Foreign Secretary Grey decided not to take 
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any special action. The newspapers, rather than merely avoiding any 
criticism of Grey for this decision, actually praised him for preventing any 
worsening of the US–UK relationship. Shidehara was also surprised at the 
maturity of public opinion in the UK. He wrote: ‘As can be seen from 
this one example, the average British citizen possesses a surprising degree 
of common sense, to an extent that would be unimaginable in Japan’.73 
Grey’s influence also manifested in Shidehara’s integrity as a politician and 
his aversion to deciphering coded messages.
Shidehara was not the only foreigner to be influenced by Grey. Another 
such individual was US diplomat William Phillips (1878–1968). Phillips 
was assigned the role of first secretary at the US embassy in the UK at 
practically the same time that Shidehara received his assignment. Phillips, 
who would soon become undersecretary of state, met Grey again in 
Washington after the conclusion of World War I. At that time, Grey 
was tasked with improving relations between the UK and the US, as 
ambassador to the US. Unfortunately, Grey’s eyesight began to weaken 
starting in World War I and worsened during his time in the US. Phillips 
could only watch in despair as Grey became blind. Shidehara too must 
have been upset by this development when he became ambassador to 
the US in 1919. When he met Grey in Washington, the man’s eyes were 
already clouded over. The one consolation was that Grey remembered the 
high-pitched sound of Shidehara’s English.74
In July 1914, Shidehara—then still a counsellor at the embassy in the 
UK—received some distressing news. Denison had died of illness in 
Tokyo. Upon learning of Denison’s death, Shidehara sank into a deep 
grief. Alongside the passing of the Meiji emperor and the suicide of Nogi 
and his wife, the loss of Denison truly impressed upon Shidehara that an 
era had come to an end. Yet Shidehara had to compose himself and search 
for a successor to Denison. In this task he was assisted by Second Secretary 
Yoshida Isaburō. Eventually it was decided that Denison’s replacement as 
adviser to the Foreign Ministry would be Thomas Baty, the famed English 
expert in international law. Following his appointment, Baty, too, would 
go on to live out the rest of his life in Japan.75
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World War I
Ultimatums and the Outbreak of War—Dual 
Minister to the Netherlands and Denmark
On the eve of World War I, Shidehara’s career reached a significant turning 
point. This was his appointment as dual minister to the Netherlands 
and Denmark. Becoming an extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary 
meant a significant increase in responsibility. Previous occupants of this 
position included talented individuals such as Chinda Sutemi and Satō 
Aimaro (1857–1934). Chinda went on to receive a series of promotions, 
taking positions such as minister to Russia, vice-minister for foreign 
affairs, ambassador to Germany, ambassador to the US and ambassador to 
the UK. Satō, meanwhile, became Japan’s ambassador to Austria-Hungary 
for the period leading up to World War I, before becoming ambassador to 
the US during the course of the war.
Shidehara was appointed dual minister to the Netherlands and Denmark 
in June 1914. Soon afterwards, on 28 June, gunshots rang out in Sarajevo, 
Bosnia. The presumptive heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Franz 
Ferdinand, and his wife were assassinated by a young Serbian nationalist. 
The following month, when Shidehara arrived at his post in The Hague, 
World War I had already commenced. Meeting Shidehara at the Dutch 
legation was Second Secretary Matsuhara Katsuo, Probationary Diplomat 
Yokota Seiichirō and Legation Clerk Tokita Takurō.
In August, Japan declared war with Germany on the basis of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. It was here that Shidehara had a bitter experience. Tasked 
with delivering Japan’s ultimatum to Germany, Shidehara attempted to do 
so via Germany’s minister to the Netherlands, with whom he was already 
familiar. This attempt was a failure.76 Funakoshi Mitsunojō (1867–1942), 
who was serving as counsellor at the Japanese embassy in Germany, has left 
us some comments regarding this ultimatum to Germany. According to 
Funakoshi, the first to make contact regarding the ultimatum was Foreign 
Minister Katō, followed by the ambassador to Italy, Hayashi Gonsuke 
and the minister to Sweden, Uchida Sadatsuchi (1865–1942). To make 
sure that the ultimatum was delivered properly, Katō contacted not only 
Uchida in Stockholm but also Shidehara in The Hague. As Funakoshi 
wrote: ‘[Katō] sent a classified telegram, telling us that he was sending the 
ultimatum, and that we needed to prepare to deploy a secret messenger’.77
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
50
Upon receiving this message, Uchida judged that it would be difficult 
to send a secret messenger to Germany, given the tense circumstances. 
He therefore decided to reach out to a friend, the Brazilian minister 
to Sweden, requesting that he get in contact with the envoy in Brazil to 
arrange a coded telegram to be sent to Funakoshi in Germany. By the 
time Uchida’s coded telegram reached Germany, however, Funakoshi had 
already received word of the ultimatum from Tokyo directly. Nevertheless, 
Funakoshi was deeply impressed by Uchida’s resourcefulness. By contrast, 
Funakoshi was irritated by Shidehara, whom he perceived as dull-witted.
Leaving Germany, Funakoshi met with Shidehara in The Hague on his 
way back to Japan. Shidehara told Funakoshi that he had sent a telegram 
to Foreign Minister Katō, stating that he was unable to dispatch a secret 
messenger to Germany. According to Funakoshi, Shidehara apologised 
and said ‘there was nothing else he could do’. Later in life, Funakoshi 
would remark: ‘It is at times like these that you get to know a person’s 
real merits’.78 In any case, Foreign Minister Katō’s preparations for the 
ultimatum to Germany were exhaustive. Even the Japanese embassy in 
Germany was surprised at how he ensured the ultimatum’s delivery by 
sending it through multiple routes.79
In fact, in terms of its exhaustiveness, Foreign Minister Katō’s ultimatum 
to Germany stood in contrast to his Twenty-One Demands issued to 
China. These demands were thrust at China by Japan in January 1915. 
Among other things, they required that Japan inherit Germany’s interests in 
Shandong, and also that Japan’s leaseholds over Lushun and Dalian, as well 
as its control over the South Manchuria Railway, be extended for a period 
of 99 years. Japan used an ultimatum in order to force China to accept the 
key demands. Shidehara, who was then residing in the Netherlands, was 
not at that time very familiar with the process by which the demands were 
formulated. Nevertheless, upon learning of the details of their contents, 
Shidehara submitted a detailed opposing opinion to Katō.80
On the above topic, Shidehara’s subordinate, Probationary Diplomat 
Tani Masayuki, left some remarks. According to Tani, after serious 
consideration, Shidehara resolutely relayed his opposing opinion on 
the Twenty-One Demands to Katō. Just as Denison once did with him, 
Shidehara frequently took Tani out for meals and walks. Vice-Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Matsui Keishirō also mentioned Denison’s absence as one 
of the causes of the disorder surrounding the issuing of the Twenty-One 
Demands. Shidehara presumably held the same opinion.81
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Recalling his time in the Netherlands later in life, Shidehara mentioned 
China’s minister to Belgium, Wang Rongbao. As Shidehara told it, 
given that China was not yet a belligerent in World War I, Wang was 
free to assist Kimura Eiichi, then secretary at the Japanese legation in 
Belgium, to wind up his own affairs. Shidehara was not yet acquainted 
with Wang; however, Wang would come to spend most of the 1920s as 
Chinese minister to Japan. In the course of that decade, they would come 
to develop a candid relationship. Shidehara also had the opportunity to 
observe Kimura Eiichi, whom he considered to be ‘brilliant’ at his work.82
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs—Concern for the 
Russo-Japanese Relationship
Under the second Ōkuma cabinet, Ishii Kikujirō was appointed foreign 
minister, succeeding Katō, who had stumbled with his issuing of the 
Twenty-One Demands. Ishii would summon Shidehara to come and 
work with him in the role of vice-minister for foreign affairs. When 
Shidehara departed Europe in September 1915, the tide of war still 
favoured Germany and Austria. When the war broke out, no one could 
foresee that it would drag on for four years. In October, Shidehara arrived 
back in Japan from the Netherlands and assumed his new appointment as 
vice-minister for foreign affairs.
The then director-general of the Political Affairs Bureau, Koike Chōzō, 
was, along with Shidehara, one of the four individuals who had passed 
the fourth diplomatic service exam. Koike had remained in office from 
the time of the first Yamamoto Gonbē cabinet, where he was appointed 
under Foreign Minister Makino Nobuaki (1861–1949). The director-
general of the International Trade Bureau was Sakata Jūtarō (1868–1919). 
Sakata also had other important responsibilities that he had been carrying 
out for some time, since the period of the second Saionji cabinet and 
Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya (1865–1936). Shidehara, meanwhile, 
had been director-general of the Investigation Bureau when Uchida was 
foreign minister. Given this similar background, we might wonder how 
Shidehara’s own career trajectory compared. The vice-minister for foreign 
affairs who served under Foreign Minister Katō had been Matsui Keishirō. 
Matsui had been ahead of Shidehara at Osaka Middle School. Shidehara 
was four years younger than Matsui and was 43 years old when he took 
over as vice-minister for foreign affairs.
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When Shidehara returned to Japan in high spirits, something unexpected 
awaited him: thousands of Denison’s books, delivered by the executor 
of Denison’s estate. Shidehara had the executor show him Denison’s 
handwritten will. As Shidehara recalls: ‘[I] read it thoroughly, multiple 
times, my heart filled with grief ’.83
Over the next four years, Shidehara carried out his duties as vice-
minister for foreign affairs, supporting five successive foreign ministers: 
Ishii Kikujirō, Terauchi Masatake, Motono Ichirō (1862–1918), Gotō 
Shinpei (1857–1929) and Uchida Yasuya. Excluding Uchida, who served 
as foreign minister for five years, including in the Hara cabinet, each of 
these foreign ministers served no longer than a year and a half (including 
Motono, who was the longest serving of these four). Shidehara plunged 
into his responsibilities as vice-minister, frequently working long into 
the night for days on end. According to Nagai Matsuzō (1877–1957), 
then director of the Telegraph Division, whenever Shidehara eventually 
returned home, the ministry would become much quieter.84
During Shidehara’s term as vice-minister for foreign affairs, the 
administration changed from the second Ōkuma cabinet to the Terauchi 
cabinet and then to the Hara cabinet. There were many important 
issues that Shidehara would be involved with during this period. These 
can broadly be divided into the categories of Russo-Japanese relations, 
Sino-Japanese relations, American–Japanese relations and the Paris Peace 
Conference. Of these, it was Japan’s relationship with Russia following 
the end of World War I that became more involved. In particular, the 
Fourth Russo-Japanese Agreement of July 1916 was close to a military 
alliance. At this time, Japan and Russia were sending members of their 
respective imperial families on state visits in order to publicly display their 
friendship. Naturally, Shidehara devoted great care to Japan’s relationship 
with Russia at this time.85
Just after his appointment as vice-minister, Shidehara began exchanging 
information with resident Russian Ambassador Nikolai A. Malevskii-
Malevich regarding Germany’s intentions. For example, as rumours 
swirled of a German plan to sabotage the Chinese Eastern Railway, 
Shidehara shared information with the Russian ambassador about 
a German individual behaving suspiciously. The Chinese Eastern Railway 
was located in north-east China and was originally built by Russia. 
Cooperating with Russia in this manner was an approach that Shidehara 
carried over from his predecessor as vice-minister for foreign affairs, Matsui 
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Keishirō. This approach was not unique to Shidehara. On the other hand, 
when Japan responded coldly to Yuan Shikai’s imperial government plans, 
Malevich informed Shidehara that Russia would pursue the same policy. 
Incidentally, written communications between Russia and Japan were 
generally not in English but in French.86
What Russia dearly desired from the Japanese side was military supplies. 
However, the Ministry of War was not inclined to agree to the provisioning 
of Russia. Shidehara’s solution was to work with the Ministry of War, 
the Ministry of Finance, and the Russian embassy to arrange for Russian 
treasury bonds to be paid in exchange for Japan’s military supplies. 
Shidehara also worked to ensure that Japan’s newspapers did not report 
sensitive news about Russia.87
On the economic front, fishing rights were regarded as particularly 
important. The Russo-Japanese Fishing Agreement, signed in July 1907, 
was for a period of 12 years. As early as 1916, however, the Fisheries 
Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce began surveying the 
Russian territorial coastline with an eye to the treaty’s renewal three years 
later. Shidehara worked to accommodate these efforts by coordinating 
with Foreign Minister Ishii and the Russian embassy.88
Sino-Japanese and American–Japanese 
Relations during World War I
While Japan was strengthening its relationship with Russia, the situation 
in China was thrown into chaos as a result of the Chinese Revolution 
of 1911, which led to the overthrow of the Chinese Qing dynasty and 
the establishment of the Republic of China. In Manchuria and Inner 
Mongolia, there were even independence movements launched by 
parts of the Japanese army, and groups such as one led by Kawashima 
Naniwa (1865–1949), one of the so-called ‘continental wanderers’ who 
appeared in this period (independent Japanese who roamed continental 
Asia). Although the Ōkuma cabinet decided to attempt to remove Yuan 
Shikai in March 1916, his sudden death in June made it necessary to shift 
towards a policy of supporting President Li Yuanhong (1864–1928). This 
new policy meant ending earlier plans to assist independence movements 
in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Consequently, Shidehara supported 
the confiscation of weapons and ammunition in Changchun, working to 
obstruct the raising of independence armies.89
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With respect to the new government in Beijing, there was the problem 
of China potentially participating in the conflict against Germany. While 
the UK, France and Russia had also asked the Chinese government to 
participate, Japan had opposed this move. Russian ambassador Vasilii 
N. Krupenskii pressed Shidehara as to why Japan opposed China’s 
participation. Shidehara replied: ‘It is hard to believe that China would 
be prepared to give up its neutral status to accept an offer from the Allies’. 
In other words, Shidehara responded that it was because China had not 
properly made up its mind about engaging in the war. In reality, however, 
Shidehara shared the same concern as Foreign Minister Ishii—that China 
might be able to improve its position by participating in the war. On the 
other hand, Shidehara was also anxious about China falling into a state 
of lawlessness and hoped that the forces in southern and northern China 
might reach ‘a clear reconciliation’.90
In October 1916, the Terauchi Masatake cabinet was formed. General 
Terauchi, who had for many years served as governor-general of Korea, 
temporarily served as foreign minister alongside his duties as prime 
minister. However, this ministerial post was soon taken over by Motono 
Ichirō. Motono had become Japan’s minister to Russia in 1906. In May 
1908, the legation was upgraded to an embassy, and Motono continued 
to serve as ambassador to Russia until 1916. Motono was deeply involved 
in each of the four Russo-Japanese agreements. Therefore, while Motono 
was very familiar with the general state of affairs in Europe, he was less 
knowledgeable about the Sino-Japanese relationship. Thus, Shidehara was 
able to enjoy an enhanced position within the ministry with respect to 
Chinese policy.
That said, Shidehara did not have complete control over how Japan 
responded to the situation in China. The leading individual in this area 
was the China expert Obata Yūkichi (1873–1947). Obata had replaced 
Koike Chōzō as director-general of the Political Affairs Bureau. Having 
been critical of the Ōkuma cabinet’s policy of intervention, Obata 
submitted a written opinion to Foreign Minister Motono that advocated 
the restoration of friendly relations with the other world powers. Shidehara 
assisted Obata in polishing the prose of this written opinion. Motono was 
able to receive private consent for this policy from figures such as Terauchi 
and Yamagata. The new policy direction, of establishing harmonious 
relationships with the world powers, was agreed upon in a meeting of the 
Terauchi cabinet on 9 January 1917.91
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China’s entry into World War I in August 1917 led to heightened tensions 
between Japan and the US. This was because the US had increased its 
involvement in China’s internal affairs. US Minister Paul S. Reinsch 
took a leading role in pushing for this new approach. When the Wilson 
administration advised the Chinese government to put an end to that 
nation’s internal conflicts, the Terauchi cabinet saw this as a form of 
interference. When Post Wheeler, the chargé d’affaires (the provisional 
ambassador) of the US embassy in Japan, visited the ministry to explain 
their position, Shidehara reminded him that ‘the manner in which the 
Japanese were always particularly sensitive with regard to the problem 
of China was no different to Americans with respect to Mexico’.92
For this reason, Japan and the US needed to reach some form of consensus 
with respect to China policy. Japan’s approach was to dispatch former 
foreign minister Ishii Kikujirō to the US. In November 1917, Ishii was able 
to conclude an exchange of notes with Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
(sometimes referred to as the Lansing–Ishii Agreement). In the agreement, 
the US recognised Japan’s ‘special interests’ in China. Further, the accord 
stipulated that both nations would maintain equality of opportunity and 
open door policies as their ideals. It was a quintessentially ambiguous 
agreement. For the most part, however, its contents were regarded 
as satisfactory in Japan. After the accord was finalised, Ishii took over as 
ambassador to the US, and American–Japanese relations also improved 
regarding naval deployment in the Pacific.93
During this period Shidehara consulted with Foreign Minister Motono 
to help ensure that the negotiations between Ishii and Lansing proceeded 
as planned. Taking into consideration Shidehara’s views, Motono had 
Satō, then ambassador to the US, deliver a memorandum to Lansing by 
hand. This memorandum cleverly included a passage stating that Japan 
had important political and economic interests in China. Shidehara took 
the additional step of showing this memorandum to Chargé d’Affaires 
Wheeler, indicating that Lansing ‘expressed himself as quite in accord 
with the deep sense of the memorandum’.94 However, Lansing would 
later angrily refute this claim. Apparently, Shidehara’s attempts here were 
actually counterproductive. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the agreement 
between Ishii and Lansing helped to ease tensions between the US and 
Japan. The diary of Undersecretary of State William Phillips is particularly 
illuminating on this matter. While Phillips was initially suspicious of 
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
56
Ishii, after some time they were able to speak candidly. Phillips wrote in 
his diary: ‘The editorial comment this morning on the exchange of notes 
with Japan is very good, with the exception of the New York Times’.95
In the following year, 1918, a serious issue for Japanese diplomacy was the 
sending of troops to Russia in the wake of the Russian Revolution. The 
nations most enthusiastic about sending a coalition expeditionary force to 
quell the revolution were the UK and France. The Wilson administration 
in the US was more wary and hesitated to commit armed forces. In Japan, 
Foreign Minister Motono of the Terauchi cabinet strongly backed 
participating in the expedition. However, Shidehara’s position was closer 
to the US’s. He was cautious about the idea of sending troops. With 
Motono frequently ill at this time, Shidehara had the rare opportunity to 
freely present his own view to US Ambassador Morris, British Ambassador 
William Conyngham Greene, French Ambassador Eugène L. G. Regnault 
and Russian Ambassador Krupenskii.96
Nevertheless, the US gradually began to lean towards sending soldiers. 
Surprisingly, in July 1918 the Wilson administration proposed to Japan 
that they land a joint expeditionary force at Vladivostok. The pretext 
of this move would be to relieve the Czech army. In August, therefore, 
a  Japanese–American joint military expedition was launched. However, 
Japan committed 73,000 soldiers, which the US saw as entirely too many. 
The Wilson administration and Undersecretary of State Phillips were also 
irritated at the actions of the Japanese army at that time.97
The end of September 1918 saw a change of government in Japan, with the 
formation of the Seiyūkai party’s Hara Takashi cabinet. This was the first 
properly party-based cabinet. With the change in cabinet, Gotō Shinpei, 
who had served as the foreign minister for about five months towards 
the end of the Terauchi cabinet, was replaced by Uchida Yasuya. Uchida, 
who had once enjoyed the favour of Mutsu Munemitsu, had passed 
through the successive positions of director-general of the International 
Trade Bureau, director-general of the Political Affairs Bureau, minister 
to the Qing dynasty and ambassador to the US. In 1911, he became 
foreign minister in the second Saionji cabinet. He also served as the 
ambassador to Russia but had to return to Japan upon the outbreak of 
the Russian Revolution.
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The Hara cabinet set to work, seeking to reduce the size of the military force 
that had been sent to Siberia, as well as placing geographical limits on how 
far the army could move. It must be added that Shidehara’s diplomatic 
activity after troops were deployed to Siberia was not simply targeted 
at fostering cooperation with the UK and the US. In his negotiations 
with these two nations, he frequently had to assert Japan’s agreed-upon 
special interests in Manchuria. In particular, Shidehara disapproved of 
the proposal to internationalise the management of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway under the guidance of the US. He cited ‘Japan’s special status’ 
in Manchuria.98
That said, Shidehara showed a different face domestically. On 26 October 
1918, he attended a meeting with the army, alongside Political Affairs 
Bureau Director-General Obata. Together, they succeeded in winning 
over Major General Hoshino Shōzaburō, chief of the Third Bureau of 
the Office of Army General Staff. (The Office of Army General Staff 
was one of two agencies that managed the Imperial Japanese Army at 
that time.) Hoshino also opposed the US proposal to place the Chinese 
Eastern Railway under international management. Shidehara responded 
to his concerns by asserting that ‘there is absolutely no fear of the US 
going back on its word, given its national character’.99
Shidehara was also critical of the inclusion of the Baikal Cossack chief 
(ataman) Grigorii Mikhailovich Semenov (1890–1946) in the Office 
of Army General Staff. Instead, Shidehara sought to strengthen Japan’s 
relationship with Aleksandr Vasil’evich Kolchak (1874–1920), the navy 
admiral who had taken over governance of the city of Omsk, which 
the UK and France were supporting. Omsk was the centre of the anti-
communist government in Siberia, supported by other leaders of the 
white movement. In practice, this meant that Japan helped supply Omsk 
with munitions, while also dispatching Katō Tsunetada (1859–1923) 
as temporary ambassador plenipotentiary.100 The government in Omsk 
was short-lived, however, collapsing in November 1919. Following the 
subsequent withdrawal of UK, French and US troops from Russia, the 
Japanese army became the last Allied forces in the former Russian Empire.
At this time another issue with the US began to emerge. The Wilson 
administration reached out to Japan, the UK and France about the 
possibility of the four nations jointly loaning money to the Chinese 
government. The syndicated loan that was established through this 
cooperation was known as the New Four-Power Consortium. Secretary of 
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State Lansing first brought the proposal for this consortium to Ambassador 
Ishii in July 1918. However, Shidehara had some doubts. In a Tokyo 
meeting held in October with Ransford S. Millar, who would go on to 
become the chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the US State 
Department, Shidehara emphasised that this development could be ‘the 
first step toward the abolition of [Japan’s] sphere of influence’, making its 
‘execution extremely problematic [for us]’.101 Behind the establishment 
of the New Four-Power Consortium was a plan by actors such as the 
Manchurian Railway Company to secretly expand the transcontinental 
railroad. Shidehara and Foreign Minister Uchida were well aware of 
this fact.
The Paris Peace Conference
January 1919 saw the commencement of the Paris Peace Conference, 
where the victorious powers set the terms for the conclusion of World War 
I. It was not until June that year that the Allied powers (including Japan) 
concluded a formal peace treaty with Germany: the Treaty of Versailles. 
At this conference, the Hara cabinet acted in concert with the UK while 
successfully negotiating Japan’s inheritance of Germany’s interests in the 
Shandong Peninsula. Japan was even able to establish the ‘South Pacific 
Mandate’, whereby Pacific islands north of the equator that had been 
part of the German Empire were placed under Japanese control. As vice-
minister for foreign affairs, Shidehara showed his discomfort with the 
diplomatic ideals of President Wilson. This was visible in his response to 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points and to Wilson’s call for the establishment of the 
League of Nations.
Wilson had given a speech to the US Congress in January 1918 in which 
he presented his vision for a liberal world order. The Fourteen Points that 
Wilson outlined in this speech included a call for the abolition of secret 
diplomacy and the establishment of a League of Nations. According to 
Mushanokōji Kintomo (1882–1962), who was director of the second 
division of the Foreign Ministry’s Political Affairs Bureau, Shidehara’s 
opinion on this plan for a League of Nations was that:
It is a great nuisance to have our fate decided at this kind of 
roundtable discussion, rather than through respective direct 
negotiations between countries that have an interest on a 
given matter.102 
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In fact, Shidehara opposed not only the League of Nations but also the 
later-established United Nations.
On the topic of the Paris Peace Conference, a fascinating anecdote about 
this period emerged after Shidehara became Japan’s ambassador to the 
US. Secretary of State Lansing had criticised Japan in his memoirs for 
being so persistent in trying to secure interests in Shandong.103 Lansing’s 
account appeared aimed at warding off critiques that he compromised 
with Japan too much with the Lansing–Ishii Agreement and during the 
Paris Peace Conference. Lansing was considerate enough to send a copy 
of these memoirs to Shidehara.
Shidehara’s strong sense of pride shows through in the letter of thanks 
he wrote for this gift, which bristles with sarcasm. Shidehara wrote that 
Lansing’s memoirs were highly ‘instructive to me’. He continued:
It shows how little the actual situation and relevant history of 
the Far East are understood by even the foremost statesmen and 
scholars of this country, and how easily the best intentions and 
honest thinkings of one nation are liable to be misconstrued by 
another. I have, however, every confidence that Japan’s position 
will someday be viewed in its truer and fairer perspective.104
Shidehara apparently encountered Lansing and his wife at a tea party shortly 
afterwards, leading to no small amount of awkwardness. Shidehara sent 
a copy of this letter of thanks addressed to Lansing to Makino Nobuaki, 
minister of the imperial household, via Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Hanihara Masanao (1876–1934). Substantially, Makino had been Japan’s 
chief plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
A Time of Trials for the Foreign Ministry—Katō 
Takaaki and Hara Takashi
So far, I have traced Shidehara’s participation in events pertaining to Russo-
Japanese, Sino-Japanese and American–Japanese relations, as well as with 
respect to the Paris Peace Conference. The reader may therefore have been 
left with the impression that Shidehara was practically the architect of 
Japan’s diplomacy during World War I. However, this was not the case. 
It was not until the Washington Naval Conference that Shidehara would 
come to lead Japan’s diplomatic efforts and make a name for himself. In 
fact, more generally, World War I was a time of trials for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which saw its status within the government deteriorate. 
There were five reasons for this state of affairs.
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First was the intervention in foreign affairs by Japan’s elder statesmen, 
the genrō. For example, the Fourth Russo-Japanese Agreement, concluded 
in July 1916, was advocated by two genrō: Yamagata Aritomo and 
Inoue Kaoru.
Second, the Extraordinary Foreign Diplomacy Investigation Committee 
was established in June 1917 by the Terauchi cabinet. Alongside figures 
such as Privy Councillor Itō Miyoji (1857–1934) and Makino Nobuaki, 
members of this committee also included presidents of two political 
parties: Seiyūkai President Hara Takashi and Kokumintō President Inukai 
Tsuyoshi (1855–1932). Together they would convene and deliberate upon 
Japan’s diplomatic problems. We may regard this as the beginning of the 
direct involvement of political parties in Japanese diplomacy.105
A third reason was the existence of the army. Leading the army during 
its Siberian Intervention were individuals such as Vice Chief of Army 
General Staff Tanaka Giichi. After troops were dispatched to the 
continent, the Office of Army General Staff worked independently in 
assisting pro-Japanese factions.
Fourth, private citizens such as Nishihara Kamezō (1873–1954) were 
involved behind the scenes in Japan’s China policy, promoting the lending 
of money to the Chinese government. The ‘Nishihara Loans’ were further 
supported by Finance Minister Shōda Kazue (1869–1948).
Finally, there was the problem of government organisation in Manchuria. 
The Resident Generals Office of Kwantung was abolished in 1919, 
with the Kwantung Territory Government established in its place. 
The  Kwantung Territory Government had jurisdiction over a leased 
territory known as Guandong (usually known as Kwantung, in Japanese, 
Kantō), located on the south-western tip of the Liaodong Peninsula. It also 
functioned as the office for policing the Manchurian Railway. The head 
of the Kwantung Territory Government was the chief of the Kwantung 
Territory Government. The chief of the Kwantung Territory Government 
was a civil service employee who, according to regulations, was under the 
supervision of the foreign minister when it came to negotiations. At the 
same time, the military division that belonged to the former Resident 
Generals Office of Kwantung was turned into the independent Kwantung 
Army, headquartered in the city of Lushun.
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What this meant was that, alongside the various consulates general and 
the South Manchuria Railway Company, there was now the Kwantung 
Territory Government and the Kwantung Army, turning Japanese 
governance in Manchuria into a four-pronged political structure. Long 
gone were the days when Japanese diplomacy in the region was based only 
on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In such a situation, it was inevitable that Shidehara would want the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enjoy greater power. Yet Shidehara 
rarely expressed these views in public directly. Shidehara’s measured 
stance became all the more conspicuous when contrasted with that of 
Katō Takaaki, who, although occupying a different position within the 
government, frequently argued for the centralisation of diplomacy.
Previously, Katō had taken up his first cabinet posting as foreign minister 
in the fourth Itō cabinet, in which he argued forcefully for a hard line 
against Russia. Later, in the first Saionji cabinet, Katō would clash with 
the military over policy in Manchuria and quit his post as foreign minister. 
When he again became foreign minister in the third Katsura cabinet, he 
made centralisation of diplomatic power his condition for accepting the 
post. Further, as foreign minister in the second Ōkuma cabinet, Katō 
antagonised the genrō by blocking their access to confidential documents. 
Katō also refused to participate in the Extraordinary Foreign Diplomacy 
Investigation Committee, on the grounds that it went against his principle 
of diplomatic centralisation. Katō also worked vigorously towards the 
realisation of one more dream: the establishment of a two-party system.106
Before long, Shidehara and Katō’s respective directions would overlap. 
The occasion was Katō’s establishment, in 1924, of the three-party 
coalition cabinet of constitutional protection (Goken Sanpa), which he 
led as prime minister. Shidehara would become foreign minister in Katō’s 
cabinet, although Shidehara had never sought to use Katō for his own 
gain. However, while Katō did attempt to promote the centralisation of 
diplomatic power within the government, his record as foreign minister 
was poor. Indeed, it was stained by the debacle of the Twenty-One 
Demands of 1915. For that reason alone, Katō would leave diplomatic 
matters to Shidehara once he assumed the position of prime minister. 
Assuming this new position, Shidehara would surely have been conscious 
of the difficult experiences his brother-in-law had undergone before him.
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Compared to Katō, Shidehara’s record as foreign minister was faultless. 
He was able to assist not only Ishii Kikujirō, Terauchi Masatake, Gotō 
Shinpei and Hara Takashi but also the group of individual personalities 
that was the genrō. Conversely, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that his 
time in office was somewhat unremarkable. Yet there was a reason for this. 
Simply put, the times were changing. With the gradual establishment of 
various diplomatic organisations and systems, alongside the emergence of 
truly party-led cabinets, what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs most needed 
was skilled officials. It was no longer the age of heroic diplomatic figures, 
as in the days of Mutsu Munemitsu or Komura Jutarō.
That said, skilled officials can still be particular when it comes to their 
acquaintances. Shidehara was fortunate to have his connection with Hara 
Takashi. When the Hara cabinet sought to scale back the excessive aid that 
had thus far been given to the Chinese warlord Duan Qirui (1865–1936), 
Shidehara lent his support. At the beginning, Hara and Shidehara’s 
relationship was not exactly amicable. When Shidehara initially assumed 
the position of vice-minister for foreign affairs, Hara and Yamagata 
suspected him of being aligned with their rival, Katō Takaaki. Yet Hara 
found himself gradually trusting Shidehara more over time. Shidehara’s 
selection as ambassador to the US reflected the seriousness with which 
Hara viewed Japan’s relationship with that nation.107
The Washington Naval Conference
Japan’s Embassy in the US
In modern terms, the elite diplomats of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
can hope for no higher career achievement than to be assigned ambassador 
to the US, following a stint as vice-minister. In other words, the situation 
has hardly changed since the prewar era. Of course, in Shidehara’s day, it 
was also possible for a government official to advance one step further and 
take on the position of foreign minister. At that point there were only six 
Japanese embassies around the world—in the UK, France, Russia, Italy, 
the US and Germany. The diplomatic establishments in places such as 
Belgium, the Netherlands and China were only legations.
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Of the overseas diplomatic establishments of the earlier Meiji era, the most 
important would surely have been the British legation. Famous ministers 
to the UK included figures such as Katō Takaaki and Hayashi Tadasu. 
However, past ministers to the US were by no means inferior. Beginning 
with Mori Arinori (1847–1889), these distinguished individuals include 
Yoshida Kiyonari (1845–1891), Terashima Munenori (1832–1893), 
Mutsu Munemitsu, Hoshi Tōru (1850–1901), Komura Jutarō and 
Takahira Kogorō (1854–1926). At the end of the Meiji era, the legation 
was upgraded to an embassy, with Aoki Shūzō (1844–1914), Uchida 
Yasuya, Chinda Sutemi, Satō Aimaro (1857–1934) and Ishii Kikujirō 
successively serving as ambassador to the US. After Ishii left the post, 
embassy counsellor Debuchi Katsuji served as chargé d’affaires starting 
June 1919. In November of the same year, Shidehara would arrive in the 
US to fill the position. He was then 47 years old.
Just after Shidehara became ambassador, the US Congress made an 
unexpected decision. The Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles. There 
was already a degree of conflict between Japan and the US surrounding 
the issue of Yap Island, which the League of Nations had decreed was now 
Japan’s mandated territory, and it was feared that further fallout might 
result from the rejection of the treaty.108 Yap Island is one of the western 
Caroline Islands, an island group located in the Western Pacific Ocean. 
It is also close to Guam, which was already US territory at that time. 
Previously, Yap Island was under the control of Germany, but Japan had 
occupied it by force in 1914, during World War I.
From the time when Debuchi transferred to the position of counsellor 
at the embassy in Germany, until the arrival of Furuya Shigetsuna in 
April 1920, the embassy in the US had no counsellor. Assisting Shidehara 
was First Secretary Saburi Sadao and Hirota Kōki. During this period 
Shidehara had to place his complete trust in Saburi. However, Saburi was 
still a young diplomat, and his reputation was poor. Though he possessed 
a keen intellect, Saburi was known to be so faithful to his duties that 
he came across as somewhat aloof. It would take time before Shidehara 
was able to speak with him frankly. By contrast, Hirota was a popular 
figure among other young diplomats, such as Third Secretary Ishii Itarō. 
Although Hirota was Saburi’s junior by a year, there was something 
philosophical about his thinking, and he seemed to hold great promise.109
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Other staff at the embassy included Third Secretary Shiratori Toshio 
(1887–1949) and probationary diplomats Ōhashi Chūichi and Morishima 
Morito. Ōhashi and Morishima disapproved of Shidehara, finding his 
instructions to his subordinates insufficient. However, Shidehara paid this 
no notice. To him, such complaints were only a reflection of overreliance 
upon others due to a lack of independence. What Shidehara wanted was 
talented subordinates such as Saburi who would faithfully carry out his 
commands. The military attaché to the embassy was Major General Inoue 
Kazutsugu. The naval attaché was Lieutenant Colonel Ueda Yoshitake, 
who was later succeeded by Colonel Nagano Osami (1880–1947). 
Lieutenant Commander Yamamoto Isoroku (1884–1943) was also in 
the US at that time, and Shidehara had already formed the opinion that 
he was an able individual.110
The Siberian Intervention Force and the Yap 
Island Problem
Many of the diplomatic problems facing Shidehara were inherited as 
part of the legacy of World War I. The most troublesome of these was 
the Siberian Intervention force. Although the Hara cabinet expressed 
a sincere intention to reduce the number of Japanese troops in Siberia, 
the Wilson administration remained suspicious of Japan.
In early January 1920, Japan was suddenly informed that American troops 
would be removed. Although the deployment of troops to Siberia was 
a joint US–Japan undertaking in name only, for Shidehara this sudden 
withdrawal amounted to a humiliation. First, the US announcement was 
made without prior consultation with Japan. Second, the announcement 
was directly relayed from the expeditionary force commander, William 
S. Graves, to the Japanese commander of the Vladivostok expeditionary 
force, General Ōi Shigemoto, bypassing Shidehara altogether.
The astonished Shidehara expressed his outrage at Lansing, writing:
On what possible basis can the U.S. government decide upon the 
withdrawal of military forces and railway engineers and simply 
report this decision without any prior negotiation with the 
Japanese government?111
However, the withdrawal was a fait accompli. For the rest of his life, 
Shidehara was unable to set aside the memories of this humiliating event. 
It constituted the largest blemish upon his record as ambassador to the US.
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It must be added that the Wilson administration was not united on 
the decision to withdraw from Siberia. Numerous officials supported 
a  continuation of the expeditionary force. The central figure in this 
camp was the chief of the State Department’s Division of Russian Affairs, 
Clinton Poole. Secretary of State Lansing was also of a similar mind. 
It should also be noted that Poole had a good relationship with the chief of 
the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, John MacMurray. However, as Poole 
himself explained, he did not call for the continuation of the expeditionary 
force in order to foster a harmonious relationship with Japan. Rather, 
Poole had previous experience in Russia and, as an anti-Bolshevik, he was 
concerned about the devastation taking place in the country. There is no 
evidence that Shidehara had properly understood this tendency among 
the Americans and used it to build a cooperative relationship.112
The legacy of World War I with respect to relations between Japan and 
the US extended beyond the issue of the Siberian Intervention force. 
When Japan entered World War I, it captured the German stronghold 
in Qingdao, effectively taking over Germany’s interests on the Shandong 
Peninsula. Moreover, the territory occupied by Japan during the war was 
not limited to the Shandong Peninsula. Japan also took control of the 
South Sea Islands, a region of far more importance in relations with the 
US.113 During the war, the Japanese navy occupied the Mariana Islands, 
the Caroline Islands, and the Marshall Islands (previously German 
territory), placing them under military administration. These South Sea 
Islands were turned into a mandated territory under Japanese control as 
a result of the Paris Peace Conference.
There were a number of mandated territories following World War I. 
This  term referred to those former German and Ottoman territories 
that were governed by other nations under the mandate of the League 
of Nations. The form of governance to be deployed in these territories 
was categorised into Class A, Class B and Class C according to factors 
such as geographical location, economic status and living standards. 
Former Ottoman territories in the Middle East were categorised as 
Class A. Former German territories in East Africa and Central Africa were 
categorised as Class B. Former German territories in South-West Africa 
and the Pacific were categorised as Class C. Class A governance meant 
that the mandatory power had only limited authority. Class C, however, 
was more like outright annexation.
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Of the Class C territories, the formerly German-controlled South Sea 
Islands that were north of the equator were entrusted to Japan, which had 
already placed them under military administration. There was one more 
Class C territory on the western edge of the Caroline Islands (located in 
the Western Pacific): the small island of Yap. The US was not pleased with 
Japan becoming the mandatory power for Yap Island. This is because it 
was in a critical area for the laying of submarine cables.114
Just before Shidehara left Japan for the US, he asked that the Japanese 
navy undertake a survey of the prescribed rights of foreigners in the South 
Sea Island, former German territories. After Shidehara left for his new 
posting as ambassador, the Special Micronesia Defense Corps completed 
the survey of the South Sea Islands.115 Meanwhile, the US maintained 
that the Yap Island submarine cables should be placed under international 
administration. Shidehara would engage Undersecretary of State Norman 
Davis in a heated debate on this topic on 8 October 1920. There was also 
a Preliminary International Conference on Electrical Communications 
held in Washington, with Davis appointed as chairman. Shidehara was in 
attendance, along with Saburi. There the US attempted to have Yap Island 
removed from Japan’s mandated territories. In February 1921, Secretary 
of State Bainbridge Colby (1869–1950) submitted a letter of protest to 
the Council of the League of Nations.116
In March 1921, Warren G. Harding was inaugurated as president of 
the US. His was the first Republican administration in eight years. The 
secretary of state was Charles Evans Hughes (1862–1948). The Harding 
administration was also reluctant to acknowledge Japan’s mandate over 
Yap Island. Some form of resolution was necessary. It is here that Shidehara 
suggested a course of action to Foreign Minister Uchida. Shidehara’s idea 
was for Japan to offer a proposal to the US; if it acquiesced to Japan’s 
mandate over Yap Island, then Japan would open up submarine cable 
unloading and management to the other world powers. Upon hearing of 
this offer, Secretary of State Hughes, who had until then strongly opposed 
Japan’s rights over the island, began to search for points of compromise.117 
After further negotiation, Shidehara and Hughes were finally able to 
conclude an agreement that included Japan’s Yap Island mandate. The 
agreement was signed on 11 February 1922. In exchange for recognising 
Japan’s mandate, the US received permission from Japan to unload and 
operate the submarine cable connecting Yap and Guam, as well as any 
future cables that would connect to Yap.118
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During this period, Shidehara was visiting the State Department practically 
every day, which eventually took a toll on his health. He was initially 
diagnosed with kidney inflammation, but it turned out to be a kidney 
stone. When the Washington Naval Conference began in November 
1921, Shidehara was largely confined to bed. The following year, when 
he became acting prime minister for a period during the Hamaguchi 
cabinet, he was still suffering badly from the condition. In any case, 
Japan abolished military administration on the South Sea Islands and, in 
April 1922, established the Government Office of the South Sea Islands 
(Nanyōcho), located on Koro Island, part of the Palau Island group, 
located on the western edge of the Caroline Islands. Branch offices were 
set up in six locations, including Yap and Saipan.119 The South Sea Islands 
remained under Japanese administration until the end of the Pacific War, 
after which they became entrusted to the United Nations, which in turn 
delegated their administration to the US.
The Anti-Japanese Immigration Issue
Along with the Siberian Intervention force and the mandate of Yap 
Island, there was also the serious issue of the movement in the US to 
block Japanese immigration. Shidehara had to grapple with this problem 
once he became ambassador to the US during the Wilson administration. 
Shidehara was well versed in the immigration issue due to his past 
experience as embassy counsellor, where he lent support to the talks held 
in 1913 between Chinda Sutemi and William Jennings Bryan. First, 
Shidehara informed the US that Japan was voluntarily prohibiting its 
women from immigrating to the US to be brides in prearranged ‘picture 
marriages’—a practice that inflamed anti-immigration sentiment among 
Americans. Then, in February 1920, Japanese labourers held a large-
scale strike at a sugar cane farm in Hawaii. Here, too, Shidehara took 
the conciliatory move of informing Undersecretary of State Frank Lyon 
Polk that he had instructed the consul general to ‘do all he could to 
restore order’.120
Despite Shidehara’s best efforts, the state of California was moving towards 
the enactment of a Second Alien Land Law that would prohibit people 
of Japanese ethnicity from leasing land. Further, there was little hope 
that US Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby would offer any measures 
to counter this development. This was because Colby had only just taken 
over from Lansing in March 1920. It was at this time that Roland S. 
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Morris returned from his term as ambassador to Japan and was able to 
assist in resolving the issue. With the commencement of negotiations 
surrounding the immigration issue, which were suggested by the US, talks 
between Shidehara and Morris began to reveal a potential way forward.121
Shidehara and Morris began their series of talks in September 1920. 
By January 1921 they had met 23 times. Shidehara’s position was that 
there should be a reform of the gentlemen’s agreement between Japan 
and the US, so that anti-Japanese movements in the US could be 
mitigated. Because the talks with Morris were unofficial, Shidehara’s role 
was all the larger. A difficult event that occurred in the middle of their 
discussions was the passing of the Second Alien Land Law in California. 
Despite this discouraging development, Shidehara persisted, continuing 
the negotiations with Morris until a new treaty draft was prepared. 
Yet progress on this front was foiled by a transition in the US government 
to the Harding administration, which was not willing to move forward 
with the treaty draft.122
Following his return to the US, Morris became the first honorary president 
of the America–Japan Society, which had been founded during World 
War I. Shidehara’s name was also formally recorded as one of the people 
who initially proposed this society. Morris would later invite Shidehara to 
attend some of the lectures that he gave in the US. With Shidehara in the 
audience, Morris stated: ‘There are no questions between Japan and the 
United States which, if approached in a generous spirit of confidence and 
candor, are not susceptible to a just and honorable solution’.123
Concerns Surrounding the Crown Prince’s Visit 
to the US
During Shidehara’s repeated talks with Morris, Prime Minister Hara Takashi 
was holding his own discussions in Tokyo with Yamagata Aritomo, the 
genrō. Their topic was the possibility that Crown Prince Hirohito Shinno 
might travel abroad. Hara and Foreign Minister Uchida supported the idea 
of the crown prince visiting not only Europe but also the US.124
Shidehara, however, was extremely apprehensive about this idea. Shidehara 
remembered what happened to Edward, the Prince of Wales (later King 
Edward VIII). When Edward had visited the US two years earlier, the trip 
had exhausted him, in part because of the ‘bad manners’ of the Americans. 
Given this concern, Shidehara wrote to Uchida:
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Even if His Highness, our crown prince, were to come to the U.S., 
because the state of our nations is so different, the crown prince 
would be placed in a position of having no option but to endure 
not only physical discomfort but also the rudeness of the ordinary 
people. For example, even if people of no standing approach 
His Highness and address him in a familiar manner, then His 
Highness is placed in a position in which he must nevertheless 
give an appropriate response, without which he may unavoidably 
give the impression of being rude.125
In other words, Shidehara felt that the national conditions of the US 
were simply too different, given that the country had nothing comparable 
to Japan’s imperial household. Amplifying this sense of unease was the 
press reporting. Previously, Shidehara had personally witnessed a reporter 
disrespectfully asking Prince Edward directly for a copy of his prepared 
speech. At this already delicate time in US–Japan relations, it was not 
impossible for things to develop in unforeseen ways as a result of Japan’s 
press reporting. Shidehara’s warnings were heeded, and the crown prince’s 
overseas trip was confined to Europe. While the Hara cabinet refused the 
invitation from the US president, they were able to settle the matter by 
having the Taishō emperor send a personal telegram.
The Washington Naval Conference
From November 1921 to February 1922, the Harding administration 
sponsored an international naval conference in Washington. 
Representatives from nine nations attended, including the UK, France, 
Italy, Japan, China and the US itself. The main topics of the Washington 
Naval Conference were naval restrictions and the situation in the Far East 
and the Pacific. Discussion of these issues led to the forming of three major 
treaties: Five-Power Treaty, Nine-Power Treaty and Four-Power Treaty.
Japan’s chief delegate for the naval restrictions negotiations was Navy 
Minister Katō Tomosaburō (1861–1923). At the beginning of the 
conference, Secretary of State Hughes made the bold proposal that 
naval construction be prohibited for a 10-year period, with capital ship 
inventory between the US, the UK and Japan maintained at a ratio of 
5:5:3. The originality of Hughes’s proposal meant that it was received 
as a ‘bombshell’. Some in the Japanese navy staunchly opposed it, such as 
Vice Admiral Katō Hiroharu (1870–1939), who sought a 70 per cent 
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ratio vis-à-vis the US. However, Katō Tomosaburō accepted a 60 per cent 
ratio, taking into consideration the burden of naval expenditures as well 
as the fostering of a cooperative relationship with the US.
In February 1922, Japan, the US, the UK, France and Italy signed the 
Five-Power Treaty, which restricted navy armaments. In exchange, Katō 
Tomosaburō, as noted in Article 19 of the Five-Power Treaty, had the US 
admit that it would not construct any fortresses or naval bases on Pacific 
islands. However, as there were no armament restrictions on auxiliary 
vessels, it was not long before the world powers once more entered 
a warship-building race with respect to these smaller ships.
Shidehara’s involvement in the Washington Naval Conference was 
primarily focused on discussions surrounding the ‘Far East problem’ and 
the ‘Pacific problem’. Here, the ‘Far East problem’ referred to issues of 
international order relating to China and the interests in Shandong. The 
‘Pacific problem’, meanwhile, concerned the continuation or termination 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. To help deal with the related negotiations, 
Vice-Minister Hanihara Masanao and American and European Bureau 
Director-General Matsudaira Tsuneo were sent to Washington from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. Hanihara, in particular, was invested 
with plenipotentiary and would in fact later become Shidehara’s successor 
as ambassador to the US. Hiroshi Saitō (who Shidehara had referred to as 
a ‘master of English’) and Shiratori Toshio also attended.126
The Japanese government’s underlying position was that they did not wish 
to have a debate on the Pacific or Far East problems. Shidehara’s advice, 
however, was the opposite. According to Shidehara, because Secretary 
of State Hughes was not knowledgeable about the Pacific or Fast East 
problems, it would be advantageous for ‘Japan, which has interests of 
vital importance at stake, to make the first move in setting the agenda 
for discussion’.127 This difference in enthusiasm between Shidehara and 
Tokyo would be most visible with respect to discussions surrounding the 
termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
With respect to the Far East problem, in February 1922, the Nine-Power 
Treaty concerning China was signed at the Washington Naval Conference. 
It was criticised at the time for lacking any provisions for punishment 
in the event of non-compliance. However, what is probably even more 
important was the manner in which the open door policy clause was 
interpreted. The term ‘open door’ is quite ambiguous. In the open door 
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policy notes issued by Secretary of State John Hay, there are two main 
types of open door policy. In the first open door policy note, dating to 
September 1899, Hay sought equality of opportunity in the sphere of 
commerce. On the other hand, in the second open door policy note 
of July 1900, Hay stipulated the territorial and governmental integrity of 
China.128 Secretary of State Hughes also emphasised the importance 
of the open door policy as a basic principle.129
So, what did an open door policy mean for Shidehara? As his writing 
indicates, here too Shidehara was influenced by Denison. In the past, 
when Denison was drafting the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the 
instructions of Foreign Minister Komura, he ‘avoided the ambiguous 
terminology of having an “open door”’. Instead, the preamble included 
the words: ‘in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the 
commerce and industry of all nations’. This was the first time that 
the term ‘equal opportunities’ was used in a convention. Later, in the 
preamble to the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Denison referred to 
‘the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of 
all nations in China’. The same term also made an appearance in the 
preamble of the Third Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as well as in Article 3 
of the Treaty of Portsmouth. Shidehara also understood the ‘principle of 
equal treatment’ that appears in the Franco-Japanese Treaty of 1907 as 
being the same concept.130
Based on the above, we can assume that Shidehara understood the 
concept of an ‘open door’ policy as meaning the embracing of equality 
of opportunity—in other words, the sense shown in the first policy 
note issued by Hay. Further, given that the open door principle was also 
included in the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Franco-
Japanese Treaty, it could hardly be regarded as an ideal that was unique to 
US diplomacy.
In the case of the Nine-Power Treaty, however, the first item utilises the 
term ‘open door’ in a sense that is closer to the second policy note issued 
by Hay: ‘[Signatories agree to] respect the sovereignty, the independence, 
and the territorial and administrative integrity of China’. Meanwhile, the 
third article of the same treaty uses this term in a sense closer to Hay’s 
first policy note: ‘With a view to applying more effectually the principles 
of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and 
industry of all nations’. Of these two sections of the treaty, it was the third 
article that Shidehara regarded as important. As he understood it, equality 
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of opportunity was needed with respect to ‘economic development’ on the 
Chinese continent.131 To put it another way, Shidehara was not inclined 
to interpret the open door clause in the sense of the second note, which 
would mean respecting China’s territorial and governmental integrity.
Of course, this did not necessarily mean that he rejected the principle 
of China’s territorial and governmental integrity. It was rather that, for 
Shidehara, the reality of the situation on the continent meant that this 
was not a useful guiding principle for diplomatic activity. One example of 
how Shidehara perceived this diplomatic reality was the discussion during 
the Washington Naval Conference of the international administration 
of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was located in Manchuria. From 
the time of the Siberian Intervention, the Chinese Eastern Railway had 
been managed by the combined international efforts of nations including 
Japan, the US, the UK and France. At the Washington Naval Conference, 
the US wished to reinforce this state of affairs. Although Shidehara was 
initially inclined to agree to the international administration of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway, led by the US, he was later swayed by Foreign Minister 
Uchida’s more cautious thinking and eventually rejected the proposal.
Even when Hughes attempted to establish an international investigative 
body that would look into open door principles, Shidehara ensured that 
it would be toothless. Shidehara was particularly opposed to any US 
political involvement in Manchuria. This attitude is also visible in the way 
in which, as foreign minister, he responded to the Sino-Soviet conflict in 
1929. It appears that, in reality, Shidehara interpreted ‘open door policy’ 
in a narrow sense.132
Resolving the Shandong Issue—the US State 
Department’s View of Japan
Of the various diplomatic issues regarding the Far East at that time, the 
most serious for Japan was the inheritance of the interests in Shandong 
Peninsula. During World War I, Japan seized Germany’s interests on 
Shandong. Later, at the Paris Peace Conference, it succeeded in having its 
control of these interests recognised by other foreign powers. However, the 
Chinese representatives refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, meaning 
that the issue of the interests in Shandong lingered and was later brought 
up at the Washington Naval Conference.
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Shidehara was able to resolve the Shandong problem at the Washington 
Naval Conference, in part because he had worked to gain the support 
of figures such as John MacMurray, chief of the State Department’s 
Division of Far Eastern Affairs. In a February 1922 treaty between Japan 
and China that concerned issues relating to Shandong, Japan redeemed 
the value of the railway assets through 15-year-term treasury bonds from 
China. The treaty also stipulated that during the redemption period for 
those bonds, the posts for chief of transportation and chief of accounting 
would both be filled by Japanese. Meanwhile, the local mines would be 
placed under joint Sino-Japanese management. Japan was largely satisfied 
with this compromise, in which, although it would eventually lose the 
Shandong railway to China, it would receive suitable repayment and, for 
the time being, the right to make appointments to the top management 
positions. In his memoirs, Shidehara wrote that ‘China intended to make 
the [negotiations surrounding the] Shandong issue collapse’. However, he 
added that, with the intervention of the US and the UK, China ‘saw that 
the situation was not developing in their favour, and hence completely 
changed their attitude’.133
Under Division of Far Eastern Affairs Chief MacMurray were two 
individuals responsible for China and Japan, respectively: Nelson Trusler 
Johnson and Edwin L. Neville. Johnson, who was highly knowledgeable 
about China, died suddenly in 1954. However, just before he died, he 
agreed to a lengthy interview about his experiences. In this interview, 
Johnson stated that, during the Washington Naval Conference, he felt 
that Japan, as well as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, constituted a threat to 
US interests in the Far East.134 Sympathy towards China was quite deeply 
rooted in the US State Department.
In that sense, Edward Thomas Williams (who would have been Johnson’s 
senior if he were still at the State Department) was no exception. Following 
a long period of initially working in China, Williams went on to enter the 
Division of Far Eastern Affairs in 1913, where he remained for five years. 
In 1918, he became a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, 
and went on to write numerous books on China’s foreign relations. 
During the Paris Peace Conference, Williams attended as an adviser on 
Far East issues and was also a State Department adviser at the Washington 
Naval Conference. For this reason, he was in a position to offer counsel 
to Secretary of State Hughes during the naval conference on matters such 
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as Shandong. Williams was even capable of offering detailed opinions to 
MacMurray, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs chief, on topics such as 
the provision on Chinese tariff treaties.135
Though he now lived in Washington, Williams, who was fluent in 
Chinese, had near-daily conversations with Shi Zhaoji (Alfred Sao-ke 
Sze) (1877–1958), China’s ambassador to the US. Shi would also confide 
in Williams and, on occasion, would privately show him telegrams sent 
to him from the government in Beijing. The two even went for drives 
together. Williams also tried to get MacMurray to inform him about 
Shidehara’s diplomatic movements. Meanwhile, Williams was very 
suspicious of Saburi, who was effectively Shidehara’s right-hand man. 
By this point, Saburi had already risen up the ranks to become embassy 
counsellor. Regarding the matter of Shandong, Williams also consulted 
thoroughly with Stanley K. Hornbeck, an old acquaintance and a member 
of the State Department’s Division of Far Eastern Affairs.
Reflecting on his experiences with the Paris Peace Conference, Shidehara 
came to distrust Williams even more. He wrote:
While occupying the post of advisor to the U.S. committee 
during the Paris Peace Conference, Williams would continually 
offer advice to the Chinese committee. Even worse, he would take 
actions in direct opposition to Japan. It is an undeniable fact that 
the extreme complications that emerged regarding negotiations 
involving China stemmed from the actions of Williams and 
his sympathizers.136
Meanwhile, from Williams’s perspective, MacMurray’s proposed solution 
for Shandong was too conciliatory. The thought of Japan being left with 
a foothold on the Shandong Peninsula kept Williams up at night. Instead 
of sleeping, he would type letters to MacMurray and Hughes, calling for 
a different course of action. Further, when topics came up on the agenda 
such as how to deal with the foreign troops stationed in China, or whether 
foreign post offices in China would continue to be permitted, here too 
Williams would show concern over Japan’s movements.137
Finally, at the fifth general meeting on 1 February 1922, it was decided that 
foreign troops not stationed as part of a treaty needed to be withdrawn, 
and that foreign post offices had to be abolished. The Nine-Power Treaty 
was signed five days later. With respect to important matters such as Japan’s 
interests in Shandong, there is little evidence that Williams’s suggestions 
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were adopted.138 However, Williams’s sympathy towards China was passed 
on to Johnson and Hornbeck. Given that both individuals would go on 
to become chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, it can be said that 
pro-Chinese officials in the State Department held more sway than pro-
Japanese ones. From the perspective of the pro-Chinese faction, it could 
hardly be said that a Japanese–American cooperative framework had been 
established at the Washington Naval Conference.
The Four-Power Treaty and the Termination of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance
At around this time, in December 1921, the Four-Power Treaty was 
concluded at the Washington Naval Conference. The signatories of the 
Four-Power Treaty promised to maintain the status quo in the Pacific, and 
its ratification simultaneously led to the termination of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance. Shidehara also played a decisive role in this development. The 
Third Anglo-Japanese Alliance, signed in 1911, was valid for 10 years. 
Opinion had been divided within the British Empire as to whether the 
alliance ought to be renewed. While Australia and New Zealand hoped to 
defend against any possible future invasion by keeping Japan within the 
alliance, nations such as Canada and South Africa saw the alliance as a 
hindrance to cooperative relations between the UK and the US. In the end, 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was ended as a result of the conclusion of the 
Four-Power Treaty at the Washington Naval Conference. The formation 
of the Four-Power Treaty and the formal termination of the alliance took 
place in three stages, outlined below.
The first stage was the drafting of a proposal by the UK’s chief delegate, 
Arthur James Balfour. Balfour, who was prime minister at the time of the 
signing of the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance, had also served as navy 
minister and foreign secretary. His proposal was the formation of a triple 
entente that would include the US as a third nation. With the Balfour 
proposal, care was taken to gain the approval of the US, while at the same 
time preserving the freedom for Japan and the UK to restore a military 
alliance in the future. In effect, therefore, the proposal amounted to an 
attempt to maintain the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Balfour went on to 
present this proposal to Katō and Hanihara.
The next stage was a counterproposal by Shidehara. Referring to Balfour’s 
proposal, he made significant revisions in order to make it more palatable 
to the US. A distinguishing feature of Shidehara’s proposal was that 
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it specified that the triple entente would take the place of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance altogether. In other words, it watered down the effective 
continuation of the alliance that was contained in Balfour’s proposal. 
Shidehara also took the step of presenting this proposal to Balfour 
without first receiving instructions from Tokyo. Once Balfour had made 
his own adjustments, Shidehara personally delivered the revised proposal 
to Hughes.
The third stage was Hughes’s own proposal. Having received the revised 
proposal from Shidehara, he proposed the inclusion of France. With 
China excluded, this meant a treaty that would be adopted between four 
powers.139 The resulting Four-Power Treaty was signed on 13 December 
1921. Article 4 of the treaty explicitly abolished the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance.
Shidehara’s solution with respect to this treaty has received occasional 
criticism. Some have argued that Shidehara made a mistake in judgement 
and that it should have been possible to avoid abolishing the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance.140 Certainly, if we look back over Japanese government 
policy at that period, we can see that it merely accepted the termination of 
the alliance only when the UK were to advance such a proposal. However, 
the Japanese government’s preference was to maintain the alliance if 
possible. In contrast to the detailed instructions that were issued with 
respect to the Far East problem, Tokyo’s policy on the continuation or 
termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was fluid.141
For this reason, Shidehara had more room than usual to exercise discretion. 
But, in that case, was there a chance that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
could have been saved? If there was such a possibility, it would have 
been through Balfour’s proposed triple entente between Japan, the UK 
and the US. Shidehara himself has emphasised that there were problems 
with communication concerning Balfour’s proposal. That is to say, when 
Balfour suggested to Hughes that the three nations form an entente, 
Shidehara said, ‘I was indisposed due to illness and was completely 
unaware that this had happened’.142 It was actually Saburi who received 
word of the proposal from the US State Department.
When Shidehara then dispatched Saburi to speak with Balfour, it emerged 
that Balfour had already sounded out Plenipotentiary Tokugawa Iesato 
(1863–1940) with respect to the proposal. Yet, given that issues concerning 
the Pacific and the Far East—including the Anglo-Japanese Alliance—
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were being managed by Shidehara, Tokugawa felt that Balfour needed to 
negotiate directly with Shidehara. The situation was complicated by the 
fact that the UK’s secretary-general, Maurice Hankey, actually forgot to 
hand over the full text of the triple entente.143
However, while this is how Shidehara recollected the events of this 
period, the fact is that, as noted above, Balfour did directly submit his 
proposal to Katō and Hanihara. That means that Shidehara’s claims of 
communication problems are somewhat exaggerated. What was more 
decisive for the eventual outcome were Shidehara’s true intentions when 
he rewrote Balfour’s initial proposal.
In Shidehara’s recollections, he stated that, in Balfour’s proposal, 
‘the triple entente between Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. was close to an 
alliance, being understood as though it existed for the purpose of creating 
a political confederation’. For this reason, Shidehara surmised that the 
US would not accept it, given its traditional reticence towards forming 
alliances. Further, Shidehara interpreted the instructions he received from 
Foreign Minister Uchida as indicating that ‘if Japan were to press strongly 
for the continuation of the alliance, then it may end up simply troubling 
the British government; it might be fruitless, yet also undignified’.144
Following this understanding, Shidehara:
Removed the provisions concerning the creation of a type of 
political confederation similar to an alliance from the triple 
entente proposal by the British chief delegate, and created 
a provision that stipulated the holding of conferences between the 
signatory nations whenever the need arose. What [I] created was a 
new proposal that replaced a treaty of alliance with something that 
more closely resembled a consultative pact.145 
Although Shidehara was confined to his bed due to his sickness, he had 
this proposal shown to Balfour, who agreed to the basic approach before 
making his own revisions. Once Saburi showed this revised proposal to 
Hughes, Hughes argued that France should also be included in the pact.
Hughes invited Balfour, Shidehara and the French chief delegate to his 
private residence, where he showed them his revised proposal, along 
with an added preamble and a clause stating when it would come into 
effect. Due to circumstances such as the details of this proposal having 
been leaked to the Jiji Shinposha Shimbun newspaper company, the 
Four-Power Treaty would be quickly signed by the participating nations. 
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The French chief delegate, however, became flustered as a result of this 
haste. Because approval from his home government did not arrive in time 
for the signing ceremony, he had to put off adding his own signature until 
a later date. This was perceived as a slight to France’s pride as a major 
power. According to Shidehara, Hughes added France to the treaty because 
he wished to exploit Americans’ affinity with France; this feeling had been 
fostered with French General Ferdinand Foch’s visit to the US.146
If the intention was to prioritise the easing of tensions between the US 
and Japan, then Shidehara’s approach was not mistaken. And, indeed, this 
was exactly what Shidehara hoped for. Hughes had been on edge at the 
idea of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. And even the UK, if it 
came to a standoff between Japan and the US, would have been highly 
unlikely to have sided with Japan. Given this reality, the potential for 
continuing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance remained limited.147
Honest Diplomacy—Tranquil Public Relations
Yet, we might ask, would an ambassador of lesser talents have come to 
the conclusion that the US would not readily agree to a proposal that 
included the effective continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance? 
In fact, I suggest, what we should focus on regarding the above process 
is what it tells us about Shidehara’s diplomatic technique. It can be 
argued that Shidehara had a tendency to look too far ahead, due to the 
importance with which he viewed Japan’s relationship with the US. When 
Shidehara made his alterations to the proposal, was he not actually putting 
into practice the method of ‘honest diplomacy’ as the first principle 
in building a relationship of trust? To put it differently, I suggest that 
Shidehara sought to anticipate the possible US reaction to such a degree 
that he ended up proposing something that was already a compromise. 
Supporting this interpretation are the memoirs of Ishii Itarō. According 
to Ishii, ‘Shidehara’s conviction was that the most important thing needed 
for diplomacy is sincerity’.148
In general, the art of diplomatic negotiation cannot simply be to proceed 
according to your anticipation of what another nation wants. There are 
also times when it is necessary to take the opposite tack, to argue from 
a position that is initially removed from a point of possible compromise. 
This is something that Shidehara should have learned from the experience 
that Denison shared with him concerning the start of the Russo-Japanese 
War. Apparently, a degree of cunning was a part of Denison’s legacy that 
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Shidehara did not attempt to emulate. This is why the Four-Power Treaty 
was agreed upon so hastily. Even if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to be 
abolished, it should have been possible to do so using a different approach. 
By giving the impression, for example, that it was foreign pressure from 
the US that caused the end of the alliance, it may have been possible to 
instil in the minds of the citizenry that Japan and the UK were natural 
allies. Yet Shidehara decided not to take this route.
In any case, some noteworthy developments also occurred later regarding 
the Washington Naval Conference. First, Japan’s diplomatic telegrams 
were decoded by the US. This fact was not revealed until 10 years after 
the conference, in 1931. In later years Shidehara would recall, ‘I could 
not quite help smiling in satisfaction at the idea that because of the stolen 
codes, the U.S. must have taken Shidehara to be an unimaginative, honest 
man’.149 Although Shidehara felt a degree of bitterness regarding this 
development, it was certainly true that he had faith in the importance of 
honest diplomacy.
Thus, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, once the cornerstone of Japanese 
diplomacy, finally came to an end. At this time, Foreign Minister Uchida 
confessed that he was ‘strongly missing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and 
reminiscing about the past’.150 It was not only the Japanese who regretted 
the termination of the alliance. Along with Balfour, UK Ambassador to 
Japan Charles N. E. Eliot, also deplored the alliance’s passing. Meanwhile, 
George Sansom, then a commercial counsellor at the British embassy in 
Japan, later asserted that if the alliance had continued, Japan may well 
have avoided heading down the extreme path it took in subsequent 
decades. However, not everybody was displeased with this outcome. For 
one thing, it is true that for some time the UK’s Foreign Office had many 
criticisms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.151
On the other hand, in the case of the US, a very interesting comment 
was made by Eugene H. Dooman, first secretary at the US embassy in 
Japan. Dooman expressed doubt as to whether, ‘if the United States 
had not brought about the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
the character and temperament of the Japanese would have been what it 
was’. For Dooman, the Japanese ‘resented very much the action of Great 
Britain in surrendering to American pressure in bringing that alliance to an 
end’.152 This episode suggests that ending an alliance is more challenging 
than establishing one.
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Yet, regardless of whether it was a necessary, a positive or a negative 
outcome, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abolished when the Four-
Power Treaty was formed. It should also be noted that Shidehara was 
successful in excluding the Japanese home islands from the scope of the 
new treaty. The reason for this exclusion was that the Japanese citizenry 
broadly felt that applying the treaty to Japan itself would be a national 
disgrace. Therefore, following the receipt of new orders after the signing 
of the Four-Power Treaty, Shidehara drafted and received approval for an 
additional agreement to be attached to the original, which outlined the 
exception with respect to the Japanese home islands.153
The honest diplomacy that Shidehara envisioned would also appear 
in material read by the general public. Starting from his time as vice-
minister for foreign affairs, Shidehara kept his distance from newspapers. 
According to Baba Tsunego, a journalist for the Kokumin Shimbun, ‘even 
if [Shidehara] would sometimes meet with [the press], he would only 
answer one question in 10 posed to him by the newspaper reporters’. 
However, ‘whenever he answered a question with a straight ‘yes’ or ‘no’, 
he would never lie’.154
This was not to say that Shidehara was entirely uninterested in 
communicating with the public. Meanwhile, a turning point in public 
relations and Japanese diplomacy took place during the Paris Peace 
Conference. Despite the fact that Japan had taken over Germany’s former 
interests at the conference, a commonly expressed view was that Japan had 
lost to China in advertising. This negative experience was a major motive 
behind the eventual formal establishment, in 1921, of the Intelligence 
Department inside the head office of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
According to Ishii Kikujirō, however, ‘if you try to look back at what kind 
of results the Intelligence Department actually achieved, there is nothing 
in particular that catches the eye’.155
In fact, while serving as ambassador to the US, Shidehara had established 
his own Intelligence Department within the embassy, in the period before 
the Washington Naval Conference. Shidehara also invited Frederick 
Moore to assist as adviser for public relations. Moore was recommended 
to Shidehara by Hiroshi Saitō.156 Meanwhile, the press unit was also 
established at the time of the Naval Conference, and Counsellor Debuchi 
was dispatched from Germany to head the public relations section. 
From the beginning, Debuchi would be a plenipotentiary attendant, and 
Moore also later received this status. Shidehara himself once asserted to 
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a Washington newspaper reporter—while referring to Article 4 of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance—that ‘it is next to impossible that Japan and 
the U.K. would assist the other in a joint strategy if their opponent was 
the United States’.157 On another occasion he explained Japan’s position 
in a magazine owned by the New York Times. Shidehara also sought to 
foster a friendly relationship with Thomas William Lamont, who was US 
representative at the time of the New Four-Power Consortium.158
Nevertheless, Shidehara struggled when it came to dealing with Japanese 
newspapers. In his view, they were still far too underdeveloped and insincere 
compared to their counterparts in the UK and the US. He was particularly 
nervous when a draft proposal of the Four-Power Treaty was leaked to the 
Jiji Shinpo. In his memoirs, Shidehara asserted that the draft found its 
way into the hands of the papers’ special correspondent, Itō Masanori. 
Although there was some suspicion that it was Plenipotentiary Tokugawa 
who shared the draft with the Jiji Shinpo, the truth of the matter was 
never revealed.159
Incidents such as the one above help cast light on how Shidehara 
understood public relations. For Shidehara, public relations did not 
constitute the axis of diplomacy. On the contrary, there was now so much 
propaganda being produced that it could only damage Japan’s relationships 
with other nations. In his view, it was enough if Japan’s true nature and 
intentions were ‘correctly’ conveyed. In other words, Japan needed to 
promote itself and its interests in a ‘tranquil’ manner. Even if China were 
content to pursue ‘propaganda diplomacy’, Japan should not follow suit. 
While Japan’s subsequent efforts in creative public relations were more 
modest, Shidehara gradually came to appreciate their effectiveness.160 Yet, 
he continued to believe that what was essential was not public relations 
but negotiations themselves and the relationships of trust upon which 
they relied. Any other approach, in Shidehara’s opinion, was putting the 
cart before the horse.
Returning to Japan—the Great Kantō Earthquake
With the conclusion of the Washington Naval Conference, Shidehara 
returned to Japan for medical treatment in April 1922. Counsellor Saburi 
would serve as acting ambassador until February of the following year. 
Back in Japan, Shidehara spent his time in convalescence, reading and 
thought. Yet, this stay was interrupted by an unexpected disaster: the Great 
Kantō Earthquake of September 1923. Following the earthquake, a large 
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amount of aid was sent to Japan from the US. Surprisingly, the US was 
concerned that the Japanese people might be insulted if they thought they 
were being treated as an object of charity. For this reason, banker Thomas 
W. Lamont, of J. P. Morgan & Co., reached out to Finance Minister 
Inoue Junnosuke (1869–1932) of the Yamamoto cabinet to impress upon 
the Japanese government that US aid to Japan was being given with no 
ulterior motive.161
On the day of the earthquake, Shidehara was in Osaka. In his reflections 
on this time, he stated that, while passing between Nagoya and Nagano 
on his way back to Tokyo, he helped some Koreans who were being 
harassed. Unfortunately, the residence that Shidehara had purchased in the 
Surugadai district, near central Tokyo, was lost in the fires that followed 
the earthquake. Most of the several thousand books from Denison’s 
old library were turned to ash. Shidehara wrote that the few books that 
survived ‘were later also destroyed when my residence in Sendagaya was 
damaged in bombing in the spring of the twentieth year of Shōwa [1945]. 
So [in the end] not a single volume remained’. He added: ‘Whenever 
I think back on this loss, I am overwhelmed by emotion’.162
Following the earthquake, the Shidehara household received support from 
the Iwasaki family (who, it should be recalled, were the founders of the 
Mitsubishi financial conglomerate, and Shidehara’s wife Masako’s original 
family). The Iwasaki family bestowed on the Shidehara household the 
Rikugien garden in Komagome, which was to serve as a new residence. 
Rikugien was a famous garden in Tokyo from the Edo period. Shidehara 
moved there a few months before his appointment as foreign minister. 
At the time, however, Shidehara was not particularly looking forward to 
serving as foreign minister.
On this topic, we have testimony from Ishii Itarō. During Shidehara’s 
time as ambassador to the US, Ishii once happened to sit beside him in 
a railway car. Ishii took the opportunity to attempt to draw Shidehara 
out a little concerning his upcoming appointment as foreign minister. 
Shidehara, however, responded curtly: ‘No, no, I’m not fit to be foreign 
minister’. Reflecting upon his time as vice-minister for foreign affairs, 
he confided in Ishii that, because ‘the Japanese political world is truly 
quite complicated, a person like me is simply not cut out to be foreign 
minister’. In particular, Shidehara considered the Privy Council and the 
political parties to be simply too difficult for him to handle. Yet, despite 
Shidehara’s reservations, in June 1924 he became foreign minister. 
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The  next time he met Ishii, Shidehara greeted him with a wry smile. 
‘I didn’t want to become foreign minister; that’s just when they went and 
made me one.’163
Four Points in a Quarter Century
This initial chapter has traced Shidehara’s career path up to the moment 
that he assumed this important position. As noted earlier, this chapter 
sought to cover four main topics regarding this quarter century. Its findings 
are summarised below.
The first topic concerned the formation of Shidehara’s thinking. 
Shidehara’s ideal was British-style diplomacy. Here the influence of James 
Bryce and Sir Edward Grey was particularly significant. This does not 
mean, however, that Shidehara’s policies were necessarily pro-British, as 
shown by Shidehara’s initiative in abolishing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
While Shidehara also stayed in the US for a long time, he did not 
encounter an individual comparable in stature with Bryce or Grey. 
He was uncomfortable with the foreign policy ideals of President Wilson 
and considered Bryan a diplomatic novice. Shidehara’s relationship with 
Lansing was also strained, as evidenced from the proceedings of the Paris 
Peace Conference and the manner in which the US withdrew its troops 
from the Siberian Intervention. Shidehara was further aware, along with 
Foreign Minister Uchida, that behind the scenes of the negotiations 
surrounding a New Four-Power Consortium was a plan to secretly expand 
railways such as the Manchurian Railway into a continental railway. In the 
final phase of the New Four-Power Consortium negotiations, Shidehara 
strove to do his utmost as ambassador to the US to protect Japan’s interests 
in China.164
That said, more than a few of Shidehara’s policies were actually favourable 
towards the US. As vice-minister for foreign affairs, Shidehara had worked 
to restrain the Japanese army during the Siberian Intervention, while at 
the Washington Naval Conference he proactively adopted open door 
policy positions. Therefore, while it is certainly the case that British-style 
diplomacy represented Shidehara’s ideal, when it came to the concrete 
actions he took as a diplomat in this period, if anything, he was in closer 
alignment with the US. Shidehara understood that diplomatic ideals and 
the Japanese national interest were separate affairs.
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As I have shown in this chapter, however, Shidehara’s interpretation and 
application of an open door policy deserves closer scrutiny. Shidehara 
understood the open door provision of the Nine-Power Treaty in 
a restricted manner. For him, it referred primarily to equality of 
opportunity, that is, the sense of the term that Hay deployed in his first 
note. In other words, Shidehara was strictly opposed to any third nation 
intervening politically in China. This is why Shidehara, despite being on 
fairly congenial terms with Hughes, stood firmly against international 
management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile, when Hughes 
attempted to establish an open door policy investigative body, Shidehara 
ensured that it was as toothless as possible.
In summary, while Shidehara accepted a form of open door policy, he 
interpreted and applied that policy in a restricted sense to protect Japan’s 
interests on the Chinese continent. By accepting an open door policy as 
an ideal, Shidehara was able to use it to protect the reality of a defence 
of national interests in China. It should be kept in mind that Shidehara 
did not think that having an open door policy was only an ideal of US 
diplomacy. According to Shidehara, Japan’s pursuit of such a policy was 
a development that arose in the wake of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the 
Treaty of Portsmouth and the Franco-Japanese Treaty. This is another 
instance where the influence of Denison is visible. I have further noted in 
this chapter that Shidehara also saw the annexation of Korea as a natural 
development. It was also Shidehara who oversaw the removal of import 
duties on Korean rice after the annexation. We can see, therefore, how 
the open door principle was already understood in a restricted sense in 
this early period. If we also take into consideration the interpretation of 
the Korean provision in the Treaty of Portsmouth, then what emerges 
is a picture whereby pursuit of the open door principle, understood  in 
a  limited sense, actually helped to support the development of the 
Japanese empire.
We have also seen how the locus of Shidehara’s direct experience of Asia 
was Korea and not China. It was not until his time as vice-minister for 
foreign affairs that he would need to seriously confront issues surrounding 
China. Later, as ambassador to the US, he would take the lead directly and 
demonstrate that he was as good as anyone in dealing with Chinese issues 
on a broad basis. Yet he tended to be overly theoretical. Later diplomats 
such as Yoshida Shigeru, Arita Hachirō and Shigemitsu Mamoru were 
frequently richer in experience with regard to China.
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Finally, with respect to the formation of Shidehara’s thinking, two more 
details should be kept in mind. First, I noted that Shidehara greatly 
admired Washburn’s book Nogi and recommended its translation to an old 
school colleague. Second, I pointed out that Shidehara was apprehensive 
about the crown prince visiting the US.
The second main topic explored in this chapter was that of Shidehara’s 
diplomatic style. If it could be said that Shidehara had a formative 
experience, then that would be his witnessing of the commencement of 
the Russo-Japanese War while stationed in Busan. It was there that he 
was baptised in the conduct of ‘power politics’, which is based on the 
deployment of military power. Shidehara was also not squeamish about 
gunboat diplomacy and its attendant use of force. His later meeting 
with Denison, however, would be a turning point. It was thereafter that 
Shidehara would acquire a thorough knowledge of international law. It was 
also from Denison that he would hear behind the scenes anecdotes about 
the diplomacy relating to the commencement of the Russo-Japanese War.
Yet, despite the inside knowledge Shidehara acquired of how to conduct 
diplomatic negotiations, he did not simply follow the model set for 
him by Denison. Rather, Shidehara tried to follow the path of ‘honest 
diplomacy’, which he saw as the first principle in building relationships 
of trust with other nations. Shidehara’s thinking in this regard is shown 
in the way he handled public relations and the termination of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the Washington Naval Conference. At that 
conference, Shidehara even took the initiative in seeking a resolution to 
the Far East problem.
We can better understand Shidehara’s ‘honest diplomacy’ by contrasting 
it with the approach of Katō Takaaki. In his Twenty-One Demands issued 
to China, Foreign Minister Katō included Group 5 (the last and most 
aggressive set of demands) as leverage for subsequent negotiation. It was 
included without the expectation that the Chinese would acquiesce to 
it. In other words, Katō was here pursuing British-style imperialist 
diplomacy. This method would also be deployed by figures such as 
Foreign Minister Komura. From Katō’s perspective, therefore, the Twenty-
One Demands must have seemed fairly reasonable at the time of their 
conception. Yet the Wilson administration sought a more moral approach 
to international relations and reacted negatively to the Twenty-One 
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Demands. Katō’s approach therefore complicated affairs significantly for 
Japan.165 It is reasonable to assume that Shidehara would have learned 
from the failure of Katō’s diplomatic efforts here.
It was at just this time that the status of the European powers was beginning 
to decline, relative to the rise of the US. Shidehara’s response to this new 
global reality was to take the initiative in abolishing the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance and in pursuing an open door policy with respect to the Far East. 
This diplomatic style helped to establish Shidehara’s name internationally. 
It was also a style that was particularly compatible with the US.
The third topic I examined was Shidehara’s personal connections. I noted 
that, at first glance, Shidehara and Komura’s personalities appear to have 
been diametrically opposed. However, Shidehara’s concrete actions show 
that, along with individuals such as Moroi Rokurō, he actually supported 
Komura’s efforts at treaty revision. It must be added that Shidehara was 
not a fervent adherent to the view that Japan ought to become the future 
leader of East Asia. In this sense, therefore, Shidehara certainly was not 
Komura’s successor. I also pointed out that during his time as counsellor at 
the Japanese embassy in the US, Shidehara greatly respected Ambassador 
Chinda for his ability to go head-to-head in debating Secretary of 
State Bryan.
As vice-minister for foreign affairs, Shidehara flawlessly served five 
consecutive foreign ministers: Ishii Kikujirō, Terauchi Masatake, Motono 
Ichirō, Gotō Shinpei and Uchida Yasuya. It was under Foreign Minister 
Motono that Shidehara would take on the burden of formulating policy 
with respect to China. Shidehara’s relationship with Hara Takashi, 
meanwhile, was not exactly good at the outset. Yet he was gradually able 
to earn Hara’s trust.
As ambassador to the US, Shidehara made Debuchi Katsuji his right-
hand man. Once Debuchi left the embassy for a new role, Shidehara 
would place greater trust in Saburi Sadao, rather than Hirota Kōki. 
I have suggested that when it came to dealing with important issues, 
Shidehara preferred to work with subordinates whom he could trust. 
Shidehara’s close-knit relations with Debuchi and Saburi during his time 
as ambassador can actually be regarded as the origin of what would later 
be the ‘Shidehara clique’. These connections would later come to the fore 
once he assumed the office of foreign minister, as we shall see in more 
detail at the beginning of Chapter 3.
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The fourth and final topic for consideration was the impact that Shidehara 
had on how other foreign nations, and, in particular, the US, viewed Japan. 
Certainly, Shidehara gained a degree of international fame for his efforts 
during the Washington Naval Conference. A product of this conference 
was the formation of a cooperative international order that centred on 
Japan, the US and the UK. In academic circles this would be called 
the Washington System. The greatest personification of the diplomatic 
approach symbolised by the Washington System was Shidehara himself.
That said, the tide still did not turn fully in favour of the US cooperating 
with Japan. A tendency to favour China, visible in the speech and actions 
of Williams, was also adopted in the State Department by individuals 
such as Johnson and Hornbeck. It would not be until the conference in 
London to sign the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval 
Armament—during Shidehara’s second stint as foreign minister—
that a pro-Japanese force would begin to form on the US side, making 
it possible for Japanese diplomats to begin exploring how to build 
a relationship with them.
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3
Japan–US Relations and 
Chinese Nationalism
The Policy Factions of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs
The Western Group and the Reformist Group
The second Yamamoto Gonbē cabinet, formed at the time of the 
Great Kantō Earthquake, would resign en masse in December 1923. 
The  Yamamoto cabinet had taken responsibility for the assassination 
attempt on Crown Prince and Regent Hirohito, referred to as the 
Toranomon Incident.
Kiyoura Keigo (1850–1942), successor to the post of prime minister, was 
originally a government official and had been closely connected to the 
elder statesman Yamagata Aritomo, who had died in 1922. The Kiyoura 
cabinet’s main members treated the ‘Kenkyū-kai’ (Study Group) of the 
House of Peers as its nucleus, with the governing party consisting only 
of the Seiyū Hontō. For this reason, the ‘Goken Sanpa’—the name of 
a group comprised of three separate pro-constitution political factions: the 
Kenseikai, the Seiyūkai and the Kakushin Club—criticised the Kiyoura 
cabinet for being anachronistic. With the Goken Sanpa later achieving 
outright victory at the general election, a new cabinet was formed in June 
1924, led by the president of the Kenseikai, Katō Takaaki.
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Because the governing parties represented in the Katō cabinet included the 
Kenseikai, the Seiyūkai and the Kakushin Club, it was also referred to as 
the Goken Sanpa cabinet. The Katō cabinet was further known for actions 
such as its enactment of universal suffrage for men. As it happens, it was 
as part of the Katō cabinet that Shidehara would serve as foreign minister 
for the first time. Shidehara was 51 years old. Party-based cabinets would 
continue from that point until the attempted coup d’état of 15 May 1932 
(known as the May 15 Incident). During this period, Shidehara would 
serve as foreign minister for a total of over five years in Kenseikai-aligned 
cabinets, including the Katō cabinet, the first Wakatsuki cabinet, the 
Hamaguchi cabinet and the second Wakatsuki cabinet.
Before covering Shidehara’s time as foreign minister, I would like to clarify 
some of the personal relations within the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.1 In general, Shidehara, Debuchi Katsuji, Satō Naotake and Hirota 
Kōki have collectively been referred to as the ‘Western group’, a clique 
oriented towards the major Western nations, due to the emphasis they 
placed on Japan’s relationship with Europe and the US. This group’s 
overall views initially dominated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
By contrast, when Arita Hachirō became director-general of the ministry’s 
Asian Bureau in September 1927, he helped establish his own group, known 
as the ‘Asia group’ or the ‘reformists’. Along with Arita, the reformists 
also included figures such as Shigemitsu Mamoru, Tani Masayuki and 
Shiratori Toshio. Of course, while we can speak of the ‘Western group’ 
or the ‘reformists’, neither was a monolithic entity. For example, as noted 
in Chapter 1 (Section 5: The Washington Naval Conference), when 
Shidehara served as ambassador to the US, he relied upon Saburi Sadao 
more than Hirota. Hirota, too, was close to the reformists.2
The reformists originated in a society within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs known as the Gaimushō Kakushin Dōshikai (Reform Association 
of Kindred Spirits of the Foreign Ministry). This was a society created by 
younger diplomats who had participated in the Paris Peace Conference—
including Arita, Shigemitsu, Saitō Hiroshi and Horinouchi Kensuke—to 
work towards structural reform. The society had around 40 members. 
It should be noted that Shiratori, who played an important role in the 
reformists, maintained positive relations with Shidehara up until the 
Manchurian Incident of September 1931. After that incident, however, 
the reformists proceeded to take control over the direction of the ministry. 
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The reformists also had their own internal divisions, with a Shiratori 
clique facing off against Arita and his supporters. Individuals such as 
Arita, Shigemitsu and Tani became known as the ‘traditionalists’.3 The 
actions of the reformists are particularly instructive for understanding 
Japanese diplomacy in the 1930s. For it was they who would go to make 
up the core of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the years following the 
Manchurian Incident.
What about the Western group? It was in fact Shidehara who, as a member 
of the Western group, acted as a pivotal figure in the ministry in the 1920s. 
Extensive research has been conducted on Shidehara’s two terms as foreign 
minister. That research characterises Shidehara as seeking cooperation 
with the US and the UK, and as a proponent of economism. With 
respect to China, Shidehara is portrayed as both a non-interventionist 
and someone who sought to foster the establishment of order. How 
prior commentators have evaluated Shidehara has depended upon which 
of these aspects they viewed as of greater significance.4 How were these 
different aspects coordinated in Shidehara’s thinking? Further, what kind 
of principle, if any, can we identify at the base of his policies? On these 
points, commentators have not yet arrived at a stable interpretation. One 
reason for this, I suggest, is the lack of analysis of his personal relations 
and of his policy process.
Among the Western group, it is particularly important to pay attention to 
the policy group that would best be referred to as the ‘Shidehara clique’. 
Within this clique, we can trace a direct line of descent, as it were, from 
Shidehara to individuals such as Debuchi Katsuji and Saburi Sadao. It is 
they who would make up, for a time, the core actors in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Yet, as seen in the case of Shidehara not talking to Hirota, 
the Western group was not united in belonging to the Shidehara clique. 
These kinds of internal connections and divisions are, in my view, very 
important. Yet, for some reason, they have not previously been properly 
analysed. Thus, it would be valuable to shed some light on what kind 
of people Shidehara worked with and to achieve which goals.
The publication of Debuchi’s diary is particularly significant in this 
respect, given his close relationship with Shidehara. As it happens, thus 
far, relatively little research has made substantial use of Debuchi’s diary. 
In the case of Saburi, whom Shidehara relied upon so strongly, we see that 
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research has merely emphasised the role he had to play in such matters as 
the Beijing Special Conference on Tariffs.5 It can be said, therefore, that 
empirical research on the Shidehara clique has only now gotten underway.
To put it another way, investigations into the Shidehara clique are still 
insufficient compared with the research that has been carried out on the 
reformists. It seems that this has occurred because it was assumed that 
Shidehara simply took the initiative with respect to the actions of this 
clique. Yet if we are to deepen our understanding of Shidehara, we must 
not neglect more in-depth analysis of this personal connection and his 
policy process. There are five reasons for this, which I shall now outline.
First, Shidehara tended to advance his policies by coordinating with 
trusted subordinates. This approach was already evident during his time 
as ambassador to the US. Once he assumed the role of foreign minister as 
well, he preferred not to rely too much upon opinions from outside his 
own circle.
Second, Shidehara’s experience of overseas postings was quite unbalanced. 
His longest posting abroad was in Korea. In all, Shidehara spent a little 
over five years at Incheon and Busan. His time in the US was also quite 
long, at nearly five years. In the case of the UK, Shidehara’s posting lasted 
two years and a few months. He also spent some time in Belgium and the 
Netherlands. However, he never had any direct experience with China.
Third, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs underwent organisational 
expansion. Because the workload expanded significantly at the time of 
the Paris Peace Conference, the ministry first responded by establishing 
the Treaties and Conventions Bureau. Then, in 1920, the Political 
Affairs Bureau was divided up into the Asian Bureau and the American 
and European Bureau. The Asian Bureau was, in turn, formed of three 
divisions, in charge of general diplomacy, finance and economy, and 
Japanese expatriates, respectively. The American and European Bureau also 
had three divisions, in charge of Russia, Europe and the US, respectively. 
Given that Shidehara was a product of the diplomatic service exam and 
sought to act in the established framework of the ministry, understanding 
what kind of organisational changes occurred is important.
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Fourth, the number of employees at the ministry increased sharply during 
this period. When Shidehara took the fourth diplomatic service exam, he 
was one of only four individuals who passed. Twenty years or so later, in 
the period following World War I, the number of successful candidates for 
the exam on a given occasion would grow to be more than 20. In 1920 
and 1921, in particular, the number of incoming staff was closer to 40. 
Capable personnel were even recruited from outside the ministry. When 
Shidehara assumed the role of foreign minister, the total ministry staff had 
grown to more than 1,100. This indicates that, regardless of whether he 
was foreign minister, it would not be a simple task to steer the ministry 
as a whole in the direction he wanted it to go.6
Fifth, and finally, negotiations with institutions such as the army and the 
navy would be conducted by someone of at least the rank of director-
general of bureaus. A classic example would be the Kiyoura cabinet’s 
policy platform regarding China. This platform was deliberated over by 
Debuchi, who was then the director-general of the Asian Bureau. On this 
occasion Debuchi attempted to restrain the army’s policy of advancement 
into northern Manchuria. This indicates the extent to which Shidehara 
relied upon the Asian Bureau staffs, and in particular Director-General 
Debuchi, on matters concerning policy on China.
Keeping these points in mind, I seek to clarify the nature of Shidehara’s 
policy process and personal connections for his first term as foreign 
minister. An examination of what Shidehara left in the hands of his 
trusted subordinates, and of what was thereby achieved, allows us to better 
understand the reality of ‘Shidehara diplomacy’. In some cases, actions 
that were thought to have arisen from Shidehara’s own decision-making 
may turn out to have actually been cases of bottom-up policymaking. 
Therefore, in the discussion that follows, I will begin by tracing the 
formation of the Shidehara clique, before moving on to topics such as 
Shidehara’s relationship with Prime Minister Katō, Shidehara’s diplomatic 
ideals, the relationship between China and Japan, the US immigration 
problem, ministry personnel, economic diplomacy and policy on the 
Soviet Union.
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The Formation of the Shidehara Faction
Our first step shall be to look at the formation of the Shidehara clique, 
by way of Shidehara’s relationships with Debuchi and Saburi. For this 
reason, it is necessary to take a step backward and return to the era 
of Shidehara’s service as the ambassador to the US. Shidehara arrived at 
his posting in Washington in November 1919. Of the various problems 
that exacerbated Japanese–American tensions during the Wilson 
administration, the primary one was opposition in the US to Japanese 
immigration. Naturally, Shidehara did his best to resolve this problem. 
Yet this was not the only issue. Japan and the US were also at odds over 
matters such as the Siberia expedition, the Shandong problem and the 
New Four-Power Consortium.7
When Shidehara became ambassador, the Wilson administration was 
already nearing its end. Moreover, the office of secretary of state was in 
transition from Lansing to Colby. This meant that the third undersecretary 
of state, Breckinridge Long, had to play a larger role, as he was frequently 
assigned to negotiations with Japan. Shidehara would make frequent use 
of Counsellor Debuchi for his negotiations with Long. Of the various 
issues discussed, it was that of the New Four-Power Consortium that saw 
the greatest progress.8 Originally, it was Lamont, representative of the US 
bankers, who received attention for his role in the development of the 
New Four-Power Consortium. Certainly, Lamont displayed a willingness 
to go along with Japan’s position and contributed significantly to the 
establishment of the consortium.9
Yet in the State Department, it was none other than Long who would 
collaborate with Lamont. This fact has been acknowledged by MacMurray, 
chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. When in negotiations with 
Debuchi and others, Long wrote, in correspondence to Lamont, that 
‘it  is  necessary to get Japan to become a member of the Consortium’. 
He added, ‘we are prepared to admit that Japan has certain specified vested 
interests in Manchuria, and that these be excepted from the operations 
of the Consortium’.10 In other words, Long was more conciliatory with 
respect to Japan than even Lamont. Shidehara would have been made 
aware of this fact from Debuchi’s group. This was why he was able to 
pressure Long further, as though he had seen through the intentions 
of the US side. In the words of Long, Shidehara:
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Spoke of the use of the word veto, and asked whether it was 
proposed  by the use of it that Japan should not have the 
right to prevent those activities which might be aimed at her 
national interest.11
Here, too, Long replied in a way that seemed to accept Shidehara’s wishes.
In this manner, Shidehara did his best to secure Japan’s special interests 
in China. Meanwhile, Lamont, working through the commercial firm 
J. P. Morgan, sought to pressure Undersecretary of State Long and Polk 
to accept a settlement.12 An agreement concerning the New Four-Power 
Consortium would finally be reached in May 1920. During this period, 
Debuchi was transferred to Germany to serve as an embassy counsellor. 
Shidehara therefore turned to his first secretary, Saburi Sadao, for help 
with negotiations with the US. As it happened, Saburi was originally 
known within the ministry as a specialist on France. His assignment to 
the embassy in the US, therefore, was due to the support he received 
from Shidehara. Back when Shidehara was serving as vice-minister for 
foreign affairs, Saburi had been serving as the French language instructor 
to Crown Prince Hirohito. He had ‘no experience at all of the U.K. or 
the U.S.’. When Saburi heard that Shidehara ‘would go to the US as the 
ambassador, he approached me with the request that he also go, because 
he wished to see the U.S.’.13 Assenting to this request, Shidehara worked 
to ensure Saburi’s assignment to the US.
In summary, Shidehara tended to advance his policy goals through 
coordination with his trusted subordinates. In particular, he relied heavily 
upon Debuchi and Saburi. At the Washington Naval Conference, Saburi 
would participate from the outset, while Debuchi also assisted as senior 
officer of the public relations section. Eventually, both Debuchi and Saburi 
supported Shidehara as the foreign minister, with Debuchi becoming the 
director-general of the Asian Bureau and Saburi the director-general of the 
International Trade Bureau. (See Table 2 on important ministry personnel 
in the 1920s.) Let us look at what roles Shidehara assigned Debuchi and 
Saburi to and what this says about his own diplomatic goals.
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The Spirit of the Washington 
Naval Conference
Shidehara and Katō
On 11 June 1924, the Goken Sanpa cabinet was formed, headed by Katō 
Takaaki. Informally, it was almost decided that the post of foreign minister 
would go not to Shidehara but to Ishii Kikujirō, who was then ambassador 
to France. At the very last minute, the position went to Shidehara.14 Why 
did Shidehara ultimately become the foreign minister instead of Ishii? 
One interview provides Ishii’s account of the circumstances:
On one occasion, Mr. Katō (Takaaki) said that if he were to form 
his administration, he would very much like to give me the office 
of foreign minister. But I responded by refusing the offer. It could 
make things uncomfortable, given that Shidehara was a relative 
[of Katō]. But basically, I recommended him as the most suitable 
candidate. Later, during my second term as ambassador to France, 
Count Katō did actually get to form a government. I wrote a letter 
right away, just to state that my opinion was the same as before, 
and that I would prefer to not take on that position.15
In other words, Ishii declined the post of foreign minister and instead 
recommended Shidehara. Katō responded by appointing Shidehara, 
rather than Ishii or the previous foreign minister, Matsui. What was Katō’s 
true intention here? Shidehara and Ishii did not have vastly different 
conceptions of foreign affairs. And, from the beginning, Shidehara had 
had a close relationship with Ishii. In fact, it was Ambassador to France 
Ishii who secured the role of vice-minister for foreign affairs in the second 
Ōkuma cabinet for Shidehara.16 It was at that point that Ishii was internally 
thought to be the best candidate to succeed Katō as foreign minister.
Naturally, Ishii was therefore regarded as belonging to Katō’s political 
faction. It was only appropriate that Ishii would go on to assume the 
role of foreign minister in Katō’s own cabinet. Yet if Katō had made this 
decision, there would have been political complications. Hence, for the 
above reasons, it would ultimately be Shidehara who would become 
foreign minister in the Katō cabinet. In fact, Shidehara would be the very 
first foreign minister to enter the ministry through the diplomatic service 
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exam. Until that point, foreign ministers were typically chosen more on 
the basis of their personal connections than the circumstances of their 
entry into the ministry.
The previous foreign minister, Matsui Keishirō, also exemplified this 
older way of doing things. Matsui stated:
When I was thinking of securing a job that concerned foreign 
nations, I spoke with Mr. Hatoyama Kazuo [director-general 
of the Investigation Bureau and, simultaneously, a professor of 
law], because he seemed to have some status within the ministry. 
He was warm to the idea and said he would put in a word with 
Katō Takaaki, so I should go and introduce myself. When I went 
to visit him in Surugadai, he gave me his approval, so then it was 
decided that I would go work at the Foreign Ministry. All I had to 
do was wait for the summons after I graduated.17
By contrast, Shidehara, as a member of the generation who entered via 
the diplomatic service exam system, was a model official. Figures such as 
Hara Takashi and Yamagata Aritomo were initially cautious of Shidehara, 
whom they saw as belonging to the Katō clique. Yet despite being 
something of an arch-rival of Katō, Hara at least would gradually come 
to trust Shidehara. He would even go so far as to have Shidehara succeed 
Ishii for the role of ambassador to the US. This speaks to how Shidehara 
was regarded as less politically partisan than Ishii.
A talk by Nagai Matsuzō is instructive on this point. Nagai had a close 
relationship with Shidehara and served under him as vice-minister for 
foreign affairs during Shidehara’s second term as foreign minister. This is 
what Nagai had to say:
I have worked under Minister Ishii Kikujirō as well as under 
Minister Shidehara Kijūrō, and Viscount Ishii had the sharper 
mind. Mr. Shidehara was careful, but I am not sure he was 
particularly politically minded. Really, it was Uchida Yasuya who 
did not show much in the way of brilliance. However, he was 
good with people and quite a capable drinker. His personality like 
a rubber doll is well liked by everybody, I suppose.
Katō Takaaki was not familiar with the U.S. At the time, I was 
director of the Immigration Division, around the time when the 
whole immigration problem was basically getting resolved. Then, 
when [Katō] became minister, he came around to our area, and 
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delivered his judgment of the whole thing right there on the spot: 
‘Those Americans can’t be trusted. You can negotiate with them as 
long as you like, and it will not get you anywhere.’18
So why did Katō choose the less politically oriented Shidehara as the 
foreign minister? If we interpret his action logically, it would seem that, 
in considering his choices, Katō had his eye fixed on Saionji Kinmochi. 
Saionji was the last of Japan’s genrō (elder statesmen). Certainly, it was no 
longer the golden age of the genrō, yet it was still they who approved the 
succeeding prime minister for leading the nation. To be able to decide 
who would head the cabinet was itself a great power.
The problem Katō faced was that he had a poor reputation in the wake 
of the Twenty-One Demands issued to China. For Katō, therefore, it was 
imperative that he take an action that could help eliminate Saionji’s 
suspicion. For this reason, it was desirable for him to assign a more neutral 
figure such as Shidehara, rather than Ishii, who was more firmly in Katō’s 
camp. Thus, Katō left diplomatic affairs to Shidehara in order to preserve 
some continuity in Japan’s foreign policy.
The Diet held on 1 July 1924 seemed to hint at Katō’s decision on 
this matter. This was Katō’s first address to the Diet as prime minister. 
Contrary to expectations, he hardly addressed diplomatic issues at all. 
He merely expressed ‘regret’ that the US had passed the Japanese Exclusion 
Act, which was scheduled for enactment that very day. According to the 
preface of the influential journal Gaikō Jihō (Diplomatic review):
It may seem that he had simply dropped the matter of the China 
problem as though he had forgotten it, yet this [omission] was 
actually reflective of Prime Minister Katō’s administrative policy.19
In other words, perhaps Katō had intentionally avoided touching upon 
the China problem, given its controversial nature.
Shidehara was the next to take the podium after Katō. Shidehara asserted 
the need to ‘maintain continuity in matters of diplomatic policy’, claiming 
that this would also help ‘preserve the dignity of the nation’.20 Shidehara’s 
approach towards diplomacy would eventually earn the trust of Saionji. 
While there may have been a mixed reception in general, Shidehara’s more 
cordial relationship with Saionji was extremely valuable to the Kenseikai.
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Shidehara and Debuchi
What kind of diplomacy did Shidehara initially pursue in the Katō 
cabinet? The longstanding issue at the time was how to deal with China. 
To better understand Shidehara’s approach, it helps to look at his address 
to the Diet. As mentioned above, his initial address was given on 1 July 
1924. The venue was the House of Peers. There Shidehara advanced the 
following position with respect to China:
When it comes to the domestic political circumstances of China, 
we need to avoid getting overly involved. Furthermore, we need 
to avoid taking measures that appear to ignore China’s reasonable 
positions. When it comes to China, for some time now, we 
have worked towards bringing Japan and China closer together 
economically, under the ideal of equal opportunity … As you are 
all well aware, at the time of the Washington Naval Conference, 
various treaties were signed that concern China … These 
prescribed policies are in complete accord with those policies we 
have sought to take. Therefore, the government’s intention is to 
act in a manner that is consistent to the spirit of these treaties.21
In summary, Shidehara declared that Japan would not interfere in China’s 
politics but would instead seek closer economic relations between the two 
countries on the basis of equal opportunity. The goal was to help forge 
an international order in accordance with the spirit of the Washington 
Naval Conference. This stance was naturally understood as constituting 
the essence of Shidehara diplomacy.
Yet it should be pointed out that, at the time, Shidehara’s address was not 
necessarily warmly regarded. To quote once more from Gaikō Jihō:
The address of Foreign Minister Shidehara was like something 
by a new editor of a provincial newspaper tasked with writing 
an editorial on diplomatic problems for the first time. It neither 
included any real aims nor had any clear central message.22
In other words, the journal harshly criticised Shidehara’s address as not 
only unoriginal but empty of meaning.
How should such strong criticism be interpreted? It may help to consider 
the Diet address of former foreign minister Matsui:
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With regard to the peaceful unification of China, an improvement 
of the conditions of that country is a task that falls upon its citizens. 
It is they who need to awaken to the needs of the day, and apply 
their efforts. It is not the place of outsiders to overly interfere in 
their matters … We need instead to work towards a complete 
understanding between the peoples of Japan and China and be 
resolute in promoting further cultural and economic relations … 
In the case of the Washington Conference, we will honor the spirit 
of the various treaties and decisions made there, and on that basis, 
take necessary steps with respect to our policy on China.23
Matsui’s address was given on 22 January 1924—only half a year before 
Shidehara’s address. In this address, Matsui maintained that, while 
Japan ought to maintain its stance of non-intervention, in the hopes of 
promoting peace and national unity within China, it also needed to push 
forward with developing closer cultural and economic ties between the 
two nations, while also respecting the spirit of the Washington Naval 
Conference. There was no essential difference between Matsui’s address 
and Shidehara’s. Thus, the ideals expressed in Shidehara’s speech can 
hardly be regarded as his own unique stance; instead, they were already 
identifiable within senior diplomatic circles from an earlier stage.
As to why Shidehara’s and Matsui’s speeches were so similar, the key 
here is Debuchi. As director-general of the Asian Bureau, Debuchi 
supported both Matsui and Shidehara during their respective terms as 
foreign minister. Debuchi, who had previously supported Shidehara 
during his time as ambassador to the US, went to Beijing in the period 
after the Washington Naval Conference to negotiate some of the details 
regarding the Shandong Treaty that had been signed at the conference. 
These negotiations began in June 1922 and were concluded in December. 
The committee chief of the Japanese side was Obata, then minister to 
China. Debuchi assisted Obata as a member of the committee, alongside 
Secretary-General Kimura Eiichi and others. The committee chief of the 
Chinese side, meanwhile, was Wang Zhengting.24
Debuchi would go on to become director-general of the Asian Bureau 
in May 1923. Debuchi was proud of the work he had done alongside 
Shidehara in successfully concluding the negotiations at the Washington 
Naval Conference. For this reason, he forcefully argued to Foreign 
Minister Ijūin and Vice-Minister Matsudaira of the Yamamoto cabinet 
that ‘the Washington treaties be followed as our guiding principles’. 
However, Debuchi was dissatisfied with Ijūin. This was primarily due 
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to their differences on policy on China. Debuchi sought to promote 
cultural undertakings with regard to China. In fact, Wang Zhengting, 
former Chinese foreign minister, even visited Debuchi once to discuss 
the issue of the lynching of innocent Chinese people in the aftermath of 
the Great Kantō Earthquake. Ijūin, meanwhile, had no interest in such 
matters. Further, from Debuchi’s perspective, Ijūin tended to hire people 
on the basis of favouritism. For example, he declined to make former 
minister to China Obata the ambassador to Germany, instead choosing 
Honda Kumatarō.25
The Kiyoura cabinet was formed in January 1924. The position of foreign 
minister went to Matsui Keishirō. When he made the address quoted 
above, the section on China was actually written by Debuchi. The main 
points were the following:
(1) The desirability of peace in China; (2) non-intervention in 
Chinese affairs; (3) cooperation between the citizens of the two 
nations; (4) the importance of cooperation conducted with a spirit 
of autonomy; (5) respect for the spirit of the Washington Naval 
Conference.26 
These were principles, therefore, that predated Shidehara’s promotion 
to foreign minister, and they were previously prepared by Debuchi. 
Moreover, it was also Debuchi who was able to impose an arms embargo 
on the warlord Zhang Zuolin.
With the beginning of the Katō cabinet in June of the same year, 
Shidehara, as foreign minister, internally shared an outline of his planned 
Diet address with the directors-general of the different ministry bureaus. 
Debuchi, after seeing a draft of the address, ‘made substantial revisions 
to the section concerning China’.27 The result was the kind of address 
seen in the excerpt above. This is all to say that the reason Matsui’s and 
Shidehara’s addresses were similar was that, in each case, Debuchi added 
his own, not inconsiderable changes. Of course, it was Shidehara himself 
who had influenced Debuchi considerably during his time as ambassador 
to the US. It was in this way that Shidehara’s diplomatic ideals began to 
take hold within Japanese diplomatic circles in general, even before he 
became foreign minister.
In the autumn of 1924, a conflict erupted in China between the Zhili 
and Fengtian military cliques. This conflict is known as the Second Zhili–
Fengtian War. At cabinet meetings at this time, Shidehara had to fight 
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for his position without support. The Katō cabinet was leaning towards 
sending troops to China, urged on by the minister for agriculture and 
commerce, Takahashi Korekiyo. Nevertheless, Shidehara continued to 
argue against intervention. It should, of course, be kept in mind that 
Shidehara’s non-interventionist stance was not at all arbitrary. Rather, he 
had his own underlying reasoning that supported his view of the situation.
At the cabinet meeting, Shidehara made the following statement:
Even if Wu Peifu [of the Zhili clique] wins and enters Dongsan 
Province (the ‘Three Northeast Provinces’ that would later become 
subsumed within the puppet state of Manchukuo), his forces will 
be fully engaged, with no reserves for deployment elsewhere … 
Feng Yuxiang [also of the Zhili clique] is in Zhangjiakou; however, 
he is not well disposed towards Wu. He is not going to just sit back 
and watch Wu capture more territory.28
In response, Prime Minister Katō went so far as to criticise Shidehara’s 
position as ‘meaningless’.29 After a furious debate, Shidehara submitted 
his resignation to Kato, but was appeased. 
As it happened, the Second Zhili–Fengtian War played out as Shidehara 
predicted, with Japan managing to secure its interests in China 
without incident. However, behind the scenes, the Japanese army was 
lending support to Feng Yuxiang. It was at this time that Asian Bureau 
Director-General Debuchi lent his support to Shidehara’s policy of non-
intervention. Debuchi organised a three-party meeting with the Ministry 
of War and the Navy Ministry, whereupon ‘it was decided that a basic 
policy of non-intervention would be followed’. Debuchi also ‘emphasized 
the importance of a non-intervention policy’ to the Seiyūkai and 
Seiyūhontō parties.30
It should be noted that Debuchi played a significant role in handling 
coordination with the army and navy during Shidehara’s first term as 
foreign minister. Shidehara and Debuchi also shared similar ideals. 
Shidehara once argued, regarding international politics in the era after the 
Paris Peace Conference:
We must speak of a future where the abuse of military force is 
swept away, where the ideology of invasion is rejected, where all 
international problems are resolved through cooperation based 
upon mutual respect of the parties involved, as well as upon an 
understanding that is shared between all the peoples of the world.31
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In December 1924, Debuchi was promoted from Asian Bureau director-
general to vice-minister for foreign affairs. This change also had an impact 
on Shidehara’s policy of non-intervention. With Debuchi now extremely 
busy working as vice-minister for foreign affairs, coordination with the 
military became more difficult. It should be remembered that this situation 
was in the context of Japan’s response to the ‘Guo Songling Incident’ 
of this period. The Guo Songling Incident was a rebellion launched in 
November 1925 by General Guo Songling against the Fengtian clique 
leader Zhang Zuolin. In response, Japan issued a warning and was able 
to force Guo Songling’s army to retreat by increasing the size of the 
Kwantung Army.32
In August 1926, in the first phase of the ‘Northern Expedition’, Matsui 
Iwane, chief of the Second Bureau of the Office of Army General Staff, 
argued that peace should be recommended to the various armies of China. 
The Northern Expedition was a military campaign inside China. It was 
launched from Guangzhou by Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), leader 
of the National Revolutionary Army, for the purpose of defeating the 
Beiyang government. However, Matsui’s proposal for promoting peace 
was rejected by Asian Bureau Director-General Kimura Seiichi. Kimura, 
as Debuchi’s successor to the post, was also concerned about Japan’s 




Along with Debuchi, another individual who was regarded as belonging 
to Shidehara’s coterie was Saburi Sadao. As an embassy counsellor, Saburi 
had previously worked as a plenipotentiary attendant at the Washington 
Naval Conference, under Ambassador Shidehara to the US. In May 1924, 
Saburi was relieved of his position in the US. Upon returning to Japan, 
he became the director-general of the International Trade Bureau in 
September that year, following a brief period as acting director-general. 
The previous director-general of the bureau, Nagai Matsuzō, had required 
a period of convalescence.34
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Traditionally, the International Trade Bureau had not been viewed as 
of particular importance within the ministry. One entry in Debuchi’s 
diary even stated: ‘In the vice-minister’s office, we debated the matter of 
abolishing the International Trade Bureau’.35 Horiuchi Tateki, who had 
long served in the bureau, was dissatisfied with its low position inside 
the ministry. This was because, in his view, ‘from the perspective of 
Japan, within it lay the fate of economic diplomacy occupying a central 
position’.36 Horiuchi was also in charge of handling practical affairs for 
the Gaimushō Kakushin Dōshikai. 
So, what did Shidehara wish to promote through Saburi and the 
International Trade Bureau? The bureau was responsible for economic 
and immigration matters. The first issue that Shidehara and Saburi 
needed to engage with was the immigration problem in the US. Let us 
go back in time a little now to revisit the roots of this issue. In 1908, an 
informal agreement between Japan and the US ensured that, in exchange 
for a voluntary restriction in the number of vessels crossing over, Japanese 
individuals could still immigrate to the US. It should be noted that, at 
this time, the immigration of Asian people from countries other than 
Japan was already prohibited. However, towards the end of May 1924, the 
US Congress enacted a Japanese Exclusion Act. A clause in the new law 
forbade foreigners who were not eligible for naturalisation from entering 
the country. This effectively outlawed the immigration of all Japanese 
individuals. In reaction, anti-US protest movements spread across Japan. 
Japan was sensitive to matters of racial discrimination and had sought 
for its citizens the status of ‘honorary whites’.
With the Japanese Exclusion Act passing in the US, Shidehara tended to 
be viewed as lacking any plan for dealing with the immigration problem. 
In reality, however, Shidehara had been deeply involved with this issue 
even before becoming foreign minister. While serving as ambassador to 
the US, Shidehara had been concerned about the influence of the 1920 
Alien Land Law that had passed in California—the law that prohibited 
Japanese people from leasing land. In October 1920, immediately before 
the passing of the bill, Shidehara had put pressure on Secretary of State 
Colby. He urged Colby to speak out as a representative of the federal 
government ‘for the purpose of allaying popular excitement in Japan’.37 
However, Colby believed he could not agree to Shidehara’s request. 
Taking into account matters such as the situation in California, he was 
very cautious about issuing any government statement.
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As mentioned earlier, Saburi left his posting in the US in 1924. On his 
way back to Japan, he visited the West Coast of the US to investigate 
the immigration problem. Undersecretary of State Phillips, after being 
informed by Saburi of his findings, wrote in his diary that Saburi ‘has 
done much during the last few years to help good relations between the 
two countries’.38
Of those individuals in Japan at that time who made proposals on what 
to do about the Japanese Exclusion Act, one was Sakatani Yoshirō, 
member of the House of Peers. Sakatani discussed the issue with Foreign 
Minister Matsui, as well as the director of the Immigration Division of the 
International Trade Bureau, Akamatsu Hiroyuki. After returning to Japan, 
Saburi reached out to Sakatani. Meanwhile, Shidehara had returned earlier 
than Saburi and was waiting for his new posting. Saburi and International 
Trade Bureau Director-General Nagai provided detailed explanations on 
the developments behind the passing of the Japanese Exclusion Act to 
Shidehara and financier Shibusawa Eiichi.39
Around March 1924, the Kiyoura cabinet examined the possibility 
of sending Shibusawa, along with the privy councillor and chairman of 
the America–Japan Society, Kaneko Kentarō, to the US to help alleviate 
anti-Japanese sentiment. Shidehara, still waiting for his next posting, was 
invited by Kiyoura to the Prime Minister’s Office where he discussed 
the matter with individuals such as Foreign Minister Matsui, Kaneko, 
Shibusawa, Uchida Yasuya and Chinda Sutemi. According to Matsui, 
‘Viscount Kaneko got very hot under the collar while debating, while by 
comparison, Shidehara primarily sought to discuss the matter by putting 
himself into the shoes of his interlocutors’.40 Shidehara did his best to 
calm down Kaneko, who was very much in favour of the expedition. 
However, Matsui and Ambassador to the US Hanihara believed that such 
an expedition might complicate matters further. In the end, therefore, the 
plan was scuttled.
Later, towards the end of May, the Japanese Exclusion Act was formally 
enacted into law in Washington. In response, several protesters in Japan 
committed suicide in various public areas, including in front of the US 
embassy. At the National Sports Hall in Ryōgoku, a Kokumin Taibei 
Taikai (People’s Meeting against the US) was held as a protest rally. 
Individuals involved in the organising of such gatherings included Ioki 
Ryōzō, Hatoyama Ichirō, Nagaoka Gaishi, Umeya Shōkichi, Shiroiwa 
Ryūhei, Mochitsuki Kotarō, Tōyama Mitsuru, Ogawa Heikichi, Nagai 
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Ryūtarō, Uesugi Shinkichi, Kuzū Yoshihisa, Miki Bukichi, Tomizu 
Hiroto, Okazaki Kunisuke, Tachibana Koichirō, Baba Tsunego, Nishihara 
Kamezō, Uchida Ryōhei and Shinobu Junpei.41
It was within this broader context that, on 31 May, Ambassador Hanihara 
personally delivered his letter of protest to Secretary of State Hughes. 
While the Kiyoura cabinet decided on the delivery of the letter, it was 
Shidehara who actually wrote it. According to Shidehara’s memoirs, at the 
request of Foreign Minister Matsui, he:
Drafted the letter of protest to the U.S. in English. When I read 
it over, I personally felt that it was an extremely polished piece of 
work. Matsui then read it out word for word during the cabinet 
meeting … Whereupon it was passed.42
Shidehara himself was quite unenthusiastic about the idea of formally 
issuing a protest with the US. When Matsui consulted him about the 
letter, Shidehara stated: ‘Whatever form of protest is carried out, it will 
ultimately not succeed in changing the mind of the US government’.43 
Because International Trade Bureau Director-General Nagai was 
unwell, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assigned Akamatsu, director of 
the Immigration Division, and Ministry Adviser Baty to handle this 
matter. Shidehara continued to view the formal protest as ‘ill-advised’. 
Nevertheless, Shidehara entrusted the final decision to Foreign Minister 
Matsui: ‘As I am not the individual responsible, the one who must decide 
whether to submit it [the letter] is Minister Matsui’.44 Although Matsui 
did have the letter delivered to the US government, the content ended up 
largely reflecting Shidehara’s own views. Soon afterward, when Shidehara 
assumed the post of foreign minister, he would discontinue Japan’s protests 
over the immigration issue.
Publication of Diplomatic Documents and the 
Immigration Committee
Shidehara became foreign minister on 11 June 1924. Half a month had 
already passed since the Japanese Exclusion Act was enacted into law by 
the US Congress. Shidehara’s view at that time was that actions needed 
to be taken to help restore relations between Japan and the US, while 
at the same time domestic and foreign popular opinion needed to be 
taken into consideration. His first step was to make public the diplomatic 
documents that had been used for negotiations between Japan and the 
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US. In response to this decision, Hanihara, Japan’s ambassador to the 
US, sought to make sure that the classified documents handed to Hughes 
in December 1923 and January 1924 were not made public without the 
consent of the US government.45
Despite Hanihara’s submission, in July 1924, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs went ahead and published two collections of official documents. 
These were titled, respectively, 1924 Nen Beikoku Imin-hō Seitei oyobi 
Kore nikansuru Nichi-Bei Kōshō Keika (The US Immigration Act of 1924 
and the process of Japan–US negotiations) and 1924 Nen Beikoku Imin-
hō Seitei oyobi Kore nikansuru Nichi-Bei Kōshō Keika Kōbunsho Eibun 
Fuzokusho (The US Immigration Act of 1924 and the process of Japan–
US negotiations, supplementary English-language official documents). 
Both monographs exceeded 200 pages. It was unprecedented for Japan to 
publish a collection of diplomatic documents relating to an ongoing issue 
in this manner. According to the foreword in these publications, they ‘were 
swiftly compiled in the hopes that they would be released before the end 
of the current special session of the Diet’.46 While Ambassador Hanihara 
was concerned about the publication of the classified documents that were 
sent to Hughes, these monographs nevertheless included sections of those 
documents. Apparently, the ministry itself had pushed for their inclusion.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs widely distributed this publication. 
Four  hundred copies were sent to the House of Peers, and there were 
a further 500 copies for the House of Representatives, 50 copies for the 
Privy Council, 12 copies for the Ministry of Home Affairs, 50 copies for 
various Tokyo newspapers, 112 copies for the prefectural governments, 
232 copies for overseas government establishments, 63 copies for the 
banks, 99 copies for the regional newspapers and so on. However, 
the major newspapers did not report on the published documents to any 
significant degree.47
Meanwhile, Shidehara was being prudent concerning further protests from 
Japan on the Japanese Exclusion Act. Given that the US was then in the 
middle of a presidential election, Shidehara believed that pressing Japan’s 
case further would only ‘uselessly inflame the sentiments of the citizens 
of the two nations’.48 Finally, in mid-September, he had a protest sent to 
Hughes. Even so, this protest was made privately and only once. Shidehara 
also wished to prevent any cooperation between Japanese residents in the 
US and anti-US movements in Japan pushed by ultranationalist groups 
such as the Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society). Saburi, director-general 
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of the International Trade Bureau; Akamatsu, director of the Immigration 
Division; and Ishii Itarō, of the section staff, debated what measures 
ought to be taken in response to the Japanese Exclusion Act. Yet there 
were no easy solutions. Saburi was hopeful, however, that ‘rather than the 
president rejecting the act and overturning it, it would be better if he first 
won the general election, so that a new approach could be found’.49
With no solution in sight to the immigration problem in the US, 
Shidehara formed an immigration committee at the end of August 1924. 
This committee was to meet every Thursday under the supervision of the 
foreign minister. Shidehara chose individuals such as Bureau Director-
General Saburi to serve as members of the committee. The secretary 
was Section Chief Akamatsu. The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce, and the Ministry of Communication also 
appointed the bureau-director-general-level staffs to the committee. 
The immigration committee concluded that immigration to Brazil was to 
be encouraged. As Ishii wrote, ‘Mr. Shidehara was particularly interested 
in Brazilian immigration’.50 The committee also deliberated on the 
possibility of immigration to the South Sea Islands. 
Edward Price Bell
How did Foreign Minister Shidehara and Prime Minister Katō view Japan–
US relations at this time? At the end of May 1925, in the twilight of his 
life, Katō was interviewed by Edward Price Bell, a reporter for the Chicago 
Daily News. Katō spoke with great fervour. As he said: ‘To the peace of the 
Pacific we Japanese are devoted’. Bell subsequently interviewed Shidehara. 
On the topic of Japanese immigration to the US, Shidehara explained 
the situation, beginning with his previous discussions with the former 
ambassador to Japan, Roland Morris. Shidehara then went on to quote 
the British ambassador to the US, James Bryce, stating: ‘The American 
people may make mistakes. They may commit injustices. But in the 
end, they always of their own will put them right. It is their history’.51 
Bell appeared receptive to Katō’s and Shidehara’s message. In his article, 
they were depicted as true statesmen.
A closer look at Bell’s article, however, raises questions. Why did Bell 
present Katō and Shidehara in such favourable terms? After all, the echoes 
of the Japanese Exclusion Act were still lingering. To present Japan in such 
positive terms, therefore, feels somehow unconvincing, even unnatural. 
A key to this mystery lies in Bell’s personal documents, as well as in the 
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records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to these sources, 
in December 1924, Bell had put in a request to Yoshida Isaburō, Japan’s 
acting ambassador to the US, to interview Prime Minister Katō. At that 
stage, Bell had already interviewed the heads of the UK, France, Germany, 
Italy and the US. His hope was to have a meeting with Katō and to bring 
all of these interviews together in a booklet.
Upon learning of Bell’s plan, Shidehara sounded out Katō on the idea 
and secured his consent. The interview was to be held after April 1925, 
thereby avoiding the extremely busy period when the Diet would be in 
session. Shidehara also informed Katō that Bell had already undertaken 
various fact-finding activities such as ‘speaking with pro-Japanese and 
anti-Japanese Americans’ in San Francisco. Meanwhile, Bell sent some 
correspondence to Katō in advance, informing him that he wished to 
ask him about the ‘Pacific problem’.52 From the above facts, we can 
surmise that, at the very least, Shidehara prepared the broad outlines 
that would guide Katō and Bell’s interview. It is important to understand 
that, from Katō and Shidehara’s perspective, this was no mere interview. 
In particular, for Shidehara, it amounted to something close to a message 
that Japan would be sending to the US. Thus, Bell’s interview eventually 
took place at the end of May. Bell quickly had the minutes of the meeting 
sent to Katō and Shidehara, receiving their approval. For his background 
research Bell also went further, referring to sources such as Katō and 
Shidehara’s Diet addresses. His pro-Japan article was published in various 
newspapers in the US and the Philippines. Shidehara would have received 
the impression on this occasion that US public opinion towards Japan 
was improving.
During his time in Japan, Bell also contacted US Ambassador Edgar A. 
Bancroft. Therefore, Bell’s reporting efforts can be considered in some 
respects close to a joint Japan–US effort to shape US public opinion. 
Bancroft had also been concerned about the influence of the Japanese 
Exclusion Act for some time and had previously exchanged his opinions 
on the matter with Shidehara. Further, Bancroft had given detailed reports 
in private correspondence with Hughes as to the content of his meetings 
with Shidehara. It should be noted that Bancroft’s background was as 
a lawyer who was familiar with issues concerning race. It was for this 
very reason that he was appointed US ambassador to Japan in November 
1924. However, Shidehara and Bancroft were careful not to discuss the 
Japanese Exclusion Act in public. Unfortunately, Bancroft would pass 
away suddenly at Karuizawa at the end of July 1925.53
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As it happened, Bell would eventually be nominated for the Nobel 
Peace Prize for his reporting. He was nominated by none other than 
Shidehara. In his letter to the Nobel Committee, Shidehara wrote: 
‘I  admire his knowledge of international affairs, and not least those of 
the Far East; and especially his untiring efforts to promote peace among 
the nations’.54 This is rare praise from Shidehara, given his distaste for the 
mass media. It seems that Bell had gained Shidehara’s trust by faithfully 
reproducing the contents of the meetings and by showing the draft to 
Shidehara beforehand. In the end, Bell did not receive the Nobel Peace 
Prize. Nevertheless, he would continue to communicate with Shidehara 
thereafter. 
Personnel
Following the passing of the Japanese Exclusion Act in Washington, 
Ambassador Hanihara relinquished his position, which was temporarily 
filled by Acting Ambassador Yoshida Isaburō. Meanwhile, Shidehara 
and Katō sought to install Mutsu Hirokichi as Hanihara’s successor. 
Hirokichi was the eldest son of Mutsu Munemitsu and had also become 
a diplomat. However, Hirokichi declined the posting as US ambassador 
due to health reasons. Shidehara responded by appointing Vice-Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Matsudaira Tsuneo to the post. Matsudaira also had 
a close relationship with Debuchi; the two were originally classmates. 
It should be noted that, following his departure from the US, Shidehara 
and Debuchi recommended Hanihara for the job of ambassador to Italy. 
However, Hanihara himself turned down the suggestion.55
The appointment of Vice-Minister Matsudaira as US ambassador led to 
a further reshuffling of personnel within the ministry. In December 1924, 
Shidehara appointed Asian Bureau Director-General Debuchi as the new 
vice-minister. From this period, therefore, there are further references to 
personnel matters in Debuchi’s diary. Debuchi held Saitō Yoshie in high 
esteem and considered making him the director-general of the Treaties 
and Conventions Bureau. In the end, Saitō was assigned the role of the 
International Trade Bureau instead. Concerning who would succeed him 
as vice-minister, Debuchi would later confide in his diary:
I cannot necessarily say that Saburi is best suited to becoming the 
next vice-minister. If one day I were to become minister, I would 
want my vice-minister to be Saitō Yoshie.56
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Debuchi was critical of the fact that Shidehara had recommended Tanaka 
Tokichi for the position of ambassador to the Soviet Union and believed 
that Obata Yūkichi would be suitable as Japan’s minister to China. Thus, 
there were some differences of opinion between Shidehara and Debuchi 
when it came to staffing. Nevertheless, Debuchi’s diary still offers 
a window on the personal networks of the Shidehara clique. For example, 
Shidehara removed Honda Kumatarō from the post of ambassador to 
Germany at Debuchi’s recommendation.57
In any case, what was particularly important at this time was the question 
of who would succeed Debuchi as director-general of the Asian Bureau. 
Debuchi’s idea was for Arita Hachirō to take on the role. In general, Arita 
was regarded as a representative of the reformist group. However, at this 
point he had not come out in opposition to Shidehara and Debuchi. 
Shigemitsu, meanwhile, was viewed as behaving too obsequiously towards 
Debuchi. In the end, it was not Arita but Kimura Eiichi who became Asian 
Bureau director-general. Previously, Kimura had attended the Washington 
Naval Conference as first division director of the Asian Bureau. Moreover, 
although he was invited by Horinouchi Kensuke, he  did not join the 
Gaimushō Kakushin Dōshikai.58
Thus, the Asian Bureau would be headed by Kimura, with the role of first 
division director going to Tani Masayuki. At the time, the Asian Bureau 
was regarded as the leading bureau of the ministry. It was also said of the 
bureau that it had its own internal ‘Monroe Doctrine’. So the critique 
went: ‘A certain clique has consolidated its grip on the Asian Bureau, 
keeping non-clique members out and ensuring that its own bureau staff 
receive good positions when sent abroad’.59 As director-general of the 
Asian Bureau, Kimura would support Shidehara’s economic diplomacy 
and his policies on Manchuria and Mongolia. Further, proceeding from 
the correct assumption that warlord Zhang Zuolin would decline and 
that the authorities in north-eastern China would compromise with the 
Nationalist Party, Kimura began to plan for a future improvement in Sino-
Japanese relations. In time, Shidehara, then in his second term as foreign 
minister, would send Kimura to direct the South Manchuria Railway.
Meanwhile, there is the question of what became of Tani, the chief of 
the first division in the Asian Bureau. He was generally seen as a member 
of the reformists. Later, upon advancing to the position of Asian Bureau 
director-general, he promoted a policy of Sino-Japanese cooperation. 
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Nevertheless, until the time of the Manchurian Incident, it seems that 
the personal relationship between Shidehara and Tani was not an overly 
poor one.60
The real problem for Shidehara was Hirota, the director-general of the 
American and European Bureau. Debuchi and Shidehara felt that Hirota 
was too different from them, and they even wanted to have him removed 
from his position as bureau director-general. That was not to say Hirota 
was on a completely different wavelength when it came to foreign affairs.61 
Yet, he was shunned by Shidehara and Debuchi. Why? The first reason 
concerns Hirota’s relationship with the Gaimushō Kakushin Dōshikai. 
According to Arita Hachirō:
One of the very first to join the [reformists] association was 
Mr. Hirota Kōki, who was then first secretary at the embassy 
in Washington. At that time, he already had something of the 
politician about him, not to mention the air of a member of 
Genyōsha [the Dark Ocean Society, a nationalist group from 
northern Kyūshū].62
It should be noted that the Gaimushō Kakushin Dōshikai received internal 
support from a number of other figures, including Sawada Setsuzō, 
director of the Telegraph Division; Kawashima Nobutarō, director of the 
First Division of the Treaties and Conventions Bureau; and Sugimura 
Yōtarō, director of the Second Division of the Treaties and Conventions 
Bureau. There are indications that Hanihara may also have been involved. 
Arita, for example, wrote that ‘there was something about Vice-Minister 
Hanihara that just did not sit well with me’.63
Hirota had returned to Japan from Washington in December 1920, 
earlier than Shidehara, who at that point was still serving as ambassador. 
The following year, Hirota became director of the Second Division 
of the Intelligence Department before later rising to the post of vice 
director-general of the Intelligence Department. It is worth pointing out 
that Hirota and Shidehara were not far apart when it came to policy. 
For example, as division director, Hirota also supported the Four-Power 
Treaty that was concluded at the Washington Naval Conference. While 
House of Peers member Egi Tasuku criticised the termination of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance as deplorable, Hirota argued that ‘the empire 
[Japan] has taken the best and only possible approach in shifting from 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to the Four-Power Treaty’.64 Recall that it was 
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Shidehara who had recommended the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance at the Washington Naval Conference. In this regard, Hirota was 
close to Shidehara.
Nevertheless, once Hirota became director-general of the American and 
European Bureau in September 1923, he began to show his colours 
more—and in a manner unbefitting a bureaucrat. On this matter, there 
is testimony from Horinouchi Kensuke. Horinouchi was second division 
director in the bureau, under Bureau Director-General Hirota. According 
to Horinouchi, Hirota’s office was ‘frequented by people such as Diet 
members, industrialists, independent patriots, and the like, lending the 
bureau quite a lordly atmosphere’. He added: ‘From early on he [Hirota] 
had the air of a politician about him’.65 Such accounts help explain why 
Shidehara and Debuchi felt uncomfortable with Hirota. Their distrust 
resulted less from his policies than from his behaviour. Hirota would 
subsequently be transferred to the position of minister to the Netherlands, 
with Hotta Masaaki succeeding him as American and European Bureau’ 
director-general.
The Fate of Economic Diplomacy
The Beijing Special Conference on Tariffs
Above I have provided an outline of the situation with respect to ministry 
personnel. With this broader human context fleshed out, we can now 
consider what kind of policies Shidehara pursued as foreign minister. 
Particularly important here is the concept of ‘economic diplomacy’. 
In  Beijing, in the autumn of 1925, an international conference was 
held to discuss China’s tariffs. Shidehara’s early policy with respect to 
this conference was to limit the discussion to a 2.5 per cent tax, as was 
previously agreed upon at the Washington Naval Conference, and then 
proceed to examine how the increased revenue might be used. However, 
nations such as the US turned out to be more sympathetic towards China 
than anticipated, forcing Shidehara to rethink his policy.
At around the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together 
with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, held a joint committee for 
the purpose of preparing for a tariff conference. This committee included 
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bureau-general-ranked bureaucrats from the respective ministries of the 
Japanese government. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shidehara 
sent Saburi Sadao, director-general of the International Trade Bureau. 
The committee secretary was Asaoka Ken, director of the First Section of 
the International Trade Bureau. There were other participants from the 
ministry as well. These included Asian Bureau Director-General Kimura, 
Asian Bureau First Division Director Tani, Secretary Horiuchi Tateki 
and Secretary Hidaka Shinrokurō. The committee met almost every day 
to discuss such matters as the conditions and impact of a 2.5 per cent 
tax. The committee also investigated the various conditions that could 
potentially arise if China were granted tariff autonomy.66
As it happened, Shidehara himself had not yet decided to recognise 
China’s tariff autonomy. An indication of his stance appears in the record 
of the cabinet decision made on 13 October 1925. The Katō cabinet was, 
above all, concerned with keeping the discussion limited to an additional 
tax of 2.5 per cent, with any additional tax collection to be conditional on 
the use of a graduated tax rate and China’s use of the increased revenue to 
service its foreign loans. On the topic of tariff autonomy, if it were granted 
depending on how events unfolded at the conference, the Katō cabinet 
intended for that autonomy to only extend as far as the setting of  the 
period of transition.
The Special Tariff Conference in Beijing commenced in late October. 
The Japanese delegation to Beijing was headed by chief plenipotentiary 
Hioki Eki, assisted by deputy plenipotentiary Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who 
at that time was envoy to China. International Trade Bureau Director-
General Saburi was also dispatched to Beijing, to act as the delegation’s 
secretary-general. Other members of the delegation included Shigemitsu 
Mamoru, Horiuchi Tateki and Hidaka Shinrokurō. Surprisingly, at 
the commencement of the conference, Hioki began with an address 
stating that Japan was prepared to accept, as a basic principle, China’s 
right to tariff autonomy. This move was actually a proposal of Saburi 
and Shigemitsu. While it had taken Shidehara by surprise when he read 
the speech in advance, he trusted Saburi’s judgement and approved its 
content. The focus of the conference was therefore shifted towards what 
provisional measures would need to be taken in the lead-up to China 
gaining tariff autonomy.
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The US and the UK wanted to recognise a high tariff rate. This was 
a  problem for the Japanese delegation. Even as late as January 1926, 
Shidehara was instructing the attendees to not allow the additional tax 
rate to exceed 2.5 per cent for ‘regular goods’. In March, a graduated 
tax rate of 2.5–22.5 per cent was jointly agreed upon by Japan, the US 
and the UK. Following this agreement, the central topic of discussion 
shifted to whether China would be required to use its increased tax 
revenue to service its foreign loans. It was at this stage that British Foreign 
Secretary J. Austen Chamberlain proposed an unconditional recognition 
of a 2.5 per cent additional tax. While an agreement on the topic of loan 
servicing had not yet been reached, each participating nation was on the 
verge of going ahead with an initial agreement on the tariff. However, 
Shidehara thought this would lead to a delay with respect to loan servicing 
and rejected the plan to go ahead with an agreement on the tariffs. Thus, 
the conference dragged on until July, whereupon it was indefinitely 
postponed without any clear resolution.
By sticking to the requirement of a clear economic benefit, Shidehara 
missed an opportunity for a more flexible give and take policy to be 
implemented. What the China tariff problem indicates is that, generally 
speaking, Shidehara’s conception of the international order remained 
stuck within the framework established at the Washington Naval 
Conference. If Shidehara had taken the plunge of joining the UK and 
the US in recognising China’s right to collect additional taxes, it may 
well have helped the government in Beijing to stabilise its financial base. 
However, it seems that on the ground in Beijing, Saburi had interpreted 
Shidehara’s intentions as favourable to China and relayed this information 
to the Chinese side. This at least led to Saburi developing more friendly 
ties with Chinese plenipotentiary Huang Fu.
Beijing also hosted an international conference on extraterritorial rights 
that foreign nations had within China. While Shidehara favoured 
a  resolution to conflicts over extraterritorial rights, arguing that it was 
‘conducive to the furtherance of our economic benefit’, he also felt that 
the time was not yet ripe for their full termination.67 At the same time, 
he also expressed his opposition to the international management of 
China and to foreign interference in China’s domestic politics. All in 
all, the discussions conducted during this conference did not engender 
much progress on the problem of extraterritorial rights. It should also be 
noted that Shidehara accepted the October 1926 proposal of the Beijing 
government to revise the Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement.
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Fragmentation of Conceptions of the 
Washington System
During this period, Prime Minister Katō entrusted diplomatic matters 
to Shidehara. That said, as someone who himself had served as foreign 
minister four times, Katō was by no means uninterested in diplomatic 
affairs. At the Beijing Special Conference on Tariffs, he spoke with 
‘surprising frankness’ to the UK’s ambassador to Japan, Charles Eliot. 
Eliot said it was Katō’s view that the:
Conference would last [a] long time and [the] result would be 
small. This, he said, would be to the advantage of Japan, for she 
would be [the] chief loser if China received tariff autonomy.68
Katō’s stance, as revealed in this statement, presumably had a strong 
influence on Shidehara’s policy.
It is worth briefly dwelling on Eliot. He was the UK’s ambassador to 
Japan from 1920 and had regretted the termination of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. An individual who was deeply familiar with the history 
of Buddhism, Eliot had attempted to secure the continued cooperative 
relationship of Japan and the UK. However, Katō and Eliot’s relationship 
was not sufficient to cement the Anglo-Japanese bond. On the contrary, 
at this time the two nations were becoming increasingly estranged 
from each other over policy on China. Foreign Secretary Chamberlain 
acknowledged this fact in private correspondence to Eliot, writing: ‘there 
is a less intimate friendship between our two nations since the termination 
of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty’.69 Chamberlain had lamented the departure 
of Hayashi Gonsuke from his post as ambassador to the UK.
At the end of January 1926, Prime Minister Katō died due to illness. 
As expected, his successor was Wakatsuki Reijirō, new president of the 
Kenseikai party. Wakatsuki had never shown a particular interest in 
foreign affairs. With his advancement to the position of prime minister, 
therefore, responsibility for directing Japan’s diplomatic efforts would fall 
even more upon Shidehara.
Another significant development would occur in February, when Eliot 
was replaced by John A. C. Tilley as the UK’s ambassador to Japan. 
Ambassador Tilley was not as passionate as his predecessor; Eliot’s 
research on Japan was instead taken up and carried on by the commercial 
counsellor, Sir George Bailey Sansom. Nevertheless, there were periods in 
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which Tilley expended considerable efforts in his new role. In January and 
February 1927, for example, he visited the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs almost every day. The reason was the commencement in China, 
in July of the previous year, of the aforementioned Northern Expedition. 
In response, Tilley sought to sound out Japan on a joint Anglo-Japanese 
deployment of troops to Shanghai. However, Shidehara did not acquiesce 
to the UK’s request for a military deployment.70
One document that gives us a direct indication of the gap that had 
opened up between the UK and Japan is known as the ‘December 
Memorandum’. The Stanley Baldwin cabinet unexpectedly sent this 
memorandum to China on 18 December 1926. Its contents included 
the immediate recognition of the additional taxation that had been 
agreed upon at the Washington Naval Conference. According to Matsui, 
Japan’s ambassador to the UK at that time: ‘Mr. Wellesley [assistant to the 
foreign vice-secretary] offered the excuse that because Foreign Secretary 
Chamberlain had suddenly made this decision afterwards, there was no 
time to let me know in advance’.71
After receiving the December Memorandum from Ambassador Tilley, 
Vice-Minister Debuchi went so far as to state: ‘I have no choice but 
to admit that Britain ignores the spirit of the Washington Treaty and 
does not want to cooperate with Japan’.72 Shidehara also criticised the 
December Memorandum on the basis of discussions such as the one that 
had been held between Saburi and Eugene Chen, foreign minister of the 
Nationalist government. He took the additional step of proposing to Tilley 
that an unofficial tariff conference be held, with representatives attending 
from northern and southern China. Perhaps he was out of patience, but 
Shidehara apparently warned Tilley while holding a copy of a book by 
former foreign secretary Grey.
So much for the situation with the UK. What about Japan’s diplomatic 
relations with the US at that time? On this topic, the reminiscences 
of Eugene H. Dooman, first secretary to the US embassy in Japan, 
are instructive. According to Dooman, because of the US’s misplaced 
benevolence, the Chinese had begun to trample upon the interests of 
various foreign nations. In Japan this weakened the political fortunes of 
Shidehara and Wakatsuki, who had sought to uphold the spirit of the 
Nine-Power Treaty and helped promote militarists. In summary, once 
Secretary of State Hughes was no longer leading the process, the US failed 
to explore systematically the premises of its own East Asia policy.
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
134
In this manner, the three nations of Japan, the US and the UK, while 
remaining within the Washington System, were each developing their own 
alternative conceptions of the international order in East Asia. Ultimately, 
they were not to converge. In other words, the diplomatic efforts of the 
powers in this period can be interpreted as representing a fragmentation 
of the Washington System.73
The Diversification of Trade
A well-known example of Shidehara’s economism in action would be the 
aforementioned Beijing Special Conference on Tariffs. However, this was 
not the full extent of the economic diplomacy he pursued through the 
mediation of assistants such as Saburi. In fact, it would be in the domain 
of Franco-Japanese relations where Saburi would prove to be more adept.
An unsolved problem between Japan and France was the development 
of trade connections, specifically with French Indochina. Because of 
high tariffs, exports from Japan had stagnated. The governor-general 
of  Indochina, Martial H. Merlin, had previously visited Japan in May 
1924. At that time Saburi had observed the meeting that took place 
between Merlin and Foreign Minister Matsui.74 After taking over as foreign 
minister, Shidehara organised the dispatch of a delegation to Indochina to 
discuss the tariff issue. He also sounded out the central French government 
on the matter, via Ishii, Japan’s ambassador to France. The special envoy 
to Indochina was headed by privy councillor Yamagata Isaburō. Other 
accompanying personnel from the ministry included Saburi and Secretary 
Matsushima Shikao. Thus, in February 1925, Yamagata and Saburi were 
both in Indochina, negotiating tariffs. Of course, to begin with, there was 
no reason to believe that these negotiations would bear fruit. Nevertheless, 
Ishii would continue to negotiate with France on the matter in the period 
after the delegation’s visit. It was around this time, in July 1925, that 
Japan and the UK concluded a supplementary treaty to the original 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.75
In April–May 1926, the Near East Trade Conference was held in 
Constantinople (today Istanbul), Turkey. The chairman was Obata 
Yūkichi. Shidehara had appointed Obata as Japan’s very first ambassador 
to Turkey. The conference was also attended by individuals such as 
Okuyama Seiji, Japan’s minister to Greece, and Mushanokōji Kintomo, 
minister to Romania. The goal of the conference was to promote trade 
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between Japan and the Near East, with resolutions made on topics such 
as the opening of direct sea routes, the establishment of suitably sized 
diplomatic establishments, the dispatching of commercial secretaries and 
the holding of trade fairs.76
It would be Nippon Yusen that would open up the Near East sea route. 
While Nippon Yusen is a member of the Mitsubishi group (recall that 
Shidehara had married a daughter of the head of the Mitsubishi group), 
there are no historical records showing a close relationship between the 
company and Shidehara. In fact, the proposal for the Near East Trade 
Conference originated not from Shidehara but from the International 
Trade Bureau. The bureau director-general at that time was Saitō 
Yoshie. It should be noted that the conference was not an international 
conference; the ministry only sent secretary Yamamoto Kumaichi from 
Japan (the other Japanese attendees were already in the region).77
Meanwhile, the First Trade Conference was also held in the House of 
Representatives in September 1926. This conference was organised to foster 
trade and investment opportunities in the regions south of Japan and was 
generally referred to as the South Sea Trade Conference. Representatives 
from numerous branches of government and sections of industry were 
in attendance, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 
of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of 
Communication, the governor-general of Taiwan, the Government Office 
of the South Sea Islands, various Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 
the cotton spinning industry, and the banking and shipping industries.78
In the opening address of the conference, Shidehara asserted that it was 
principally oriented towards not only the ‘promotion of foreign trade, 
but also the encouragement of overseas business investment by Japanese 
people’. Shidehara continued:
We begin this conference with the view that commercial 
intercourse will absolutely change for the better and that, from 
the beginning, it must be free of any form of political motivation 
… The essence of the matter, and also our goal, must be that other 
nations will equally benefit at the same time as our own.79
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Shidehara stated that ‘the development of international commerce must 
be the principal focus’. He added:
The strenuous efforts and cooperation of assembled businesspeople 
are to be anticipated, and the government must conduct itself in 
such a manner so as to fundamentally avoid interfering in this 
domain.80
Here we have a conception of free trade, to be opened up in the region of 
the South Sea. Shidehara’s comments can also be read as an expression 
of Japan’s orientation towards trade diversification and towards becoming 
a maritime nation. According to Ishii Itarō, who was then Third Division 
director under International Trade Bureau Director-General Saitō:
My understanding of Shidehara’s fundamental idea, upon which 
he based his international trade policy, was that Japan should, 
beginning with its closest neighbor, China, gradually expand 
[its trade connections] into Southeast Asia, thereby laying the 
foundations for building an economic powerhouse.81
On the topic of the South Sea Trade Conference, he added: ‘I believe 
it was Saitō Yoshie’s suggestion, which Shidehara then gave the OK to’.82
It should be noted that the aforementioned trade conferences were one-
time events. It was not the case, therefore, that Shidehara and Saitō’s plans 
quickly led to fruition. It was not until 1928 that the South Seas Unit was 
finally established within the International Trade Bureau, to investigate the 
economic conditions of the region, including the availability of resources. 
The South Seas Unit was quickly abolished, before being restored in 1929. 
The establishment of the South Seas Bureau to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs would have to wait until November 1940.83
Japan–Soviet Relations
Shidehara’s diplomatic efforts had a weak spot. On Manchuria, he was 
unable to develop a policy that rose to the challenges presented by the 
region. At that time, the foreign affairs mechanisms in the region were 
diverse and were quite vulnerable to the intervention of other organisations, 
such as the army and the South Manchuria Railway Company. There 
were also further complications arising from the rise of the Soviet Union. 
The army and the South Manchuria Railway Company’s policies with 
respect to Manchuria and Mongolia were partially directed at addressing 
this shift in regional power. Later, with the first Tanaka Giichi cabinet, 
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the Ministry of Overseas Affairs would be established. This ministry was 
placed in charge of colonial administration and the supervision of the 
South Manchurian Railway Company. The relationship with the railway 
company would become more regulated under Foreign Minister Tanaka 
than it was under Shidehara.
At the same time, the policies Shidehara pursued in this region, with 
respect to Manchuria, Mongolia and the Soviet Union, serve to throw his 
ideals into sharp relief. Here I am referring not only to Shidehara’s desire, 
as discussed earlier, to centralise Japan’s diplomacy, placing it firmly under 
the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As seen earlier, Shidehara 
was also a firm believer in non-intervention and economism and was not 
particularly suspicious of communism. Hence, he helped to establish 
diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in January 1925.
The agreement reached between the two parties (referred to in English 
by the lengthy title ‘The Convention Embodying Basic Rules of the 
Relations between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’) 
was signed in Beijing. It was generally seen as beneficial to Japan, and not 
only within Japanese circles. For example, this view was also expressed in 
the correspondence of Bancroft, the US ambassador to Japan. In a private 
letter to the US’s minister to China, Jacob Gould Schurman, Bancroft 
wrote: ‘The Treaty strikes me as distinctly advantageous to Japan’.84 The 
reason for this perception was that the Japan–Soviet convention contained 
provisions such as the continuation of the Treaty of Portsmouth, the 
revision of the fishery treaty, an agreement of reciprocal non-intervention 
and the granting to Japan of rights over certain resources in the Soviet 
Union. Two protocols produced as a result of the convention set a May 
1925 deadline for Japanese military withdrawal from northern Sakhalin 
Island, while promising Japan rights over the development of oil fields in 
that area. The final details of the revision of the fishery treaty and Japan’s 
oil field rights would be left to be worked out in subsequent negotiations.
In February 1925, in private correspondence to Secretary of State Frank 
B. Kellogg, Bancroft further expressed the opinion that ‘the Japan-Russian 
Treaty was wisely and advantageously made by Japan’. He added:
The first crisis in the Far East, I suspect, will arise in China 
as a result of the activities of [the] Russian Ambassador in the 
dissemination, through purchased agents, of the destructive side 
of Sovietism.85
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It should be noted that, at this point, the US had not yet officially recognised 
the Soviet Union. As though substantiating Bancroft’s judgement, a large-
scale strike soon took place at Zaikabō in Shanghai; Zaikabō were cotton 
spinning mills established in China with Japanese capital. Following this 
development, Bancroft wrote: ‘Baron Shidehara told me that the Soviet[s] 
[were] the sole cause of that strike; that the workers had no grievances [sic] 
against their Japanese employers’.86
Prime Minister Katō and Foreign Minister Shidehara would have 
multiple meetings with Bancroft on this topic. Concerning the situation 
in China, Katō believed that ‘the Powers must act together’.87 Shidehara 
had the same opinion. Katō also indicated that he understood why the 
US continued to avoid recognising the Soviet Union, while at the same 
time implying that Japan’s policy on the matter was different. Shidehara 
would provide further details on this topic at a later date, writing that 
‘the Japan-Russia Treaty was necessary in order to carry out the public 
declaration of Prime Minister Katō before he took office that Japanese 
troops should be promptly withdrawn from Saghalien [sic]’.88 That 
said, the Soviet policy of the Katō cabinet did not amount to a Japan–
Soviet partnership. Shidehara  himself wrote to Bancroft that public 
rumours of Japan teaming up with the Soviet Union or with Germany 
‘lack common sense’.89
Even after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and 
the Soviet Union, tensions between the two powers would continue 
with respect to problems such as the railways in northern Manchuria 
and political propaganda directed at Japan. It was in this context that 
the Soviet Union proposed the signing of a Japan–Soviet nonaggression 
pact. For Shidehara, however, the maintenance of good relations with 
the UK and the US ruled out such possibilities. Instead, he placed more 
emphasis upon economic relations between the two powers, prioritising 
the signing of the fisheries agreement and commercial treaties. To put it 
differently, Shidehara’s policy regarding the Soviet Union was to separate 
political and economic concerns. Further, it is clear that Shidehara was 
not yet particularly concerned about the spread of communism in China. 
By contrast, Tanaka, who would later serve as both prime minister and 
foreign minister, was concerned about political propaganda aimed at 
Japan and alarmed about the influence of the Soviet Union on China.90
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The Northern Expeditions and the Nanjing 
Incident of 1927
In southern China at this time, the National Revolutionary Army, led by 
Chiang Kai-shek, was continuing its advance in the name of reunifying 
China. As mentioned above, in Chinese history, this event is referred 
to as the Northern Expedition. On 24 March 1927, as the National 
Revolutionary Army of China advanced northwards, it attacked foreigners 
and Japanese and British consulates in Nanjing. It also damaged the US-
affiliated Jinling University (also known as the University of Nanjing). 
During the ‘Nanjing Incident’ of 1927, UK and US warships fired upon 
the city. Partly at the request of Japanese residents in the city, Japan did not 
retaliate. Shidehara also had a favourable impression of Chiang Kai-shek 
and was opposed to punishing China. As a result, however, Shidehara was 
criticised domestically for his ‘weak diplomacy’.91
Shidehara’s policy during the Nanjing Incident of 1927 was to ‘cooperate 
with the U.K. and the U.S. in negotiating’ with Chiang Kai-shek. 
However, in the past, such cooperative diplomacy with the UK and the US 
was not particularly effective. For example, in such matters as the problem 
of treaty revision, the UK and the US would head in a different direction 
and attempt to earn the favour of China, throwing the joint efforts into 
disarray. This issue was on display with the aforementioned December 
Memorandum by the UK, as well as Secretary of State Kellogg’s January 
1927 declaration. Kellogg declared that the US would be adopting a new 
policy whereby it would be willing to act alone, if necessary, to help revise 
China’s unequal treaties.
In the case of the Nanjing Incident of 1927 as well, while Japan initially 
issued a joint note with the US, the UK and France, cooperation with 
the other powers soon ran into trouble. The central point of contention 
was with respect to issuing a fresh warning. While the UK favoured 
such a move, the US staunchly opposed it. This disagreement caused 
negotiations with China to fragment, with each nation undertaking its 
own approach.92
A direct impression of Shidehara’s understanding of the situation at that 
time can be gained from the discussion he held with Tilley, the UK’s 
ambassador to Japan. On 2 April 1927, Shidehara warned Tilley that 
a  hardline policy, such as issuing an ultimatum, needed to be avoided 
and that Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘position’ was not to be undermined. 
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
140
Even  if a  hardline approach was resorted to, Shidehara believed that 
‘the communist-aligned mobs, disorderly soldiers, and so forth who 
constituted the core of the anti-foreign rioting would hardly be affected’.93 
That is to say, Shidehara’s understanding was that the cause of the Nanjing 
Incident of 1927 was not Chiang Kai-shek and his immediate clique, but 
the ‘communists’. From the perspective of assisting the development of 
order in China, Shidehara believed that a ‘peaceful diplomatic method’ 
needed to be deployed, one that would enable ‘a central figure such as 
Chiang Kai-shek’ to deal with the situation.
At the basis of such a judgement lay Shidehara’s perspective on the 
national interest, which prioritised economic benefits. Shidehara told 
Tilley that, while he did not think China would become communist, 
he did think that:
Even if the communists were to take control, within the span of 
two or three years foreigners would be able to trade in China once 
again, so I do not think it is an overly dangerous situation.94
In other words, even in the unlikely event of a communist takeover of 
China, Japan could live with and trade with China, just as it could with the 
Soviet Union. In summary, Shidehara believed that, provided economic 
benefit could be gained, the national interest could be protected.
Shidehara’s perspective on foreign affairs contrasts sharply with Hara 
Takashi’s or Tanaka Giichi’s. This is because Hara and, from some time 
earlier, Tanaka too saw the relationship Japan had with the government 
of the Manchurian warlord, Zhang Zuolin, as of particular importance. 
Conversely, Shidehara foresaw the eventual unification of China and 
therefore preached a policy of non-intervention and the prioritisation of 
markets and commerce. In this regard, Shidehara was exceptional for the 
era. Shidehara’s view on the Northern Expedition was not unfounded. 
One justification for his stance was the field survey conducted by Saburi. 
When the Beijing Special Conference on Tariffs ended, Saburi headed to 
southern China under Shidehara’s orders on a special mission to conduct 
a survey of the region. With the Northern Expedition underway, Saburi 
was able to contact leading figures of the Nationalist Party and hear their 
opinions on trade and the removal of China’s unequal treaties. It seems 
that through Saburi’s efforts, Shidehara was able to gain a window on 
the direction the leaders of the Northern Expedition would seek to 
take China.95
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Was Shidehara correct, however, to interpret the Nanjing Incident of 1927 
as the result of Chinese Communist Party intrigue? Current scholarly 
research on the topic has not returned any conclusive judgement. That 
said, the theory of a Communist Party conspiracy is not unfounded. There 
are comments, for example, by Yang Jie, commander of the 17th Division 
of the Sixth Army. On 25 March, Yang visited Morioka Shōhei at Japan’s 
Nanjing consulate. There Yang expressed his regret for the events of the 
Nanjing Incident of 1927. According to Morioka, Yang stated that:
The pillaging was the result of agitation directed by Communist 
Party members in Nanjing or by bad soldiers and that he 
would directly take strict control of the situation and respond 
to negotiations for reparation alongside China’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.96
Yang’s claim—that responsibility for the Nanjing Incident of 1927 lay 
with the Communist Party—was relayed to Shidehara via a telegram 
from Morioka and would have influenced Shidehara’s perspective on the 
situation in China. Further, Chiang Kai-shek, through his representative, 
Huang Fu, had also begun to indicate to the Japanese that the Nanjing 
Incident of 1927 was the result of the machinations of the Communist 
Party. Shidehara’s response was to instruct Yada Shichitarō of the Shanghai 
consulate general to impress upon Chiang Kai-shek and his associates 
the importance of ‘deep reflection and determination’.97 In other words, 
Shidehara wanted Chiang Kai-shek to covertly take firm measures against 
the Communist Party. In fact, on 12 April, Chiang Kai-shek carried out 
an anti-communist coup d’état in Shanghai. On 3 April, an incident 
also occurred in Hankou: a Chinese mob attacked Japanese marines in 
the Japanese concession. Japan responded by deploying the land forces 
of the navy. This was known as the Hankou Incident, and Shidehara’s 
response led to increased domestic criticism of his ‘weak diplomacy’.
Another aspect of Shidehara’s policies on Soviet Russia and Manchuria–
Mongolia deserves attention. This is his approval of the construction 
of the Taoang (Japanese: Tōkō) Railway. The Taoang Railway was part 
of a strategy by the Japanese army and the South Manchuria Railway 
Company to advance into northern Manchuria and thereby counter the 
influence of the Soviets. This plan ran counter to the earlier agreement 
reached with the New Four-Power Consortium. In this case, it seems 
that Shidehara gave higher priority to the expansion of Japanese national 
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interest in China along existing lines than to his principle of pursuing an 
open door policy. Victor L. Kopp, the Soviet ambassador to Japan, would 
issue a protest in response to this decision.
The original promoter of the Taoang Railway was Matsuoka Yōsuke, 
then director of the South Manchuria Railway. In a December 1925 
correspondence to Prime Minister Katō, Matsuoka wrote that:
Needless to say, the construction of the Taoang Railway would 
serve to push back against the sphere of influence that Russia 
established following the conclusion of the First Russo-Japanese 
Agreement; it would constitute a challenge to Russia[’s regional 
dominance].98
Even during negotiations with the Dongsan Province Regime, Matsuoka 
stated that, ‘with planning going ahead for the construction of the Taoang 
Railway, we are determined to do our very best to assist Zhang Zuolin 
and eliminate Russian resistance’.99 It is clear that during Shidehara’s term 
as foreign minister, the South Manchuria Railway was planning great 
advances, even when compared with the relationship it enjoyed with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the era of the Hara cabinet.
Diplomacy and Party Politics
Shidehara’s Miscalculation
We now have some understanding of Shidehara’s policies and personal 
connections during his first term as foreign minister. I would like to 
elaborate upon this topic further, while considering the connection that 
existed between Shidehara’s diplomacy and Japanese party politics. At this 
time, and against the backdrop of the establishment of a ‘four-bureau 
system’, the rise of the generation of diplomats who had entered the 
ministry through the examination system can be seen in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. For that reason alone, Shidehara was able to pursue 
his policies through close coordination with his trusted subordinates. 
In particular, he placed considerable trust in Debuchi and Saburi. However, 
he also had positive relations with other individuals in the ministry, such 
as Matsudaira, Kimura, Obata, Nagai and Ishii. Conversely, Shidehara 
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tended to ignore opinions from overseas agencies of the ministry. In this 
respect he contrasted sharply with the subsequent foreign minister, 
Tanaka Giichi.100
If we are to refer to this group of individuals with Shidehara at its centre as 
the ‘Shidehara clique’, then this clique was already germinating during his 
time as ambassador to the US. Meanwhile, Shidehara’s first term as foreign 
minister was characterised not so much by this clique’s opposition to the 
reformists as it was by aversion to Hirota, who was at least superficially 
closer with respect to his conception of foreign affairs. To put it another 
way, the Shidehara clique was extremely critical of Hirota’s politician-
like behaviour. Presumably, it was for the same reason that Shidehara 
did not like Yoshida Shigeru, who would become vice-minister under 
Foreign Minister Tanaka. Yoshida also differed from Shidehara in that 
he would not renounce state intervention in his policies on Manchuria 
and Mongolia.
What about Japan’s relationship with the League of Nations? Shidehara 
and the other leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not 
particularly interested in engaging with this organisation. Individuals 
who were more enthusiastic about the league included Ishii Kikujirō, 
ambassador to France; Sugimura Yōtarō, under-secretary-general of the 
League of Nations Permanent Secretariat; and individuals who worked 
in branches of the ministry, such as Satō Naotake, director-general of the 
League of Nations’ Imperial (Japanese) Secretariat. Though Shidehara 
and Satō were together regarded as leaders of the ‘Western group’ in the 
ministry, their attitudes differed when it came to the league. Indeed, 
Satō was quite annoyed with the ministry’s passive attitude towards the 
league.101 If we then also consider the relationship between Hirota and 
Shidehara’s circle, it becomes clear that the ‘Western group’ was far from 
monolithic in its composition.
Therefore, even if Shidehara, Hirota, Satō, Yoshida and others are 
collectively referred to as the ‘Western group’, this grouping only goes so 
far towards explaining the dynamics of the ministry. This is why I have 
instead used the concept of the Shidehara clique. Shidehara, Debuchi and 
other members of this clique sought to follow the spirit of the Washington 
Naval Conference, promoting non-interventionist and economic-centric 
policies. Further, even though they attempted to separate diplomacy 
from Japan’s domestic politics, they were cool towards the activities of the 
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League of Nations. As is the case with all kinds of policy-oriented groups, 
the key to understanding the Shidehara clique is the human relations that 
comprised it.
The core of the Shidehara clique was made up of Shidehara himself, 
Debuchi and Saburi. However, figures such as Matsudaira, Kimura, Nagai 
and Ishii were in the periphery. Many of these individuals shared the 
same formative experience in the Washington Naval Conference, while 
much of the reformist group, by contrast, had experienced the Paris Peace 
Conference. That said, as the Shidehara clique occupied the dominant 
position within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they did not pursue the 
same centripetal force as the reformists. It was this closed-off elitism that 
led over time to an increasingly strong backlash.
Given the dominance of his clique within the ministry, what did 
Shidehara manage to achieve with the help of Debuchi, Saburi and the 
other members? First, he carried out a policy of non-intervention with 
regard to China, which he hoped would become unified and increasingly 
stable. In this regard, he respected the spirit of the Washington Naval 
Conference. The cliques’ debt to Debuchi here was significant, with 
respect to both their guiding ideal and the practical implementation of that 
ideal. However, it should be remembered that this was an ideal that was 
originally developed by Shidehara himself during earlier occasions such 
as the Washington Naval Conference. Debuchi also took on the burden 
of coordinating ministry efforts with the army and navy. Meanwhile, 
Kimura too followed the non-interventionist path, planning the future of 
Sino-Japanese relations after the defeat of Zhang Zuolin.
Second, there was the problem of Japanese immigration to the US. 
Shidehara tends to be viewed as lacking a policy for dealing with this 
issue. In reality, however, Shidehara deftly navigated the complexities 
of this area, beginning with his time as ambassador to the US. When, 
for example, Foreign Minister Matsui requested that Shidehara write 
a letter of protest, he followed through with the request, while at the 
same time softening the contents. He also succeeded in calming down 
Kaneko, who strongly supported sending a special delegation to the US. 
Later, when Shidehara became foreign minister himself, he was cautious 
about launching further protests, while at the same time publishing 
two collections of public documents for a domestic audience. Further, 
Shidehara took the step of sending a group led by Saburi to an immigration 
committee and promoted Japanese immigration to Brazil. It should also 
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be remembered that Shidehara utilised the reporting of Edward Bell as 
a way to convey Japan’s position to the US, thereby working to improve 
US public opinion. Finally, because Shidehara was so familiar with the 
details surrounding the problem of Japanese immigration to the US, 
he was able to avoid overly relying on the International Trade Bureau. 
His policy process was close to a top-down model.
Third, there was Shidehara’s economic diplomacy. A prime example of 
Shidehara responding with an economy-centred approach would be the 
Beijing Special Conference on Tariffs. For the most part, Shidehara’s 
conception of regional order remained within the framework established 
at the Washington Naval Conference. He also displayed enthusiasm 
for the diversification of trade. On matters of economic diplomacy, 
Shidehara would take into account the opinions of his advisers such 
as Saburi, as well as Obata and Saitō. While the final decision on such 
matters may have rested with Shidehara, in this area his policy process 
was closer to a bottom-up model. We may say that through economic 
diplomacy, Shidehara raised the relative position within the ministry 
of the International Trade Bureau, which during this period would be 
alternately headed by Saburi and Saitō.
Shidehara’s response to the Northern Expedition can be treated as an 
encapsulation of his diplomatic style. As pointed out above, following 
the spirit of the Washington Conference, Shidehara asserted to the UK’s 
ambassador that, even if the Chinese mainland were to go communist, 
Japan’s focus would remain on economic benefits such as rights 
of residency and access to trade. Shidehara therefore avoided the kind of 
ideological response later demonstrated by Tanaka Giichi.
Supporting Shidehara’s interpretation of the Northern Expedition 
was Saburi’s survey of southern China. Here again, Shidehara relied 
heavily upon Saburi. However, this reliance was also at the root of his 
miscalculation. When Saburi attended the Beijing Special Conference 
on Tariffs, he was influenced by the discourse on the ‘Sino-Japanese 
partnership’ promoted by figures such as Shigemitsu. Saburi would also 
take a more favourable attitude towards the Nationalist Party following 
his observations of the situation in southern China. The rationally 
minded Saburi would have found himself wavering between the positions 
of Shidehara and Shigemitsu. As it happens, this foreshadowed Saburi’s 
mysterious death some years later.
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Finally, there was also a side to Shidehara that sought to expand Japan’s 
interests in China. We see this aspect of him on display when he gave 
approval to the construction of the Taoang Railway, despite the fact that 
it ran counter to the stance of the New Four-Power Consortium. Here we 
have a glimpse of how even Shidehara was not entirely free of the tradition 
of Japanese diplomacy.
Diplomacy and Party Politics
This chapter has shown how Shidehara utilised his connections with others 
to further his diplomatic goals. Yet it is worth re-emphasising that he 
did not have complete control over Japanese foreign policy. As indicated 
by the existence of the army and the South Manchuria Railway, Japan’s 
diplomatic apparatus remained as pluralistic as ever. Shidehara worked 
within the framework of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and did not pay 
much attention to the political background of Japan.
Nevertheless, Shidehara was fully entrusted with diplomatic matters 
by the Kenseikai-led cabinet, and his policies succeeded in earning the 
trust of the elder statesman Saionji. At the time of the Beijing Special 
Conference on Tariffs, Saionji even went so far as to state: ‘Foreign Minister 
Shidehara’s approach today really hit the mark. First off, I want to praise 
him for developing into a capable minister of foreign affairs’.102 Shidehara 
also expressed his respect for Saionji as a politician. One incident is 
particularly symbolic of the relationship of trust that developed between 
Shidehara and Saionji. In December 1926, when the Taishō emperor 
was critically ill, Saionji was searching for accommodations closer to the 
Hayama Imperial Villa. Meanwhile, Shidehara had a holiday residence in 
the village of Kotsubo, in present-day Zushi city. As this residence was far 
closer to the Imperial Villa in Hayama, Shidehara lent it to Saionji. Thus, 
Shidehara and Saionji were able to ‘become better acquainted and gained 
the opportunity to frequently meet’.103
There are two possible ways of evaluating the decision by the political-
party-run cabinet to leave diplomatic decision-making to Shidehara. First, 
there is the interpretation that, by leaving diplomacy to Shidehara, the 
Kenseikai cabinet was able to gain the trust of Saionji. This decision also 
coincided with Shidehara’s ideal of centralising Japan’s diplomatic efforts. 
However, while Shidehara sought to separate Japan’s domestic politics 
from its foreign policy, this does not mean that his diplomatic efforts were 
devoid of political implications. On the contrary, the consolidation of 
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party-based cabinet rule could be said to constitute the domestic political 
significance of Shidehara diplomacy. Katō’s Kenseikai party had already 
begun to absorb the spirit of the Washington Naval Conference from its 
time in opposition. With the coming of the Katō and Wakatsuki cabinets 
and Saionji’s positive evaluation of Shidehara’s diplomacy, the Kenseikai 
began to be viewed as the establishment party. Thus the Kenseikai 
developed into a proper governing party, and, together with the other 
major party, which was Seiyukai, helped to thereby establish party-based 
politics in Japan.104
Second, we have a somewhat different interpretation, whereby overreliance 
on Shidehara by the Kenseikai led to the general neglect of party-
based guidance of Japanese diplomacy. Even if leaving foreign affairs to 
Shidehara had the positive effect of gaining Saionji’s trust, should not 
the next stage have been the pursuit of a system where the governing 
political party had a hand in guiding diplomatic decision-making? In fact, 
this approach towards diplomacy would be undertaken by a later prime 
minister, Hamaguchi Osachi, when he guided Japan’s participation in the 
London Naval Treaty Conference on Disarmament in 1930. However, 
the second Wakatsuki cabinet was unable to adequately respond to the 
international situation in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, and 
prewar party-based politics ultimately collapsed. The greatest tragedy of 
Taishō democracy was that the Manchurian Incident occurred before the 
institutionalisation of party-based guidance of Japan’s diplomacy.105
How did Shidehara himself view diplomacy and party politics in Japan? 
On 10 June 1925, in a letter to Izawa Takio, the governor-general 
of Taiwan, Shidehara wrote:
At least with respect to simple ideals, it seems that there are 
areas where the position of foreign minister is similar to that 
of the governor of a colony. In order to achieve continuity in 
diplomatic matters, it may be appropriate to create a custom 
whereby the foreign minister does not act in line with the cabinet. 
Nevertheless, such things are extremely difficult under the present 
political conditions.106
In other words, from the perspective of diplomatic continuity, the foreign 
minister should not share the same career path as the cabinet. Yet Shidehara 
understood that the party politics of Japan at that time meant that it 
was impossible for the foreign minister’s position to not be tied to the 
cabinet in some manner. In fact, it could even be said that Shidehara’s life 
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work was this very problem of how to maintain diplomatic continuity, 
given that a party-based political system entails periodic changes in the 
governing party.
It would not be long before Shidehara himself would cede the position 
of foreign minister to the president of the Seiyukai party, Tanaka Giichi, 
in the wake of the collapse of the first Wakatsuki cabinet in 1927. 
The  militaristic diplomacy of the Tanaka cabinet would be dubbed 
‘Tanaka diplomacy’. With the irregular course of Tanaka diplomacy, 
Shidehara’s sense of impending crisis grew stronger. It was at that very 
time that, in June 1927, the Constitutional Democratic Party (the Rikken 
Minseitō) was formed, with Shidehara’s old friend Hamaguchi Osachi 
as its president. This development would lead Shidehara to deepen his 
involvement in party-based politics. This is a topic that I wish to explore 
in more detail in Part II.
Endnotes
1  Chapters 3, 4 and 5 (Sections 1 and 3) of this book are based on my previous work: Hattori Ryūji, 
‘Shidehara Kijūrō no Seisaku to Jinmyaku’ [Shidehara Kijūrō’s policies and personal connections], 
Chūō Daigaku Ronshū, no. 27 (March 2006): 21–57.
2  Usui Katsumi, Chugoku wo Meguru Kindai Nihon no Gaikō [Modern Japanese diplomacy 
concerning China] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1983), 128–29.
3  The reform faction movements have been thoroughly researched. See Tobe Ryōichi, ‘Shiratori 
Toshio to Manshū Jihen’ [Shiratori Toshio and the Manchurian Incident], Bōei Daigakkō Kiyō, no. 39 
(September 1979): 77–130; Tobe Ryōichi, ‘Shiratori Toshio to “Kōdō Gaikō”’ [Shiratori Toshio and 
‘benevolent imperial diplomacy’], Bōei Daigakkō Kiyō, no. 40 (March 1980): 77–143; Tobe Ryōichi, 
‘Gaikō niokeru “Shisōteki Rikyo” no Tankyū: Shiratori Toshio no Kōdō Gaikō-ron’ [The search for 
an ‘intellectual approach’ in diplomacy: Shiratori Toshio’s theory of benevolent imperial diplomacy], 
Kokusai Seiji, no. 71 (August 1982): 124–40; Tobe Ryōichi, ‘Gaimushō “Kakushin-ha” to Gunbu’ 
[The ‘reform faction’ in the ministry of foreign affairs and the military], in Shōwa-shi no Gunbu to Seiji 
[The military and politics in Shōwa-era history], ed. Miyake Masaki, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Dai-ichi Hōki Co., 
1983), 89–122; Tobe Ryōichi, ‘Gaimushō Kakushin-ha no Tai-Bei-Saku’ [The approach to the US 
advocated by the reform faction in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Gaikō Jihō, no. 1273 (November 
1990): 66–80; Tobe Ryōichi, ‘Gaimushō Kakushin-ha to Shin-Chitsujo’ [The reform faction in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the new order], in Nihon no Kiro to Matsuoka Gaikō [Japan’s crossroads 
and Matsuoka diplomacy], ed. Miwa Kimitada and Ryōichi Tobe (Tokyo: Nansōsha, 1993), 117–38; 
Sakai Tetsuya, ‘“Ei-Bei Kyōchō” to “Nicchū Teikei”’ [‘UK–US cooperation’ and ‘Japanese–Chinese 
partnership’], Nenpyō Kindai Nihon Kenkyū, no. 11 (October 1989): 61–92; Sakai Tetsuya, Taishō 
Democracy Taisei no Hōkai: Naisei to Gaikō [The collapse of the Taishō democracy system: Domestic 
politics and diplomacy] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1992); Shiozaki Hiroaki, ‘“Pax Anglo 
Saxonica” to Gaimushō Kakushin-ha: Kokusai Chitsujo no “Kakushin” Ka wo Megutte’ [‘Pax Anglo 
Saxonica’ and the reform faction in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: On the ‘reform’ of the international 
order], in Kindai Nihon no Seiji Kōzō [The political structure of modern Japan], ed. Arima Manabu 
and Mitani Hiroshi (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1993), 206–33; Shiozaki Hiroaki, Kokunai Shin-
Taisei wo Motomete: Ryō-Taisen ni Wataru Kakushin Undō, Shisō no Kiseki [In search of a new national 
system: The trajectory of the reform movement and its thought between the two world wars] (Fukuoka: 
Kyūshū University Press, 1998), 61–108; Takeda Tomoki, Shigemitsu Mamoru to Sengo Seiji [Shigemitsu 
Mamoru and postwar politics] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2002); Hattori, Manshū Jihen to Shigemitsu 
149
3. JAPAN–US RELATIONS AND CHINESE NATIONALISM
Chūka Kōshi Hōkokusho; Koike Seiichi, Manshū Jihen to Tai-Chūgoku Seisaku [The Manchurian Incident 
and policy regarding China] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2003); Takahashi Katsuhiro, ‘Gaimushō 
Kakushin-ha no Shisō to Kōdō: Kurihara Tadashi wo Chūshin ni’ [The actions and thoughts of the 
reform faction in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Focusing on Kurihara Tadashi], Shoryō-bu Kiyō, no. 55 
(March 2004): 35–55.
4  For research on Shidehara’s first period as foreign minister, see Iriye Akira, After Imperialism: 
The  Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1965), 57–145; Usui Katsumi, Nihon to Chūgoku: Taishō Jidai [Japan and China: The Taishō era] 
(Tokyo: Harashobō, 1972), 191–269; Bamba Nobuya, Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New 
Light on Japan’s China Policy, 1924–1929 (Kyoto: Minerva Press, 1972), 225–82; Goto-Shibata 
Harumi, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925–31 (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 13–54, doi.
org/10.1057/9780230389830; Nishida Toshihiro, ‘Higashi Asia no Kokusai Chitsujo to Shidehara 
Gaikō: 1924–1927 Nen’ [The international order in East Asia and Shidehara diplomacy: 1924–1927] 
(1) (2), Hōgaku Ronsō 147, no. 2 (May 2000): 51–69, 149, no. 1 (April 2001): 99–121; Katō Kiyofumi, 
‘Shidehara Gaikō niokeru Man-Mo Seisaku no Genkai: Gaimushō to Mantetsu Kantoku-ken Mondai’ 
[The limits of Manchuria–Mongolia Policy in Shidehara diplomacy: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the problem of the power of supervision over the South Manchuria Railway], Waseda Daigaku 
Daigakuin Bungaku Kenkyūka Kiyō, no. 46 (February 2001): 47–58; Yu Hong, ‘Shidehara Gaikō 
niokeru “Keizai Chūshin Shugi”: 1925 Nen no Qingdao Rōdō Sōgi to 5/30 Jiken no Gaikō-teki Taiō 
wo Megutte’ [The ‘economic centrism’ of Shidehara diplomacy: Considering the Qingdao labor dispute 
of 1925 and the May 30 Incident], Ningen Bunka Ronsō, no. 3 (March 2001): 1–11; Seki Shizuo, Taishō 
Gaikō: Jinbutsu ni Miru Gaikō Senryaku-ron [Taishō diplomacy: Theories of diplomatic strategy as 
represented by figures] (Tokyo: Minerva Shobō, 2001), 197–244; Furuse Hiroyuki, ‘Austin Chamberlain 
no Higashi Asia Seisaku: 5/30 Jiken, Tokubetsu Kanzei Kaigi, Kanton Fukazei wo Chūshin ni’ [Austin 
Chamberlain’s East Asian policy: Focusing on the May 30 Incident, the Special Tariff Conference and 
the Canton additional tax], Joho Bunka Kenkyū, no. 16 (October 2002): 189–212.
5  Takahashi Katsuhiro, ed., ‘“Debuchi Katsuji Nikki” (1): Meiji 32 Nen, 34 Nen’ [The diary 
of Debuchi Katsuji (1): Meiji 32, 34], Kokugakuin Daigaku Nihon Bunka Kenkyū-jo Kiyo, no. 84 
(September 1999): 227–70; Takahashi Katsuhiro, ed., ‘“Debuchi Katsuji Nikki” (2): Taishō 12 
Nen–15 Nen’ [The diary of Debuchi Katsuji (2): Taishō 12–15], Kokugakuin Daigaku Nihon Bunka 
Kenkyū-jo Kiyo, no. 85 (March 2000): 373–530; Bamba Nobuya, ‘Pekin Kanzei Tokubetsu Kaigi ni 
Nozomu Nihon no Seisaku Kettei Katei’ [The Japanese policy decision-making process in the case 
of the Beijing Special Conference on Tariffs], in Taigai Seisaku Kettei Katei no Nichi-Bei Hikaku 
[A  comparison between Japan and the United States with regard to the foreign policy decision-
making process], ed. Hosoya Chihiro and Jōji Watanuki (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), 
375–417; Hattori, Higashi Asia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō, 1918–1931, 149–89.
6  ‘Taishō 14 Nen 4 Gatsu 16 Nichi Sesshōkan no Omeshi ni Yori Shidehara Daijin ga Nashitaru 
Shinkō no Sōkō’ [Draft of the lecture to be presented to the emperor by Minister Shidehara, 
following his summoning by the regent official on 16 April, the 14th year of the Taishō Era], in 
‘Gaimushō Kansei oyobi Naiki Kankei Zakken’ [Various incidents concerning the organisation and 
inner regulations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], vol. 1, M.1.2.0.2, Diplomatic Archives of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. For a copy of the draft, see ‘Goshinkō Kankei Zakken’ [Various 
incidents relating to lectures for the emperor], L.1.0.0.6, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan. See also Minister’s Secretariat Personal Division, Gaimushō Nenkan, 1926, 
221–27; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hundred-Year History Compilation Association, Gaimushō no 
100 Nen, vol. 1, 752–55.
7  From Shidehara to Uchida, 5 November 1919, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō 
Bunsho, 1919, vol. 2, part 1, 371–75.
8  Long diary, 23 December 1919, Breckinridge Long Papers, Box 2, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress; memoranda by Long of conversations with Debuchi, 23 December, Long Papers, Box 183.
9  Mitani Taiichirō, ‘Wall Street to Kyokutō: Washington Taisei niokeru Kokusai Kinyū Shihon 
no Yakuwari’ [Wall Street and the Far East: The role of international finance capital under the 
Washington system], Chuōkōron 90, no. 9 (September 1975): 165–67.
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
150
10  Long to Lamont, 20 December 1919, Long Papers, Box 180.
11  Memorandum by Long of a conversation with Shidehara, 30 April 1920, Long Papers, Box 180; 
MacMurray to Long, 2 November 1920, Long Papers, Box 161. See also Long to Morris, 6 February 
1920, Morris, Roland S. Papers, Box 3, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Shidehara to Uchida, 
30 April 1920 in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 1920, vol. 2, part 1, 275–80.
12  Lamont to Morgan, 26 March 1920, Thomas William Lamont Papers, Box 185, Baker Library, 
Harvard University.
13  Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Wasureenu Hitobito: Kōyū Kaisōki’ [Those I will never forget: Memoirs 
of comradeship], Bungei Shunjū 29, no. 1 (January 1951): 57–58.
14  Takahashi, ‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (2)’, 411. See also Murai Ryōta, Seitō Naikaku-sei no Seiritsu, 
1918–27 Nen [The establishment of the party cabinet system, 1918–27] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2005), 
206–07.
15  Kubota Kanichirō, ed., ‘Ishii Shishaku Kandan-roku’ [Record of a chat by Viscount Ishii], 
Kokusai Mondai, no. 65 (August 1965): 61.
16  Kubota Kanichirō, ed., ‘Ishii Shishaku Nikki’ [Diary of Viscount Ishii], Kokusai Mondai, no. 67 
(October 1965): 62–63.
17  Matsui, Matsui Keishirō Jijoden, 12.
18  Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, Ankoku Nikki: Shōwa 17 Nen 12 Gatsu 9 Nichi–20 Nen 5 Gatsu 5 Nichi 
[Diary of darkness: 9 December, Shōwa 17, to 5 May, Shōwa 20] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1979), 
459.
19  Kanpō, extra edition, 2 July 1924; Kantōgen [foreword], ‘Shushō Gaishō no Enzetsu’ [Speech by 
the prime minister and the foreign minister], Gaikō Jihō, no. 471 (July 1924): n.p.
20  Kanpō, extra edition, 2 July 1924; Kantōgen [foreword], ‘Shushō Gaishō no Enzetsu’ [Speech by 
the prime minister and the foreign minister], Gaikō Jihō, no. 471 (July 1924): n.p.
21  Kanpō, extra edition, 2 July 1924.
22  Kantōgen, ‘Shushō Gaishō no Enzetsu’, n.p.
23  ‘Dai 48 Kai Teikoku Gikai Kizokuin Giji Sokkiroku’ [Shorthand record of the proceedings of the 
48th Imperial Diet House of Peers], no. 2, 22 January 1924, in Teikoku Gikai Gijiroku [Proceedings 
of the Imperial Diet], Reel 46, Tokyo: Yūshōdō, date unknown, 28.
24  Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Zhong Ri guanxi shi liao: Shandong wenti, 
1920-6 [Documents on Sino-Japanese Relations: Shandong Question], vol. 1 (Taipei: Institute of 
Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1987), 489–93.
25  Takahashi, ‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (2)’, 375, 377–79, 381, 383–86, 389, 403–04, 462–63. 
See also Kawashima Shin, Chugoku Kindai Gaikō no Keisei [The formation of modern Chinese 
diplomacy] (Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2004), 532.
26  Takahashi, ‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (2)’, 390–96.
27  Ibid., 412–13.
28  Shidehara Kijūrō (speaking), Kiyosawa Kiyoshi (notation), ‘Daiichiji Gaishō Jidai no Omoide’ 
[Memories from my first period as foreign minister], date unknown, in ‘Shidehara Heiwa Bunko’, 
Reel 7.
29  Ibid.
30  Takahashi, ‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (2)’, 421–34.
31  Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Kokusai Seikyoku no Suii to Gaikō no Konpon-gi’ [Shifts in international 
politics and the foundational significance of diplomacy], Gaikō Jihō, no. 500 (October 1925): 20.
32  Takahashi, ‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (2)’, 488–89.
33  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 1921, vol. 2, 126–35.
151
3. JAPAN–US RELATIONS AND CHINESE NATIONALISM
34  From Secretary Yamazaki to Yamakawa, 17 February, year unknown, in ‘Yamakawa Tadao 
Kankei Bunsho’ [Documents relating to Yamakawa Tadao], Reel 1, Modern Japanese Political 
History Materials Room, National Diet Library; Takahashi, ‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (2)’, 405; Nagai, 
‘Shidehara Danshaku no Omoide’.
35  Takahashi, ‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (2)’, 522.
36  Horiuchi, Chūgoku no Arashi no Naka de, 44.
37  Colby to Wilson, 4 October 1920, Bainbridge Colby Papers, Box 3B, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress; Ōta Tamekichi, consul general in San Francisco, to Foreign Minister Uchida, 
11 October 1920, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 1920, vol. 1, 256–57; Ōta 
to Uchida, 30 October ibid., 295–96; Shidehara to Uchida, 1 November, ibid., 300–01. For studies 
of the Japanese Exclusion Act of this period, see Hirobe Izumi, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: 
Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 Immigration Act (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2001); Minohara Toshihiro, Hai-Nichi Imin-hō to Nichi-Bei Kankei [The Japanese Exclusion Act and 
Japan–US relations] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002).
38  William Phillips diary, 31 January 1924, William Phillips Papers, Box 2, Houghton Library, 
Harvard University.
39  ‘Sakatani Yoshirō Nikki’ [The diary of Sakatani Yoshirō], 16, 17, 24 March, 25 April and 24 May 
1924, in ‘Sakatani Yoshirō Kankei Bunsho’ [Documents relating to Sakatani Yoshirō], Document 
Department, no. 698, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library; 
Nagai to Shidehara, 14 January 1924, in ‘Beikoku niokeru Hai-Nichi Mondai Ikken—1924 Nen 
Imin Hōan Seiritsu Keika: Shibusawa Shishaku-tō ni Tsūchi no Ken’ [An incident relating to the 
anti-Japanese problem in the US—the process of the establishment of the Immigration Act of 1924: 
The incident relating to the informing of Viscount Shibusawa, etc.], 3.8.2.339-6-1-4, Diplomatic 
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Saburi, proxy for the Chief of the International 
Trade Bureau to Shibusawa, 20 May, ibid.
40  Matsui, Matsui Keishirō Jijoden, 135–36; Matsui to Hanihara, 15 March 1924, in Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 1924, vol. 1, 124–25.
41  ‘Beikoku niokeru Hai-Nichi Mondai Zakken—1924 Nen Imin Hō: Seiritsu to Kakushu Jiken’ 
[Miscellaneous incidents relating to the anti-Japanese problem in the US —the Immigration Act of 
1924: Its establishment and various incidents]. 3.8.2.339-6-1-5, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Kokumin Tai-Bei Taikai Kaisai Shusseki-gan [Request to attend the 
citizens vs. the United States meeting], 2 June 1924, in ‘Yamakawa Tadao Kankei Bunsho’, Reel 1.
42  Kiyoura cabinet meeting decision, 28 May 1924, in ‘Beikoku niokeru Hai-Nichi Mondai 
Zakken: 1924 Nen Imin Hō nitaisuru Kōshō oyobi Kōgi’ [Miscellaneous incidents relating to the 
anti-Japanese problem in the US: Negotiations and protests regarding the Immigration Act of 1924], 
3.8.2.339-6-6, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Hanihara to Matsui, 
1 June 1924, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 1924, vol. 1, 190–202; Shidehara, 
Gaikō 50 Nen, 47–48.
43  Kawashima Nobutarō, ‘Shidehara Sōri heno Omoide: Jyoyaku Kaisei (zoku)’ [Memories of 
Prime Minister Shidehara: The revision of the unequal treaties (continued)], July 1953, in ‘Shidehara 
Heiwa Bunko’, Reel 18.
44  Ibid.
45  Hanihara to Shidehara, 28 June 1924, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 
1924, vol. 1, 217–18.
46  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., 1924 Nen Beikoku Imin-hō Seitei oyobi Kore nikansuru Nichi-Bei 
Kōshō Keika [The US Immigration Act of 1924 and the process of Japan–US negotiations] (Tokyo: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1924); Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., 1924 Nen Beikoku Imin-hō Seitei 
oyobi Kore nikansuru Nichi-Bei Kōshō Keika Kōbunsho Eibun Fuzokusho [The US Immigration Act of 
1924 and the process of Japan–US negotiations, supplementary English-language official documents] 
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
152
(Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1924); Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research Department, Section 1, 
‘Gaikō Shiryō Hensan Jigyō nitsuite’ [Regarding the task of editing diplomatic historical material], April 
1939, in Hirose, Kindai Gaikō Kaikoroku, vol. 1, 44; Takahashi, ‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (2)’, 412.
47  ‘“1924 Nen Beikoku Imin-hō Seitei oyobi Kore nikansuru Nichi-Bei Kōshō Keika” Kobunsho 
Haifu-Saki’ [The US Immigration Act of 1924 and the process of related negotiations’ official 
document distribution destination], in ‘Teikoku niokeru Gaikō Bunsho Kohyō Kankei Zakken’ 
[Miscellanea related to the publication of diplomatic documents in Japan], N.1.7.1.2, Diplomatic 
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
48  Shidehara to Yoshida Isaburō, temporary acting ambassador to the US, 11 September 1924, in 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 1924, vol. 1, 221–23; Shidehara to Ōyama Ujirō, 
consul general in San Francisco, 3 August 1924, ibid., 313.
49  Saburi Sadao, ‘Beikoku Shin-Imin Hōan nitsuite’ [Regarding the new Immigration Act in the 
US], Kensei 7, no. 7 (July 1924): 45.
50  Shidehara to Foreign Minister Katō, 26 August 1924, in ‘Zoku Kakugi Kettei-sho Shūroku 
(Sōkō)’ [Continued compilation of cabinet decision (draft)], vol. 3, Z.1.3.0.1, Diplomatic Archives 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; ‘Imin Iinkai Giryō Jiko nikansuru Ken’ [The matter 
relating to the discussed items of the immigration committee], 21 November 1924, 1-4E-018-
00-zatsu-03205-100, National Archives of Japan; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade 
Bureau, ‘Dai 50 Kai Teikoku Gikai Setsumei Sankō Shiryo’ [Explanatory reference material for the 
50th Imperial Diet], January 1925, in ‘Teikoku Gikai Kankei Zassan: Bessatsu, Setsumei Shiryō 
(Tsūshō-kyoku)’ [Miscellanea related to the imperial diet: explanatory materials (international trade 
bureau)], vol. 6, 1.5.2.2-6-2, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Ishii 
Itarō (speaking), ‘Shidehara-dan no Keizai Gaikō nitsuite’ [On the economic diplomacy of Baron 
Shidehara], date unknown, in ‘Shidehara Heiwa Bunko’, Reel 13; Ishii, Gaikōkan no Isshō, 141–50.
51  Edward Price Bell, with an introduction by Calvin Coolidge, World Chancelleries: Sentiments, 
Ideas, and Arguments Expressed by Famous Occidental and Oriental Statesmen Looking to the 
Consolidation of the Psychological Bases of International Peace (Chicago: Chicago Daily News, 1926), 
119–43. See also James D. Startt, Journalism’s Unofficial Ambassador: A Biography of Edward Price Bell, 
1869–1943 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979), 112; Minohara, Hai-Nichi Imin-hō to Nichi-Bei 
Kankei, 224; Murai, Seitō Naikaku-sei no Seiritsu, 1918–27 Nen, 232–33.
52  Yoshida to Shidehara, 10 December 1924, in ‘Gaikoku Shimbun Tsushin Kikan oyobi Tsushin-
in Kankei Zakken: Tsushin-in no Bu, Beikokujin no Bu’ [Miscellaneous matters concerning foreign 
news communication media and communication staff: On communication staff, US individuals], 
vol. 1, 1.3.2.50-2-2, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Shidehara 
to Katō, 18 April 1925, ibid.; Bell to Kato, 5 May 1925, Edward Price Bell Papers, Outgoing 
Correspondence Box 1924–1930, Newberry Library; Bell to Kato, 30 May 1925, Bell Papers, 
Outgoing Correspondence Box 1924–1930.
53  Remarks of Edgar A. Bancroft at the Japan–American Society’s dinner, 12 December 1924, 
Edgar A. Bancroft Papers, Box 5, Seymour Library, Knox College; Bancroft to Hughes, 5 January 
1925, Bancroft Papers, Box 4; Bancroft to Bell, 8 May 1925, Bancroft Papers, Box 4; Bell to Bancroft, 
6 June 1925, Bell Papers, Outgoing Correspondence Box 1924–1930; New York Times, 29 July 1925.
54  Shidehara to the Nobel Peace Prize Committee, 11 December 1930, in J. L. Garvin Papers, 
Folder: Recipient: Bell, Edward Price, Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of 
Texas at Austin; Shidehara to Makino Nobuaki, 5 May 1933, in ‘Makino Nobuaki Kankei Bunsho’, 
Correspondence Department, vol. 28. See also Shidehara to Mrs Bell, 11 December 1930, Bell 
Papers, Incoming Materials Box Scraq-Sn; Startt, Journalism’s Unofficial Ambassador, 159, 230.
55  Katō Takaaki to Mutsu Hirokichi, 29 August 1924, in ‘Katō Takaaki Bunsho’ [Katō Takaaki 
documents], 85, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library; 
Takahashi, ‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (2)’, 408, 418, 438–40, 454, 514–15; Mutsu Ian, ‘The Mutsu 
Family’, in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, ed. Ian Nish, vol. 2 (Richmond, Surrey: Japan 
Library, 1997), 161.
56  Takahashi, ‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (2)’, 438, 441, 487, 509–10, 512–13, 521.
153
3. JAPAN–US RELATIONS AND CHINESE NATIONALISM
57  Ibid., 456, 458–61, 463, 473, 475, 500, 502–04.
58  Ibid., 392, 438–41; Horinouchi Kensuke, Horinouchi Kensuke Kaikoroku: Nihon Gaikō 50 Nen 
no Rimen-shi [The memoirs of Horinouchi Kensuke: A behind the scenes history of 50 years of 
Japanese diplomacy] (Tokyo: Sankei Shimbunsha, 1979), 24.
59  Ishii, Gaikōkan no Isshō, 158; Hattori, Higashi Asia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon 
Gaikō, 1918–1931, 43, 164, 197, 236, 309, 312; for a work that relays the collected information 
on the material section of the Manchurian Railway negotiations division, see Manchurian 
Railway Negotiations Division, Material Section, ‘Shōwa 5 Nendo Sōgo Shiryō (Kimura Riji-yō)’ 
[Comprehensive documentation for the fifth year of Shōwa (for use by Director Kimura)], 6 June 
1931, in Kimura Eiichi Papers, Box 1, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Manchurian 
Railway Negotiations Division, Material Section, ‘Shōwa 6 Nendo Sōgo Shiryō (Kimura Riji-yō)’ 
[Comprehensive documentation for the sixth year of Shōwa (for use by Director Kimura)], date 
unknown, Kimura Papers, Box 1. See also Satō Motoei, Kindai Nihon no Gaikō to Gunji: Keneki Yōgō 
to Shinryaku no Kōzō [Modern Japan’s diplomacy and the military: The structure of interest protection 
and invasion] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2000), 287–88.
60  Tani Masayuki, ‘Holland Kōshi Jidai no Shidehara-san’. See also Kawamura Shigehisa, ‘Kasumigaseki 
Taiheiki: Jinei Ijyō Ariya Nakiya’ [Record of the great peace of Kasumigaseki: Was there disorder in the 
camps or not], 11 November 1932, in ‘Kawamura Shigehisa Kankei Bunsho’ [Documents relating to 
Kawamura Shigehisa], 3–7, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Hattori, 
Higashi Asia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō, 1918–1931, 311–12; Kobayashi Michihiko, 
‘Tanaka Seiyūkai to Santō Shuppei’ [The Tanaka-led Seiyūkai and the sending of troops to Shandong], 
1927–1928 (1), Kita Kyūshū Shiritsu Daigaku Hōsei Ronshū 32, no. 2–3 (December 2004): 26.
61  Takahashi, ‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (2)’, 407, 438, 453, 470, 510, 521, 523.
62  Arita Hachirō, Bakahachi to Hito ha Iu: Ichi Gaikōkan no Kaiso [Some people call me ‘Bakahachi’: 
The recollections of a diplomat] (Tokyo: Kōwadō, 1959), 29.
63  Ibid., 29.
64  Hirota Kōki, ‘Egi Tasuku-shi no “Shikoku Jōyaku to Beikoku Ryūho” wo Yomu’ [Reading Mr 
Egi Tasuku’s ‘The Four-Power Treaty and the US suspense’], Gaikō Jihō, no. 423 (June 1922): 1–13.
65  Hirota Kōki Biography Publishing Association, Hirota Kōki, 600–01.
66  Chūgoku Kanzei Tokubetsu Kaigi Jūnbi Uchiawase-kai Dai 1 Shouiinkai Hoka Gijiroku 
[Proceedings of the Chinese Tariff Special Conference, preliminary meeting, first subcommittee 
and others], 29 August – 29 September 1925, in ‘Shina Kanzei narabini Chigai Hōken Teppai 
Mondai Pekin Kaigi Ikken: Shina Kanzei Tokubetsu Kaigi Junbi Uchiawase-kai’ [Beijing conference 
on China’s customs tariffs and elimination of extraterritoriality: Preparatory meeting for the special 
conference on customs tariffs in China], vol. 2. 2.9.10.13-12, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan.
67  Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Chinese Minister to the US Shi Zhaoji (Alfred Sao-
ke Sze), 30 January 1926, in Diplomatic Archives, 03.25.25.31.1, Institute of Modern History, 
Academia Sinica; Shen Yunlong, ed., Huang Yingbai xiansheng nianpu changbian [Long chronicle 
of Mr Huang Yingbai] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1976), 252, 258, 259; Shidehara to 
Hioki, 15 December 1925, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 1926, vol. 2, part 2, 
871–72; Wang Rongbao, Chinese minister to Japan, to Shidehara, 20 October 1926, ibid., vol. 2, 
part 1, 385–87; Shidehara to Yoshizawa, 9 November, ibid., 400–02; Japanese legation in China to 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 November 1926, in Zhong Ri guanxi shi liao: Shangwu jiaoshe, 
1918–27 [Documents on Sino-Japanese relations: Commercial negotiations], ed. Institute of Modern 
History, Academia Sinica (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1994), 608–09; 
Hattori, Higashi Asia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō, 1918–1931, 163–69.
68  Eliot to FO, 4 November 1925, 10813/25/30, FO 228/2791, National Archives; Hattori, 
Higashi Asia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō, 1918–1931, 167.
69  Chamberlain to Eliot, 17 December 1924, FO 800/255, National Archives; Chamberlain to 
Eliot, 23 July 1925, FO 800/255, National Archives.
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
154
70  Reminiscences of Sansom; Charles Eliot, Japanese Buddhism, ed. G. B. Sansom, with a memoir 
of the author by Sir Harold Parlett (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1994). See also Shidehara to Matsui, 
ambassador to the UK, 3 February 1927, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Shōwa 
Era I, part 1, vol. 1, 435–36; Etō Shinkichi, Higashi Asia Seijishi Kenkyū [Study of the political history 
of East Asia] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1968), 160; Harumi Goto-Shibata, ‘Sir John Tilley, 
1869–1951: British Ambassador to Japan, 1926–31’, in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, 
ed. Hugh Cortazzi, vol. 4 (London: Japan Library, 2002), 78–88.
71  Matsui, Matsui Keishirō Jijoden, 143–44.
72  Takahashi, ‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (2)’, 529; Shidehara to Matsudaira, 30 December 1926, 
in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 1926, vol. 2, part 2, 1219–23.
73  Reminiscences of Dooman; Hattori, Higashi Asia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō, 
1918–1931, 167–69.
74  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 1924, vol. 2, 216–19, 222–25. Another source 
is Ministry of Foreign Affairs et. al., Jōyaku Kaisei Kankei: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Bessatsu, Tsushō Jōyaku 
to Tsūshō Seisaku no Hensen, 614–21. However, the above source does contain some inaccuracies. 
See also Unno Yoshirō, ‘Nihon to Indochina no Bōeki Masatsu’ [Trade friction between Japan and 
Indochina], in Taiheiyō Asia-ken no Kokusai Keizai Funsō-shi [A history of international economic 
disputes in the Pacific and Asia region], ed. Hosoya Chihiro (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 
1983), 41–64.
75  Shidehara to Ishii, 1 October 1924, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 1924, 
vol. 2, 237; Katō cabinet meeting decision, 20 January 1925, ibid., 1925, vol. 1, 254–55; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs proclamation, 31 July 1925, ibid., 237–49. Regarding Yamagata, see Tokutomi, Sokū 
Yamagata Kō Den, 433–83.
76  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade Bureau, First Section, ‘Kintō Bōeki Kaigi 
Gijiroku narabini Hōkoku-sho’ [Near East Trade Conference minutes and report], date unknown, 
in ‘Kintō Bōeki Kaigi’ [Near East Trade Conference], vol. 3, 3.2.1.41, Diplomatic Archives of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Obata Yūkichi Biography Publishing Association, Obata Yūkichi, 
340–59.
77  Permission Proposal, ‘Honpō to “Balkan” Kokkai Engan Kantō oyobi Egypt Hōmen to no Bōeki 
Sokushin notame Gaimushō Kankei-kan Kaigi Kaisai-gata nikansuru Ken’ [Matter concerning the 
holding of a conference with officials connected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of 
facilitating trade between Japan, the ‘Balkan’ Black Sea coast, the Near East, and Egypt], 28 December 
1925, in ‘Kintō Bōeki Kaigi’, vol. 1; Shidehara to Obata, 29 December, ibid.; Nihon Yūsen, Nihon 
Yūsen Kabushiki Gaisha 50 Nen-shi, 410.
78  ‘Dai 1 Kai Bōeki Kaigi Ikken: Sankasha Kankei: 1’ [First Trade Conference: Participants]. 
3.2.1.40-5, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
79  ‘Dai 1 Kai Bōeki Kaigi Sōkai niokeru Gaimu Daijin Aisatsu (Taishō 15 Nen 9 Gatsu 13 Nichi)’ 
[Opening address by the minister for foreign affairs at the First Trade Conference general meeting 
(13 September, 15th year of Taishō)], in ‘Dai 1 Kai Bōeki Kaigi Ikken: Gidai nikansuru Ikensho (Ko) 
Kanchō oyobi Zaigai Kōkan’ [First Trade Conference: View about subjects (section a) government office 
and diplomatic establishments abroad], 3.2.1.40-3-1, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan. For more details on the South Sea Trade Conference, see Shimizu Hajime, ‘1920 
Nendai niokeru “Nanshin-Ron” no Kisuu to Nanyō Bōeki Kaigi no Shisō’ [The trend of ‘Nanshin-ron’ 
(‘advance to the south’ theory) in the 1920s and the thought behind the South Sea Trade Conference], in 
Ryō-Taisen-kan-ki Nihon, Tōnan Asia Kankei no Shosō [Various aspects of the relationship between Japan 
and South-East Asia during the era between the two world wars], ed. Shimizu Hajime (Tokyo: Asian 
Economic Research Center, 1986), 3–46.
80  ‘Dai 1 Kai Bōeki Kaigi Sōkai niokeru Gaimu Daijin Aisatsu’.
81  Ishii Itarō (speaking), ‘Shidehara-dan no Keizai Gaikō nitsuite’.
82  Ibid.
155
3. JAPAN–US RELATIONS AND CHINESE NATIONALISM
83  Permission Proposal, ‘Tsusho-kyoku ni Nanyō-gakari Secchi nikansuru Ken’ [Matter concerning 
the establishment of a South Sea section in the International Trade Bureau], drafted 7 November 
1929, in ‘Gaimushō Kansei oyobi Naiki Kankei Zakken’, vol. 2. I also received insight on this topic 
from Koike, Manshū Jihen to Tai-Chūgoku Seisaku, 104. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hundred-
Year History Compilation Association, Gaimushō no 100 Nen, vol. 2, 7.
84  Perhaps for this reason, Bancroft’s evaluation of the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Japan and the Soviet Union was that: ‘Of course this is not the end of their controversies, but rather an 
adjustment of some’. See Bancroft to Schurman, 25 January 1925, Bancroft Papers, Box 4.
85  Bancroft to Kellogg, 25 February 1925, Bancroft Papers, Box 4.
86  Bancroft to Kellogg, 5 March 1925, Bancroft Papers, Box 4.
87  Bancroft to Kellogg, 19 March 1925, Bancroft Papers, Box 4.
88  Ibid.
89  Ibid.
90  Hattori, Higashi Asia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō, 1918–1931, 150–56, 229–34.
91  ‘Sasaki Tōichi Chūjō Dan’ [A talk with Lieutenant General Sasaki Tōichi], 15 November 1942, 
in Manshū Jihen no Rimen-shi [The inside story of the Manchurian Incident], ed. Mori Katsumi 
(Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1976), 437–38; Sasaki Tōichi, Aru Gunjin no Jiden [The autobiography 
of a soldier] (Tokyo: Futsūsha, 1963), 140.
For research on the Nanjing Incident, see Etō, Higashi Asia Seijishi Kenkyū, 149–76; Usui Katsumi, 
Nicchū Gaikō-shi [Sino-Japanese diplomatic history] (Tokyo: Hanawashobō, 1971), 30–47; Tochigi 
Toshio and Banno Ryōkichi, Chūgoku Kokumin Kakumei: Senkanki Higashi Asia no Chikaku Hendō 
[The Chinese national revolution: Tectonic shifts in East Asia during the inter-war period] (Tokyo: 
Hōsei University Press, 1997), 259–62.
92  Shidehara to Yoshizawa, 28 March 1927, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 
Shōwa Era I, part 1, vol. 1, 521–22; Yoshizawa to Shidehara, 22 April 1927, ibid., 601–03; Iriye, After 
Imperialism, 97–109.
93  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Shōwa Era I, part 1, vol. 1, 542–45.
94  Ibid.
95  Yada Shichitarō, consulate general in Shanghai, to Shidehara, 4 December 1926, in ‘Kakkoku 
Naisei Kankei Zassan: Shina no Bu, Chihō’ [Miscellaneous collection relating to the internal affairs 
of various nations: China, regions], vol. 52, 1.6.1.4-2-3, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan; Takao Tōru, consul general in Hankou, to Shidehara, 16 December, in 
‘Shogaikoku Gaikō Kankei Zassan: Ei-Shi-Kan’ [Miscellaneous diplomatic relations of various 
countries: Between the UK and China], vol. 2, 1.2.1.10-8, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan; Shidehara to Matsudaira, 2 February 1927, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Shōwa Era I, part 1, vol. 1, 435; Horiuchi, Chūgoku no Arashi no Naka de, 
62–63; Tsutsui Kiyoshi, ‘Saigo no Gaikō’ [The final diplomacy] (3), Kasumigaseki-kai Kaihō, no. 310 
(December 1971): 12; Liu Jie, ‘Nicchū Teikei no Mosaku to Man-Mō Mondai: Shigemitsu Mamoru 
to Wang Zhengting’ [The Manchuria–Mongolia problem and the search for a Japanese–Chinese 
Partnership: Shigemitsu Mamoru and Wang Zhengting], in Nihon Rikken Seiji no Keisei to Henshitsu 
[The formation and deterioration of Japanese constitutional politics], ed. Toriumi Yasushi, Mitani 
Hiroshi, Nishikawa Makoto and Yano Nobuyuki, (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2005), 303.
96  Morioka to Shidehara, 27 March 1927, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, 
Shōwa Era I, part 1, vol. 1, 518.
97  Shidehara to Yada, 31 March 1927, ibid., 532–33.
98  Matsuoka Yōsuke Biography Publishing Association, Matsuoka Yōsuke: Sono Hito to Shōgai 
[Matsuoka Yōsuke: The man and his life] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1974), 171–72; Katō Kiyofumi, 
‘Matsuoka Yōsuke to Mantetsu: Washington Taisei eno Chosen’ [Matsuoka Yōsuke and the south 
Manchuria railway: Challenging the Washington system], in Kindai Nihon to Mantetsu [Modern 
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
156
Japan and the south Manchuria railway], ed. Kobayashi Hideo (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2000), 
64–107; Hattori, Higashi Asia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō, 1918–1931, 153, 230–32, 
308–10.
99  Matsuoka Yōsuke Biography Publishing Association, Matsuoka Yōsuke, 171–72.
100  Hattori, Higashi Asia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō, 1918–1931, 196.
101  Satō Naotake, ed., Kokusai Renmei niokeru Nihon [Japan in the League of Nations] (Tokyo: 
Kajima Research Center Press, 1972), 453–54.
For further details on the League of Nations, see Unno Yoshirō, Kokusai Renmei to Nihon [The League 
of Nations and Japan] (Tokyo: Harashobō, 1972); Usui Katsumi, Manshūkoku to Kokusai Renmei 
[Manchukuo and the League of Nations] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1995); Hattori, Higashi Asia 
Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō, 1918–1931, 35–42, 45, 54, 65, 76, 209, 260, 279, 281, 
285–86; Hattori, Manshū Jihen to Shigemitsu Chūka Kōshi Hōkokusho; Gotō, Ahen to Igirisu Teikoku.
102  Oka Yoshitake and Hayashi Shigeru, eds, Taishō Democracy-ki no Seiji: Matsumoto Gōkichi Seiji 
Nisshi [Politics in the era of Taishō democracy: The political journal of Matsumoto Gōkichi] (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 1959), 447.
103  Shidehara, ‘Wasureenu Hitobito’, 55. See also ‘Gaimu Daijin Danshaku Shidehara Kijurō 
Shucchō no Ken’ [The matter of Foreign Minister Baron Shidehara Kijurō’s trip], 18 December 1926, 
1-2A-019-00-nin-B1336-100, National Archives of Japan; Oka and Hayashi, Taishō Democracy-ki no 
Seiji, 331, 413, 457, 471, 545, 547.
104  Kobayashi Michihiko, ‘Tairiku Seisaku to Jinkō Mondai: 1918–31’ [Continental policy and the 
population problem: 1918–31], in Kan-Taiheiyō no Kokusai Chitsujo no Mosaku to Nihon: Daiichiji 
Sekai Taisen-go kara 55 Nen Taisei Seiritsu [The Search for an International Order in the Greater 
Pacific and Japan: From the Aftermath of World War I to the Establishment of the 1955 System], ed. 
Itō Yukio and Kawada Minoru (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1999), 207; Murai, Seitō Naikaku-sei 
no Seiritsu, 1918–27 Nen, 229–34.
105  See also Hattori, Higashi Asia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō, 1918–1931, 178, 
313–14.
106  Izawa Takio Document Research Association, Izawa Takio Kankei Bunsho, 265.







Japan’s Intervention  
in China
Japan and the Northern Expedition
The Shandong Expedition
The Seiyūkai party, led by Tanaka Giichi, formed a government in April 
1927. At that time Prime Minister Tanaka also took on the role of foreign 
minister. Freed from his ministerial responsibilities, Shidehara spent 
a period of convalescence due to appendicitis at his coastal residence in 
Kotsubo, in the Zushi region south of Yokohama. This residence had 
been given the name ‘Shūen-sō’ (Shūen villa) by Saionji Kinmochi. After 
Shidehara recuperated from his illness, he visited Saionji in Okitsu to 
express his thanks. On this occasion he asked Saionji why he had given 
the residence the name of ‘Shūen-sō’. Saionji told him that the meaning of 
the character ‘for “en” (遠) was to convey the sense of “world”, and means 
that you [Shidehara] are gathering together the hopes of the world’.1 
Saionji wanted to remind Shidehara that, although he was no longer the 
foreign minister for the time being, a great deal of responsibility rested 
upon his shoulders. I also note that from January of the previous year 
(1926), while Shidehara was still foreign minister, he had been nominated 
by the imperial household for a position in the House of Peers. Of the 
factions that constituted the Diet, he would go on to associate with the 
relatively neutral Dōwakai.2
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In the political world, the formation of the Tanaka cabinet was the occasion 
for the Kenseikai and Seiyūhontō parties to merge. This development 
led to the birth of the Rikken Minseitō (the Constitutional Democratic 
Party, hereafter simply referred to as the Minseitō) in June 1927. The 
first president of the Minseitō was Hamaguchi Osachi. In fact, it was 
Shidehara who had persuaded Hamaguchi to assume the responsibility of 
party president. Although Hamaguchi then offered him the role of vice-
president, Shidehara declined.
During this period, the Tanaka cabinet authorised the deployment of 
Japanese troops to the Shandong Peninsula in China. The impetus was 
the further advancement of the Northern Expedition, led by Chiang 
Kai-shek. Under the official justification of protecting local Japanese 
residents, the Tanaka cabinet authorised the first Shandong deployment 
in May 1927. The Tanaka cabinet authorised a second deployment in 
April of the following year. This move led to a clash with China’s National 
Revolutionary Army in Jinan, west of Qingdao. The occurrence of the 
‘Jinan Incident’ (in Japanese, the ‘Sainan Incident’) led to the Tanaka 
cabinet responding by committing even further, with the third Shandong 
deployment. Then, in June, Zhang Zuolin of the Mukden clique was 
assassinated when the train he was travelling in was bombed. In time, it 
was learned that the perpetrators of the assassination plot were actually 
the Kwantung Army (the branch of the Japanese army stationed in 
Kwantung-leased territory on the Liaodong Peninsula). The details of this 
‘Huanggutun Incident’ (or, in Japanese, the ‘Zhang Zuolin Explosion 
Death Incident’) were not widely known in Japan; government documents 
simply referred to ‘A Certain Important Incident in Manchuria’.3
The situation in China at the time of Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern 
Expedition was therefore one of rapid change, while at the same time, 
the Tanaka cabinet’s policy was characterised by dependency on military 
force. What did Shidehara think of these developments? Shidehara 
expressed his view in a private June 1927 letter to Adachi Mineichirō, 
Japan’s ambassador to Belgium:
Now that the upheaval in China is at its height, it is a great nuisance 
for the world’s powers. Yet there is little doubt that for the citizens 
of China, the trend in thinking after the world war is towards 
a gradual political awakening, particularly in light of the examples 
of what occurred in Turkey and Egypt. Calls for the termination 
of unequal treaties or the overthrow of imperialism are now being 
recognized as a reflection of true national self-consciousness. 
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I believe that attempts by external forces to apply force in order 
to prevent these shifts are not only doomed to failure but may 
actually provoke matters further.4
In other words, according to Shidehara, not only was it impossible to 
prevent China’s ‘awakening’ and ‘national self-consciousness’ with ‘external 
forces’ but also such measures could actually exacerbate the situation.
That is not to say that Shidehara thought Japan had to acquiesce to China’s 
demands and renounce its interests in China. For example, when Belgium 
declared that it would return its foreign concessions in Tianjin, in the 
hopes that it could thereby develop its relations with China, Shidehara 
asked Adachi: ‘Is this not a mistake on their part in judging the political 
situation in China?’5
‘Overview of the Chinese Problem’
Although Shidehara was still in poor health, he would gradually become 
more active. The cause was the general election of February 1928. This 
was the first election in Japan with universal suffrage for male citizens. 
During the lead-up to the election, the Seiyūkai criticised the previous 
Wakatsuki cabinet for their policies on China. In reaction, Shidehara 
embarked upon trips to cities such as Nagoya and Osaka to present his 
views in public speeches. Newspapers from the period reported:
Former foreign minister Mr. Shidehara Kijūrō fears that the 
Tanaka cabinet’s handling of China policy may incur international 
misunderstanding and place the empire [Japan] in an unfavorable 
position. On this occasion, he has spoken forcefully on various 
aspects of his diplomatic approach, appealing to the citizens of 
the nation.6 
Shidehara gave his speeches in order to convince his fellow citizens of the 
benefits of his diplomatic ideals, rather than to support any particular 
candidate in the general election. Their contents were conveyed in 
newspaper print, alongside photos. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, for example, 
reported:
Expressing his regret that [the ideals of ] Shidehara diplomacy 
had been trampled upon by the current cabinet, former foreign 
minister Baron Shidehara Kijūrō has made his way down to 
the Kansai area, via Nagoya, in order to publicly critique the 
government’s approach to China policy.7
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Although the governing Seiyūkai party would narrowly come in first 
place in the election, the Minseitō was able to close the gap to a single 
seat. In this political context, Shidehara published an essay titled ‘Shina 
Mondai Gaikan’ (Overview of the Chinese problem) in the April 1928 
issue of Gaikō Jihō. This essay was a vehicle for Shidehara to discuss his 
own recommended policy on China. In the essay, Shidehara wrote:
Today’s China is no longer the China of the past. If you believe 
that it is still possible to recklessly use military force and pressure 
in order to achieve your goals through confrontation, you will fail 
to apprehend how the times have changed.8
On the other hand:
If the citizens of China believe that they themselves can use 
violence and threats in order to subdue the great powers, ignoring 
their responsibilities and rigidly thinking only of their rights, then 
this would in turn be their mistake.9 
In the same essay, Shidehara quoted his own Diet address to discuss 
China’s communism, arguing:
The question of how many people should be in control of political 
power, and what kind of domestic policies would be appropriate 
for China, is, of course, a matter that must be resolved by the 
citizens of that country.10
On the topic of the Wakatsuki cabinet’s China policy, Shidehara repeated 
the following four points from his Diet address:
1. Respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and 
abide by the principle of absolute non-interference in internal 
conflicts.
2. Pledge to promote a relationship of prosperous coexistence 
and economic cooperation between the two nations.
3. Respond to reasonable requests from the citizens of China 
with sympathy and goodwill and work resolutely toward 
a cooperative resolution.
4. While taking as patient and tolerant an attitude as possible 
with respect to current conditions in China, use all available 
reasonable methods to protect our legitimate and important 
rights and interests.11
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According to ‘Shina Mondai Gaikan’, Sino-Japanese relations improved 
from the time of the Washington Naval Conference to the mid-1920s:
Since the turning point of the Washington Conference, the 
relationship between our two nations gradually improved. 
In particular, our [ministry] staff played a central role in the 
Chinese Tariffs Special Conference and the Extraterritorial Rights 
Committee convened in Beijing last year. They worked in an 
impartial and temperate manner, thereby concretely demonstrating 
to China our sympathetic attitude. This, alongside our approach 
of absolutely not interfering in China’s domestic conflict, served to 
bring the citizens of our two nations significantly closer together 
and improve mutual understanding.12 
Shidehara was clearly proud of how his policies served to reform Japan’s 
relations with China.
In the essay, Shidehara also set forth his thinking, albeit in an indirect 
manner, on whether it was correct to deploy troops to Shandong. In his 
view, when dispatching troops, it was important to carefully consider the 
possible outcomes, including any negative impacts on business dealings. 
Military intervention should only ever be an ‘emergency measure’. 
For Shidehara, ‘suddenly sending soldiers without first working out some 
form of preliminary measures must be regarded as gravely unfortunate 
for the nation’.13 Finally, Shidehara touched upon his own speech at the 
Washington Naval Conference:
Our nation feels most urgently a concern for the speed at which 
peace and unity may be restored to China, as well as for the 
economic development of both nations’ rich natural resources 
… We must acknowledge that our own nation has particularly 
important interests in China, far more so than any geographically 
distant foreign land … What we seek is a footing for economic 
activity whereby both nations may benefit, under the principles of 
an open door policy and equal opportunity. I believe that at the 
time [of my speech] the above points received unanimous support.14
In the above manner, Shidehara asserted that Japan should avoid 
interference in China’s affairs, in the interest of promoting peace and 
economic commercial activity in that nation. Further, even though Japan 
had special interests in China, it ought not to attempt to shut out other 
nations from economic participation. Publicly expressing this position 
was also Shidehara’s way of attempting to reign in the Tanaka cabinet. 
He concluded the essay with the following words:
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It is my earnest desire that we might cut through present-day 
publicity stunts and various forms of emotional discord and, 
from the vantage point of pure concern for the nation, reach 
our judgements following earnest and calm consideration of the 
problem at hand.15
When viewed over the long-term, it would seem that Shidehara’s opinion 
was correct. Yet what about the short-term? It is difficult to see what 
concrete policies could be drawn up to protect Japanese interests and 
residents. It is also doubtful as to whether this approach convinced the 
Japanese populace. It may well be that from Shidehara’s perspective, 
politicians, the media and even the citizenry were immature, yet the fact 
remains that Shidehara received a significant degree of criticism from these 
quarters. One example is an essay by Honda Kumatarō titled ‘Tai-Shi 
Gaikō no Hatan’ (The bankruptcy of diplomacy towards China). After 
being forced out of his position by Shidehara, former diplomat Honda 
had become a commentator on Japanese diplomacy. On the topic of the 
previous Wakatsuki cabinet, Honda wrote:
Time and again it led us to unstable situations, due to a lack of 
understanding as to the complex nature of China’s revolutionary 
movement, and a failure to establish any foundational policies.16
‘My Views on Diplomacy’
When Shidehara aired his views publicly in the manner outlined above, 
he was not simply giving his advice as a bureaucrat. Rather, in the context 
of a two-party political system, he was effectively siding with the Minseitō 
against the Seiyūkai. Shidehara also engaged with the Minseitō in other 
ways. For example, he participated in the formulation of a Minseitō 
statement on Chinese policy, alongside figures such as Hamaguchi 
Osachi, Egi Tasuku, Kobashi Ichita, Nagai Ryūtarō and Adachi Kenzō. 
He also spoke with Hamaguchi and other members of the party on the 
occasion of his speech on Chinese policy to the Japan–China Economic 
Association in Osaka. Further, Shidehara even consulted Hamaguchi 
on the topic of the Kellogg–Briand Pact.17 The Kellogg–Briand Pact, 
which outlawed war, was signed in Paris in August 1928. Through such 
discussions, Shidehara’s position would also influence Hamaguchi’s 
thinking. We see this influence in Hamaguchi’s view that ‘we must give 
sufficient opportunity for peace and unity to take hold in China’ and that 
diplomacy had to avoid becoming entangled in political strife.18
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Shidehara would also publish a dialogue transcript in the Minseitō organ 
magazine, Minsei. As suggested by the title, ‘Yashiteki Tanaka Gaikō’ 
(The charlatanry of Tanaka diplomacy), it was a severe criticism of Tanaka’s 
diplomatic approach. Shidehara attacked the Tanaka cabinet for its role 
in the Jinan Incident, writing that ‘to pretend you can do something 
that is impossible is to act no differently than a street-side conjurer’.19 
In the past, when still foreign minister, Shidehara had also published his 
Diet address in the organ magazine of the Kenseikai (which, it should be 
recalled, was one of the two parties that merged to become the Minseitō). 
In having reached this point, however, we can see that Shidehara’s deep 
sense of crisis with regard to Tanaka diplomacy had pushed him even 
further towards alignment with the Minseitō.
We can get a clearer sense of this more partisan Shidehara from the speech 
he gave on 19 October 1928 at Keiō University entitled ‘Gaikō Kanken’ 
(My views on diplomacy). In this speech, Shidehara argued forcefully 
that ‘the essence of diplomacy does not lie in scheming’.20 That is to say, 
diplomacy conducted through scheming had little to offer a nation in the 
long-term. This was because:
As the life of a nation is to be eternal, those who would scheme 
for the purpose of a temporary benefit must prepare themselves 
for the serious calamities that would one day occur as a result.21
What did Shidehara mean here by diplomacy conducted through 
scheming? He mentioned the Triple Intervention as one such ‘example 
of scheming diplomacy in the Far East’. (In the Triple Intervention of 
1895, Russia, Germany and France intervened following Japan’s victory 
over Qing-dynasty China.) ‘Needless to say, the Triple Intervention was 
a diplomatic conspiracy, a serious international crime.’ Yet, even though 
Japan was forced to return the Liaodong Peninsula to China as a result 
of the Triple Intervention, ‘it was China itself who was the first to suffer 
poetic justice’. This was because:
China was betrayed by the two governments of Russia and 
Germany, which it once regarded as its friends. Not only was 
China deprived of the benefits it hoped to gain through the Triple 
Intervention, but it ended up losing all of Manchuria, along 
with Shandong province, with no choice but to allow Russia and 
Germany to carry out their invasion strategies unimpeded.22
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
166
Shidehara stated:
Diplomacy is not a conjurer’s trick. Those who seek to deceive 
the eyes of onlookers, producing hundreds of feet of paper, a dove 
of peace, or the national flag expressing the dignity of the nation 
from the interior cavity of an empty box, in order to receive the 
praise of the masses, are not politicians but magicians.23 
Shidehara’s conviction was that diplomacy must be based upon honesty 
and begin by establishing a relationship of trust.
With this speech, Shidehara offered an explanation for his response in 
March the previous year to the Nanjing Incident of 1927, alongside 
a criticism of the Tanaka cabinet. He wrote:
These days, there are those who view the Nanjing Incident as 
a product of the weak diplomacy Japan and other powers had 
pursued in the past with respect to China. Further, they may 
say that it followed from the Japanese government at that time 
following a path of absolute non-resistance. This kind of false 
speculation is circulating in our society even now. One cannot 
help but be shocked, however, at the sight of ministry officials 
of the present government openly disseminating such falsities.24
On the other hand, Shidehara also made demands of China’s diplomacy. 
As he argued:
The methods that the Chinese side are utilizing today, for the 
purpose of abolishing its unequal treaties, differ quite significantly 
from how our own nation dealt with the very same problem.25 
That is to say, in the case of Japan:
Rather than blame the great powers, we first blamed ourselves. 
Rather than calling for the overthrow of imperialism and so on, 
we first quietly put all our energy into reforming our national 
political affairs.26
However, in the case of China, ‘the present situation is that it is unwilling 
to  wait for an improvement in domestic governance, instead directly 
pressing for the revision and termination of currently existing treaties’.27 
In reality, however, there had been many reforms and attempts at 
self-strengthening in China, which Shidehara underestimated.
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That being the case, what kind of policies should Japan adopt with respect 
to China? Shidehara argued for a combination of non-intervention and 
the protection of national interests. By ‘non-intervention’, Shidehara 
meant that:
With various parties opposing each other in China’s political 
world, it is essential to absolutely avoid lending any form of unfair 
aid to one side, or to work towards removing another side.28 
His reason for taking this stance was that ‘our rights and interests [in China] 
were certainly not bestowed by any one political faction’.29 Shidehara then 
turned to the ‘idea that the carrying out of a policy of non-intervention 
nevertheless requires some discrete intervention for the purpose of protecting 
our rights and interests’. However, he added: ‘Such thinking actually looks 
down upon our benefits, our position [in China]’.30
By advancing this view, Shidehara criticised the Tanaka cabinet’s 
deployment of troops to Shandong. He concluded his speech by making 
a final point on the importance of economic diplomacy:
Our government must not stop at merely protecting our economic 
rights within a particular region of China. Rather, it must adopt 
a much bigger perspective and endeavor to promote greater 
economic ties between Japan and the entirety of China.31
Here Shidehara was direct in his criticism of the Tanaka cabinet. 
The  bluntness of this speech is quite conspicuous when compared 
with his ‘Overview of the Chinese Problem’ essay of half a year earlier. 
Perhaps he felt more confident in sharing his real thoughts before 
a more limited audience. Certainly, having witnessed the fallout of the 
Jinan Incident and the assassination of Zhang Zuolin, Shidehara had an 
even stronger conviction as to the importance of non-intervention and 
economic diplomacy.
The Argument with Prime Minister Tanaka
Shidehara would have been anxious not only about the effects of Tanaka 
diplomacy abroad but also about how Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
personnel were faring. There were two significant shifts with respect to 
personnel during the era of the Tanaka cabinet, both of which would later 
have an impact on Shidehara’s second term as foreign minister. First, there 
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was the rise of reformists such as Arita Hachirō and Shigemitsu Mamoru. 
Arita became the director-general of the Asian Bureau, while Shigemitsu 
became the consulate general in Shanghai. Alongside Arita’s appointment 
as Asian Bureau director-general, Shidehara’s confidant Kimura Eiichi 
was made minister to Czechoslovakia. Second, Yoshida Shigeru became 
vice-minister for foreign affairs, replacing Debuchi Katsuji. Yoshida was 
not originally a member of the central clique within the ministry. It was 
due to his closeness to figures such as the Seiyūkai’s Mori Tsutomu, the 
parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs, that he was able to secure 
this position. Thus, some referred to Yoshida as ‘the uninvited vice-
minister’. Debuchi, meanwhile, was made ambassador to the US.
Mori Tsutomu, parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs, had been 
critical of Shidehara’s policy of non-intervention. He was also behind 
the move to push Shidehara’s confidants, Vice-Minister Debuchi and 
Asian Bureau Director-General Kimura, out of their respective positions. 
Mori looked down upon career diplomats but saw Yoshida Shigeru and 
Shiratori Toshio as exceptions. While Tanaka initially resisted making 
these extensive changes in personnel, he apparently relented and 
accepted Yoshida as vice-minister following the assassination of Zhang 
Zuolin of June 1928 and the impasse that had been reached with Japan’s 
China policy.
Given the circumstances, Shidehara could not have been particularly 
enthusiastic about Yoshida’s appointment as the vice-minister. In fact, 
Yoshida had also disliked Shidehara for some time. When Shidehara 
was vice-minister for foreign affairs, Yoshida was acting director of the 
Document Section. A strong-willed individual, he did not get on well with 
Vice-Minister Shidehara. Even when Shidehara summoned him, he was 
apparently not quick to respond. Later, when the Manchurian Incident 
occurred during Shidehara’s second term as foreign minister, Yoshida was 
also critical: ‘He is not skilled at handling unexpected incidents’.32
Nevertheless, the most problematic individual for Shidehara was Prime 
Minister Tanaka himself. Tanaka’s Manchuria policy began to stagnate 
following the Huanggutun Incident. Japan was unable to get China to 
recognise its right to lease land in southern Manchuria, which had long 
been a contentious issue between the two countries. Further, Zhang 
Zuolin’s successor, his eldest son Zhang Xueliang, would not acknowledge 
Japan’s right to begin constructing the Jihui or Zhangda railways. At this 
time, Shidehara was residing in Rikugien. One day he received some 
169
4. JAPAN’S INTERVENTION IN CHINA
disturbing information. It was details on the ‘Seiyūkai cabinet’s latest 
hardline policy’. To strengthen Japan’s hand in securing both land leasing 
and railway construction rights in Manchuria, the Tanaka cabinet were 
‘ready to carry out the mobilization of several divisions’.33 Fearing the 
worst, Shidehara relayed this information to the lord keeper of the privy 
seal, Makino Nobuaki.
Shidehara felt it necessary to use his position as a member of the House of 
Peers in order to speak at the plenary session on 2 February 1929. Upon 
the podium, Shidehara addressed Tanaka, asking him to clarify just what 
was meant by a ‘so-called hardline policy, and by an aggressive policy’. 
According to Shidehara, from the time of the Tōhō Kaigi (Eastern Summit) 
held in Tokyo in the summer of 1927, the Tanaka cabinet had inflamed 
the ‘indignation of the [Chinese] people against our nation’, triggering 
an anti-Japanese movement. Shidehara also argued that when Tanaka 
had previously spoken of rendering Manchuria ‘into a peaceful land’, he 
should have stopped at the protection of Japan’s interests.34 Shidehara was 
also critical of how the Tanaka cabinet had advised Zhang Xueliang to 
delay reaching an understanding with the Nationalist government.
Further, Shidehara asserted that the deployment of troops to Shandong 
was also a policy failure, given that they did not prevent a considerable 
loss of life among local Japanese residents. In his view, the Japanese 
government should have negotiated with the National Revolution 
Army and evacuated Japanese residents before deciding to send troops. 
He pointed out that not a single Japanese life was lost in the Nanjing 
Incident of 1927, when he himself had been foreign minister, despite the 
fact that no troops were deployed. Finally, Shidehara criticised the Tanaka 
cabinet’s announcement that the Chinese policies of the previous cabinet 
had reached a dead end. Rather, the situation was exactly the opposite. 
In fiery language he handed down his damning verdict:
The foundation of friendly Sino-Japanese relations, the 
achievement of diligent effort during our time in charge of the 
ministry, has during the current cabinet been, for the most part, 
tragically destroyed.35
In response, Tanaka spoke evasively of the need for diplomacy to be 
tough and aggressive. He also claimed that use of military force was a last 
resort and that he was doing his utmost to avoid it. According to Tanaka, 
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if troops had not been deployed to Shandong, the situation would have 
certainly grown much worse. Of course, this line of reasoning would 
never have convinced Shidehara.36
Therefore, on 5 February 1929, Shidehara stood to ask questions at 
the House of Peers. Again, he pressed the issue, asking whether troops 
would be dispatched to Manchuria for the sake of maintaining stability. 
He also repeated his doubts as to the wisdom of the advice given to Zhang 
Xueliang, and the deployment of troops to Shandong. He also expressed 
his regret that Japan was now behind the other powers when it came to 
reaching a tariff agreement with China.
In the end, however, the Tanaka cabinet would not last out the year. 
The cause of its undoing was their handling of the assassination by bomb 
of Zhang Zuolin. Tanaka had asserted that the perpetrators would face 
harsh punishment. However, pressure from the army ensured that the 
chief conspirator, Kōmoto Daisaku, only faced suspension from office. 
This led to the Shōwa emperor reprimanding Tanaka, and the subsequent 
resignation of the entire cabinet in July 1929.
Years later, when questioned at the Tokyo Trial by international prosecutors, 
Shidehara would say emphatically: ‘One cause of the collapse of the 
Tanaka cabinet was clearly the dispatch of troops to Jinan, along with 
other failures of its China diplomacy’.37 From Shidehara’s perspective, he 
had worked hard to establish both the tradition of Japanese diplomacy 
and international trust in Japan. Yet the policies of the Tanaka cabinet 
had disrupted these efforts. How would he manage to overcome these 
setbacks during his second term as foreign minister, commencing in the 
Hamaguchi cabinet?
Endnotes
1  Shidehara, Gaikō 50 Nen, 277–80.
2  Itō Takashi and Hirose Yoshihiro, eds, Makino Nobuaki Nikki [The diary of Makino Nobuaki] 
(Tokyo: Chuōkōronsha, 1990), 278; Oka and Hayashi, Taishō Democracy-ki no Seiji, 607; ‘Kizokuin 
Giin Kakuha-betsu nikansuru Chosa’ [Survey of respective factions among the House of Peers members], 
date unknown, in ‘Kondō Hideaki Kankei Bunsho’ [Documents relating to Kondō Hideaki], no. 70, 
Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library; ‘Kizokuin Giin Kakuha-
betsu: Ji Meiji 34 Nen 12 Gatsu, Shi Shōwa 7 Nen 3 Gatsu’ [Respective factions in the House of 
Peers, from December of Meiji 34 to March of Shōwa 7], in ‘Kondō Hideaki Kankei Bunsho’, no. 96; 
House of Representatives and House of Councilors, eds, Gikai Seido 70 Nen-shi: Seitōkai-ha Hen 
[A 70-year history of the Diet system: Volume on party-based factions] (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance 
Printing Bureau, 1961), 60; House of Representatives and House of Councilors, eds, Gikai Seido 70 
Nen-shi: Kizokuin, Sangiin Giin Meikan [A 70-year history of the Diet system: House of Peers, House of 
Councillors, Diet members directory] (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau, 1961), 124.
171
4. JAPAN’S INTERVENTION IN CHINA
3  Shidehara, Gaikō 50 Nen, 145–49. For details on Chinese policies of the Tanaka cabinet, see Satō 
Motoei, Shōwa Shoki Tai-Chūgoku Seisaku no Kenkyū: Tanaka Naikaku no Tai-Man-Mo Seisaku [A study 
of policy regarding China of the early Shōwa era: The Tanaka cabinet’s policies regarding Manchuria and 
Mongolia] (Tokyo: Harashobō, 1992); Hattori, Higashi Asia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō, 
1918–1931, 191–251; Kobayashi Michihiko, ‘Tanaka Seiyūkai to Santō Shuppei: 1927–1928 (1) (2)’, 
Kita Kyūshū Shiritsu Daigaku Hōsei Ronshū 32, no. 2–3 (December 2004): 1–33; 33, no. 1 (June 2005): 
1-52; Shao Jianguo, Beifa zhanzheng shiqi de Zhong Ri guan xi yan jiu [A study of Sino-Japanese relations 
during the Northern Expedition War] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2006).
4  Shidehara to Adachi, in ‘Adachi Mineichirō Kankei Bunsho’ [Documents relating to Adachi 
Mineichirō], 7 June 1927, Correspondence Department, no. 302, Modern Japanese Political History 
Materials Room, National Diet Library.
5  Ibid.
6  Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 14 February 1928.
7  Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, 16 February 1928.
8  Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Shina Mondai Gaikan’ [Overview of the Chinese problem], Gaikō Jihō, no. 560 
(April 1928): 9.
9  Ibid., 10.
10  Ibid., 10.
11  Ibid., 11.
12  Ibid., 12.
13  Ibid., 15.
14  Ibid., 17, 18.
15  Ibid., 18.
16  Honda Kumatarō, ‘Tai-Shi Gaikō no Hasan’ [The bankruptcy of diplomacy towards China], 
Gaikō Jihō, no. 538 (May 1927): 19–38.
17  Ikei Masaru, Hatano Masaru and Kurosawa Fumitaka, eds, Hamaguchi Osachi Nikki, Zuikanroku 
[Hamaguchi Osachi diary, record of reflections] (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1991), 19, 41, 44, 45, 46, 
54, 56, 61, 65, 67, 74, 83, 109, 124, 134, 143, 158, 166. Murai Ryōta has also provided me with 
valuable insights on this topic.
The presentation given in Osaka is also contained in Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Tai-shi Gaikō nitsuite’ 
[On the matter of diplomacy towards China], Minsei 2, no. 11 (November 1928): 4–17. See also 
‘Hamaguchi Shidehara Ryo-shi no Tanaka Gaikō Hihan’ [Critiques of Tanaka diplomacy as advanced 
by Mr Hamaguchi and Mr Shidehara], date unknown, in ‘Shidehara Heiwa Bunko’, Reel 18.
18  Hamaguchi Osachi, ‘Yukizumareru Kyokumen no Tenkai to Wagatō no Shuchō’ [The 
development of the current impasse and the position of my party], Minsei 2, no. 10 (October 1928): 
6–17; ‘Hamaguchi Sōsai no Ketsui Kataku’ [The strong determination of President Hamaguchi], 
Minsei 2, no. 10 (October 1928): 86–93. Murai Ryōta has also provided me with valuable insights on 
this topic.
19  Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Yashi-teki Tanaka Gaikō’ [The charlatanry of Tanaka diplomacy], Minsei 2, 
no. 10 (October 1928): 18–20; Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Gen-Naikaku no Gaikō Hōshin’ [The diplomatic 
policy of the present cabinet], Kensei 7, no. 8 (August 1924): 5–9; Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Teikoku 
Gaikō no Kichō’ [The basic theme of Japanese diplomacy], Kensei 8, no. 2 (February 1925): 11–12; 
Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Jishu-teki Gaikō no Kiso Kakuritsu’ [Establishing the foundations of autonomous 
diplomacy], Kensei Kōron 6, no. 2 (February 1926): 13–20; Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Waga Kuni Genka no 
Kokusai Kankei’ [Our nation’s contemporary international relations], Kensei Kōron 7, no. 2 (February 
1927): 21–27.
For further details on Diet speeches given during Shidehara’s second appointment as foreign 
minister, see Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Kokusai Heiwa nikansuru Sekai no Taisei’ [The global situation on 
international peace], Minsei 3, no. 12 (December 1929): 9–13; Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Genjitsu Nihon 
no Kokusai Kankei’ [Japan’s international relationships at the present moment], Minsei 4, no. 2 
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
172
(February 1930): 27–35; Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Genzai Nihon no Kokusai Kankei’ [Japan’s current 
international relationships], Minsei 4, no. 5 (May 1930): 16–19; Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Shiryoku wo 
Tsukushite Keirin no Jitsugen ni Manshin’ [Pushing forward to the utmost of our ability to realise 
governance], Minsei 5, no. 2 (February 1931): 4–6; Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Wagakuni Saikin no Kokusai 
Kankei’ [Our nation’s recent international relationships], Minsei 5, no. 2 (February 1931): 15–18.
20  Shidehara Kijūrō (lecture), ‘Gaikō Kanken’ [My views on diplomacy], 9 October 1928, in 
‘Shidehara Heiwa Bunko’, Reel 17. For discussion on the full text, see Hattori Ryūji, ‘Shidehara 
Kijūrō kōen, “Gaikō Kanken”’ [Shidehara Kijūrō (lecture), ‘My Views on Diplomacy’], Sōgō Seisaku 
Kenkyū, no. 13 (March 2006): 99–112.
Further, the majority of ‘Gaikō Kanken’ is included in Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Gaikō no Honshitsu to 
Waga Tai-Shi Gaikō’ [The essence of diplomacy and my diplomacy towards China], (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(6), Minsei 3, nos 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (February–July 1929): 102–07, 100–03, 96–101, 88–93, 102–07, 
96–101.











32  Miyake Kijirō, ‘Yoshida-san wo Shinobite Omou Kotodomo’ [Reminiscences of Mr Yoshida] 
(2), Kasumigaseki-kai Kaihō, no. 285 (November 1969): 12–13; Tsutsui Kiyoshi, ‘Mori Tsutomu 
no Seikaku’ [The personality of Mori Tsutomu], Kasumigaseki-kai Kaihō, no. 289 (March 1970): 
7–10; Yamaura Kanichi, ed., Mori Tsutomu (Tokyo: Harashobō, 1982), 552–53; Yoshida to Makino 
Nobuaki, 7 June 1932, in Yoshida Shigeru Shokan [The letters of Yoshida Shigeru], ed. Yoshida 
Shigeru Memorial Project Foundation (Tokyo: Chuōkōronsha, 1994), 630–33. See also Shibata 
Shinichi, Shōwa-ki no Kōshitsu to Seiji Gaikō [The imperial household in the Shōwa era and political 
diplomacy] (Tokyo: Harashobō, 1995), 11–14.
33  Shidehara to Makino, 17 February 1929, in ‘Makino Nobuaki Kankei Bunsho’, Correspondence 
Department, vol. 28, no. 476–2. See also Itō and Hirose, Makino Nobuaki Nikki, 338–39, 341.
34  Kanpō, extra edition, 3 February 1929.
35  Ibid.
36  Ibid.
37  Kanpō, extra edition, 6 February 1929; a question to Minister of State Shidehara and its reply, 
31 May 1947, in ‘Shidehara Heiwa Bunko’, Reel 7.
173
5
The London Naval 
Conference and the 
Manchurian Incident
China and the Soviet Union
The Hamaguchi Cabinet and Shidehara’s 
Personnel
July 1929 marked the beginning of the Minseitō party cabinet, led by 
Hamaguchi Osachi. When the imperial order to form a cabinet was 
issued, Hamaguchi’s reply to the throne included the names of Ugaki 
Kazushige, Inoue Junnosuke and Shidehara Kijūrō as cabinet minister 
nominees. Ugaki, Inoue and Shidehara would take over the positions of 
war minister, finance minister and foreign minister, respectively. Shidehara 
had anticipated that he would be able to return to the position of foreign 
minister at this time. Shidehara and Hamaguchi were old friends from 
school days; their school, what would become the Third Higher Middle 
School, had been relocated from Osaka to Kyoto while they were in 
attendance. Shidehara was also 56 years old and now reaching the end of 
middle age. The Hamaguchi cabinet announced that it would pursue a 
platform of 10 major policies, including the reform of Chinese policy, 
a  reduction in the size of the military, a curtailment of public finance 
and a lifting of the gold embargo.
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Now that he was once again serving as foreign minister, what kind of 
diplomatic efforts did Shidehara initially undertake? Let us answer that 
question by first looking at the matter of ministry personnel. The shift that 
is generally referred to as ‘Shidehara personnel’ would begin at the end of 
the following year, 1930. At that time, Shidehara installed Nagai Matsuzō 
and Matsuda Michikazu as vice-minister and Treaties and Conventions 
Bureau director-general, respectively.1 That is to say that, for a period 
of over a year following his return to office, Shidehara avoided making 
any significant personnel changes. Presumably, Shidehara could have 
conducted an early reshuffle of individuals such as the Tanaka-cabinet-
aligned vice-minister Yoshida Shigeru. However, Shidehara decided that 
he ‘could not consent to administrative-level staffing changes directly 
following the assumption of office’.2 This meant that Vice-Minister 
Yoshida and the various bureau directors-general retained their positions 
for a time.
Debuchi Katsuji, who had supported Shidehara during his first term 
as foreign minister, had already become ambassador to the US by this 
point. Meanwhile, his other trusted subordinate, Saburi Sadao, was now 
a counsellor at the British embassy. There, Saburi undertook actions such 
as visiting the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Manchester to 
discuss trade with China.3
Before long, Saburi was internally selected to serve as ambassador to the 
Soviet Union. However, Shidehara instead sent him to China as Japan’s 
minister. Unfortunately, this decision led to tragedy. Only a short time after 
becoming the minister to China, Saburi returned to Japan in November 
1929 to discuss with Shidehara the future direction of Chinese policy. Just 
after these discussions, on 29 November, Saburi was discovered dead in 
his hotel in Hakone in suspicious circumstances. He had been minister to 
China for only one month. Upon receiving this shocking news, Shidehara 
decided that Saburi’s death must have been a murder. This was because ‘he 
held a pistol in his right hand. As it happens, the pistol bullet entered his 
head from the left temple and exited on the right’. Nevertheless, a theory 
spread widely that he committed suicide due to anguish over his wife’s 
death and Sino-Japanese relations. Shidehara strongly rejected this theory, 
stating: ‘Our discussions had concluded positively, and he had departed 
in good spirits, intending to enjoy himself [Hakone is a town popular for 
its recuperative hot springs]. This is an absolute fact’.4
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Was Saburi murdered, as Shidehara asserted? Certainly, the suggestion 
that the bullet entered through his left temple lends some weight to this 
interpretation. However, this was an early rumour. An autopsy later found 
that the bullet entered not from the left temple but from the right. The 
police also determined that it was suicide. Shidehara would have been 
aware of these facts. Perhaps Shidehara simply did not want to admit that 
Saburi could have killed himself.5
Within the diplomatic corps, there were others who, unlike Shidehara, 
believed the suicide thesis. Shigemitsu Mamoru was one such individual. 
At the time, Shigemitsu was consul general in Shanghai. Shigemitsu 
and Saburi had a friendly relationship from the time of the Paris Peace 
Conference. In the past, on the occasion of the Beijing Special Conference 
on Tariffs, the two had worked on the announcement that Japan was 
prepared to recognise China’s tariff autonomy. Together they had sought 
to lead policy on China from the front lines. The Nationalist government 
therefore welcomed the news that Shidehara was appointing Saburi as 
Japan’s minister to China. According to Shigemitsu, when he temporarily 
returned to Japan, Saburi had attempted to convince Shidehara that 
‘for Japan the true problem of essential importance is the China problem’. 
Yet the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was buried in work 
dealing with other matters, such as reductions in the size of the military. 
Saburi apparently complained to Shigemitsu that ‘they simply won’t 
consider the matter seriously’.6 Given that Saburi’s wife had already 
passed away, Shigemitsu saw his death as a suicide arising from loneliness. 
Horinouchi Kensuke, counsellor to the Japanese legation in China, had 
a similar interpretation of Saburi’s death.7
In any case, Saburi’s death must have been a serious blow to Shidehara. 
At  the same time, however, he now had to decide who would replace 
Saburi as minister to China. In December 1929, he selected Obata Yūkichi 
for the role. Obata had previously headed the Political Affairs Bureau 
when Shidehara was vice-minister. The Chinese side, however, indicated 
that it was not inclined to reach an agrément on Obata. In diplomatic 
language, an agrément is the acknowledgement a nation gives before the 
appointment of a minister or similar dignitary who would be dispatched 
there. The reason the Chinese were concerned about Obata was that he 
had worked as first secretary at the Japanese legation in China at the time 
of the Twenty-One Demands. Further, China’s foreign minister, Wang 
Zhengting, had issued a surprising condition: China would only give its 
agrément if the legation was upgraded to an embassy. There was no way 
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
176
that Shidehara would accept what he considered to be a preposterous 
demand. In his opinion, the promotion to the embassy should have had 
nothing to do with the agrément. In the first place, Obata had worked 
at the legation for some time following the Twenty-One Demands from 
1918 to 1923. In the end, the Nationalist government refused to issue an 
agrément for Obata.8
China and the Soviet Union
During this period, some significant shifts occurred within China. When 
Shidehara returned to the position of foreign minister, a dispute broke 
out between China and the Soviet Union regarding the Chinese Eastern 
Railway. Located in north-eastern China, this railway was jointly managed 
by the Soviet Union and China. In July 1929, however, China attempted 
to regain full control over the railway. In response, the Soviet Union cut off 
diplomatic relations with the Chinese government. Events then escalated, 
with the Soviets launching a military incursion into Chinese territory in 
November. The north-eastern border towns of Manzhouli and Hailar 
were overrun. This Sino-Soviet conflict of 1929 ended in total victory 
for the Soviet side, and, in December, the two nations signed a protocol 
returning the Chinese Eastern Railway to its former state.
Shidehara’s policy on responding to the Sino-Soviet conflict had two 
major features. First, he had Japan directly mediate negotiations between 
China and the Soviet Union. Believing that the Chinese policy of retaking 
the Chinese Eastern Railway was ‘a plan to retake Russia’s interests under 
the pretense of anti-Bolshevization’, Shidehara closely questioned China’s 
minister to Japan, Wang Rongbao. In this sense, Shidehara’s response 
can be considered somewhat favourable towards the Soviet Union, even 
if only slightly. Second, Shidehara avoided adding Japan’s voice to the 
multilaterally negotiated mediation by US Secretary of State Henry L. 
Stimson. Shidehara, who was assisting the unofficial negotiations between 
China and the Soviet Union, believed that Stimson’s plan ‘would only 
further inflame the feelings of the nations involved and could not be 
expected to yield positive results’.9 Hence, although closely involved in 
the talks between the two nations, Shidehara kept the details of those 
talks secret. Later, he would boast that this kind of secret diplomacy 
was effective.
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Around this time, there was another issue with implications for 
Sino-Japanese relations. A document of dubious origin known as the 
‘Tanaka Memorial’ was circulating within China. The Tanaka Memorial 
purported to be a report by Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi to the Shōwa 
emperor. The contents were a plan for the invasion of China based upon 
the discussions held during the aforementioned Tōhō Kaigi (Eastern 
Summit). However, the details of the document differed significantly from 
the actual discussions held at the summit, and it is highly likely that it was 
forged in north-eastern China in the first half of 1929. On 16 September 
1929, the acting minister to China, Horinouchi Kensuke, sent a telegram 
to Shidehara. According to this telegram, Cheng Liting, chief secretary 
for the Shanghai YMCA, planned to read the Tanaka Memorial aloud 
at the Kyoto conference of the Taiheiyō Mondai Chōsakai (Investigative 
Committee for the Pacific Problem). This civil international investigative 
committee was established for the purpose of mutual understanding; it 
was also known in English as the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR).10 
IPR members included experts from Japan, the US and China, and 
the IPR had previously convened in Honolulu in 1925. Along with the 
general secretary of the YMCA in China, Yu Rizhang, Cheng Liting was 
a central figure in the IPR.11
At the time of the Honolulu conference, Shidehara displayed a cooperative 
attitude towards the IPR. He once stated to a US associate of the group 
that he thought ‘this kind of unofficial conference can help to foster 
mutual understanding between the citizens of the various [Pacific] 
nations’.12 However, at the Kyoto conference of the IPR, held in the 
autumn of 1929, the Asian Bureau and Intelligence Department of 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stepped in to prevent the reading out 
of the Tanaka Memorial. Regardless, the Tanaka Memorial became widely 
distributed within China in pamphlet form, and even Chinese newspapers 
and magazines published its contents. This development led Shidehara to 
issue warnings in February 1930 to the various consuls general stationed 
in China. Guiding Japan’s Chinese policy in the field at this time was 
Shigemitsu, acting minister to China. Shigemitsu’s response to the problem 
represented by the Tanaka Memorial was to ask the Chinese government 
to crack down on its circulation. On this occasion, Shigemitsu also took 
the opportunity to thoroughly point out the fundamental mistakes visible 
in the document, and the Foreign Ministry of the Nationalist government 
showed signs that they would indeed take steps to deal with the matter. 
This appears to indicate that the Chinese side knew that the document 
was a forgery.
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It is also worth noting that, during this period, Shidehara became 
the chairman of an arbitration committee established according to 
the guidelines of a treaty signed between the US and Germany. This 
arbitration committee would be tasked with helping the two nations 
reach an amicable settlement in the event of a conflict. While the US 
and Germany each selected two members to sit on the committee, the 
chairman was to be selected from a third nation that was trusted by both. 
Their agreed-upon choice was Shidehara. However, given the lack of 
a conflict, the role did not involve much work.13
The London Naval Conference 
on Disarmament
Party Politics and Japan–US Relations
Shidehara’s greatest achievement during his second term as foreign 
minister was the London Naval Conference on Disarmament.14 The aim 
of this international conference, held in London in the first half of 1930, 
was to limit the number of auxiliary warships among the participating 
nations. Before looking at the strategy Shidehara deployed, let us first 
review the circumstances leading up to the conference. Naturally, the 
precursor to the London Naval Conference was the Washington Naval 
Conference. As mentioned earlier, the Washington Naval Conference was 
held from November 1921 to February 1922. The naval disarmament 
agreed upon at this conference only limited the number of capital ships 
that participants could have. This led to an auxiliary ship construction 
race between the major powers in the years following the conference. 
Later, in the summer of 1927, a naval disarmament conference was held 
in Geneva to place limits on auxiliary ships as well. However, due to 
disagreements, including a confrontation between the UK and the US, 
the Geneva Conference was a failure. This was the background leading up 
to the 1930 London Naval Conference.
The London Naval Conference was attended by Japan, the UK, the US, 
France and Italy. Leading Japan’s delegation, the Hamaguchi cabinet sent 
former prime minister Wakatsuki Reijirō and Navy Minister Takarabe 
Takeshi. The policy of the Hamaguchi cabinet included the goal of 
securing an auxiliary warship ratio of 70 per cent relative to the US in 
terms of total tonnage. This goal made compromise between Japan and 
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the US quite difficult. Nevertheless, the representatives of the two nations 
reached an understanding whereby, among other things, the total tonnage 
of Japanese vessels would be permitted to reach 69.75 per cent relative to 
the US. Although the Japanese navy were unhappy with a number that 
was lower than their initial goal, the Hamaguchi cabinet accepted this 
compromise. The resulting treaty, the London Naval Treaty, was signed in 
April 1930. It can be considered a success for Japanese diplomacy.
The figures who were ultimately responsible for leading the conference 
to its successful conclusion were Foreign Minister Shidehara and Prime 
Minister Hamaguchi. The ratification of the London Naval Treaty as 
a result of their political guidance marked a high point for cooperative 
diplomacy in the history of modern Japanese party politics. Nevertheless, 
prewar party politics in Japan was fated for an early end. Strictly speaking, 
the period of party politics began with the formation of the Katō cabinet 
in June 1924 and ended with the May 15 Incident of 1932. As was 
revealed by the Manchurian Incident, an indirect cause of the collapse of 
party politics in Japan was that the political parties did not clearly define 
a system for guiding the nation’s diplomatic efforts.
In this sense, the London Naval Treaty was a turning point. That is to 
say, while the Hamaguchi cabinet was certainly proactive in politically 
guiding the outcome, it led to another problem: the problem of 
supreme command interference. The concept of supreme command 
refers to the highest authority over the military, and, according to the 
Meiji Constitution, this highest authority was the emperor. Following 
the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty, the Seiyūkai opposition 
party was, therefore, able to accuse the Hamaguchi cabinet of supreme 
command interference—a problem that could potentially undermine the 
foundation of party politics.
The London Naval Conference was also quite important for relations 
between Japan and the US. As it happened, a group more familiar with, 
and sympathetic towards, Japan was beginning to take shape in the US 
State Department.15 It should be noted that, because it was conflict 
between the UK and the US that had led the earlier Geneva Conference 
to run aground, both nations had had detailed consultations before the 
main event. The UK had also succeeded in decoding important telegrams 
from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, the Japanese 
navy continued in its tradition of viewing the US as a hypothetical 
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enemy. It  was therefore anticipated that the debate surrounding naval 
disarmament would be most contentious between Japan and the US. And, 
indeed, the Japanese–American relationship dominated the conference.16
Keeping these facts in mind, we can now consider the details of the 
London  Naval Conference, which has been viewed as a high point in 
prewar Japanese democracy. In this overview I will consider not only 
Shidehara’s perspective but also that of the US ambassador to Japan, 
William R. Castle, Jr. This approach will be of assistance for considering 
the maturity of party politics in Japan. There are three major points 
to consider.
This first is the internal processes in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and, in particular, the relationship between Foreign Minister 
Shidehara and Vice-Minister Yoshida. From the time Yoshida was 
consul general in Mukden, his and Shidehara’s policies on China began 
to diverge. Yoshida became vice-minister through his close association 
with the Tanaka cabinet, yet he was left in the role by Shidehara with the 
beginning of the Hamaguchi cabinet. This meant that the relationship 
between the two individuals was somewhat delicate. However, during the 
London Naval Conference, Yoshida would take Shidehara’s opinions on 
board with respect to US policy, while making every effort to coordinate 
with Castle, the imperial court and the military.
Second, we need to consider Castle’s actions and his perspective on Japan. 
As the US ambassador to Japan, Castle was a representative figure of the 
pro-Japanese faction in the State Department. Along with diplomatic 
telegrams, Castle also left behind documentation such as a detailed diary, 
correspondence and speech drafts.17 If we examine these sources, we find, 
at times, unexpected evaluations of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its 
political parties, the imperial household and other subjects. I suggest that 
such resources can not only serve as a guide to Castle’s relationship with 
Shidehara but also may be helpful for considering contemporary Japanese 
party politics.
Third, we need to consider the possibilities and limits of any new 
order that could be reached through Japanese–American cooperation. 
The London Naval Conference was not an isolated phenomenon. It also 
included attempts to expand Japan–US cooperation to matters such as 
the ‘China problem’, as well as the immigration problem. This means that 
there was a latent possibility that international politics in this period could 
181
5. THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE AND THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT
head towards the construction of a more stable global order, with the 
London Naval Conference serving as a foothold. While Shidehara is my 
main focus regarding this topic, I will also examine the actions of Castle, 
Secretary of State Stimson, State Department Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs Chief Hornbeck, ambassador to the US Debuchi and others. 
In this way, I aim to shed further light on barriers to the construction of 
a new international order, as well as the nature of the relationship between 
naval disarmament on the one hand and both the China and immigration 
problems on the other.
Shidehara and Castle
Before Castle was sent to Japan as the US ambassador at the time of the 
London Naval Conference, he worked for nearly three years as assistant 
secretary of state. Shidehara welcomed Castle’s appointment as US 
ambassador, as Castle learned from Ambassador Debuchi. Castle had also 
thought for some time that Shidehara was trustworthy.18 The personal 
relationship between Castle and President Herbert Hoover was also 
generally positive.19 Conversely, there was some discord between Castle 
and Secretary of State Stimson at the time of the Sino-Soviet conflict in 
the second half of 1929.20 While attending the London Naval Conference, 
Stimson requested that Undersecretary of State Joseph P. Cotton serve as 
acting secretary of state.
Meanwhile, in the lead-up to the London Naval Conference, the 
Hamaguchi cabinet made a number of planned attendees plenipotentiaries. 
These attendees included former prime minister Wakatsuki Reijirō as chief 
delegate; he would be accompanied by Navy Minister Admiral Takarabe 
Takeshi, ambassador to the UK Matsudaira Tsuneo and ambassador to 
Belgium Nagai Matsuzō. Further, Admiral Abo Kiyokazu and Admiral 
Sakonji Seizō were appointed as adviser and chief attendant, respectively. 
On 26 November 1929, the cabinet further decided upon three 
fundamental principles for the conference: auxiliary warship tonnage at 
70 per cent of the US total, large cruisers at 70 per cent of the US total 
and the preservation of the current number of submersibles.21
Following the precedent of the Washington Naval Conference, Hamaguchi 
assigned multiple individuals to help the navy minister with his 
administrative responsibilities. These were the vice-minister of the Navy 
Ministry; Vice Admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin; the chief of Bureau of 
Naval Affairs, Major General Hori Teikichi; and, as their assistant, senior 
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aide Colonel Koga Mineichi. I also note that, at that time, the chief of the 
Naval General Staff was Admiral Katō Hiroharu, the vice chief was Vice 
Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa and the chief of the First Bureau was Rear 
Admiral Katō Takayoshi. On the US side, the plenipotentiary delegation 
was headed by Secretary of State Stimson. The delegation also included 
the US ambassador to the UK, Charles G. Dawes; Secretary of the Navy 
Charles Francis Adams; a Democratic senator, Joseph T. Robinson; 
a Republican senator, David A. Reed; the ambassador to Belgium, Hugh 
S. Gibson; and the ambassador to Mexico, Dwight W. Morrow. The 
British representatives, meanwhile, were led by Prime Minister J. Ramsay 
MacDonald, who also chaired the conference. They included Foreign 
Secretary Arthur Henderson and Secretary for the Navy Albert Victor 
Alexander. Meanwhile, the French and Italian chief delegates were Prime 
Minister André P. G. A. Tardieu and Foreign Minister Dino Grandi di 
Mordano, respectively. On 9 January 1930, Japan’s three representatives, 
Wakatsuki, Takarabe and Matsudaira, visited MacDonald at the prime 
minister’s residence for informal talks.22
Castle, meanwhile, arrived at Yokohama via Honolulu on 20 January. 
Shidehara immediately received him as a visitor. Castle’s task was to take 
over from acting US ambassador Neville.23 On 24 January, Shidehara and 
his wife dined with Castle. They were joined by former ambassador to the 
US Hanihara Masanao, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoshida Shigeru 
and Asian Bureau Director-General Arita Hachirō. The Shideharas were 
apparently in good spirits that evening. On the same day, Castle also met 
Nelson T. Johnson, the US consul to China, who was then visiting Japan. 
In his diary, Castle wrote: ‘Nelson and I agree very largely on Far Eastern 
Questions, although I am not sure that he would agree that Japanese 
friendship is more important than Chinese’.24
It might also be asked how Shidehara appeared to Castle. In correspondence 
with President Hoover, dated 27 January, Castle relayed his first 
impressions of the Hamaguchi cabinet:
Shidehara is really a statesman, farseeing and broad minded, 
and Hamaguchi, the Prime Minister, is a man of high integrity. 
It would be difficult to find another man as Finance Minister as 
able, courageous and experienced as Inoue.25
Castle added: ‘We cannot ignore the fact that Japan as truly has special 
interests in Manchuria as we have in Cuba’.26
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‘Certain Thoughtful Japanese’—Foreign Minister 
Shidehara
Thus, Shidehara had the opportunity to strengthen his relationship 
with Castle. In a telegram sent on 14 February to Secretary of State 
Cotton, Castle reported that ‘certain thoughtful Japanese’ regretted that 
a 70 per  cent tonnage ratio had been adopted as a critical target.27 By 
‘certain thoughtful Japanese’, Castle presumably meant the leaders of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, beginning with Shidehara. In fact, Castle had 
met with Shidehara on that day and had informed him that even if Japan 
were limited to a 60 per cent tonnage ratio, the US navy would not regard 
an attack on Japan as viable. According to Castle, the US public worried 
that a build-up of the Japanese navy might lead to a future invasion of 
the Philippines. Shidehara replied that even if Japan initially succeeded in 
occupying the Philippines, ‘it would be the beginning only of a war which 
in the end must be the ruin of Japan’.28
What was disturbing for Castle was the gap between Shidehara, who had 
extensive knowledge of the realities of international affairs, and public 
opinion in both Japan and the US, which was dominated by fear of possible 
conflict. For example, Hirata Shinsaku published an essay in the journal 
Nihon oyobi Nihonjin (Japan and the Japanese) titled ‘Beikoku Taishi 
Sai-Kaiken-ki’ (Records of another meeting with the US ambassador). 
The essay included a depiction of military commentator Hirata directly 
pressing Castle and First Secretary Dooman. According to this depiction, 
when speaking with Shidehara, Castle once threatened that the US Air 
Force would be capable of bombing Tokyo.29 However, Castle did not 
actually threaten the bombing of Tokyo, and Shidehara and Castle got on 
quite well.
Shidehara and Castle were troubled by these trends in public opinion. 
Nevertheless, on 20 February, they received some positive news: the 
Minseitō had achieved an outright victory in the general election. This 
meant that the Hamaguchi cabinet was now in a position to carry out 
some bolder policies. Further, there was also a change in government in 
France with the formation of a cabinet led by G. Camille Chautemps. 
Until then, France had been holding back the proceedings at the London 
Naval Conference, and other participants hoped that a new French 
government would lead to greater progress. At this time, Castle sounded 
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out Shidehara on the possibility of excluding France and Italy and 
reaching a tripartite agreement with the US and the UK. Shidehara gave 
a favourable response.30
On 26 February, the London Naval Conference split into the ‘European 
Group’ of the UK, France and Italy, and the ‘High Seas Group’ of the UK, 
the US and Japan.31 To ensure that the preliminary negotiations of the 
latter would be smooth, Japan and the US in turn began with their own 
unofficial talks, held between Matsudaira and Reed. Likewise, Japanese–
British negotiations were held between Saitō Hiroshi, director-general of 
the Intelligence Department of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and Robert Leslie Craigie, chief of the American Department of the British 
Foreign Office. Of these, it was the talks between Matsudaira and Reed 
that began to show signs of reaching a breakthrough. Shidehara himself 
was inclined to accept the US proposal regarding cruisers. However, he 
was concerned about opposition from the Japanese navy. In the end, Castle 
convinced him that it was now Japan’s turn to make a compromise.32
On 13 March, Japan and the US agreed on a compromise proposal: 
Japan’s auxiliary vessel tonnage would be set to 69.75 per cent of that 
of the US, and submarine tonnage between Japan, the UK and the US 
would be set at the same level. The following day, seeking approval of 
the proposal from the government at home, the Japanese delegation to 
London sent a  telegram stating that ‘the U.S. side has for all practical 
purposes already agreed to a general 70 per cent principle’.33 Castle 
had also emphasised to Shidehara that this proposal would be the US’s 
final concession. On 15 March, Shidehara visited Hamaguchi with this 
telegram in hand. Upon receiving it, Hamaguchi summoned Navy Vice-
Minister Yamanashi and ordered him to sound out the general opinion of 
the naval leadership. Meanwhile, military affairs adviser Admiral Okada 
Keisuke (who had previously served as navy minister under the previous 
Tanaka cabinet) had already been coordinating with Vice-Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Yoshida in an effort to bring the Naval General Staff 
on board.34
The Hamaguchi cabinet also received support from a group affiliated 
with the imperial court. This group included the elder statesman Saionji 
Kinmochi, who was then suffering from pneumonia, Lord Keeper of 
the Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki, Minister of the Imperial Household 
Ichiki Kitokurō, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantarō, Deputy Grand 
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Chamberlain Kawai Yahachi and Okabe Nagakage, who was concurrently 
serving as both chief secretary to the lord keeper of the privy seal and as 
deputy grand master of the ceremonies. At around this time, Castle wrote 
in his diary:
The London situation looks a lot better as between the Americans 
and the Japanese because the Japanese are apparently realizing that 
if the conference is to succeed they cannot have everything 
they want.35
Despite the progress that had been made, three problems remained. First, 
there was criticism from the Naval General Staff and from Fleet Admiral 
Tōgō Heihachirō. To deal with this criticism, Shidehara enlisted the 
support of Yamanashi, a fact that Castle learned from Yoshida.36
Second, there was the problem of the Japanese media. Of particular 
concern were articles that appeared in the evening editions of the Tokyo 
Asahi Shimbun and the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun on 17 March. These 
articles contained figures from the compromise proposal between Japan 
and the US that had been leaked by Vice Chief Suetsugu and were 
published alongside a dissenting opinion from the navy. This event greatly 
irritated Shidehara, Hamaguchi and the Japanese delegation.37
Third, France, which had proven difficult in its negotiations with the 
UK, attempted to avoid becoming isolated by arguing that Japan should 
not be permitted more submarines than it already had. There were also 
those in the delegation, such as Representative Takarabe, who thought 
that Japan ought to join forces with France and push back against the UK 
and the US. However, Shidehara and Wakatsuki reacted coldly to France’s 
proposal. Shidehara did not want the conference to founder upon the 
submarine problem. This, too, was relayed to Castle by Yoshida.38
To try to bring the navy around, Shidehara enlisted the cooperation of the 
governor-general of Korea, Saitō Makoto, who had temporarily returned 
to Japan. Shidehara also took into consideration the opinion of Okada 
Keisuke. However, it was thought that a direct meeting between Shidehara 
and Saitō might be misinterpreted by others. For this reason, Shidehara 
sent Yoshida as a messenger, after receiving approval from Hamaguchi. 
Meanwhile, Stimson was increasingly irritated at the delay in any formal 
instructions from the Hamaguchi cabinet to the Japanese delegation.39
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‘A Silent Man’—Prime Minister Hamaguchi
On 20 March, having grown tired of waiting for a response, Stimson 
sought to push through the apparent impasse by asking Castle to seek 
a meeting with Prime Minister Hamaguchi. However, Castle was against 
seeking such a meeting. He understood that it might give the Japanese 
public the impression that the US was directly applying pressure on Japan.
As Castle puts it, Hamaguchi was ‘a silent man’ and not necessarily the 
sort of politician who could exercise leadership in such matters. Rather, 
Castle suggested that within the cabinet it was Shidehara who had more 
initiative, asking rhetorically: ‘Could anyone be stronger than Shidehara 
has proven himself to be?’40 Castle’s proposal was for Hamaguchi to be 
awakened to the reality of the situation in London through Shidehara. 
To put it another way, for Castle, it was Shidehara who was ultimately the 
real negotiating partner. He did not have a high opinion of Prime Minister 
Hamaguchi. The British ambassador to Japan, John Tilley, had the same 
impression. The message from Prime Minister MacDonald to Hamaguchi 
was also entrusted to Shidehara, as Castle was aware. Similarly, Shidehara 
was also concerned that if Castle were to meet directly with Hamaguchi, 
it could lead to sensationalistic reporting in the Japanese media.41
There was another individual who concurred with Shidehara on the issue 
of Castle directly speaking with Hamaguchi. This was Yoshida Shigeru. 
Speaking with Castle, Yoshida agreed that ‘it would have been most 
unwise to approach Hamaguchi’.42 Such a meeting, in his view, would 
only have furnished Japanese hardliners with an excuse to push their 
own agenda. In response to this feedback, Stimson began to change his 
stance. If Shidehara himself was against the idea, then he would not insist 
upon having his confidential message presented directly to Hamaguchi. 
On 24  March, Shidehara received a visit from Castle, who had come 
to discuss the message from Stimson to Hamaguchi. The message itself 
contained a great deal, including the argument that the US, the UK and 
Japan ought to cooperate with each other, given that they were the world’s 
three great naval powers. As for how the message to Hamaguchi was to be 
handled, this Castle left entirely to Shidehara’s discretion. The result was 
that Stimson’s message was handed to Hamaguchi via Shidehara, as had 
taken place with the message from MacDonald.
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Shidehara was also kept informed of Castle’s movements through Yoshida. 
For example, Yoshida informed Shidehara of a 23 March visit from Castle. 
At that time, to try to avoid the impression that the US was applying 
‘undue pressure’, Castle had even sought to prevent Shidehara from passing 
Stimson’s message on to Hamaguchi.43 On another occasion, Castle 
informed Yoshida through Secretary Dooman that Stimson was concerned 
about potentially inciting the Japanese public. Certainly, the US diplomats 
were being extremely cautious. Shidehara, of course, was aware of their 
concern. He himself took great pains with the handling of these messages.
Throughout this period of negotiations, Shidehara met numerous times 
with Hamaguchi. Finally, on 1 April, the Hamaguchi cabinet decided to 
respond to the Japanese delegation’s request with instructions to accept 
the Japanese–American compromise proposal. Half a month had already 
passed since the delegation had sent its request. Prior to the cabinet meeting, 
Hamaguchi invited Military Affairs Adviser Okada, Naval General Staff 
Director Katō and Navy Vice-Minister Yamanashi to his residence. For an 
hour he attempted to bring them on board with respect to the delegation 
instruction draft, giving reasons for accepting the compromise from the 
perspectives of diplomacy and finance. Despite Hamaguchi’s efforts, when 
Shidehara met with Castle after the issuing of the instructions, Castle 
interpreted this outcome as the result of Shidehara’s efforts and sought to 
assist Shidehara further. In fact, since before the cabinet meeting, Castle 
had foreseen that the Hamaguchi cabinet would approve of the terms 
of agreement reached in London, thanks to information shared by Vice-
Minister Yoshida and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino.44
Meanwhile, from 31 March to 1 April, Naval General Staff Director Katō 
sought permission to issue a report to the throne. However, the report 
was delayed by Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantarō until 2 April. Nara 
Takeji, chief aide-de-camp to the emperor, was critical of Suzuki for this 
obstructionism, writing in his diary: ‘I believe the grand chamberlain’s 
actions were extremely improper’.45 On 1 April, Hamaguchi issued his 
report to the throne on the delegation instructions draft, which was then 
approved by the emperor.
On 2 April, Katō had an audience with the Shōwa emperor and presented 
the following report:
The proposal by the U.S. contains content that threatens to 
cause serious strategic ramifications for the Imperial Navy … 
The adoption of the agreement proposed by the U.S. would require, 
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for all intents and purposes, a reduction in military capacity as 
well as the ratio [of our forces relative to other nations], as argued 
for by the other imperial powers. Because this [reduction] would 
bring about serious changes to our strategic planning, based upon 
the national defense policy that was adopted in the 12th year of 
Taishō [1923], it is my belief that it requires serious deliberation.46
Although unaware of the specific details of the report, on 3 April, the 
Times stated that it contained a severe critique of the Japanese government.
However, while Naval General Staff Director Katō did present his report 
to the emperor on 2 April, it was not the case that he sought to prevent 
the acceptance of the agreement outright. The formal reason was that 
the Shōwa emperor had already approved the delegation instructions the 
previous day. Katō himself stated that the true motive of the report was 
‘only to have my concerns heard’. The emperor, too, ‘was only of the 
opinion that he should at least hear [what I wished to say]’. Nara, chief 
aide-de-camp to the emperor, similarly wrote in his diary: ‘As for the 
handling of this report to the emperor, even if it had been submitted prior 
to the issuing of the instructions, there was nothing to be done except 
to listen [to Katō’s concerns]’.47 In other words, although it was a formal 
report, Katō, the emperor and Nara all felt that it should be treated only 
as an opinion to be taken into consideration.48 Even so, Katō ought to 
have received support by Vice Chief Suetsugu. Yet Suetsugu’s imprudent 
behaviour was counterproductive in this regard.49
On 13 April, a luncheon party was held at the Imperial Palace. The Shōwa 
emperor had invited British Ambassador Tilley, with Shidehara and 
Prince Takamatsu Nobuhito also attending. The task of interpreting for 
the emperor fell to Sawada Renzō, director of the Telegraph Division. 
While the luncheon party was being held prior to Prince Takamatsu’s 
planned visit to Europe, the discussion also ranged over the London Naval 
Conference. It was here that the Shōwa emperor addressed Ambassador 
Tilley with the following words:
Incidentally, on the topic of the Naval Disarmament Conference 
that is presently taking place in London, I am extremely pleased 
to hear that a satisfactory result may now be anticipated, thanks 
to the cooperation of the three nations of Japan, the U.K., and 
the U.S. … Along with the success of this conference, it is also 
my hope that cooperation among the participatory nations, and 
in particular between Japan, the U.K., and the U.S., will help to 
further the advancement of world peace.50
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In front of both Shidehara and Prince Takamatsu, the emperor expressed 
his pleasure that negotiations at the London Naval Conference appeared 
to be concluding with a compromise agreement. Understandably, 
Sawada was nervous interpreting the emperor’s words on this occasion. 
Although the Japanese delegation had already received instructions from 
the Hamaguchi cabinet to accept the Japanese–American compromise 
agreement, the treaty had yet to be signed in London. There were also 
disquieting moves being made by the navy and the Seiyūkai. Given 
the delicate nature of the situation, which was after the issuing of the 
instructions but before the signing of the final treaty, it may well have been 
better if the emperor’s statement was more reserved. Although Sawada was 
unsure whether to interpret everything the emperor was saying, he was 
effectively left with no choice but to render his words into English.
Pleased with the emperor’s comment, Tilley stated that he would relay it 
to London. The manner in which the emperor expressed his thoughts on 
this occasion was therefore fully capable of leading to unforeseen events. 
That being said, Shidehara, who, as noted above, was also in attendance, 
was not overly nervous about the possible ramifications of the emperor’s 
statement. Moreover, when he returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
he attempted himself to relay the details of the emperor’s comment to 
the Japanese delegation. Although the emperor had already granted 
his approval of the delegation instructions, Shidehara’s actions on this 
occasion appear to have been somewhat careless. It was Yoshida who 
realised the possible danger. Taking into account the wishes of Ichiki, 
the minister of the imperial household, he made his own addition to 
Shidehara’s telegram: ‘Request that particular care be taken to prevent 
this news leaking to the newspapers, etc’.51 Yoshida was aware that the 
emperor’s words, if leaked, would have a massive impact. 
Shidehara’s Diet Address and Castle’s Departure
In the end, the London Naval Treaty on Disarmament was formally signed 
on 22 April.52 Right afterwards, the 58th Imperial Diet commenced in 
Japan. This Diet would soon become the setting for an unfolding debate 
regarding the problem of supposed supreme command interference. 
Article 11 of the Meiji Constitution stipulates that supreme command 
over the navy rests with the emperor and not with the ministers of state. 
On the other hand, Article 12 states that supreme power over military 
organisation is a state affair to be determined by the advice of the cabinet.
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At the convening of the House of Representatives on 25 April, Shidehara 
made an address directly after Prime Minister Hamaguchi. He stated: 
‘Through a comparative analysis of the various positives and negatives 
for the empire [Japan], we have confirmed that it is absolutely advisable 
to participate in this agreement’. Shidehara was immediately showered 
with criticism from the attending members of the Seiyūkai opposition. 
The president of the Seiyūkai, Inukai Tsuyoshi, then responded with 
a counterargument based upon a declaration by Naval General Staff 
Director Katō. In the same fashion, Hatoyama Ichirō aligned himself with 
the Naval General Staff, angrily arguing: ‘I believe that Foreign Minister 
Shidehara’s position is entirely that of an administrator and not the serious 
argument of a politician. (Applause.)’53
From today’s perspective, we may find it hard to fault Shidehara’s address. 
It cannot be denied, however, that, given the circumstances at the time, 
Shidehara did not show sufficient concern for how the opposition and 
the navy would react. In his diary, Naval General Staff Director Katō 
wrote that ‘Shidehara’s speech on diplomacy was nothing but a spewing of 
groundless arguments; the government and the people are in an uproar’.54 
Although Shidehara thought he had received the navy’s support through 
discussions with Vice-Minister Yamanashi, Yamanashi was perplexed by 
Shidehara’s speech. Even if only to some degree, there was a need for 
suitable comments to be directed at the nation. Beyond that, there was 
the problem of the Seiyūkai’s policy. Although the Diet had no authority 
over ratification, their reaction posed a threat to the foundation of party 
politics; the authority for ratification rested with the Privy Council.55 
That said, while the manner in which the Seiyūkai and the navy reacted to 
the London Naval Treaty is typically viewed as problematic, that does not 
mean that they had the same stance. For example, as noted earlier, though 
it is true that Naval General Staff Director Katō presented a dissenting 
view in his 2 April report to the emperor, he did not actively seek to 
overturn the acceptance of the compromise agreement.
Even more so than Shidehara, it was Castle who had demonstrated the 
most caution when it came to the Diet and Japanese public opinion. 
Throughout the month of May, Castle went on a speaking tour of several 
Japanese cities, including Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, Nara and Nikkō. 
For Castle’s speech at Osaka, Shidehara gave him permission beforehand 
to mention some of the details of the London Naval Conference.56 Castle, 
who handled the media shrewdly, later boasted that his speeches helped to 
hasten Japan’s ratification of the London Naval Treaty. Shidehara himself 
acknowledged this fact. As Castle would later recall:
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The press was waiting, and the Navy was waiting for me to make 
the break of going over Shidehara to Hamaguchi or for me to 
make some public utterance that might be interpreted as bringing 
pressure to bear.57 
For this reason, Castle was careful until the very end to always restrict 
himself to dealing with Shidehara and Yoshida.
It should be noted that, to begin with, it was on the occasion of the 
London Naval Conference that Castle was dispatched to Japan. Indeed, 
he had to return to the US after concluding his speeches in the various 
regions of Japan, even though this was still before Japan’s final ratification 
of the London Naval Treaty. Along with the ratification of the treaty, there 
was one more matter that Castle was apprehensive about. Division of 
Far Eastern Affairs Chief Hornbeck had engaged in negotiations, albeit 
unofficial ones, with China’s minister to the US, Wu Chaoshu, over 
the termination of extraterritorial rights in China. Shidehara, however, 
believed that Japan, the US and the UK ought to engage in coordinated 
negotiations with China, in Nanjing. Castle was sympathetic towards 
Shidehara’s view and told Stimson he was concerned about Hornbeck 
overstepping on this matter.58
With Castle’s scheduled return to the US drawing closer, Tani Masayuki, 
First Division director of the Asian Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, assumed that Shidehara and Castle would have a final opportunity 
to meet. On 20 May, he drafted a proposal for Shidehara’s use of topics to 
discuss in that final meeting. Tani wrote:
As your ambassador was recently proclaiming, with respect to the 
policies towards China of Japan and the U.S., and the principle 
advocated by your ambassador of mutual prosperity through 
commerce, not only are [these policies] not opposed, they are 
actually entirely congruent.59
Upon receiving a copy of this draft, Asian Bureau Director-General Arita 
Hachirō made the following addition on the same day:
Among officials and the people of some foreign nations, there 
are those who have misunderstandings regarding the problem of 
Japan’s ‘competitive lines’ in Manchuria, believing that the South 
Manchuria Railway Company seeks to exclusively dominate all 
of Manchuria.60
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Arita was attempting, through Shidehara, to gain Castle’s understanding 
with respect to Japanese policy on the South Manchuria Railway. 
However, although Shidehara was aware of the Asian Bureau’s opinion, 
he did not seek to emphasise this point during his meeting with Castle. 
It would seem that, when it came to Castle at least, Shidehara had judged 
him as already recognising Japan’s initiative in matters of Chinese policy. 
We also know that Castle himself wanted to avoid directly touching upon 
Manchurian policy, given its controversial nature.61
On the occasion of Castle leaving his posting in Japan, the America–
Japan Society hosted a dinner party on 23 May. Along with Shidehara and 
Yoshida, the dinner party was attended by Tokugawa Iesato, Chairman 
of the America–Japan Society and President of the House of Peers, and 
Hanihara Masanao, former ambassador to the US. In his address to the 
gathering, Castle spoke of the coming period following the conclusion of 
the London Naval Treaty. The US, he argued, needed to learn that ‘Japan 
must be and will be the guardian of peace in the Pacific’.62
On the Japanese side, following Tokugawa, Hanihara began to read an 
address. He unexpectedly mentioned the Japanese Exclusion Act, arguing 
for the need of a ‘renewal of friendship’.63 This comment left Castle feeling 
ill at ease. Upon hearing of this incident, British Ambassador Tilley spoke 
with Yoshida, asking half-jokingly if Hanihara’s speech had been suggested 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yoshida replied that, during Hanihara’s 
speech, both he and Shidehara were so uncomfortable that they did not 
even know where to look.64
Although the Japanese Exclusion Act Hanihara mentioned had been 
overshadowed by the proceedings of the disarmament conference, even 
in the US calls for its revision were growing stronger. Shidehara had been 
informed of this fact by ministry officials in the field. As one example, 
when president of Columbia University Nicholas Murray Butler invited 
Sawada Setsuzō, Japanese consul general in New York, to a luncheon, he 
responded positively to the idea of revising the immigration act. Similarly, 
MacMurray—who had resigned from his post as the US minister to China 
and taken up a position at Johns Hopkins University as the director of the 
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations—had discussed 
the Japanese Exclusion Act in a speech.65
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The Japanese Exclusion Act Amendment Problem 
and Policy on China
In July 1930, following his return to the US, Castle was once more 
appointed assistant secretary of state.66 William Cameron Forbes, 
Castle’s replacement as the US ambassador to Japan, had previously 
served as governor-general of the Philippines. Shidehara was initially 
informed about Forbes through private correspondence from Castle, who 
mentioned that Forbes was a prominent Western expert on East Asia. 
As well as stating that he welcomed Forbes’s appointment, Shidehara 
indicated that he appreciated the US government’s position on reforming 
the Japanese Exclusion Act. It was best, he wrote, to avoid being overly 
hasty with such matters.67
In correspondence addressed to Forbes, Castle also wrote that Tokyo was 
a first-rate city, equal to London. He also took pains to offer advice to 
Forbes, who was then 60 years old and single, including on local living 
conditions. Following his return to the US, Castle did not neglect in his 
speeches to promote the importance of fostering goodwill between Japan 
and the US.68 It may well have been that Castle’s concerns over the US 
embassy in Japan were groundless. On this topic, further details can be 
found in the written recollections of Sir George Sansom, who resided 
long-term in Japan while serving as commercial counsellor at the British 
embassy. According to Sansom, ‘the American embassy always had one 
or two very good counsellors like Edwin Neville’.69 Sansom noted that 
Neville had developed friendships with many Japanese during his time 
in Japan and that Sansom’s own close friend Dooman, the first secretary 
at the US embassy, was also talented. Finance Minister Inoue, who was 
an old acquaintance of Forbes’s from his time as governor-general of the 
Philippines, also welcomed his posting as ambassador.
Another notable incident occurred on 10 June, when Naval General Staff 
Director Katō submitted his resignation to the emperor. Despite such 
protests, the London Naval Treaty was ratified on 2 October, following 
deliberation by the Privy Council. Shidehara had been waiting impatiently 
for this day, and it was to him that Castle immediately dispatched a letter 
once he learned of the result.70 On the other hand, Debuchi, who was 
still serving as ambassador to the US, attempted to turn the ratification 
of the London Naval Treaty into an opportunity to reform the Japanese 
Exclusion Act. Secretary of State Stimson, who spoke with Debuchi on 
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the topic on 30 October, agreed to the idea of Debuchi and Castle holding 
secret talks on the immigration act, an indication of his enthusiasm for 
the further improvement of Japanese–American relations.71
Shidehara and Castle acknowledged that resolving the issue of naval 
disarmament had helped improve relations between Japan and the US. 
At  the same time, however, they believed that any sudden attempt to 
move forward with Japan’s keenly desired reform of the Japanese Exclusion 
Act could backfire. For this reason, they viewed Debuchi’s more insistent 
attempts at seeking a revision of the act as rash.72
Along with the matter of revising the Japanese Exclusion Act, an 
outstanding issue for Japan and the US was policy on China. Shidehara, 
as noted above, thought that the problem of extraterritorial rights in 
China should be handled through negotiations conducted in Nanjing, 
with Japan, the US and the UK jointly coordinating their efforts. Castle 
similarly argued in favour of cooperation between Japan and the US on this 
matter, bringing him into opposition with Hornbeck, chief of the State 
Department’s Division of Far Eastern Affairs, who was more sympathetic 
toward China. Hornbeck frequently received private correspondence from 
Johnson, US minister to China. This placed him in the unique position 
of knowing what was going on inside China, including the movements of 
individuals such as British Minister Miles Lampson.73 China hands such 
as Hornbeck and Johnson did not express interest in tying the success 
of the London Naval Conference to the matter of Japanese–American 
cooperation in China. While Stimson showed a degree of sympathy to 
Debuchi with respect to the immigration problem, when it came to policy 
on China, he was unable to overlook the advice and information from 
figures such as Hornbeck.74
As can be seen, Castle paid careful attention not only to how the press 
covered the London Naval Treaty but also to matters such as his successor, 
the immigration problem and policy on China. Thanks in part to Castle’s 
efforts, the relationship between Japan and the US had begun to improve. 
Unfortunately, the situation soon worsened, and the cause was Shidehara 
himself. In November 1930, Prime Minister Hamaguchi was shot and 
badly wounded at Tokyo Station. This meant that Shidehara became 
acting prime minister. Then, in February 1931, he would misspeak during 
the 59th Diet, triggering an uproar.
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The specific occasion was a meeting of the House of Representatives 
budget committee on 3 February. Nakajima Chikuhei of the Seiyūkai had 
asked some questions about naval disarmament. Because Navy Minister 
Abo Kiyokazu was absent due to sickness, initially these questions were 
answered by Yabuki Shōzō, parliamentary vice-minister for the navy. 
When Nakajima inquired about responsibility for ‘causing our national 
defenses to be insufficient’, Shidehara responded with the following 
ill-advised words: ‘Given that it has now been ratified [by the emperor], 
it is clearly the case that the London Naval Treaty has not put our national 
defense into any danger’. The committee responded uproariously, with 
jeers to the effect of: ‘What is the meaning of making it the emperor’s 
responsibility?’75 Further discussion was impossible. Even Committee 
Chief Takeuchi Sakuhei was unable to get the committee to reconvene 
the following day.
Shidehara meant to point out that the navy minister had also attended 
the military counsellor meeting and added his signature to the petition 
to the emperor requesting that the treaty be ratified. Therefore, it hardly 
made sense to speak of supreme command interference. And indeed, his 
response continued with the following justification:
In saying that [the treaty] received ratification, [what I mean is 
that] it is entirely the government’s responsibility. I do not seek to 
absolve myself of this responsibility in the slightest. At the same 
time, when the ratification petition to the emperor was sent.76
Yet Shidehara’s voice was drowned out by the angry roar of the committee.
Judging from the committee minutes, it cannot be denied that Shidehara’s 
response to Nakajima’s line of questioning was careless. Reflecting upon 
this incident in later years, Shidehara suggested that the uproar was in fact 
orchestrated by Mori Tsutomu, secretary-general of the Seiyūkai. Castle 
must have surely been disturbed to learn of Shidehara’s difficulties via 
sources such as the correspondence he received from Nitobe Inazō.77
The Limits of Japan–US Cooperation
So far in this chapter, I have provided an outline of both Shidehara’s 
actions and Japanese–American relations during the period of the London 
Naval Conference. I will now expand upon this initial picture with some 
further details, while also considering the reality and the limits of Japan–
US cooperation at this time. If asked to think of a party-based cabinet 
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in modern Japan that attempted to carry out cooperative diplomacy 
between Japan and the US, most would probably name the cabinet of 
Hara Takashi. However, although the Hara cabinet was supposed to be 
the first fundamentally party-based cabinet, it was not highly regarded by 
the Wilson administration.78 In fact, it was in the period of the London 
Naval Conference when party-cabinet-based cooperation with the US was 
at its most mature, as well as when there were those on the US side who 
sought to reach out as potential partners. At the centre of these efforts at 
cooperative diplomacy were Shidehara and Castle.
That said, from Castle’s perspective, it was not the Minseitō that had 
taken the initiative of guiding cooperation between the two nations. 
Rather, it was Shidehara who Castle considered to be leading such efforts. 
His estimation of the man in this regard was close to overwhelming praise. 
In correspondence sent to President Hoover following the Hamaguchi 
cabinet’s issuing of instructions to the Japanese delegation, the only 
Japanese individual Castle specifically named as deserving of merit was 
Shidehara, stating that he was the leader of those who sought closer 
cooperation with the US. Castle understood his own responsibility to 
be that of ‘creating a friendly atmosphere’ in a nation that he saw as of 
particular importance for the US. As he also wrote in a letter to Hoover: 
‘I cannot help feeling that London, Tokyo and Mexico are our three most 
critical posts’.79
As noted earlier, Shidehara and Castle saw eye to eye not only on the 
London Naval Treaty but also regarding policy on China, such as the 
matter of extraterritorial rights.80 Castle was quick to discern that the 
‘China problem’ was not unconnected to the issue of naval disarmament. 
Therefore, in seeking to have Japan’s leadership recognised regarding the 
China problem, Castle was, at the same time, attempting to help guide 
the London Naval Conference to a successful conclusion. In reality, the 
Naval General Staff, beginning with Katō Hiroharu, had been arguing for 
some time that one of the reasons they could not compromise on naval 
disarmament was that they wanted to forestall US pressure on Japan’s 
policies regarding China. A similar opinion was expressed by the Privy 
Council’s London Naval Treaty Judging Committee. Committee member 
Kawai Misao, for example, was concerned about the US becoming 
emboldened in its regional diplomatic efforts. Pressing Hamaguchi on 
the topic, he once asserted that ‘Japan has to militarily prepare with the 
China problem in mind’.81
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It was Yoshida, meanwhile, who served as mediator between Shidehara 
and Castle so well. This is a bit surprising, given that Shidehara and 
Yoshida had differing views when it came to policy on China. In terms of 
personality as well, Yoshida found Tanaka, the previous foreign minister, 
to be easier to work for, due to his ‘generous temperament’. By contrast, 
he was not fond of the ‘stubbornly precise’ Shidehara. According to 
Yoshida, Shidehara’s obsession with the minutiae of ministry work was 
such that he could not stand to delegate tasks to the vice-minister as 
needed. Such behaviour, in his opinion, showed that Shidehara was not 
cut out to be the foreign minister. Given that Shidehara spent so much of 
his time holed up in the ministry, it often fell to Yoshida himself to take 
care of public relations. In doing so, he was able to make up for some of 
the shortcomings of Shidehara, the ‘discreet worker’.82 This dynamic was 
probably what inspired the running joke in the ministry that Shidehara 
was the vice-minister and Yoshida was the minister. Yoshida also took 
responsibility for sharing ministry information with certain key figures. 
For example, during one period he delivered summaries of discussions 
that were being held between Shidehara and China’s minister to Japan, 
Wang Rongbao, to his father-in-law, the lord keeper of the privy seal, 
Makino Nobuaki.83
Castle’s estimation of Makino was also extremely high. Indeed, 
Makino’s shrewdness was one of the reasons he had long been trusted 
as the emperor’s go-between. This kind of evaluation of Makino was 
not necessarily unreasonable, particularly given that Shidehara felt 
comfortable in providing him with top-secret documents from the navy 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.84 On the other hand, aside from 
concerning Hamaguchi’s performance alongside Home Minister Adachi 
Kenzō in leading the Minseitō to electoral victory, Castle’s opinion of 
Hamaguchi was not high.85 Of course, the reason why Castle avoided 
directly negotiating with Hamaguchi was that he was wary of giving 
the impression that he was applying outside pressure on behalf of the 
US. Given that even in London the important negotiations between 
Japan and the US were unofficial, it was surely wise that Castle avoided 
negotiating with Hamaguchi. Shidehara had also been opposed to any 
direct discussions between Hamaguchi and Castle.
However, the more fundamental reason was that Castle had higher 
expectations of Foreign Ministry officials such as Shidehara and Yoshida 
than of the leaders of the ruling party. And indeed, Shidehara more than 
lived up to those expectations. From Castle’s perspective, the role of the 
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party politicians headed by Hamaguchi was not of primary importance. 
Hamaguchi’s sheer determination to steer a meeting to a consensus, even 
at the risk of his own life,86 was apparently a quality that the staff at the 
US embassy were not sufficiently aware of. In considering the nature of 
Japanese politics during the period in question, it is illuminating that 
the US ambassador held Makino in higher esteem than Hamaguchi. 
Further, Castle did not have contact with Nagai Ryūtarō, who supported 
Shidehara from within the Minseitō party, as parliamentary vice-minister 
for foreign affairs.87 Evidently, as far as foreign affairs was concerned, the 
US embassy did not view Japanese party politics as mature.
When Castle sought to have his thinking communicated with the Japanese 
navy, a common path of transmission was from Shidehara to Navy Vice-
Minister Yamanashi. Shidehara’s English proficiency was invaluable in 
this regard. In fact, the closeness of Shidehara and Castle was such that it 
became a matter of concern for Naval General Staff Director Katō.88 That 
Castle developed such a positive relationship with Shidehara following 
his dispatch to Japan for the period of the London Naval Conference 
was in itself quite significant. At that time, the US ambassador to Japan 
was generally thought to be of little importance, even compared to the 
minister to China.89 It was rare for officials at the rank of undersecretary 
of state to have the experience of actually residing in Japan.
It was also during this period that officials more familiar with Japan, such 
as Secretary Dooman, began to work at the US embassy. This development 
would also have helped bring the two nations closer together.90 Along 
with Dooman, another figure who was viewed as representative of a new 
generation of Japan was the State Department official Joseph W. Ballantine. 
Returning home after the London Naval Conference, Ballantine’s choice 
for his next posting was not Japan but Guangdong, as consul general. 
Given that Ballantine had tended to be biased in favour of Japan at that 
point, this experience would have surely expanded his perspective.91
This is all to say that the relationship between Japan and the US in 
the modern period more or less reached its peak during the period of the 
London Naval Conference. On the Japanese side, there was Shidehara, 
a foreign minister who acted as a driving force for positive relations from 
the time of the conference. Then there was also Debuchi, Shidehara’s 
subordinate and close confidant, who would go on to serve as ambassador 
to the US. In the US State Department, meanwhile, a pro-Japan clique 
was forming. Castle’s appearance in the annals of US diplomacy can be 
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seen as continuing down a path blazed by MacMurray, previous minister 
to China and chief of the State Department’s Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs. After returning to the US, Castle initially served as assistant 
secretary of state from July 1930 to April 1931. He would subsequently 
become undersecretary of state, from April 1931 to March 1933.92 
While Japan–US relations were at their best in this era, this situation was 
not sustainable.
Certainly, the naval disarmament talks were not unconnected to the 
‘China  problem’ or to the immigration problem. Their successful 
conclusion, therefore, at the same time indicated that it was possible for 
a more secure regional order to arise in East Asia. Hence, we see, for 
example, figures such as Debuchi pushing quite strongly for a revision to 
the Japanese Exclusion Act, and Secretary of State Stimson showing his 
willingness to work on this issue. However, as they were familiar with the 
situation on the ground, Shidehara and Castle considered it overly hasty 
to tie the success of the London Naval Conference directly to the Japanese 
Exclusion Act reform. Instead, they were concerned about the possibility 
of a backlash. They did not think that the construction of a new order 
through Japan–US cooperation, including on immigration and China, 
could be realised so quickly. After all, while Castle was favourable to Japan, 
his perspective was not representative of US mainstream thought. The idea 
that China policy ought to be tied to the success of naval disarmament 
talks was a difficult sell to China hands such as Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs Chief Hornbeck, or Johnson, the US minister to China.
Stimson too, though sympathetic to the need to revise the Japanese 
Exclusion Act, could hardly ignore the wishes of the China hands in 
his department when it came to policy on China. This area may well 
have become a barrier to the development of a new international order, 
which was in turn essential to Japan–US relations. On this matter we 
have corroboration from Sansom, who was a commercial counsellor at the 
British Embassy in Japan. In his reminiscences on the period, he stated: 
‘The State Department and the American Government over-emphasised 
the importance and also the virtues of the Chinese’.93 In his view, the State 
Department and the government ought to have paid greater heed to those 
officials who were more familiar with Japan.
The isolation of the pro-Japan faction in the State Department did not 
greatly improve in the subsequent period, when Joseph C. Grew served 
as ambassador to Japan. According to the recollections of Embassy First 
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Secretary Dooman, Hornbeck was eager to deny the wishes of Grew and 
Dooman. Understanding that it was hopeless, they apparently lost the 
motivation to even bother writing private correspondence to Hornbeck 
or his subordinates.94 All this is to say that, given subsequent events, the 
London Naval Conference on Disarmament was undeniably not only 
a high point but also a turning point.95 Matters deteriorated from then on. 
When looking at the problem of military disarmament, it is easy to pay 
too much attention to the ratios allotted to each nation that limited their 
naval forces. In reality, such ratios by no means guarantee that peace will 
prevail. Of far greater importance is the foundation of such disarmament 
treaties: the potential for the steady cultivation of a relationship of trust. 
Though it was over 90 years ago, Shidehara and Castle’s friendship still 
provides this message to us today.
The Manchurian Incident
The Hamaguchi Shooting Incident: Assuming the 
Role of Acting Prime Minister
In December 1930, following the ratification of the London Naval Treaty, 
Shidehara replaced Yoshida Shigeru with Nagai Matsuzō as vice-minister 
for foreign affairs. Previously, when Shidehara served as vice-minister, 
Nagai was director of the Telegraph Division. Together, they would 
frequently work late into the night. Since that time, Nagai had progressed 
through the positions of International Trade Bureau director-general, 
minister to Sweden and ambassador to Belgium. During the London Naval 
Conference on Disarmament, he served as one of the plenipotentiary 
representatives in the Japanese delegation. It should be noted that his 
appointment as ambassador to Belgium in April 1928 was the wish of 
Vice-Minister Debuchi. Under the Meiji Constitution, ambassadors and 
vice-ministers were ranked as ‘shinninkan’ (officials appointed by the 
emperor) and ‘chokuninkan’ (imperial appointees), respectively. In other 
words, ambassadors actually ranked higher than vice-ministers. This 
meant that when Nagai became vice-minister after serving as ambassador 
to Belgium, he was technically being demoted. Nevertheless, Shidehara 
wanted his old acquaintance to take on the role.96
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Shortly before this staffing change, Shidehara had also requested that the 
ambassador to Italy, Matsuda Michikazu, serve as director-general of the 
Treaties and Conventions Bureau. Such personnel choices were certainly 
unusual. Yet, in this way, Shidehara was able to reinforce the ministry with 
the capable figures of Vice-Minister Nagai and Treaties and Conventions 
Bureau Director-General Matsuda. As a diplomat wrote:
The army and the navy seemed quite displeased by these personnel 
changes … What was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs planning by 
having three generals (shinninkan) at once? Were they seeking to 
gain leverage to push back against the San-Chokan [Three Chiefs] 
in the Army? There were people making jokes of this nature.97
The ‘San-Chokan in the Army’ referred to here were the war minister, the 
chief of army general staff and the inspector general of military training.
Shidehara was extremely busy during this period. As indicated earlier, this 
was because he was serving as the acting prime minister. According to 
Shidehara:
I will never forget it. It was the fifth year of Shōwa [1930], 
November 14. That was the day that Prime Minister Hamaguchi 
was shot by an assassin at Tokyo Station.98
On the day in question, Shidehara had been standing on a platform at 
Tokyo Station. He had come to see off Hirota Kōki, who was departing 
to take his position as ambassador to the Soviet Union. Coincidentally, 
Prime Minister Hamaguchi appeared at the same time. He was headed for 
Okayama, where he intended to observe military exercises.
The next moment, Shidehara heard a gunshot. A right-wing youth had 
shot Hamaguchi. In shock, Shidehara pushed through the gathering crowd 
and found Hamaguchi bloodstained and gravely wounded. In a strained 
voice, Hamaguchi reportedly said: ‘Danshi no Honkai da’. Translated 
literally, this means ‘a man’s long-cherished desire’. What Hamaguchi 
meant was: ‘I have served my country’. Struggling, Hamaguchi then 
added, with a groan: ‘I dealt with the cabinet meeting for the budget 
draft yesterday, so this is good timing’. Shidehara replied, looking into 
Hamaguchi’s face: ‘If you keep talking, you’ll only lose more blood, 
so be quiet now’.99 The assailant’s motive was opposition to the naval 
disarmament treaty. Apparently, the assassination plans had also included 
Shidehara as a target. As a result of the Hamaguchi Shooting Incident, 
Shidehara became acting prime minister.
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Recommending Shidehara for the position of acting prime minister were 
the minister for railways, Egi Tasuku, and House of Peers member Izawa 
Takio. As Shidehara himself had no ambition for high political office, it 
was relatively easy to secure sufficient support for him to serve as acting 
prime minister. As he said: ‘I merely took on the position temporarily’.100 
Yet, desired or not, Shidehara’s appointment as acting prime minister 
was actually a disaster for his friend Hamaguchi. As mentioned above, in 
February 1931, Shidehara misspoke at a committee meeting during the 
Diet. Following this incident, in March, he was relieved of his position 
as acting prime minister. The problem was that there was no government 
mechanism allowing an acting prime minister to be replaced by another 
acting prime minister. The result was that Hamaguchi himself was forced 
to attend the House sessions as prime minister. As he began to attend the 
House sessions, Hamaguchi’s condition soon deteriorated. At the time, 
Hamaguchi sought Shidehara’s opinion on who should succeed him as 
president of the Minseitō. When Shidehara said that ‘Wakatsuki would be 
a suitable choice’, Hamaguchi replied: ‘I agree entirely’.101
Thus, former prime minister Wakatsuki was chosen as the next Minseitō 
president. When the Hamaguchi cabinet resigned en masse in April 1931, 
the emperor instructed Wakatsuki to form his second cabinet. Naturally, 
Shidehara resumed his post as foreign minister. However, Hamaguchi’s 
condition grew worse. He finally passed away on 26 August, aged 61. 
It  was late summer, and a mere three weeks before the Manchurian 
Incident. If it were not for the shooting at Tokyo Station that Shidehara 
witnessed, the cabinet led by his old friend Hamaguchi might well have 
become the longest administration since the Hara cabinet. Further, if 
Hamaguchi, known as the ‘lion prime minister’, had still been in charge, 
the days following the Manchurian Incident might well have unfolded 
quite differently. For Shidehara, it was undoubtedly a heartbreaking loss.
As if this were not enough, Shidehara also had another problem on 
his hands at this time: the ‘Black Chamber’. The Black Chamber was 
the name given to the US government’s secret decoding room. There the 
diplomatic telegrams of various foreign nations were decoded in huge 
quantities. This included the diplomatic telegrams of Japan, which the 
US had been intercepting since before the Washington Naval Conference. 
The central figure in this effort was a man named Herbert O. Yardley.
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Yardley’s Black Chamber, however, was eventually abolished by Secretary 
of State Stimson. Displeased with this decision, Yardley would go on 
to publish a tell-all book on the decoding project, titled The American 
Black Chamber. Shidehara learned of this book in June 1931, through 
Ambassador Debuchi. The book apparently had many pages on Japan. 
The details of this project would subsequently become known throughout 
the world. The Japanese press, of course, was hardly likely to overlook such 
a story. The Osaka Mainichi Shimbun company quickly had it translated 
into Japanese and published it in August 1931 with the title The Black 
Chamber: Beikoku wa Ikanishite Gaikō Hiden wo Nusundaka (How did the 
US steal the secret diplomatic telegrams?). Although Shidehara worked 
out a plan for handling the Diet and issued warnings to Japan’s overseas 
diplomatic establishments, the damage was done.102
The Manchurian Incident and Discussions 
with Stimson
Let us now turn to the matter of Japan’s relationship with China. March 
1930 saw the initial signing of the Sino-Japanese Tariff Agreement. With 
this agreement, Japan recognised China’s tariff autonomy. At this time, 
the Hamaguchi cabinet also passed a resolution to change how China 
was formally referred to in official documents. Rather than simply 
‘China’—or, rather, the old equivalent, which was ‘Shina’ (支那) in 
Japanese—China would now be referred to as the ‘Republic of China’ 
(中華民国).103 The  Chinese government had criticised Japan’s original 
designation of ‘Shina’, and the Hamaguchi cabinet decision was a response 
to that criticism.
With the matter of tariffs resolved, the focus of attention subsequently 
shifted to the termination of Japan’s extraterritorial rights in China, and the 
refinancing of foreign loans. Concerning Japan’s relationship with China, 
Shidehara gave a speech on national radio in which he argued: ‘We are 
determined to do our utmost in working toward the goal of reciprocal 
benefit, that is to say, so-called prosperous co-existence’.104 When it came 
to negotiations with China, however, Shidehara was hardly free to take 
the lead himself. Given the London Naval Conference on Disarmament 
and, later, his work as acting prime minister, Shidehara was buried in 
paperwork. He therefore delegated work in this area to Shigemitsu, the 
acting minister to China. Shigemitsu proceeded with the negotiations 
with an eye towards promoting greater cooperation between the two 
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nations. He also went a step further and attempted to push Shidehara 
towards promoting Sino-Japanese partnership. Shidehara, however, did 
not acquiesce. As in the past, he continued to put far more emphasis 
on Japan’s relationship with the US and the UK. He was also gradually 
moving beyond the economism that he once adhered to so strongly. 
Ironically, it was not until the Manchurian Incident that Shidehara’s and 
Shigemitsu’s positions began to converge.105
On the evening of 18 September 1931, the Kwantung Army (a division 
of the Japanese Imperial Army stationed in Kwantung) detonated a bomb 
that they set on a line of the South Manchuria Railway, near Liutiaohu 
on the outskirts of Shenyang. Blaming this explosion on the Chinese, the 
Kwantung Army then used the incident as a pretence for mobilisation. 
This conspiracy, which is also known as the Liutiaohu Incident, was the 
beginning of the Manchurian Incident. The core figures in this conspiracy 
were Ishiwara Kanji and Itagaki Seishirō of the Kwantung Army. Before 
the Liutiaohu Incident, Shidehara perceived signs of a plot by members 
of the Kwantung Army, thanks to telegrams from Hayashi Kyūjirō, consul 
general in Mukden.106
On 19 September, the day after the Liutiaohu Incident, numerous pieces 
of information gathered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were read aloud 
at a meeting of the Wakatsuki cabinet. This information included details 
such as how, before the explosion, the Fushun Independent Garrison had 
asked the South Manchuria Railway to prepare a train carriage for transport. 
Similarly, the General Headquarters of the Kwantung Army had also been 
preparing for mobilisation before the explosion. Thus, Shidehara was able 
to state that ‘this incident almost appears as though it occurred as a result 
of planning by the military’.107 For this reason, War Minister Minami Jirō 
was unable to secure a cabinet agreement that day to send reinforcements 
from the Japanese Korean Army. Instead, the Wakatsuki cabinet decided 
that the incident needed to be contained. The US likewise hoped that 
Shidehara would work to prevent any escalation.
The cabinet’s wishes, however, were soon frustrated. On 21 September, 
the Kwantung Army moved into Jilin, and the Japanese Korean Army, 
led by Commander Hayashi Senjūro, crossed the border into Manchuria 
without orders. The following day, the cabinet voted to authorise the 
expense request sent by the Japanese Korean Army. On the Japanese 
Korean Army’s unauthorised crossing of the border, Prime Minister 
Wakatsuki stated indifferently: ‘Now that it has happened, I suppose it 
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simply cannot be helped’.108 On 8 October, the Kwantung Army bombed 
the city of Jinzhou, which was far away from the South Manchuria Railway 
line. The actions of the Japanese army were now expanding throughout 
the broader Manchuria region. When the Manchurian Incident erupted, 
Shidehara’s basic thinking was that direct negotiations were necessary 
between Japan and China. He wished to avoid having any of the Western 
nations act as mediators.
On 9 October, the Wakatsuki cabinet agreed upon a new policy of 
withdrawing troops following the reaching of a general agreement with 
China on matters such as the prohibition of boycotting Japanese goods, 
and the signing of a Sino-Japanese railway agreement. While China had 
asserted that a troop withdrawal was a precondition for any negotiations, 
Japan decided it would withdraw only if its conditions were met through 
direct negotiation. The Nationalist government, however, appealed to 
the League of Nations over the Manchurian Incident, and resolved not 
to negotiate directly with Japan under the given circumstances. Chiang 
Kai-shek even sent a request to Zhang Xueliang, asking him not to begin 
any such negotiations.
At the end of November, V. K. Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun), who had 
taken the position of foreign minister for the Nationalist government, 
informed the UK, the US and France of a plan to establish a neutral zone 
around Jinzhou. Jinzhou, located in south-western Liaoning province, 
had become the base of operations for the government of Zhang Xueliang 
after he was ousted from Shenyang. Wellington Koo’s proposal was 
for the Jinzhou region to be demilitarised and to be monitored by the 
other powers, so as to prevent any further conflict between Japanese and 
Chinese forces. At the same time, this plan can be seen as a signal for 
opening up negotiations with Japan. Wellington Koo had previously 
engaged Shidehara in debate at the Washington Naval Conference and 
had hopes that he would assist with his plan to prevent further conflict. 
This development increased the possibility of direct negotiations between 
Japan and China.
At the beginning of December, Shidehara also began to push Zhang 
Xueliang to accept the demilitarisation of Jinzhou. However, Shidehara 
sought not only to have the Chinese army withdraw but also to have the 
government of Zhang Xueliang withdraw west past Shanhaiguan. Chiang 
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Kai-shek and Zhang Xueliang would hardly accept such a request. Thus, 
it was not surprising that direct negotiations between Japan and China 
did not resolve the crisis.
Following this failure, Shidehara began to acquiesce to the idea of 
establishing a puppet government in north-eastern China led by the 
Japanese army. In mid-November, a fierce debate had broken out 
between War Minister Minami, who argued for an attack on Qiqihar city 
in Heilongjiang province, and Shidehara and Wakatsuki, who objected 
to such an idea. The agreement that was eventually reached was for 
a  puppet government to be established in Qiqihar, with a subsequent 
withdrawal of Japanese troops. This was the moment when Shidehara 
compromised on the idea of a military-led puppet state. Thereafter, 
Shidehara gradually distanced himself from the ideal of the military being 
regulated by international cooperation. Increasingly, he acquiesced to the 
military having control over policy in China. With the style of Shidehara 
diplomacy in part disintegrating, in part metamorphosing, it can be said 
that the end of the Washington System of regional order in East Asia was 
instigated by the Japanese side.109
The Manchurian Incident would have serious implications for Japan’s 
relationship with the US. Managing this relationship was a major problem, 
both for possible direct negotiations with China and for the plan for 
a puppet government. At the beginning of October, the Kwantung Army 
bombed Jinzhou, despite the fact that it was far away from the South 
Manchuria Railway. This event shocked Secretary of State Stimson, who 
urged President Hoover to impose economic sanctions on Japan. In his 
view, ‘the militaristic elements in Japan could learn only through suffering 
and not by the sanctions of public opinion, which we in America are 
committed to and deem enough for ourselves’.110 Hoover, however, was 
cautious about economic sanctions.
Of even more importance were some comments made by Secretary of State 
Stimson. Towards the end of November, Stimson received information 
that the Japanese army was being dispatched to Jinzhou. Fearful of this 
development, on 27 November, Stimson released to the US press corps 
a summary of a discussion that had taken place between Shidehara 
and Ambassador Forbes.111 The details of Stimson’s ill-considered press 
conference also reached Japan. According to the evening edition of the 
Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (29 November), Stimson claimed that Shidehara 
had declared Japan would not attack Jinzhou:
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On November 24, Foreign Minister Shidehara replied that Japan 
had no intention of pushing further in the direction of Jinzhou. 
Further, in that reply, Foreign Minister Shidehara has declared 
that the Japanese government had already announced the above 
fact to the commanders of the Japanese forces in Manchuria.112
Perhaps Stimson’s aim with these comments was to try to restrain 
Japan. Shidehara, however, responded to Stimson’s thoughtlessness with 
a mixture of grief and anger. This was because he had told Ambassador 
Forbes to keep the details of their discussion confidential.
These comments were also poorly timed. As the same newspaper pointed 
out, the Kwantung Army central command had already ordered its forces 
to cancel its attack on Jinzhou. This created the impression that Japan had 
simply bowed to US pressure. The result was that Stimson’s comments 
damaged the authority not only of Shidehara but also of military central 
command. The League of Nations had been close to bringing about an 
agreement on the demilitarisation of Jinzhou. Shidehara responded by 
having Ambassador Debuchi begin an inquiry about Stimson’s press 
conference.113
However, the situation went in the opposite direction of Shidehara’s 
intention. On 28 November, Stimson held a second press conference 
in order to defend his previous comments. An extra edition of the 
Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (29 November) reported that Stimson made 
the following statement:
On November 24, I received from Foreign Minister Shidehara, via 
Ambassador Forbes, the declaration that the foreign minister, the 
war minister, and the chief of army general staff had all reached the 
agreement that no military action would be taken against Jinzhou. 
Further, this decision had been relayed to the commander-in-
chief on the ground. Given this fact, I struggle to understand the 
newspaper reports on the mobilization of Commander-in-Chief 
Honjō’s forces.114
This second comment by Stimson only served to make a bad situation 
worse. This was because he had made public some details on the supreme 
command of Japan’s forces. These details were also more explicit than 
in his first statement. The source of this information, of course, was 
Shidehara. Naturally, Shidehara responded by issuing a protest to 
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Ambassador Forbes. Upon receiving this protest, Forbes had no choice 
but to awkwardly apologise. Shidehara also found himself pressed by War 
Minister Minami during a cabinet meeting as to his own responsibility.115
Why did this situation occur in the first place? One interpretation is that 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ignored Japanese newspaper articles and 
instead read English-language sources such as the Associated Press. Thus 
they failed to grasp the essence of the problem: information relating to 
the supreme command had been made public by the US. For this reason, 
Debuchi’s inquiry failed to touch upon matters such as the ‘announcement’ 
of orders to the Kwantung Army command. Therefore, when Stimson 
defended himself in a second press conference, he actually made matters 
worse by allowing further details relating to the supreme command of 
Japan’s military to become public. This sequence of misunderstandings 
between Japan and the US has been pointed out by scholars and historical 
commentators for some time.116 Yet this explanation leaves certain basic 
questions unanswered. In the first place, why did Shidehara leak to Forbes 
details relating to the supreme command? To answer this question, we 
need to go back in time a little, to when Shidehara and Forbes first met.
Shidehara and US Ambassador Forbes
According to Forbes’s journal, he first met Shidehara in October 1926. 
At that time, Forbes was visiting Japan as part of a trip around the globe. 
On this occasion, he met not only Shidehara but also Debuchi, Hanihara 
and other ministry figures. They discussed topics such as the Philippines, 
Korea and Taiwan.117
Later, in September 1930, Forbes would return to Japan, this time as the 
US ambassador. His relationship with Shidehara was a good one. One 
example of their relations comes from a national holiday observed at that 
time celebrating the Meiji emperor’s birthday on 3 November. On this day, 
not only were celebrations held at locations such as the Imperial Palace, 
military facilities and schools, but also the nation’s citizens raised flags 
above their dwellings. In Japan today, this public holiday has survived, 
but it has been renamed ‘Culture Day’. Shidehara and Forbes had been 
invited to the Imperial Palace by the Shōwa emperor, where they also 
met with Hamaguchi and other members of the government. On that 
occasion, Forbes remembered telling Shidehara that ‘I had just heard 
from California that Senator Johnson was now friendly to a much desired 
modification of the immigration law’.118 Another example of their strong 
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relationship was from circumstances far less auspicious: they were quick 
to get in contact with each other after the shooting of Prime Minister 
Hamaguchi on 14 November.
In June 1931, Shidehara received an interesting proposal from Forbes: 
a suggestion to expand commercial relations between Taiwan and the 
Philippines. As Forbes had previously served as governor-general to 
the Philippines, he was far from indifferent about such matters. Shidehara 
responded by communicating the proposal to Ōta Masahiro, the 
governor-general of Taiwan, in order to get his opinion.119 Even after the 
outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, Shidehara and Forbes’s relationship 
remained strong. Shidehara met with Forbes in mid-November. When 
Shidehara stated that he was ‘definite about the utter impossibility of 
Japan’s immediate withdrawal of troops to the railway zone because 
the Chinese returning soldiers would drive out all Japanese and Korean 
residents of Manchuria’, Forbes apparently responded that this was 
‘unquestionably true’.120
On 3 December, however, Forbes’s opinion of Shidehara abruptly shifted. 
In his journal, he wrote: ‘Baron Shidehara has been frank and conciliatory 
but it is evident that the army is hard to control’. Here Forbes was referring 
to the comments by Stimson, which had been published at the end of 
November. According to Forbes: ‘Secretary Stimson gave out what seemed 
like a perfectly fair statement outlining perhaps in a little too much detail 
what Japan had represented to us of her plans’. Forbes noted that when he 
later met Shidehara to discuss the matter, he ‘was almost tearing his hair 
over it’. It should be noted that Forbes was not indifferent to Shidehara’s 
situation and felt he was partially responsible. In his diary, he remarks that 
he had ‘failed to caution Washington about the delicacy of some of the 
situations’ but also that he ‘lost no sleep over it’. He added that ‘Shidehara 
had given me this note with the statement that it was absolutely between 
ourselves’.121 Following advice from counsellor Neville, Forbes decided to 
send a telegram to Stimson relaying Shidehara’s wishes. Apparently, this 
message did not have a decisive impact on Stimson’s thinking.
In fact, it was only after Shidehara pointed out Stimson’s comments 
in a  meeting that Forbes became aware of them. Upon returning to 
the embassy, Forbes confirmed the contents of the comments. Only 
minutes later, an Associated Press reporter burst into the room to 
speak with a dumbfounded Forbes. The reporter handed Forbes a copy 
of a  statement by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Forbes’s 
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
210
words, the statement was ‘a very bitter and intemperately worded attack 
on Secretary Stimson’. He noted that ‘it didn’t sound like Shidehara at all’. 
And indeed, its originator was in fact Shiratori Toshio, director-general 
of the Intelligence Department. Forbes relayed the details of their talks. 
Forbes then took the added step of apologising to Shidehara for Stimson’s 
comments. This was when he learned that Shidehara had not written 
any statements of the kind that Shiratori had authored. Nevertheless, 
Shidehara expressed his concern that Stimson’s comments ‘might upset 
the plan of an accord between Japan and China then under negotiation’. 
As Forbes himself admitted, Stimson’s comments ‘did the opposite to 
Shidehara’s plans’.122
As a result of this incident, criticism of Shidehara increased from the 
military and the Japanese public. Home Minister Adachi Kenzō, who 
had been pushing for a collaborative cabinet that incorporated members 
of the Seiyūkai party, chimed in: ‘What Stimson said—that is going 
to become a serious political problem’.123 Adachi was entirely correct. 
The political fallout from this incident gave the Wakatsuki cabinet no 
choice but to resign. On 11 December, Shidehara was once more pushed 
into opposition. According to rumours that reached Forbes sometime 
later, Shidehara’s life had also been in danger on numerous occasions. 
As it happened, Shidehara would not have another opportunity to meet 
with Forbes before he left his posting as ambassador in March 1932.124
In November of the same year, Shidehara wrote to Forbes, who had by 
then returned to the US. In this letter, Shidehara objected to China’s 
actions following the Manchurian Incident. In order ‘to institute direct 
negotiations between the two Governments on the subject, the difficulties 
should have been adjusted long ago’, he wrote. Yet China ‘failed to 
appreciate the singleness of purpose shown in our overtures, and sought 
to fight out the case at Geneva’. Shidehara concluded by observing that 
‘the Sino-Japanese dispute should not be allowed to drift in such a way 
as to affect the friendly relations between America and Japan’.125 To these 
comments Forbes responded sympathetically.
To summarise the above discussion, Stimson’s comments must be 
understood in a broader context: Forbes failed to adequately warn 
Stimson that the details concerning Japanese supreme command had 
been given to him in the utmost confidence. There are also legitimate 
doubts as to whether either Forbes or Stimson had a correct understanding 
of the problem of supreme command, or of its seriousness for the 
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Japanese leadership.126 Indeed, at the beginning, even Shidehara and 
Debuchi did not adequately grasp the essence of this problem and its 
political implications.
That said, an indirect cause of Stimson’s comments was that Shidehara 
had placed too much trust in Forbes. Thus, he gave away too much 
information about matters relating to supreme command. These were 
details that normally would never have been revealed to outsiders. 
Shidehara had a friendly relationship with Forbes, and, as we have already 
seen, the building of relationships of trust was a fundamental tenet of 
Shidehara’s ‘honest diplomacy’, which, in turn, constituted his guiding 
creed as a diplomat. On this occasion, however, Shidehara’s ‘honest 
diplomacy’ led to unintended results. So, it came to pass that Shidehara 
ran into difficulties with the Japanese–American relationship, supposedly 
his field of expertise, and left the ministry to which he was so attached. 
Along the way, over 35 years had passed since he began as a consular 
assistant. It was early winter, and not long before his sixtieth birthday.
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From the Second 
Sino-Japanese War to 
the Pacific War
Following the May 15 Incident
National Unity Governments
In December 1931, the Wakatsuki cabinet resigned en masse. The direct 
cause was disunity in the cabinet surrounding the plan for a coalition 
that included members of the Seiyūkai party.1 As a result of the cabinet’s 
dissolution, administrative power shifted from the Minseitō to the 
Seiyūkai, with the Seiyūkai president Inukai Tsuyoshi forming a new 
cabinet. For the position of foreign minister, the Inukai cabinet called 
upon Yoshizawa Kenkichi, former ambassador to France. When Shidehara 
left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he had spent a cumulative total of five 
years and three months as foreign minister.2 Now in political opposition, 
he was merely a House of Peers member.
As it happened, still more shocking events would occur the following 
year, in 1932. First, on 9 February, Inoue Junnosuke, who had just left his 
post as finance minister, was shot and killed by Onuma Shō, a member 
of the right-wing organisation, Ketsumeidan (League of Blood). 
Inoue was assassinated in Komagome, close to Shidehara’s temporary 
residence.3 This, however, was only a foreshadowing of what was to 
come. On 15 May Prime Minister Inukai was assassinated by young naval 
officers. This became known as the May 15 Incident.
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Following the May 15 Incident and the death of Prime Minister Inukai, 
a new cabinet was formed, led by Saitō Makoto. Saitō was originally from 
the Imperial Japanese Navy and had no party affiliation. The formation 
of his government, therefore, was at the same time an end to the period of 
party-based cabinets, which had continued for eight years until that point. 
It should be noted that members of the Saitō cabinet were appointed from 
both the Seiyūkai and the Minseitō. For this reason, the Saitō cabinet, 
as well as the subsequent Okada cabinet, was referred to as a national 
unity government. On 27 May, Shidehara wrote to Saitō expressing his 
‘utmost delight’ at the smooth formation of the cabinet.4 At the time of 
the London Naval Treaty on Disarmament, Shidehara had been working 
with Saitō, who had temporarily returned to Japan while serving as 
the governor-general of Korea. Given their past relationship, it can be 
presumed that Shidehara was not necessarily discouraged by the birth 
of the Saitō cabinet.
Shidehara even wrote a letter expressing the ‘utmost delight in my heart’ 
to House of Peers Member Izawa Takio, who had assisted in the formation 
of the Saitō cabinet.5 Later, in May 1934, Shidehara asked Prime Minister 
Saitō to select Suzuki Fujiya as a member of the House of Peers. Suzuki 
had been the chief cabinet secretary for the Hamaguchi cabinet. What 
made Shidehara most anxious was the direction of Japan’s policies on 
China. With the formation of the Saitō cabinet, Uchida Yasuya returned 
as foreign minister after a nine-year break. Under Foreign Minister 
Uchida, Japan recognised Manchukuo as a state in September 1932, and, 
in March 1933, it notified the League of Nations of its withdrawal in 
opposition to the adoption of the report of the Lytton Commission and 
the non-recognition of Manchukuo.
Ashida Hitoshi, who became a member of the House of Representatives 
after an initial career as a diplomat, would reflect upon this in the 
postwar years:
Soon after I gained a seat in the House of Representatives, 
in January, the eighth year of Shōwa [1933], I gave a speech 
criticising the military’s continental policy. When this led to 
me being attacked by the right-wingers, I received an invitation 
from Mr. Shidehara for a chat. He said to me, ‘At the very least, 
you’re brave enough to say things that will make you unpopular, 
aren’t you?’ To this day, I still strongly remember those words 
of consolation.6
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Of these continental policies, the ‘Rehe Strategy’ was of particular concern 
for Shidehara. In February 1933, the Kwantung Army had launched an 
assault on China’s Rehe province. This development prompted Shidehara 
to pay a visit to Saionji Kinmochi at his home in Okitsu. Yoshida Shigeru, 
who was then waiting for a new posting, had given Shidehara an idea. 
Like Shidehara, Yoshida was anxious about the situation in China. His 
proposal was to call a meeting of the Imperial Council to try to resolve 
the situation, and he wanted Shidehara to try to convince Saionji of this 
approach. However, despite Yoshida’s best efforts, he did not succeed in 
convening the Imperial Council. It should be noted that Shidehara was 
much more indifferent to this plan than Yoshida was.7
Nevertheless, Shidehara did subsequently support Yoshida in other 
matters, such as requesting that he be dispatched to Europe. The Shōwa 
emperor also deeply trusted Shidehara.8
Table 3: Prime ministers and foreign ministers, 1931–45
Prime Minister Foreign Minister
Inukai Tsuyoshi (1931–32) Yoshizawa Kenkichi
Saitō Makoto (1932–34) Uchida Yasuya
Hirota Kōki
Okada Keisuke (1934–36) Hirota Kōki
Hirota Kōki (1936–37) Arita Hachirō
Hayashi Senjūrō (1937) Satō Naotake
Konoe Fumimaro (1937–39) Hirota Kōki
Ugaki Kazushige
Arita Hachirō
Hiranuma Kiichirō (1939) Arita Hachirō
Abe Nobuyuki (1939–40) Nomura Kichisaburō
Yonai Mitsumasa (1940) Arita Hachirō
Konoe Fumimaro (1940–41) Matsuoka Yōsuke
Toyoda Teijirō
Tōjō Hideki (1941–44) Tōgō Shigenori
Tani Masayuki
Shigemitsu Mamoru
Koiso Kuniaki (1944–45) Shigemitsu Mamoru
Suzuki Kantarō (1945) Tōgō Shigenori
Higashikuni Naruhiko (1945) Shigemitsu Mamoru
Yoshida Shigeru
Shidehara Kijūrō (1945–46) Yoshida Shigeru
Note: Acting foreign ministers are not listed here.
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A 20-Year Memorial Anniversary for Denison
It was 3 July 1933. As the sun set upon Aoyama Cemetery, Shidehara 
lingered in front of the tombstone of former ministry adviser Denison. 
It had been exactly 20 years since Denison’s death from illness in Tokyo. 
Also in attendance was Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya. It was Uchida 
who hosted the gathering marking the anniversary of Denison’s passing.
Other diplomatic and political figures who came to pay their respects 
included Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki; Imperial 
Household Ministry Lord Chamberlain Hayashi Gonsuke; Matsui 
Keishirō, who had already retired from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
House of Peers Member Yoshizawa Kenkichi; and Yoshida Shigeru, who 
was still waiting to be assigned to a new position. These individuals were 
also joined by Arita Hachirō, who had just given up the post of foreign 
affairs vice-minister to Shigemitsu Mamoru; American and European 
Bureau Director-General Tōgō Shigenori; and Intelligence Department 
Director-General Amō Eiji. Of those gathered, however, it was Shidehara 
who had by far been the closest to Denison.
Before long, the attendees departed the cemetery and went to the foreign 
minister’s residence for a dinner in honour of Denison. Following the 
dinner, the group were loath to part and return home, so instead they 
started a discussion in the drawing room. It was there that Uchida asked 
Shidehara to say a few words, since he and Denison had had a ‘special 
relationship’. Shidehara related an anecdote that he had prepared for such 
an occasion.
Once, Denison had informed Shidehara that the Nile River was so fertile 
because of the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile further 
inland. Denison had said: ‘The [First] Sino-Japanese War is just like that 
meeting of the Blue Nile and the White Nile. Reactionary ideas and 
Europeanism were harmonized, fostering Japan’s advancement’. With the 
Russo-Japanese War, meanwhile, Japan ‘did not seek to rush forward, but 
at the right timing tightened the reins and then dealt with the Treaty of 
Portsmouth’.9 Denison had expressed the hope that, if the nation ever 
faced an existential crisis in the future, a similar attitude would help to 
open up a way forward.
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With this anecdote, Shidehara may have sought subtly to prompt some 
self-reflection in Uchida, who tended to be dogmatically nationalist. 
Shidehara also mentioned how Denison, towards the end of his life, had 
wished to quit the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and retire to Hayama. This 
wish was, unfortunately, left unfulfilled. A portrait of Denison watched 
over a subsequent discussion between Shidehara and Uchida. It was after 
10 pm when the gathering finally dispersed.
In September that year, Uchida resigned as foreign minister. His successor 
was Hirota Kōki. Foreign Minister Hirota would remain in his position 
during the subsequent Okada cabinet, which formed in July 1934. 
Shidehara also expressed his admiration for Denison in a diplomacy 
roundtable discussion, the content of which was published in the Asahi 
Shimbun. This discussion took place at the Imperial Hotel on 19 February 
1934. Along with Shidehara, other attendees included Makino Nobuaki, 
Akizuki Satsuo, Hayashi Gonsuke, Matsui Keishirō, Ishii Kikujirō and 
Yoshizawa Kenkichi. Kurino Shinichirō would have attended but was 
absent due to illness.
Beginning with treaty revision, the roundtable participants discussed 
a wide range of topics, including the First Sino-Japanese War, the Yihetuan 
Movement, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Russo-Japanese War and the 
era following World War I. This occasion similarly presented Shidehara 
with the opportunity to reminisce on Denison’s achievements and 
virtuousness to Japan’s most eminent diplomats. The discussion began at 
3 pm and lasted until 11 pm.10
Foreign Threats
In January 1933, Adolf Hitler took power in Germany. Japan, which 
left the League of Nations in March that year, gradually came to seek 
an anti-communist partnership with the Nazi Party. Shidehara received 
information on developments in Germany from Ambassador Nagai 
Matsuzō. That he was critical of the Nazis is a matter of public record.11
When 1934 began, Shidehara’s attention turned to the upcoming Second 
London Naval Conference on Disarmament, to be held as early as the 
following year. In April, he visited Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino 
and expressed his opinion. ‘The current authorities’, Shidehara argued, 
‘are not capable of properly dealing with the situation’. Shidehara further 
suggested that Navy Minister Ōsumi Mineo be replaced. ‘The top priority 
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is to secure somebody far more capable for the role.’12 Makino had no 
objections on this front. Shidehara also conversed with Makino on the 
topic of Soviet policy.
In May 1934, Shidehara exchanged views with Konoe Fumimaro, the 
lord speaker of the House of Peers, concerning the Second London Naval 
Conference. Shidehara predicted that problems of the Far East, a number 
of issues regarding territory in China—and Manchuria, in particular—
would not be covered during the conference. Konoe relayed Shidehara’s 
view to Kido Kōchi, lord keeper chief private secretary. Foreign Minister 
Hirota, on the other hand, believed that Far East problems could be up 
for deliberation.13 Shidehara turned out to be correct: problems of the Far 
East were not discussed at the Second London Naval Conference of 1935.
Regardless, Japan pulled out of the London Conference in January 1936. 
Then a group of military officers attempted to carry out a coup, in what 
became known as the ‘February 26 Incident’. Although Prime Minister 
Okada narrowly avoided harm, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Saitō 
Makoto and Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo were killed. Shidehara, 
who was staying at his Rikugien residence at that time, fled to Kamakura 
upon the instructions of police.14
After the February 26 Incident, Foreign Minister Hirota replaced Okada 
as prime minister. The foreign minister of the new Hirota cabinet was 
Arita Hachirō. This government would later approve the November 1936 
signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. The Soviet Union was 
naturally displeased, indicating that it was now unwilling to revise the 
Japan–Soviet Fisheries Treaty. It was then that Shidehara, who was still in 
political opposition, received a visitor: Konstantin K. Yurenev, the Soviet 
ambassador to Japan. Ambassador Yurenev alluded to the possibility of 
the Soviet Union refusing to sign the fisheries treaty. Shidehara strongly 
protested, arguing that a refusal would not only worsen the situation but 
also could ‘lead to us witnessing the tragedy of a Russo-Japanese War by 
April or May of next year’.15 He proposed that the two powers provisionally 
agree to extend the current treaty before it expired at the end of 1936.
Shidehara’s proposal was accepted. On 28 December, an interim agreement 
was signed in Moscow. A public proclamation of the agreement’s signing 
that same day would have helped ease tension between the two powers. 
In later years, Shigemitsu, Japan’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, 
was displeased to learn of Shidehara’s unofficial diplomatic activities. 
According to Shigemitsu, the Soviet side:
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Knew that the signing of an interim agreement had originally 
been suggested by Mr. Shidehara. This, unfortunately, revealed 
to them that the Japanese side had already given up on reaching 
an accord on a new treaty and would be satisfied with a mere 
interim agreement.16
February 1937 saw the formation of a new cabinet under the leadership 
of Hayashi Senjūrō. The foreign minister was Satō Naotake.
US Ambassador Grew: The Semblance 
of Shidehara Diplomacy
Although Shidehara was a member of the House of Peers, he had no 
official post in government. Thus, he had almost no involvement in 
diplomatic negotiations during this period. The aforementioned Japan–
Soviet Fisheries Interim Agreement was an exception. Nevertheless, that 
is not to say that Shidehara was left entirely without influence. Following 
the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt as president of the US in 
March 1933, preliminary negotiations commenced for a world economic 
conference. It was rumoured that both Shidehara and Ishii Kikujirō were 
strong contenders for the role of Japan’s plenipotentiary representative. 
In the end, Ishii was selected.17
Deserving of closer attention here is the relationship between Shidehara 
and US Ambassador Grew. Grew was posted to Japan for close to 
10  years, from 1932 until the war between Japan and the US began. 
Nevertheless, Grew was unable to correctly assess the political situation 
in Japan. His major sources of information were from moderates such 
as Makino Nobuaki, Kabayama Aisuke, Yoshida Shigeru and Shidehara. 
Grew first met Shidehara on 24 October 1932 and was deeply impressed. 
As he wrote in his diary: ‘I could talk with absolute frankness without the 
slightest fear of being misunderstood, and he has a fine sense of humor’.18
Through his communication with Shidehara, Grew arrived at two 
conclusions. First, Japanese diplomacy would swing back like a ‘pendulum’ 
and, before long, return to a more normal state. Grew particularly hoped 
for a return to the kind of diplomacy that had been practised by Shidehara. 
Grew also saw a semblance of ‘Shidehara diplomacy’ in the approaches 
of Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki and Foreign Minister Satō Naotake. 
Although Shidehara and Grew were not in frequent contact, Grew came 
to see Shidehara as a pole by which to orient himself in interpreting 
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Japanese diplomacy. Second, Grew saw that the Shōwa emperor was 
a pacifist. Upon returning to the US in December 1941 after hostilities 
between the two nations had begun, he began to push for the preservation 
of the emperor system. His efforts were not unconnected to the present-
day system of the emperor as symbol.
Grew’s faint hope of a return to the model of Shidehara diplomacy was to 
be cruelly betrayed by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, during 
the war years, Grew attempted to inform Americans of the moderate 
politicians and officials in Japan. In 1944, Grew published a collection of 
diary entries and official papers under the title Ten Years in Japan. In this 
book, Shidehara was frequently mentioned as a member of the Japanese 
moderates. Many Americans presumably first learned of Shidehara by 
reading Ten Years in Japan.19
While Grew saw a semblance of ‘Shidehara diplomacy’ in Hirota’s actions, 
such an interpretation does not appear in the recollections of Craigie, the 
British ambassador to Japan. According to Craigie, the Japanese army had 
been more sympathetic towards Foreign Minister Hirota of the Konoe 
cabinet than it had been towards former foreign minister Satō. This was 
because, for the army, Satō’s policy of appeasement towards China was ‘so 
unpleasantly associated with the name of Baron Shidehara’.20 It should be 
noted that, during this period, Shidehara continued to correspond with 
former ambassador Forbes. 
The Second Sino-Japanese War and 
World War II
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research 
Department
Amid these troubles both at home and abroad, in October 1936 Shidehara 
had the opportunity to give the directors of the Honolulu Museum of Art 
a tour of the Rikugien. The trip was organised through the America–Japan 
Society in the hope that it would help improve relations with the US.21
However, these hopes were not to be realised. The outbreak of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 would further damage Japan’s foreign 
relations. At that time, the governing Konoe cabinet decided to restore 
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Hirota Kōki as foreign minister. Peace initiatives attempted under Foreign 
Minister Hirota include the Trautmann Initiative and the Wang Jingwei 
Initiative. These initiatives received their names from two key figures: 
respectively, Oskar Paul Trautmann, German ambassador to China, 
and Wang Jingwei, a powerful figure in the Chinese Nationalist Party. 
According to A Shōwa Emperor Monologue, the Shōwa emperor once 
stated that:
After the fall of Nanjing, a peace initiative was carried out through 
the mediation of the German ambassador. However, according to 
Shidehara [Kijūrō, former foreign minister], Japan’s proposal at 
that time was apparently torn up by Soong Mei-ling [Madame 
Chiang Kai-shek] and never reached Chiang Kai-shek himself.22
Another peace initiative undertaken during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War was the Ugaki Initiative. In May 1938, former war minister Ugaki 
Kazushige replaced Hirota as foreign minister in the Konoe cabinet. 
At  that time, Ugaki made peace negotiations with China a condition 
for his joining the cabinet. While in agreement with this new Ugaki 
Initiative, Shidehara undertook his own manoeuvrings from the outside. 
Kido Kōichi, minister of health and welfare, wrote in his diary: ‘I have 
information that Mr. Shidehara is being very active outside of the 
cabinet’.23 Shidehara also made contact with his ex-subordinate, Asian 
Bureau Director-General Ishii Itarō. Ishii had been working to try and 
prevent the Second Sino-Japanese War from expanding.
However, the Konoe cabinet was unsuccessful in resolving the conflict, 
leading to resignation en masse. A new cabinet was subsequently formed 
under Hiranuma Kiichirō in January 1939. Before his nomination 
as prime minister, Hiranuma was serving as the chairman of the Privy 
Council. During the Hiranuma cabinet, Shidehara met with Ugaki 
Kazushige and critically examined the proposal for an alliance between 
Japan and Germany.24
At this time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Research Department was 
editing a compilation of ministry records and diplomatic officer memoirs. 
The Research Department had been established in December 1933. 
In  June 1936, the Research Department published the first volume of 
Dai Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (Documents on Japanese foreign policy) from 
the Japan International Association.25 This important inaugural volume 
was a systematic collection of diplomatic documents from the early 
Meiji period relating to unequal treaty reform. To this day it constitutes 
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a foundational resource for scholars seeking to understand Japan’s modern 
diplomatic history. By 1940, a total of nine volumes were published in 
this series. However, work ceased at that point due to the Pacific War. 
In fact, Shidehara himself assisted the Research Department with this 
project. Fonder of the ministry than anyone, meticulous Shidehara could 
hardly be indifferent to such an undertaking relating to ministry records 
and diplomatic history.26
Having been away from the ministry for so long by this point, Shidehara 
had no objection to writing his own contributions to the history of 
Japanese  diplomacy. In February 1939, Shidehara wrote a draft for 
ministry officials, titled ‘Washington Kaigi no Rimen-kan Sonota’ (Behind 
the scenes of the Washington Naval Conference and others). In this text, 
Shidehara made reference to the ‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘open door’ 
provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty. He described how ‘in recent years 
I  have heard speculation that these provisions were initially proposed 
by the U.K. and the U.S., so that these powers could restrict Japan’s 
economic activities in China’. However, he responded that the pursuit of:
Equality of opportunity and open-door [ideals] in China was 
originally promoted by our nation since the time of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, as an important principle for regulating China’s 
relationships with outside nations.27 
In a roundabout way, Shidehara was criticising contemporary Japanese 
diplomacy with respect to the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Next, in April of the same year, Shidehara wrote a paper detailing the 
circumstances surrounding the Japan–Soviet Fisheries Interim Agreement, 
again for practical use by ministry officials as a reference. It was titled: 
‘Shōwa 11-nen 12-gatsu Nisso Gyogyō Zantei Kyōtei Seiritsu nikansuru 
Keii no Ichikyokumen’ (A perspective on the circumstances relating to 
the establishment of the Japan–Soviet Fisheries Interim Agreement in 
December, Shōwa 11 [1936]). Then, in April 1940, Shidehara composed 
another paper, titled ‘Gaikō Bunsho no Buntai, Kisōsha no Kokoroe 
narabini Shoshu no Keishiki’ (Writing style for diplomatic documents, 
important knowledge for drafters, different types of forms). In this text, 
Shidehara drew upon such sources as the teachings he once received from 
Denison on topics such as the diplomacy surrounding the commencement 
of the Russo-Japanese War, and the style rules to follow when writing 
diplomatic documents.28
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World War II
In August 1939 Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed the German–
Soviet Nonaggression Pact. The following month, Germany invaded 
Poland, triggering World War II. Shown to be at the mercy of developments 
in Europe, the Hiranuma cabinet resigned. The subsequent cabinets of 
Abe Nobuyuki and Yonai Mitsumasa were similarly short-lived.
In June 1940, Shidehara wrote an essay in English expressing his thoughts 
on the situation. In this English essay, titled ‘Outlook of the European 
War’, Shidehara considered the influence that World War II would have 
upon the Second Sino-Japanese War, while at the same time attempting to 
take a clear view of the events in Europe. He sent a five-page draft of this 
essay to Makino Nobuaki. However, he later asked Nobuaki to burn this 
draft, because it was based on inaccurate information.29
In ‘Outlook of the European War’, Shidehara asserted that, in order to 
gain an upper hand in the war, Germany could take one of three paths. 
First, Germany could try to pressure the UK and France to surrender on 
the condition that they disarm themselves and dismantle their empires. 
Yet,  Shidehara noted, this approach was unlikely to proceed smoothly. 
It was hard to believe that the UK or France would tolerate foreign 
domination. The British Commonwealth, in particular, was not under 
the influence of the German military. Second, Germany could seek 
a compromise, offering a peace deal that would spare the UK and France 
from complete defeat. Shidehara regarded this option as more feasible 
than the first. In this case, the UK and France would gradually recover 
their strength with the help of the US. Third, Germany could pursue 
the war to the very end. In this scenario, the UK and France would be 
supported by their colonies’ resources and would probably be more able 
than Germany to maintain the strength necessary for victory.
From Shidehara’s perspective, therefore, the general outlook for Germany 
was grim. Its flagrantly illegal actions were unlikely to be forgiven, and 
‘the memory of the tragedy will long stand in the way of a lasting peace in 
Europe’.30 At the end of the essay, Shidehara quoted A. L. Kennedy’s work 
Old Diplomacy and New, 1876–1922, from Salisbury to Lloyd-George, 
concerning Germany and the UK during World War I. Kennedy wrote: 
‘Germany had no scruples; we had some—too few for honor, too many 
for success’.31 Shidehara concluded ‘Outlook of the European War’ with 
the well-known observation: ‘History often repeats itself ’.32 Shidehara 
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wrote this manuscript on 14 June 1940—the very day the German 
army occupied Paris. Hitler’s advance continued unimpeded. Given 
this situation, Shidehara’s prediction that Germany would ultimately 
not prevail was quite insightful. It was the kind of assessment to be 
expected from a man such as Shidehara, whose ideals had been inspired 
by British-style diplomacy.
The Pacific War
Outbreak of War between Japan and the US
The second Konoe cabinet was formed in July 1940. This time, the post 
of foreign minister went to Matsuoka Yōsuke. Under his guidance, Japan 
signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September that year. 
As the above discussion makes clear, Shidehara was critical of Matsuoka’s 
diplomatic efforts and his siding with Germany.
October saw the inauguration of a new organisation of a government-
made national movement known as the Taisei Yokusankai (Imperial Rule 
Assistance Association). While Shidehara was a member of the House of 
Peers, he did not participate. Shidehara was absolutely opposed to the 
idea of Japan going to war with the US.33 Nevertheless, this is not to 
say that he personally did all that he could to prevent the situation from 
heading in that direction. Towards the end of July 1941, the Japanese 
army advanced into the southern part of French Indochina. In response, 
the Roosevelt administration banned all oil exports to Japan. It was then 
that Shidehara had a meeting with Prime Minister Konoe. Shidehara has 
left behind some testimony as to what was discussed during the meeting. 
According to Shidehara:
I did my best to warn Duke Konoe that his diplomatic policy 
was mistaken. Duke Konoe was extremely regretful that Japan had 
already taken such steps as signing the Anti-Comintern Pact and 
the Tripartite Pact.34 
In other words, Shidehara had urged Konoe to reflect seriously on how he 
had contributed to the current crisis.
Following this meeting, Konoe began to mull over a plan: to visit the US 
himself and meet directly with Roosevelt. Such a decisive stance was quite 
rare for Konoe. At the beginning of August, Konoe secretly dispatched 
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Itō  Nobufumi, director-general of the Intelligence Department, to 
Shidehara’s residence in Sendagaya. The intention was to seek out the 
opinion of a third party concerning this plan. However, Shidehara:
Would not easily offer a constructive opinion, simply repeating 
modestly that he had been away from the political world for so 
long that he could not really say what ought to be done.35
In the end, the cabinet collapsed without Konoe ever meeting Roosevelt. 
October 1941 saw the formation of the Tōjō Hideki cabinet, with Tōgō 
Shigenori as foreign minister. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, there 
was a final attempt at negotiations with the US. The proposal was that 
Japan would offer to withdraw its army from southern French Indochina 
on the condition that the embargo on oil exports would be dropped. 
It was Shidehara who initially suggested this approach. He had suggested 
it to Yoshida Shigeru, who then passed it on to Foreign Minister Tōgō, 
who in turn made his own additions. Even at the last minute, Shidehara 
responded to Yoshida’s request in offering advice to Konoe and Kido.36 
In  the end, however, negotiations with the US were abandoned, and 
Japan ultimately launched an attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December.
Kiyosawa Kiyoshi
Even as the Pacific War loomed ever closer, Shidehara did not lose 
his interest in diplomatic history. In fact, through cooperation with 
diplomatic commentator Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, Shidehara began to involve 
himself in diplomatic history research. In June 1941, Kiyosawa published 
a historical overview titled Gaikō-shi (Diplomatic history).37 Kiyosawa 
presented a copy of his book to Shidehara. Shidehara’s letter of thanks is 
fascinating. He wrote:
There are many, even among our own citizens, who need to 
properly grasp the true nature of our government’s politics and 
actions … Your book is extremely valuable for its potential to help 
improve our present situation.38
In other words, it was difficult for insiders and outsiders alike to fully 
appreciate the realities of Japanese diplomacy. Shidehara hoped that 
Kiyosawa’s work could make a significant contribution in this respect 
and thus even assist in addressing the then-unfolding crisis. Shidehara 
lamented the extent to which Japan’s citizens were ignorant of how 
diplomacy actually worked.
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Even after war broke out between Japan and the US in December 1941, 
Shidehara continued to support Kiyosawa’s production of a chronology 
of  Japanese diplomacy. Indeed, if anything, Shidehara was more of 
a scholar than Kiyosawa; he was very strict in noting erroneous entries or 
the omission of important documents. When given a copy of Tōan Kou 
Seiwa (A dialogue by Tōan-kō [Saionji Kinmochi]) by the editor Harada 
Kumao, Shidehara even pointed out a mistake with regard to the Chinese 
name that appeared in the work.39 ‘Tōan’ was a moniker of Saionji 
Kinmochi. Harada had worked as Saionji’s secretary for many years, but 
the elder statesman passed away in November 1940.
Shidehara met with Kiyosawa again at the end of February 1943 to relay 
details on proceedings in the House of Peers. According to Shidehara, 
several members had inquired as to the ‘postwar plan’, but Foreign 
Minister Tani Masayuki of the Tōjō cabinet had simply replied that it 
was under consideration. Aoki Kazuo, the minister for Greater East Asia, 
had reacted furiously, demanding: ‘How can you ask about postwar plans 
when the war is still going on?’40
On 20 November 1944, Kiyosawa visited Shidehara at his home. 
Shidehara brought Kiyosawa up to the second floor, where he had an 
impressive study of over 36 square metres. Shidehara’s study was filled 
with books, including recent publications. Kiyosawa had come to ask 
Shidehara to give an address on the occasion of the inauguration of the 
Japanese Diplomatic History Research Institute. Shidehara willingly 
accepted and even promised to join the institute in an advisory role.
The new institute was inaugurated on 5 December that year. Along 
with Shidehara himself, attendees included such figures as Itō Masanori, 
Ishibashi Tanzan, Tamura Kōsaku, Uehara Etsujirō, Matsumoto Jōji, 
Ashida Hitoshi, Baba Tsunego and Shinobu Junpei. Following welcomes 
by Kiyosawa and Ashida, it was time for Shidehara’s address. Shidehara 
used the opportunity to share some little-known anecdotes regarding 
the Russo-Japanese War and the Washington Naval Conference. Later, 
he would attend regular meetings of the institute, giving him the 
opportunity to go into more detail about his memories of various Japanese 
diplomatic events.
Kiyosawa wrote in his diary that Shidehara ‘was certainly an extremely 
capable diplomat’. Kiyosawa also transcribed the contents of these 
discussions, which he sent to Shidehara. While Kiyosawa also visited 
other diplomatic figures such as Matsui Keishirō, Ishii Kikujirō and 
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Makino Nobuaki, he thought that when it came to powers of recollection, 
‘Shidehara was outstanding’.41 Shidehara gave another address to 
Kiyosawa’s institute on 18 January 1945. However, he was apparently 
dissatisfied with Kiyosawa’s shorthand notetaking. He wanted every 
word and phrase captured, down to the smallest detail. His solution was 
to write the draft for his talk himself and give it to Kiyosawa. According to 
Kiyosawa, Shidehara was:
Very sensitive about [the importance of ] accurate wording, both 
as a diplomat and as a man of law. If I shared a draft with him, he 
would make so many changes that the original text would become 
entirely obliterated.42
Shidehara also published some anecdotes about Denison in a diplomatic 
journal, Gaikō Jihō.43
Arguments for an Early Peace
During this time, around 1943, the war situation began to deteriorate. 
Though now a former diplomat, Yoshida Shigeru made great efforts to 
secure a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Along with Wakatsuki Reijirō, 
Yoshida began to lay a plan to gain Masaki Jinzaburō’s cooperation in 
forming a new cabinet, headed by Kobayashi Seizō. His hope was to 
install Shidehara as foreign minister and ‘entrust him with conducting 
peace talks’.44 Though perhaps not to the extent that Yoshida did, 
Shidehara also contributed to this plan. He spoke with figures such as 
Konoe, Kido, Prince Takamatsu and Prince Higashikuni in an attempt to 
bring them around. The idea was to sue for peace with the UK and the US 
under favourable conditions, while the war situation was still sufficiently 
advantageous. Shidehara held to the idea of suing for an early peace until 
at least August 1943.45
In reality, by this time, there was no real hope for establishing a peace 
agreement. In June 1944, Japan lost the Battle of the Philippine Sea, 
and, the following month, the island of Saipan fell to the Allied forces. 
By  this stage, it was undeniable that Japan was losing. At around this 
time, Shidehara was able to keep up with events via sources such as House 
of Representatives Member Tsurumi Yūsuke. Shidehara also attended, on 
a near-monthly basis, the regular meetings of the Diplomatic Research 
Institute hosted by the Gaikō Jihōsha (Diplomatic Review Company). 
There, he would listen to explanations provided by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and by military officials.46
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In July 1944, a new cabinet was formed under Koiso Kuniaki. 
On the Allied side, meanwhile, October that year saw the issuance of the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposal. This proposal concerned the founding of 
a new international organisation that could replace the League of Nations 
after the war. In response to this development, Vice-Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Sawada Renzō invited Shidehara to his residence in December. Also 
in attendance on that day was temporary ministry employee Takayanagi 
Kenzō, professor at the University of Tokyo. The topic for discussion was 
how to respond to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal. We do not know for 
sure what kind of comments Shidehara made.47 However, we do know 
that Shidehara was sceptical not only of the League of Nations but also of 
its successor, the United Nations. Presumably, had Japan still been at war, 
he would not have supported the proposal.
At this time, Shidehara began to argue to Kiyosawa that ‘attempts at 
reaching a peace deal are completely hopeless and only harmful’. If Japan 
wants peace, he thought, ‘we should create a situation where the other 
side is forced to seek it’.48 As the war situation became increasingly grim, 
Shidehara apparently began to embrace the view that Japan should resist to 
the bitter end. Kiyosawa was unable to comprehend Shidehara’s thinking 
in this regard. Kiyosawa could not foresee how an opportunity for peace 
could ever arise out of stubborn resistance.
Shidehara was also resistant to the plan to end the war put forth by former 
member of the House of Representatives Uehara Etsujirō. Uehara had met 
with figures such as Shidehara, Wakatsuki Reijirō, and Okada Keisuke. 
Okada himself had already given up on the Koiso cabinet. According to 
Uehara, however, Shidehara ‘simply thought that [Japan] ought to resist 
to the very end; [Shidehara] was not thinking about domestic political 
matters at all’.49 Uehara therefore decided to seek out Kiyosawa’s assistance 
in convincing Shidehara.
Another plan to end the war was formulated by seven professors from the 
University of Tokyo Law Department, including Nanbara Shigeru, Takagi 
Yasaka and Tanaka Kōtarō. They had received word of the moderate peace 
policy advanced by Undersecretary of State Grew and other members of 
the State Department. Nanbara and Takagi argued that ‘we should take 
appropriate steps with regard to the war situation, while emphasizing the 
need to protect the national polity’.50 However, Shidehara was similarly 
nonplussed at this idea. Shidehara conversely told Nanbara and his 
associates that a scorched-earth policy was the only option; the citizens of 
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Japan needed to fight until the bitter end. The professors were extremely 
surprised and disappointed by this stance. Responding in such a fashion, 
Shidehara must have seemed particularly lacking in enthusiasm for peace, 
even when compared with Ugaki Kazushige, whom Nanbara and Takaki 
had also spoken with.
In the Great Tokyo Air Raid of 10 March 1945, Shidehara’s one-time 
matchmaker, Ishii Kikujirō, went missing. Shidehara’s residence in 
Sendagaya also burned down. Concerning what was left of the book 
collection bequeathed to him by Denison, Shidehara noted that:
It was destroyed in Shōwa 20 [1945] when my home in Sendagaya 
was hit by bombing. Not a single volume remains. Reflecting back 
upon the past, I am truly filled with deep emotion.51
In April, yet another cabinet was formed. This time the leader was Suzuki 
Kantarō. In the bombing of 26 May, even the headquarters of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs was destroyed, forcing the staff to move to the fourth 
floor of the Ministry of Education.52 In July, Prime Minister Suzuki and 
Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori began to seek a peace accord via Soviet 
mediation. Konoe Fumimaro’s name arose for the role of special envoy to 
the Soviets. The plan was for Konoe to visit the Soviet Union with a special 
letter from the Shōwa emperor. Shidehara was deeply mistrustful of this 
proposal. A letter from the emperor would have no hope of changing 
the course of events. If anything, it would simply bring trouble to the 
imperial household. Naturally, the response from the Soviet Union was 
frosty, and the proposal was abandoned.53
Ministry of Foreign Affairs records that have been made public in recent 
years show that Shidehara’s premonition about the plan was correct. 
According to these records, in mid-July a message was sent from Tokyo 
to Moscow. It ‘effectively’ expressed, ‘in accordance with the will of the 
emperor of Japan, the desire to end the war’.54 The main meaning of 
the emperor’s letter that Konoe was supposed to bring with him had 
apparently reached the Soviet Union regardless. Premier Stalin relayed 
the details of the emperor’s message to the UK and the US during the 
Potsdam Conference. However, thanks to their interception of Japan’s 
radio communication, US president Harry S. Truman and Secretary of 
State James F. Byrnes were already well aware of Japan’s efforts to seek 
peace through mediation with the Soviet Union.
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At the beginning of August, US forces dropped atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Soviet Union also entered the war 
against Japan, advancing into Manchuria and Sakhalin. Japan now had 
no choice but to accept the Potsdam Declaration, through the Shōwa 
emperor’s ‘imperial decision’ or seidan in Japanese.
From Defeat to Recovery
This chapter has traced Japan’s path from the collapse of the Wakatsuki 
cabinet to wartime defeat. Now in political opposition, Shidehara had 
already been effectively forgotten. Probably his only direct participation 
in diplomatic affairs was with the negotiations for the Japan–Soviet 
Fisheries Interim Agreement. That said, his mind remained sharp. This 
was demonstrated by his participation in various roundtable discussions, 
while at the same time assisting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research 
Department with their efforts to compile historical documents. Even 
with respect to his relationship with Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, Shidehara 
remained, if anything, too exact when it came to accounts of events in 
Japanese diplomatic history. Shidehara also displayed some insight when 
formulating his assessment of how World War II was likely to unfold.
However, when it came to the formulation of peace plans, Shidehara did 
not demonstrate the kind of resolute action displayed by Yoshida Shigeru. 
Although he proposed suing for early peace after the Pacific War began, 
the hard realities of the time did not permit such a strategy. What is 
particularly enigmatic is how Shidehara became a proponent of fighting to 
the bitter end once the Pacific War reached its final stages. He had lost his 
ability to understand the situation. There is an undeniable inconsistency 
between this position and his previous call for suing for an early peace.
There are two possible ways of understanding Shidehara’s thinking in this 
regard. The first interpretation is that Shidehara was poor at handling 
a crisis. This interpretation fits with how he reacted to the Manchurian 
Incident as foreign minister. The second interpretation was that Shidehara 
foresaw Japan’s total defeat. Although this theory cannot be proven on the 
basis of historical documents, it is not altogether unlikely. It may be that 
Shidehara anticipated that Japan would be utterly defeated and yet held 
onto the hope that it would subsequently recover.
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Prime Minister of an 
Occupied Nation: The 
Emperor System and the 
New Constitution
The Formation of the Shidehara Cabinet
Accepting Defeat
At noon on 15 August 1945, the Shōwa emperor’s voice was directly 
broadcast to the nation via radio for the very first time.1 Known as the 
Jewel Voice Broadcast, this broadcast informed the citizens of Japan that 
the war had been lost. Today, this broadcast is seen as synonymous with 
the official end of the war. However, it should be remembered, first, 
that the formal, indirect language of the Jewel Voice Broadcast made it 
extremely difficult for ordinary Japanese people to understand what the 
emperor was saying. Many citizens only learned that the war was lost 
from the subsequent explanations in newspaper reports and on the radio. 
Second, the imperial edict was actually promulgated on 14 August, and 
the emperor’s reading of it was also recorded on that day. Thus, the Jewel 
Voice Broadcast on 15 August was merely the occasion when that reading 
was broadcast to the public.
Preceding the Jewel Voice Broadcast was the ‘imperial decision’ of the 
Shōwa emperor. This imperial decision was handed down on two 
occasions. The first occasion was 10 August. It led to the Suzuki Kantarō 
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cabinet contacting the Allies with word of their acceptance of the Potsdam 
Declaration (i.e. that Japan was offering its unconditional surrender). 
However, this offer was made based on the understanding that there 
would be no changes to Japan’s sovereignty and the supreme authority of 
the emperor. Secretary of State Byrnes responded in a somewhat elusive 
manner to this request. The second imperial decision was handed down 
on 14 August. This confirmed the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. 
On that same day, the official imperial edict declaring an end to the 
war was promulgated. The command to cease hostilities was given on 
16  August. On the following day, the Suzuki cabinet was replaced by 
a new cabinet headed by Prince Higashikuni.
On 2 September, on the deck of the USS Missouri, Foreign Minister 
Shigemitsu Mamoru and Chief of Army General Staff Umezu Yoshijirō 
signed the terms of surrender. It is said that the ministers of the 
Higashikuni cabinet ‘had extremely pained expressions’ when learning 
that the word ‘surrender’ appeared in the document.2 As noted above, the 
foreign minister in Prince Higashikuni’s cabinet was Shigemitsu Mamoru. 
He would later be replaced with Yoshida Shigeru. As it happened, the 
Higashikuni cabinet was extremely short-lived. Its members resigned 
at the beginning of October. Such a cabinet, led by a member of the 
imperial household, was formed in order to suppress any resistance to 
surrender from the military. It could not remain in office because the 
General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
(GHQ) demanded far more political democratisation than was expected.
The following cabinet was the Shidehara cabinet. Shidehara asked Yoshida 
Shigeru to continue as foreign minister. In the immediate aftermath of the 
war, Shidehara, Yoshida and the other leaders of the nation faced four 
urgent political tasks. First, there was the issue of how to deal with the 
defeat itself. This was basically the problem of who was responsible for 
the war. Second, there was the issue of what would happen to the Shōwa 
emperor. Although the emperor was understood to have brought about 
peace by issuing an ‘imperial decision’, the very issuing of an ‘imperial 
decision’ connected him to the problem of who was responsible for 
the war in the first place. Third, there was the matter of reforming the 
constitution. Finally, there was the reconstruction of party politics.
Shidehara was deeply involved in each of these tasks. Although he had 
once  helped lay the foundations for an age with his work as foreign 
minister, he had been practically forgotten during the war years. 
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Now, in the unprecedented circumstances of an occupied Japan, he would 
once again be pushed into political life. Following the resignation of the 
Higashikuni cabinet, Shidehara became the prime minister of Japan in 
the early period of occupation. How did Shidehara deal with questions 
that arose in the aftermath of Japan’s defeat? Further, what role did he 
have to play in the construction of the postwar political system?
In this chapter I shall seek to shed light on these topics. Beginning with the 
formation of the Shidehara cabinet, I will proceed to examine Shidehara’s 
involvement in the Investigation Committee for the Greater East Asia 
War, his relationship with the Shōwa emperor, his contribution to the 
creation of a new constitution and his participation in party politics.3
Forming the Cabinet
On the morning of 15 August 1945, Shidehara departed for a social 
gathering at the Japan Club. It was there that he would hear the Jewel 
Voice Broadcast. ‘The unconditional surrender of the imperial army 
was of the greatest regret. Upon hearing the emperor’s voice announcing 
the imperial rescript on the radio, my tears flowed quite involuntarily.’ 
Shidehara found he could hardly remain at the club following such 
momentous news. Instead, under the blazing sun, he hurried home, 
and there he stayed. Shidehara wrote a letter to his close friend Ōdaira 
Komatsuchi, former vice-president of the South Manchuria Railway 
Company. With ‘the whole country banding firmly together’, Shidehara 
wrote, ‘I believe that within a short time, we may enhance the glory of the 
nation to a point beyond that of the prewar era’.4
For Shidehara, Japan’s defeat did not necessarily mean a complete loss of 
confidence. He saw that it could actually be an opportunity for rebirth. 
Indeed, this was certainly the case for Shidehara personally. Japan’s prime 
minister during the period of occupation could not be somebody who 
was at risk of being accused of complicity in the war. As he had once 
been so active on the world stage, Shidehara quickly rose to the top of the 
potential candidates for the role. In truth, had the Pacific War not broken 
out, he would have been forgotten as simply a diplomat who had been 
unpopular with the citizenry. Yet the war, and Japan’s eventual defeat, 
would instead offer him an abrupt reversal of fortunes.
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Directly after the end of the war, Shidehara wrote a paper titled ‘Shūsen 
Zengosaku’ (Postwar remedial measures). In it, Shidehara recommended 
that Japan work to build relationships of trust with the Allied nations. 
It would need to remember its defeat yet look towards the future. With 
effort, Japan could secure an advantageous position in the international 
order. To this end, it was also important that the government properly 
investigate the causes of the defeat and make its findings public. Shidehara 
proceeded to offer four reasons for why Japan had lost the war: the 
conflation of state affairs and supreme command, insufficient research 
in the natural sciences, the termination of military production due to air 
raids and the destructive force of the atomic bombs. Shidehara would 
provide a copy of ‘Shūsen Zengosaku’ to Foreign Minister Yoshida in the 
Higashikuni cabinet in October 1945.5
It might be asked, however, why Shidehara prepared this paper. In fact, we 
know that by the end of the Pacific War, government figures such as former 
home affairs officials Tsugita Daisaburō and Nagaoka Ryūichirō had 
already asked Shidehara to put himself forward as a candidate for prime 
minister. Shidehara’s writing of ‘Shūsen Zengosaku’ was not unrelated to 
his possible return to politics.6 Shidehara knew it was possible that he 
might become the next leader of Japan.
Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido Kōichi had raised the possibility 
of Foreign Minister Yoshida succeeding Prince Higashikuni as prime 
minister. However, Yoshida thought Shidehara was more appropriate for 
the job. To discuss the matter further, Kido met with Prince Higashikuni, 
Konoe Fumimaro and Chairman of the Privy Council Hiranuma 
Kiichirō. They concluded that Shidehara was the top candidate, followed 
by Yoshida. Their criteria were that the candidate needed to be ‘somebody 
without ill feelings towards the US, who was free of any doubt as to 
their responsibility for the war, and who was well versed in matters of 
diplomacy’.7 When Yoshida thereafter obtained the informal agreement 
of Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 
Yoshida asked Shidehara to be appointed as prime minister. However, 
Shidehara himself was not easily persuaded to accept this responsibility.
On 6 October, Shidehara had an audience with the Shōwa emperor. When 
the emperor sought to draw Shidehara out on the topic of becoming 
prime minister, he refused to accept the implicit offer, saying, ‘I do not 
believe I am capable’.8 Shidehara was already 73 years old and had spent 
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10 years in political opposition. Further, even when serving as a diplomat, 
he had sought to keep his distance from domestic politics. Yet, Shidehara 
recollects, he then:
Observed just how much [this answer] pained [the emperor]. 
Things had already gotten to this stage, so [I] could hardly bear 
to cause the emperor further worry. I therefore swore to myself 
that I would do whatever I could, even at the cost of my own life. 
Then I responded: ‘[I] am lacking in confidence that I can handle 
this important responsibility. However, let me do everything in 
my power to honor your will.’ I then withdrew from his presence.9
Although Shidehara may not have been filled with confidence, it should 
be remembered that only less than two months had gone by since the 
war ended in ruinous defeat. Surely there was not a soul who could have 
confidently assumed responsibility for the nation in such circumstances. 
The emperor also understood this. After all, even Yoshida, who was known 
for his daring, hesitated to agree to become prime minister during such 
unprecedented difficulties. Shidehara fortified his will and eventually 
issued his reply to the throne: ‘I will devote all of my strength to do what 
is necessary’.10 Ultimately, Kido’s cooperation with the emperor ensured 
that Shidehara was unable to decline the offer. Kido himself believed that 
‘there was nobody else we could turn to … it is best if we have the emperor 
himself thoroughly bring him around’.11 The key cabinet ministers were 
thus selected: Shidehara, Yoshida and Tsugita. Yoshida remained foreign 
minister, while Tsugita became the chief cabinet secretary. 
On 9 October, the Shidehara cabinet was at last officially sworn 
in. As  newspaper reporters surrounded Shidehara, one blurted out: 
‘So, Mr. Shidehara, it turns out you were still alive, huh?’12 It is also worth 
pointing out that to this day, Shidehara and Suzuki Kantarō remain the 
only prime ministers of Japan who were originally from Osaka.
Given Shidehara’s background, it would not have been unnatural for the 
positions in his cabinet to be filled with individuals affiliated with the 
old Minseitō party. And, indeed, there were Minseitō-affiliated ministers 
in the cabinet beyond Tsugita. For example, there was the agriculture 
minister, Matsumura Kenzō; the transport minister, Tanaka Takeo; and 
the minister for commerce and industry, Ogasawara Sankurō. However, 
Ashida Hitoshi, the health and welfare minister, was originally a member 
of the old Seiyūkai party. Yoshida Shigeru, who continued as foreign 
minister under Shidehara, had also once served as vice-minister for foreign 
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affairs in the Seiyūkai party cabinet of Tanaka Giichi. From Shidehara’s 
perspective, Yoshida was more of a collateral than a mainstream member of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, during his time in political 
opposition, Shidehara had strengthened his relationship with Yoshida.
While Home Minister Horikiri Zenjirō was once an official at the Ministry 
of Home Affairs, he did not have strong party affiliations. With Shidehara’s 
permission, he proceeded to work on revising the electoral laws, a task that 
included the incorporation of women’s suffrage. Meanwhile, the chief of 
the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Narahashi Wataru, was an international 
lawyer who had studied in France. Minister of State Matsumoto Jōji was 
a scholar of commercial law but had previously served as the minister of 
commerce and industry in the Saitō Makoto cabinet. Finance Minister 
Shibusawa Keizō had been the governor of the Bank of Japan. Justice 
Minister Iwata Chūzō and Education Minister Maeda Tamon remained 
in their positions from the earlier Higashikuni cabinet.13 Meanwhile, 
War Minister Shimomura Sadamu and Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa 
remained in their posts at the request of the emperor.
In a letter to Makino, Yoshida wrote that ‘the staffing of the cabinet has 
generally been going smoothly’.14 Certainly, this was a cabinet staffed 
primarily on the basis of ability. Former Ministry of Home Affairs official 
Izawa Takio also used his behind the scenes influence to assist with the 
selection of cabinet personnel. As mentioned earlier, Shidehara and Izawa 
had been classmates at the Osaka Third Higher Middle School. However, 
Tsugita, Matsumura, Tanaka, Horikiri and Maeda were eventually forced 
out of the cabinet when they were purged from public office.
Meeting with MacArthur: ‘Japanese-Style 
Democracy’
As soon as Shidehara became prime minister, the GHQ commissioned 
a  report on him for their own purposes. The beginning of this report 
features a quote from former ambassador Grew’s published diary, 
Ten  Years  in Japan. There were also references to a book by Moore, 
a former Ministry of Foreign Affairs adviser, titled With Japan’s Leaders. 
The GHQ report referred to Shidehara as ‘one of the old school of 
Japanese diplomats, a  man of integrity as well as caution’. The report 
also contains some details from an interrogation of Tokuda Kyūichi, 
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the leader of Japan’s Communist Party. Tokuda had stated: ‘Because of 
his weak nature, SHIDEHARA has the tendency to yield to any strong 
demand of the zaibatsu or even the military clique’.15
Viewed from another perspective, there was little information here that 
was of significance for the occupying army. Even MacArthur, upon hearing 
that Shidehara had been informally picked for prime minister, reportedly 
remarked to Foreign Minister Yoshida: ‘Damn, he’s old … Can he speak 
English?’ Yoshida, who had himself put Shidehara forward as a candidate, 
lamented this sorry state of affairs: ‘Here is Mr. Shidehara, a master of 
English, as anybody who knows him would attest, and yet the general 
thinks it necessary to even ask, “Can he speak English?”’16 In Washington, 
President Truman was also struggling to size up Shidehara. He had to 
turn to former ambassador Forbes to get a sense of this man. Forbes told 
Truman that he regarded Shidehara to be ‘a close personal friend of mine’ 
and that he ‘had the highest opinion of him’. Truman responded by saying 
that he was ‘extremely glad to know that’.17 Although Forbes’s relationship 
with Shidehara had been strained by the Manchurian Incident, Forbes 
had not forgotten him.
As the new prime minister of Japan, Shidehara faced the vital task of 
building a relationship with MacArthur. Just after the new cabinet was 
formed on 11 October, Shidehara visited the general. MacArthur had no 
time for pleasantries and sought to get down to business immediately. 
He asked Shidehara to carry out five reforms, now known in Japanese as 
the Five Great Reforms: women’s suffrage, the encouragement of labour 
unions, liberal-style education, the abolition of secret trials and the 
democratisation of the economic system.
To these requests for democratisation, Shidehara responded without 
hesitation. He noted that the cabinet had already begun work on matters 
such as women’s suffrage and that, as Japan already had ‘democratic 
trends’ before the war, it would not be difficult to move in that direction 
once again. Shidehara asserted that what Japan required was not US-style 
democracy but rather ‘the development of a Japanese-style “democracy”’ 
more suitable to the nation’s own circumstances. ‘Quite so’, responded 
MacArthur.18 This suggests that Shidehara had a positive impression of 
MacArthur, believing that he would be easy to deal with. From Shidehara’s 
perspective, meanwhile, MacArthur’s requests were already incorporated 
into the policy planning of his cabinet. There was, however, a pitfall to 
this way of thinking: Shidehara lacked sufficient awareness of GHQ’s 
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request for constitutional revision. In other words, MacArthur saw a new 
constitution as a prerequisite for his desired reforms. On the other hand, 
Shidehara had not acknowledged that a radical revision of the constitution 
was essential.
Although the Shidehara cabinet met on 12 October and discussed 
MacArthur’s requested Five Great Reforms, Shidehara still did not 
seriously consider constitutional revision.19 Of course, it is worth pointing 
out that these were the early days of Japan’s occupation, and innumerable 
tasks faced the country.
What, then, was the basic policy direction pursued by the Shidehara 
cabinet? Shidehara gave a speech on his administrative policy before the 
House of Representatives on 28 November. In this speech, Shidehara 
listed a number of specific policies to be pursued. Beginning with the 
revision of the electoral law, these policies addressed issues such as 
educational reform, freedom of expression, stability of the lives of the 
citizens, farmland reform, support for demobilised soldiers, restoration of 
regions damaged by war, improvement of land and sea transportation, and 
an investigation into the causes of the defeat.20 Of these, the investigation 
of the defeat would link directly to questions of who was responsible for 
the war to begin with. It also had the potential to touch upon the emperor 
system itself. Thus, this task required both prudence and speed.
The Survey Association of Greater East 
Asia War
At this time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was discreetly establishing 
a  board for researching problems relating to the peace conditions. 
The aim was to conduct preliminary research on the implications of the 
signing of the peace treaty. The chief secretary of the board was Sugihara 
Arata, director-general of the Treaties and Conventions Bureau, while 
secretaries were selected from among the director-ranked staff of the 
various bureaus.21
That said, the finalisation of the peace process was still a long way off. 
The first challenge that the Shidehara cabinet faced was what lessons to 
take away from the defeat, and what changes would need to be made in 
the way the nation was run. One particularly difficult topic was that of 
responsibility for the war. On 30 October 1945, the Shidehara cabinet 
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decided to create a new survey association specifically for the purpose of 
investigating the causes of the defeat. Towards the end of November, the 
government proclaimed the establishment of the Dai Tōa Sensō Chōsa-kai 
(Survey Association of Greater East Asia War).22
Aoki Tokuzō was selected as the secretary-general of the association. 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Tsugita had sounded out Aoki on assuming this 
position. Previously, Aoki had served as a Ministry of Finance official 
affiliated with the old Minseitō party. The more difficult problem was 
who to appoint as president. Through Yoshida, Shidehara asked Makino 
Nobuaki if he would accept the responsibility. However, Makino firmly 
declined. Shidehara then sought out former prime minister Wakatsuki 
Reijirō. However, Wakatsuki also refused. In January 1946, the Dai 
Tōa Sensō Chōsa-kai was renamed the Sensō Chōsa-kai (War Research 
Institute). Even by this time, no one willing to act as president had 
been found. In  the end, Shidehara had to take on the role himself. 
The institute’s first general meeting was held on 27 March.
To start the meeting, Shidehara gave an address in his role as committee 
president, stating: ‘The purpose of this institute is to clarify the causes 
behind, and facts relating to, the defeat in the war’. He added: ‘Our mission 
is not that of investigating war criminals and holding them to account’.23 
Shidehara also emphasised the significance of Article 9 contained in the 
draft for the new constitution. Aoki, who had written the original outline 
for Shidehara’s address, noted that ‘Mr. Shidehara had completely reworded 
what I had written’.24 There were 20 members of the Sensō Chōsa-kai, 
including the president of the Yomiuri Newspaper Company, Baba Tsunego. 
There were a further 18 provisional members of vice-ministerial level from 
the various government ministries. The Sensō Chōsa-kai consisted of 
a total of five subcommittees. The first of these was tasked with inquiring 
into political and diplomatic matters. The other four subcommittees were 
charged with considering the respective topics of military affairs, finance 
and economy, ideology, and science and technology.
The committee’s second general meeting was held on 4 April 1946. 
Shidehara served as the chairman. On this occasion, Shidehara also stated 
that the ‘problem of wartime responsibility’ was not ‘the main object of this 
institute’. On the contrary, Shidehara hoped that an inquiry into the facts 
and their relations, and the relaying of these details to the broader public, 
could ‘help bring about an end to the fantasies that some individuals held 
about wars of this nature’.25
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However, at this point, unexpected interference emerged. In a July 
meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, the Soviet Union criticised the 
Sensō Chōsa-kai for its inclusion of former military personnel. The Allied 
Council for Japan was an advisory body to the Supreme Commander for 
the Allied Powers, which had been established in Tokyo. The need for such 
an advisory body had been agreed upon in November of the previous year, 
during a foreign ministers’ conference in Moscow. Although Shidehara 
objected to the Soviets’ denunciation, the institute was abolished at the 
end of September 1946.26
These developments have been criticised for trivialising the pursuit 
of wartime responsibility.27 Certainly, the investigation of who had 
responsibility for the war may well have been insufficient. Nevertheless, 
Shidehara had an uncommonly strong will, as demonstrated in the 
following correspondence that Shidehara had sent to Makino:
The work of the Dai Tōa Sensō Chōsa-kai will serve to provide 
lessons of the greatest importance for ages to come, to ensure 
that the citizens of our nation do not repeat the mistakes of the 
past. This is why, as a matter of the greatest importance, I have 
disturbed you in particular with respect to the role of president of 
this committee, and why I earnestly await your instruction as to 
the general policies the committee should adopt.28
In other words, Shidehara, through Yoshida, had urged Makino to 
reconsider his refusal to accept the position of president. Shidehara also 
did not simply look on as the Sensō Chōsa-kai was abolished. Even after 
Shidehara left the office of prime minister on 22 April, he continued to 
show passion for preparing Japan for the future by thoroughly assessing 
the events of the past. Later, on 30 May, during the Yoshida cabinet, 
Shidehara met with Ashida and asked that he take on the role of vice-
president of the Sensō Chōsa-kai before it was abolished. Ashida accepted 
this offer on 7 June.29
Once it was decided to disband the Sensō Chōsa-kai, Shidehara drafted 
a revised ‘plan for a civil research organization’ and requested that the 
provisional committee members ‘continue to cooperate’.30 Shidehara’s 
plan was for the work of the original committee to continue through 
the creation of an incorporated foundation. However, the GHQ would 
not allow it. At this point, Shidehara personally entrusted the matter to 
Aoki Tokuzō.
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Aoki proceeded to write a meticulous outline of the sequence of events 
leading up to the commencement of war with the US, taking the London 
Naval Conference on Disarmament as the starting point. Of course, Aoki 
made use of the historical documents that had thus far been collected 
by the Sensō Chōsa-kai. This was how Aoki came to write the six-
volume series Taiheiyō Sensō Zenshi (The prehistory of the Pacific War). 
This work omitted all subjective evaluation. It resembles a collection of 
historical material, just as Shidehara would presumably have intended 
for such an endeavour. In fact, Shidehara provided the foreword for this 
series, including the following line: ‘I believe [this work] is sufficient for 
[the purposes of ] convincing future generations of citizens, and for calling 
upon them to reflect’.31
It should be noted, however, that Shidehara’s activity of determining the 
causes of the war was very much official in nature. Thus, these actions 
do not reveal what Shidehara thought as an individual about the issue of 
wartime responsibility. As it happens, Shidehara expressed his personal 
thinking on the subject after an unexpected event: the suicide of Konoe 
on 16 December 1945. Following Konoe’s death, there were moves 
towards having his biography written. Shidehara was asked to formally 
initiate such an undertaking. However, he was unwilling to comply. 
His  reasoning was that ‘responsibility for causing the Pacific War lay 
above all with individuals like Duke Konoe and Lord Kido’.32
How would Shidehara have dealt with the military? Let us go back in time 
a few months to mention one more matter from this initial period of the 
Shidehara cabinet. At the end of November 1945, the cabinet decided 
to abolish the War Ministry and the Navy Ministry. To replace them in 
overseeing the ongoing demobilisation, on 1 December, the cabinet further 
established the Daiichi Fukuin-sho (First Demobilization Ministry) and 
the Daini Fukuin-sho (Second Demobilization Ministry).33 Shidehara 
himself took the responsibility of heading both of these ministries.
Shidehara observed that many of the survivors of the conflict ‘had 
tasted the sorrow of disillusionment’ upon returning to see their war-
torn homeland. To this end, rather than merely discussing how to help 
the returnees with the Ministry of Health and Welfare or the Ministry 
of Justice, Shidehara made a plea on the radio for ‘heartfelt solidarity 
between those returning and those who remained’.34
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The Shōwa Emperor
Amid Criticisms of the Emperor System
When the Shidehara cabinet was formed at the beginning of October 
1945, the GHQ ordered the Japanese government to release its political 
prisoners. This meant that the Japanese Communist Party was able to 
publicly resume its activities. Tokuda Kyūichi and other leaders of the 
Communist Party were particularly critical of the emperor system. 
The  cabinet minister who reacted most strongly to the communists’ 
criticisms of the emperor system was Narahashi Wataru, chief of the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau. In a cabinet meeting, Narahashi proposed 
responding to the communists. Although Yoshida voiced his disagreement, 
Shidehara consented to the idea. Narahashi thereafter personally criticised 
the Communist Party on NHK Radio and argued for the continuation 
of the emperor system.35
Of course, it was not only the Japanese Communist Party that criticised 
the emperor system. In China and the US, much of the public regarded the 
Shōwa emperor himself as a war criminal. It was in this context that the US 
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee reached out to MacArthur to 
seek his opinion on the matter. MacArthur responded that if the emperor 
were accused, it would lead to a chaotic situation for the occupation, and 
a million soldiers would be needed to maintain order. In other words, 
MacArthur responded to Washington by paradoxically stressing the 
usefulness of the emperor.36
Shidehara himself also worked to help preserve the emperor system. 
He began such efforts even before becoming prime minister. Shidehara 
anticipated that the emperor would eventually have the opportunity to 
speak with reporters from the New York Times on the matter. Therefore, 
towards the end of September 1945, he set about writing a draft in English 
for the emperor to utilise on such an occasion. In this draft, Shidehara 
noted that the imperial edict issued by the Tōjō cabinet announcing the 
war included the statement that specifics of wartime strategy ‘should 
be left to the decision of the commander-in-chief of these forces’.37 
In  other words,  Shidehara was careful that the emperor not mention 
Tōjō specifically.
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Taking this draft of answers into consideration, the emperor met with 
US reporters on 25 September. The press conference with the emperor 
proceeded much as Shidehara had anticipated. Nevertheless, the manner 
in which the New York Times reported on the emperor’s response made 
it sound as though he was attempting to shift blame on to Tōjō. On this 
topic, a standard interpretation is that the summary of the meeting drafted 
by the newspaper was incorrect.38
However, the documentary records from the emperor’s meeting with 
Frank Kluckhohn, reporter for the New York Times, state: ‘His Majesty 
had no intention to have the war rescript used as General Tōjō used it’.39 
If we take into account the contents of Kido’s diary, we can infer another 
possibility: that the emperor himself told the reporter that it had been 
‘heartbreaking’ to issue to Tōjō the imperial rescript for commencing 
the war. If that were the case, then it would mean that the emperor’s 
statement went further than what Shidehara prepared for him. This is 
what the New York Times had suggested. Further, the article also appeared 
on the 29 September front page of the Asahi Shimbun. Upon seeing this, 
Shidehara could not help but be ‘pained’ at the ‘audaciousness of the 
questioning’.40
The first meeting between the emperor and MacArthur was held on 
27  September. Almost all of what was said is known, as the historical 
records were recently made public. According to those meeting records, 
the emperor told MacArthur: ‘With respect to the war, I myself wished to 
the fullest extent to avoid it. When I saw that the war would nevertheless 
take place, I felt the greatest regret’.41 Although the emperor did not 
mention Tōjō, his use of the expression ‘regret’ could be tied to theories 
of his responsibility for the war.
Exactly how Shidehara learned of the specifics of this first meeting 
is unclear. However, he was the type to go into the smallest details. 
Of the 11 meetings that eventually took place between the emperor and 
MacArthur, Shidehara received fairly accurate reports on at least some of 
them. Presumably, he received much of this information from contacts 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the case of this first meeting, the 
emperor’s statement that he felt ‘regret’ must have been cause for great 
concern for Shidehara, who viewed the wording as ‘imprudent’.42
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At around this time, the Treaties and Conventions Bureau at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs had begun to examine questions of the emperor’s 
responsibility for the war from the perspective of the Meiji Constitution. 
According to the bureau, responsibility for beginning the war ‘should be 
borne by the government, which was responsible for advising the emperor, 
and not by the emperor himself ’.43 On 5 November 1945, the Shidehara 
cabinet reached a decision on the problem of war responsibility. This 
cabinet decision stressed that the emperor was exempt from responsibility. 
More specifically, it stated that the emperor ‘sought a peaceful settlement 
when it came to negotiations with the U.S.’. However, ‘with respect to 
matters such as the decision to go to war and the carrying out of war 
strategy, he had no choice but to follow certain conventions established 
within the constitution’.44
On the surface, this may appear to be an example of the typical justification 
given by the Japanese side. In reality, the wishes of the GHQ were surely 
also at play here to some degree. After all, MacArthur had a positive 
attitude towards the emperor and fretted over the condemnation of him 
from the US public and the Soviets. Further, reports on MacArthur’s 
disposition were relayed from Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, who 
was a close adviser to MacArthur, to Chief Cabinet Secretary Tsugita via 
former army lieutenant general Haraguchi Hatsutarō.45
Declaration of Humanity
On New Year’s Day 1946, an imperial rescript was promulgated that 
denied the Shōwa emperor’s divinity. This was known as the ‘Declaration 
of Humanity’. However, aside from the imperial oath consisting of five 
articles at the beginning, the Declaration of Humanity was not conceived 
by the emperor himself. Here, too, Prime Minister Shidehara played 
a role. However, the primary leader of this undertaking is understood to 
have been Lieutenant Colonel H. G. Henderson, adviser to the GHQ 
Civil Information and Educational Section. There are also those who 
emphasise the guidance of Yamanashi Katsunoshin. Previously an admiral 
in the navy, Yamanashi had become president of Gakushūin.46
The Yamanashi Katsunoshin documents held at Gakushūin include an 
English-language draft of the Declaration of Humanity. In the margins 
of the draft, the following names are written: ‘Dyke, Henderson, 
Blyth, Yamanashi’. The draft was written on 15–20 December 1945. 
Here, the names ‘Dyke’ and ‘Blyth’ refer to Ken R. Dyke, chief of the 
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Civil Information and Educational Section, and R. H. Blyth, a teacher 
at Gakushūin. Notes written on the Yamanashi document also state 
the following:
A (written by Blyth) → minister of the imperial household → 
emperor → minister of the imperial household → vice-minister, 
Asano → (Foreign Minister Yoshida → prime minister → 
Foreign Minister Yoshida) → vice-minister → Asano → Mr. B → 
Henderson + Dyke → M’Arth.
Approval of M’Arth → Mr. B → Asano → minister of the 
imperial household, vice-minister → emperor → prime minister 
→ Cabinet council etc. → Proclamation.47
To clarify, what it states is that the English-language draft was given to the 
Japanese side by Blyth. It then passed through the hands of individuals 
such as Minister of the Imperial Household Ishiwata Sōtarō, Vice-
Minister of the Imperial Household Ōgane Masujirō and Gakushūin 
administrative official Asano Nagamitsu, before eventually reaching 
Prime Minister Shidehara. The Yamanashi document notes also feature 
the statement: ‘This draft has been shown beforehand to Dyke-M’ck, in 
order to receive their input’.48 Of course, the names ‘M’Arth’ and ‘M’ck’ 
in these notes refer to MacArthur. In summary, although the proposal 
for the Declaration of Humanity originated on the GHQ side, its actual 
contents were a joint effort between the Japanese and US sides. Naturally, 
this joint effort included Shidehara.
On 25 December, as hunger and bitter cold swept over the ruins of 
Tokyo, Shidehara continued to work on the English-language draft of 
the Declaration of Humanity at the Prime Minister’s Office. For this task 
he had the consent of the GHQ, as well as the approval of the emperor, 
received via Maeda, the minister for education. As it happens, Kinoshita 
Michio, the deputy grand chamberlain, was critical of Shidehara’s draft. 
Specifically, he was resistant to a document such as this that denied the 
emperor’s divinity. Yet, Shidehara fought this opposition. ‘To change the 
meaning of the text now that it has been shown to MacArthur’, Shidehara 
stated, ‘would trespass against the faith [he has put in us]’.49 Shidehara 
collapsed the following morning with acute pneumonia, due to his 
exhausting workload. He was eventually confined to bed to recover. Upon 
learning about Shidehara’s illness, MacArthur personally ensured that he 
received a special delivery of penicillin.
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Thus, on New Year’s Day 1946, the morning editions of the nation’s 
newspapers published the imperial rescript, which began: ‘We are together 
with thee, the citizens’. It would later become known as the Declaration of 
Humanity. These morning editions also displayed unprecedented pictures 
of the emperor wearing a regular suit. The public had never seen him 
shown in such a manner before. At this time, Shidehara issued his own 
comment as prime minister: ‘Carrying out the will of our lord’s imperial 
command, we will build a new nation that is permeated with the ideals of 
democracy, pacifism, and rationalism’.50 Of course, what Shidehara meant 
by ‘democracy’ was something different from the Western-style concept. 
For Shidehara, Japanese democracy was to be developed on the basis the 
emperor’s five-article imperial oath.
Some at the time were aware of Shidehara’s involvement in the emperor’s 
Declaration of Humanity.51 The Shōwa emperor himself acknowledged 
this in the late 1970s, when he made the following public statement:
The first goal of that declaration was the imperial oath. The 
matter of divinity [its rejection] was actually a secondary matter 
… I think it was very necessary at that time to point out that 
democracy was not an import from outside … I also spoke with 
Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō. When the prime minister 
showed [the draft] to Supreme Commander MacArthur of the 
GHQ, he responded very positively, praising it for ‘being excellent 
beyond expectations,’ and was strongly in favor of the whole text 
being published. Hence it was decided to release the entire text.52
Although the emperor claimed that the rejection of his divinity was 
‘a secondary matter’, this interpretation differs from Shidehara’s intention. 
I note that Shidehara had also suggested to the emperor that he consider 
conducting an imperial tour of the nation and bestow funds from the 
imperial household finances to the people.53
There are other details that help to paint a picture of Shidehara’s 
perception of the imperial household. At that time Japan was suffering 
from food shortages. Shidehara told Finance Minister Shibusawa: ‘Japan 
has run out of food. If we do not ask the U.S. for food aid, then Japanese 
people will starve to death’. Casting about for ideas, Shibusawa even urged 
Shidehara: ‘Please send the crown prince to study in the U.S.’. Shibusawa 
worried that the US might not send enough food unless Japan signalled 
its obedience by sending its crown prince there as a hostage, so to speak. 
This gives us some idea of just how concerned he was about the situation. 
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Shidehara declined Shibusawa’s request on the spot: ‘I cannot present 
such a discourteous request to His Majesty’.54 At a loss as to what should 
be done, Shibusawa could only weep.
Establishing the New Constitution
The Constitutional Problems Investigation 
Committee
Another ordeal awaited the Shidehara cabinet after the Declaration of 
Humanity. This was the mass purging of individuals from public office on 
4 January 1946. Five ministers from the Shidehara cabinet were among 
those purged that day. Furious, Shidehara summoned Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Tsugita to his sickbed and began to fiercely criticise MacArthur:
That bastard Mac, to give such a ridiculous order … I simply 
cannot agree to this. I cannot execute such orders. I am unable to 
force out my cabinet ministers who have worked with me up until 
today, so I am determined instead to trigger a mass resignation of 
the cabinet. Please tell the ministers of my decision and gather all 
their letters of resignation.55
In sum, Shidehara informed Tsugita that he had decided that the cabinet 
should resign en masse. However, he tearfully retracted this decision after 
strenuous persuasion by Matsumura, the minister for agriculture.
Hence the Shidehara cabinet was instead reshuffled. Along with Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Tsugita and Agriculture Minister Matsumura, the five 
ministers forced to resign included Home Minister Horikiri, Education 
Minister Maeda and Transport Minister Tanaka. Their respective positions 
were filled by Narahashi Wataru, Soejima Senpachi, Micchi Chūzō, Abe 
Yoshishige and Murakami Yoshikazu. As Narahashi took on the role of 
chief cabinet secretary, the now-vacated chief of the Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau was in turn filled by Ishiguro Takeshige. The GHQ Government 
Section was critical of this reshuffle.56
The most serious point of contention during the cabinet reshuffle was 
that of constitutional reform. In truth, Shidehara was not enthusiastic 
about the proposition. When Shidehara originally formed his cabinet 
at the beginning of October 1945, he had expressed the opinion that 
constitutional reform ought to be carried out ‘extremely passively, with 
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changes made [only] as specific needs arose’.57 Nevertheless, he also felt 
that if the US demanded constitutional reform, it would be difficult to 
resist. On 13 October of that same year, the cabinet decided to establish 
the Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee. The  committee 
chairman was State Minister Matsumoto Jōji. The committee members 
included scholars such as Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Chief of the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau Narahashi, Cabinet Legislation Bureau First 
Department Director Irie Toshio and Second Department Director 
Satō Tatsuo.58
That said, Shidehara’s intention was to examine whether constitutional 
reform was even required. His establishment of this committee did 
not mean he had committed to a course of reform. Although the 
Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee convened at the 
meeting room of the prime minister’s official residence, there is practically 
no evidence that Shidehara actually offered the committee any guidance. 
Indeed, the committee itself was entirely unofficial. Moreover, Shidehara 
was at a loss when it came to dealing with Konoe Fumimaro, who pushed 
for constitutional reform from outside of the cabinet.59
Another occasion when Shidehara revealed his perspective on 
constitutional matters was his address to the House of Representatives on 
28 November 1945. To a question from Saitō Takao, Shidehara responded 
that it was still premature to speak of reforming the constitution. As he 
stated: ‘The articles of the imperial constitution are highly flexible and do 
not obstruct the development of democracy’. At the same time, Shidehara 
noted that while the Meiji Constitution could operate in a flexible manner, 
it might also need some revisions to ‘put an end to long-running concerns 
over its abuse’.60 Shidehara’s thinking on the matter was two-tiered, as 
it were. Therefore, while the kind of constitutional reform Shidehara 
had in mind was not comprehensive, he did not think to stand by idly. 
From the outside, he may have appeared to be merely indecisive. George 
Sansom, an old acquaintance who was visiting Japan at this time, wrote 
that Shidehara:
Is old and tired … [He] had no experience in domestic politics 
… [and] was interested more in the past than the future … 
[He was] a melancholy figure certainly unfit to lead his country in 
a desperate crisis.61
Sansom was then serving as the British representative to the Far Eastern 
Advisory Commission.
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The Origin of Article 9
One of the problems that arises when considering the history of this period 
is the origin of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. This is the famous 
article that prevents Japan from participating in wars. Although some 
have theorised that MacArthur proposed Article 9, MacArthur himself 
stated that the article was based upon a proposal from Prime Minister 
Shidehara. It has been said that MacArthur and Shidehara had a debate 
over this article during a meeting between the two on 24 January 1946. 
Shidehara had returned to his duties following his recovery only three 
days earlier. According to his close friend Ōdaira Komatsuchi, Shidehara 
had initially visited MacArthur to thank him for the penicillin he had 
received. However, recalls Ōdaira, Shidehara also used the opportunity to 
‘tell MacArthur that he wanted to maintain the emperor system, no matter 
what, and wanted to know if he would receive MacArthur’s cooperation 
in that respect’. MacArthur responded by ‘promising that he wanted to 
cooperate as much as possible, which was a great relief for Shidehara’.62
Shidehara also reportedly:
Began to talk about how, for some time, he had thought that in 
order for the world to give up on military force, in order for that 
ideal to be realized, and for the world as a whole to stop engaging 
in war, the only way would be [for nations] to renounce the right 
to wage war. As it happened, MacArthur suddenly stood up and 
grasped Shidehara’s hand with both of his hands and expressed his 
heartfelt agreement with tears in his eyes, such that Shidehara was 
quite surprised for a moment.63
For the most part, both Shidehara and MacArthur placed the highest 
importance upon the continuation of the emperor system. ‘Clearly 
announcing to the world’ that Japan renounced the waging of war has 
hence been understood by commentators as a method for achieving this 
end. In other words, it was necessary to renounce war in order to placate 
international opinion, which had thus far been critical of the emperor 
system. It must be added that, at this point, the Japanese side had just 
begun to prepare a draft of the revised constitution. They had no way of 
foreseeing that the GHQ would produce its own draft. Further, Shidehara’s 
talk of renouncing war had, at that stage, been only an expression of ideals. 
It is hard to imagine Shidehara proposing that such an article be included 
in the constitution. Yet, this is just what MacArthur would soon work 
towards having incorporated into the draft.
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
270
At any rate, it is important to clarify the context within which Shidehara 
mentioned the renunciation of war. Fortunately, some details on this 
matter appear in the unearthed correspondence of Shiratori Toshio. The 
former diplomat Shiratori had been arrested and detained in Sugamo 
Prison as a suspected A-class war criminal. On 10 December 1945, 
Shiratori composed a letter in English to Foreign Minister Yoshida, 
stating that it was necessary to carry out ‘a totally new departure in 
constitutional legislation … binding up that [peace] clause indissolubly 
with the provisions concerning the Emperor’.64 In other words, Shiratori 
proposed including a renunciation of war in the constitution in order to 
protect the emperor system. Shiratori asked Yoshida to make a copy of his 
letter and provide it to Shidehara. However, the letter was held by GHQ 
censors until 20 January 1946.
Later, at the Tokyo Trial, former diplomat Hirota Yōji acted as Shiratori’s 
assistant counsel. According to the affidavit of Yoshida Shigeru, as 
prepared by Hirota, Shiratori had met with Yoshida just before his 
detention. On that occasion, he told Yoshida that he wished to speak with 
Shidehara on matters that included a proposal for a new constitution. 
Upon hearing this, Yoshida requested that he put the details of this request 
in writing, which Shiratori then did. This is why Yoshida would later 
hand a copy of Shiratori’s letter to Shidehara. Shidehara is believed to have 
received Shiratori’s letter directly after its release by the GHQ censors, 
around 20 January 1946. If that was the case, it means that Shidehara 
would have had the chance to look at Shiratori’s letter just before the 
24 January meeting with MacArthur. Therefore, Shidehara’s mentioning 
of the renunciation of war during that meeting may well have occurred as 
a result of his coming into contact with that letter.65
Did Shidehara’s talk of renunciation of war bring about the inclusion of 
Article 9 in the new constitution? Drawing upon comments by Shidehara’s 
secretary, Kishi Kuramatsu, Hirota Yōji says the following about the 
24 January meeting between Shidehara and MacArthur:
It is true that Prime Minister Shidehara had spoken of the idea, 
or the ideal of renouncing war, and that General MacArthur 
completely agreed with him on the matter. However, they did not 
at all discuss the inclusion of any such provision in the Japanese 
constitution. That is why, when the U.S. draft of the Japanese 
constitution was shown to the Japanese side on February 19 [sic.], 
even the prime minister appeared somewhat surprised. Even the 
Matsumoto draft that the Japanese side created contained nothing 
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remotely like the renunciation of the right to wage war. This is 
because Mr. Shidehara never thought to use the constitution to 
prescribe such a thing.66
In other words, while Shidehara and MacArthur had seen eye to eye 
on the topic of renouncing war, this was simply at the level of an ideal, 
and not as an article in the constitution. Further, when Hirota visited 
Shidehara and Yoshida:
The two of them said that they had read Shiratori’s letter. However, 
they would not tell me anything at all about how they would 
respond to his war renunciation proposal, or the other contents 
of the letter.67 
We can surmise that what Shiratori had in mind when he composed 
his letter was something like the Kellogg–Briand Pact of some 20 years 
prior. This pact was named for the US secretary of state and the French 
foreign minister who spearheaded its formulation. The Kellogg–Briand 
Pact included the renunciation of warfare as an instrument of national 
policy, prescribing that arguments between nations were to be resolved 
peacefully. It was signed in Paris in August 1928. When plenipotentiary 
representative Uchida Yasuya signed the pact in Paris, Shiratori had been 
present as his attendant. For this reason, Shiratori was well acquainted 
with the details of the pact.
Thus, it is possible that the spirit of the Kellogg–Briand Pact had a real 
impact on MacArthur, via the mediation of Shidehara’s comments 
following his reading of Shiratori’s letter. However, it should be noted 
that, through its censors, the GHQ would have known of Shiratori’s 
war renunciation proposal before Shidehara did. Further, although 
Shidehara spoke of the renunciation of war after seeing Shiratori’s letter, 
his comments were, as noted above, only at the level of ideals. He did not 
propose incorporating a war renunciation article into the constitution. 
It is also worth pointing out that Shiratori hoped to use this letter at the 
Tokyo Trial as proof of his own pacifism.68
At a cabinet meeting held on 30 January 1946, Matsumoto reported on 
the progress of the Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee. 
The cabinet subsequently deliberated upon topics such as Matsumoto’s 
own proposal for constitutional reform. In this proposal, Shidehara stated 
that the article on the emperor left the relationship between ‘His Majesty’ 
and ‘inviolable’ unclear. Shidehara further argued emphatically that the 
military provisions needed to be removed from the constitution draft:
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If we leave military provisions in the constitution, then the Allies 
will definitely come and complain about it. I am concerned that 
it may be a problem if, at the present time, we place a provision 
in the constitution with the premise that we would be able to 
have a military in the future. Won’t we end up spending one, two 
months in negotiations with headquarters [GHQ] for the sake of 
this provision? … Thinking [of the matter] from the perspective 
of the general world situation, our nation may well be able to 
have an army again one day. However, I think it would be too 
provocative to put this provision in here today.69
What Shidehara had in mind with this statement was the planned 
submission to the GHQ of the Japanese constitutional draft. The Japanese 
proposal did not strongly reflect Shidehara’s own intentions. On top of 
that, it was rejected by the GHQ. This makes it unlikely that Shidehara 
was the one who originally proposed Article 9.
A record of an interview conducted at this time has been preserved 
in  a  collection of Shidehara’s personal documents. According to these 
records, Shidehara asserted that ‘a liberal democratic system with the 
Emperor as constitutional monarch is the only regime that will prove 
stable and beneficial for Japan’. He added:
The constitution of Japan should not be an exact reproduction of 
the British or any other monarchical system … it must be adapted 
to the Japanese character and traditions.70
Here, too, Shidehara was thinking mainly of the emperor system.
The Emperor System and Renouncing the Right 
to Wage War
A significant turning point came on 1 February 1946. Nishiyama 
Takichi, a journalist for the Mainichi Shimbun, published a scoop on 
the conservative draft plan of the Constitutional Problems Investigation 
Committee. The Mainichi Shimbun editorial launched the following 
criticism:
When it comes to what may be regarded as the core of the 
constitution, the sovereignty of the emperor, this new plan is 
based on exactly the same principles as the current constitution.71
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Surprised by the conservative plan for constitutional reform that the 
Japanese side had devised, the GHQ began work on its own proposal for 
a new constitution. However, if Nishiyama had not succeeded in securing 
the above scoop, the GHQ’s draft might well have arrived much later, 
and, as a result, led to further chaos.
The above circumstances show that the only way that Shidehara could 
have been responsible for introducing Article 9 into the new constitution 
is if the prime minister had buried the conservative Japanese draft and 
instead endorsed the GHQ draft. Information could potentially have been 
purposely leaked to the press to such ends. Indeed, from the outside, the 
Mainichi Shimbun scoop does look as though it might have been the result 
of such a political manoeuvre. However, Shidehara was not the source 
of Nishiyama’s information. We know this because Nishiyama himself 
has spoken out on the matter, stating that Shidehara ‘absolutely did not 
allow reporters to approach him’ and that, in any case, Shidehara ‘hated 
newspaper reporters’.72 It is therefore difficult to imagine that Shidehara 
would leak the Japanese draft. Nishiyama has also said of Shidehara:
The symbolic emperor system uniting the citizens and the emperor 
constitutes the underlying framework of postwar Japan, and 
it was Shidehara (Kijūrō) who created it. He was a great figure. 
Mr. Yoshida (Shigeru) is lionized these days; however, I want the 
young people of today to know about Mr. Shidehara.73 
On 3 February, MacArthur’s three basic principles on constitutional 
reform were shown to Courtney Whitney, chief of the GHQ Government 
Section. These three basic principles were the emperor system, the 
renunciation of war, and the abolition of feudalistic systems. Here, 
the retention of the emperor system was combined with the renunciation 
of war. In other words, MacArthur was concerned about the Far Eastern 
Commission, which was critical of the emperor system.74 The Far Eastern 
Commission was a policymaking body focused on Japan that the Allied 
nations had set up in Washington. Its establishment had been decided 
upon at a foreign ministers’ conference in Moscow in December 1945.
On 8 February 1946, the Japanese side submitted a general outline of 
its proposal for constitutional reform to the GHQ. This outline was not 
reflective of the views that Shidehara had earlier expressed at the cabinet 
meeting on 30 January.75 Moreover, not only did the GHQ have a poor 
impression of the reform outline, but also they viewed it as effectively 
preserving the Meiji Constitution.
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As a result, the initiative for reforming the constitution shifted entirely 
to the GHQ. As early as 13 February, Whitney and Colonel Charles L. 
Kades handed over a copy of their own draft, known as the ‘MacArthur 
Draft’, to Matsumoto and Yoshida. Matsumoto and Yoshida had only 
expected to hear GHQ’s opinion of the revisions proposed by the 
Japanese side. When they were suddenly shown this ‘MacArthur Draft’, 
they were shocked, especially once they saw its contents. With Shidehara’s 
assistance, Matsumoto submitted a supplementary explanation on the 
Japanese proposal to GHQ. However, Whitney not only replied that 
there was no leeway for reconsideration but also warned him that if they 
did not receive a response by 20 February, they would publicly announce 
the GHQ proposal.76
Left with little choice, Shidehara slipped out of the Prime Minister’s 
Office on 21 February and paid a visit to MacArthur. Their discussion 
lasted a full three hours. MacArthur argued that, although he very much 
wished to keep the emperor’s position secure, the Far Eastern Commission 
was taking a hard line. It was therefore necessary for GHQ to create 
a proposal that would prescribe both the symbolic emperor system and 
the renunciation of war. MacArthur further stated that he thought ‘Japan 
should take moral leadership [on this matter] by declaring it will renounce 
its right to wage war’. In response, Shidehara replied: ‘It might be called 
leadership, but I doubt that there will be any followers’. MacArthur 
immediately countered: ‘Even if there are no followers, Japan has nothing 
to lose’.77 On the following day, 22 February, after a visit to the Imperial 
Palace, Shidehara reported to the cabinet on his meeting with MacArthur. 
Matsumoto responded in a raised voice:
As can be clearly seen from precedents such as Germany and 
South America, constitutions that are pressed upon a nation from 
the outside are, in the end, not deserving of observance.78
Yet Shidehara believed there was ‘some room for compromise’ regarding 
the GHQ proposal.79 What finally convinced Shidehara was MacArthur’s 
argument that if Japan did not accept the US proposal, he would be unable 
to guarantee the survival of the emperor system. To put it another way, 
the emperor system could be protected by codifying Japan’s renunciation 
of war. This may well have been why Shidehara returned from his meeting 
with MacArthur ‘in a slightly cheerful mood’.80
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Shidehara took the further step of revising Article 1 of the Japanese 
proposal. It now stated that the emperor was a symbol that was based 
upon ‘the supreme collective will of the Japanese people’.81 Shidehara also 
changed the prescriptions on constitutional reform, allowing them to 
take place via special national referendums, and not merely at the time of 
general elections. Following further consultation with GHQ, on 6 March, 
the cabinet was able to announce a summary of its constitutional reform 
proposal. When giving his statement, Shidehara emphasised Japan’s 
renunciation of the right to wage war.
There was a suitable reason for expediting the process. On 27 February, the 
Yomiuri Hōchi had reported that ‘the emperor wished to abdicate’.82 
The source of this report was Prince Higashikuni. So, the cabinet finally 
agreed to accept the GHQ proposal on 5 March, following a visit to the 
Imperial Palace by Shidehara and Matsumoto to gain the emperor’s approval. 
This was the moment in which the basic political framework for postwar 
Japan was decided. The cabinet meeting held that day stretched late into 
the night, and more than a few of the cabinet ministers had tears in their 
eyes. Before his assembled ministers, including Yoshida and Matsumoto, 
Shidehara concluded the cabinet meeting with the following words:
It is an extremely serious responsibility to accept such 
a constitutional draft. In all likelihood, it is a responsibility that 
will have an impact upon our descendants. If we announce this 
plan, there shall be some who will praise it. There shall also be 
those who will remain silent, yet their hearts will surely be filled 
with a deep indignation at our attitude. However, when we take 
a broad view of the situation, we can see that today there is no 
other path that we can take.83
Shortly afterwards, on 20 March, Shidehara attended a plenary session 
of the Privy Council. There Shidehara sought to convince those present 
that the renunciation of war was important to protect the emperor 
system. Shidehara told them frankly that, due to the involvement of the 
Far Eastern Commission, MacArthur had been able to ‘suddenly rush 
the announcement of the constitution draft in order to create a situation 
where everything had already been effectively decided’.84
On 22 April, Shidehara gave an even more detailed explanation to the 
First Privy Council Investigative Committee for Proposed Revisions to 
the Imperial Constitution. Shidehara also frequently spoke with Suzuki 
Kantarō, who was then serving as the chairman of the Privy Council.85
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Meanwhile, although the Constitutional Problems Investigation 
Committee would never again convene, it was not actually abolished. This 
was due to Shidehara’s concern for Committee Chairman Matsumoto. 
What gave Shidehara the most reason for anxiety was the ‘rumour’ that 
Article 9 had been forced upon Japan by the US. He responded by making 
sure that all officials had their story straight: it was a proposal from the 
Japanese side.86
Shidehara’s reshuffled cabinet paved the way for constitutional reform. 
When Shidehara said to Kanamori Tokujirō that ‘we absolutely must push 
for a peace constitution that renounces war’, his intention was to protect 
the emperor system. He understood that it was possible for a clause 
renouncing war to one day be changed. Yet if the emperor system were 
abolished, the loss would be irreversible. In a meeting with the emperor, 
MacArthur also made the following meaningful statement: ‘Thanks to 
His Majesty’s assistance, the constitution is now ready. [Smiling] If we did 
not have His Majesty, we would not have this constitution’.87
Resignations of the Shidehara Cabinet
Inauguration as President of the Progressive Party
Along with the problem of the constitution, Shidehara’s reshuffled cabinet 
was also tasked with the challenge of improving the lives of the citizenry. 
The opposition party had been severely denouncing Shidehara over the 
tightening of supply restrictions and the rationing system. In a letter 
to Izawa, he expressed the feeling of being ‘surrounded by enemies on 
all sides’.88
From the outset, the Shidehara cabinet had been regarded as a ‘stopgap 
cabinet’. Its most important mission was to carry out electoral reform 
and an election for the House of Representatives. That is to say, the 
calling of a  general election was seen as the cabinet’s primary purpose. 
It was expected, as it were, ‘to serve as a midwife for the establishment 
of democratic politics’.89 Once the Shidehara cabinet had revised the 
electoral law in December 1945, the next general election was scheduled 
for April 1946. It was the first postwar election, as well as the first election 
in Japan where women received suffrage. In a radio broadcast, Shidehara 
appealed to the significance of ‘this election as the departure point for 
democratic politics in our nation’.90 Yet he made no comment as to what 
course of action ought to be pursued following the election.
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When the election was held on 10 April 1946, the leading party was 
Hatoyama Ichirō’s Liberal Party (Jiyūtō). The runner-up was the Japan 
Progressive Party (Nihon Shinpotō), followed by the Japan Socialist Party 
(Nihon Shakaitō). However, the Shidehara cabinet would not readily step 
down. This was because, even though the Liberal Party took first place, 
it had secured less than a third of the seats in the house. The work of 
establishing the new constitution was also yet to be completed. Mitsuchi, 
Narahashi and Ishiguro were particularly eager to see the cabinet continue. 
For this reason, Shidehara—who had once served as foreign minister 
in the so-called Goken Sanpa coalition cabinet—was now the target of 
public criticism for his ‘turncoat scheming’. In the end, the Shidehara 
cabinet resigned on 22 April. On 23 April, Shidehara agreed to serve as 
president of the Progressive Party. For the first time, Shidehara joined 
a political party, probably because he wished to ensure that constitutional 
reform was carried out correctly.91
The Progressive Party that Shidehara now presided over had been formed 
in November 1945. Despite its name, it was actually a conservative 
political party, and the only party in power that had previously lent its 
support to the Shidehara cabinet. Initially, the party found it difficult to 
select a president. Eventually the role was filled by Machida Chūji, but 
he was soon caught up in the aforementioned purge of public officials. 
The Progressive Party suffered a major defeat in the general election of 
April 1946, ceding the position of leading conservative party to the Liberal 
Party. As for its alignment, the party understood itself to be ‘to the right 
of the Socialist Party and to the left of the Liberal Party’.92
Following the resignation of his cabinet, Shidehara intended to formally 
petition the emperor to have the Liberal Party president Hatoyama Ichirō 
become the next prime minster. On 4 May he sought informal consent 
for this move from MacArthur, via Yoshida’s mediation. Just after sending 
this request, however, even Hatoyama fell victim to the purge of officials. 
He would be replaced by Yoshida. Shidehara thereafter sought to have 
Yoshida installed as prime minister. On 15 May, he had Yoshida himself 
make this request to MacArthur, who granted his approval. 93
From the Democratic Party to the Liberal Party
On 16 May 1946, Shidehara formally recommended Yoshida Shigeru 
to the imperial throne as the next prime minister of Japan. The Yoshida 
cabinet was formed on 22 May as a coalition cabinet containing ministers 
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from both the Liberal Party and the Progressive Party. As president of the 
Progressive Party, Shidehara entered the cabinet as minister of state.94 As a 
minister without a portfolio of his own, Shidehara was assigned to deal 
with constitutional reform and also sought to work on policy relating to 
the Diet.
On the Progressive Party side, the cabinet included figures such as 
Saitō Takao, who served as an adviser, and Inukai Takeru, who was the 
chairperson of the general affairs committee.95 However, alongside such 
allies, Shidehara also had to endure working with Ashida Hitoshi from the 
Liberal Party. Although Ashida had previously served as health and welfare 
minister in the Shidehara cabinet, they did not see eye to eye. When 
Shidehara sought to have the two parties coordinate their efforts, Ashida 
instead argued for a three-party coalition that included the Socialist Party. 
This disagreement had deepened the divide between the two.
In correspondence sent to Shidehara when he was prime minister, 
Ashida wrote:
Regrettably, it seems that one or two ministers have sought to 
create a ruling party that supports the cabinet by shifting their 
political alignments. I believe that at this present crucial moment, 
such actions may push the political world in a more chaotic 
direction and give rise to anxiety among the citizenry.96
Discontented with these developments, on 19 April 1946, Ashida 
submitted to Prime Minister Shidehara his resignation as minister 
of health and welfare ‘due to personal circumstances’.97 Just after this, 
however, the Shidehara cabinet resigned en masse.
Before long, the Yoshida cabinet also began to run into difficulties. It was 
at this time that Ashida decided to visit Shidehara. The day was New 
Year’s Eve 1946. Ashida asked Shidehara if he would consider becoming 
prime minister once more, this time of a three-party coalition cabinet 
that would include the Socialist Party. Yet Shidehara replied that he 
instead ‘wanted to find a way of pushing ahead with some reshuffling’.98 
Meanwhile, there were disquieting movements in the Progressive Party. 
Hori Shigeru of the Progressive Party approached Ashida and informed 
him that ‘there are those [in the party] who would be comfortable with 
pushing Mr. Shidehara out’.99 Progressive Party reformists became bolder 
and began rallying around younger figures such as Inukai Takeru. This 
inner discord would lead to the dissolution of the party on 31 March 1947, 
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and the subsequent founding of a new party known as the Democratic 
Party (Minshutō). The Democratic Party also gathered members from the 
National Cooperative Party (Kokumin Kyōdōtō). At this time, Shidehara 
was focused on the coming general election and wanted Yoshida’s Liberal 
Party to merge with the remnants of the Progressive Party. However, the 
Liberal Party was not amenable to this idea. Left with no other choice, 
Shidehara participated in the creation of the Democratic Party, out of the 
core of the old Progressive Party.
Although Shidehara was successful in the April 1947 election, he had lost 
the favour of the general public. The Democratic Party did not get around 
to selecting its very first leader until after the election. The position would 
go to Ashida, who had previously left the Liberal Party. Having lost out 
to Ashida, Shidehara was instead elected honorary president of the party. 
Although the Democratic Party had the most House seats at the time 
of its formation, in the fourth general election it slipped to third place. 
In fact, it was the Socialist Party that took first place in the election, with 
Yoshida’s Liberal Party pushed into opposition in second place.
Katayama Tetsu, chairman of the Socialist Party, formed a new cabinet 
towards the end of May. Democratic Party President Ashida formed 
a coalition with the Katayama cabinet, taking the role of foreign minister 
for himself. In other words, the Katayama cabinet was a coalition cabinet 
consisting of ministers from the leading Socialist Party, as well as from the 
Democratic Party, which had come in third. Shidehara was particularly 
displeased with the Democratic Party for this decision. He had wished 
to merge the party with the Liberal Party but was ultimately unable to. 
Although he did not go so far as to leave the party, at the end of May he 
submitted his resignation as honorary president, arguing for the ‘level-
headed development of the party’.100 In the Democratic Party were some 
30 individuals who were viewed as belonging to the Shidehara clique, 
including Hitomatsu Sadayoshi, minister of health and welfare.
Significantly, it appears that GHQ’s Government Section played some 
role in Ashida’s rise to the position of Democratic Party president. While 
Shidehara promoted a ‘conservative coalition’ between the Democratic 
Party and the Liberal Party, there is a theory that the Government Section 
was against this idea. It seems likely that Shidehara was not sufficiently 
aware of this fact. At any rate, Shidehara was not at all comfortable 
with Ashida’s rise to party president. As for these movements, there 
were also dark rumours in the air relating to money. A supremely proud 
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individual, Shidehara felt humiliated. His ill feelings towards Ashida 
never disappeared.101 Ashida, meanwhile, focused on creating a gathering 
of political moderates.
At the end of November 1947, Shidehara left the Democratic Party 
altogether. The direct cause was his voting against the Katayama cabinet’s 
proposed Coal Mining Nation Management Law. Twenty-two members 
of the Shidehara clique left the Democratic Party with him, and together 
they created a new party called the Dōshi Club. This meant that Shidehara 
was once again in political opposition.
Shidehara disclosed his intentions in a letter he wrote on New Year’s 
Day 1948, addressed to Ishibashi Tanzan, who was still barred from 
public office:
Happy New Year
It has been some time since I had the pleasure of seeing you. 
When I reminisce about those happier days when I had the honor 
of speaking with you regularly, I am filled with a vague sense 
of loneliness.
As you are aware, I find myself deploring the current state of 
events in the political world and have resolutely decided to end 
my ties with the Democratic Party. It has become necessary for me 
to push forward on the basis of my own convictions.
From the beginning, I have tried not to dwell upon such 
matters as the collapse of the current cabinet or the future 
of  the administration. Rather, I have only hoped that affairs of 
state might be carried out smoothly, and that we might keep the 
political situation stable.
I am aware that it would be absurd for this failure of an old man 
to continue in such farcical performances. And so, I have set sail 
on this voyage. Until I arrive at my port of destination, I beg you 
to take into consideration the real state of affairs.
These days it grows ever colder, and I pray that you will take all the 
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Upon receiving this letter, Ishibashi noted that he ‘felt a special affection 
for Mr. Shidehara’.103
Before long, the Katayama cabinet entered a deadlock with the Socialist 
Party over a budget proposal. On 10 March 1948, it was replaced by 
the Ashida cabinet. The Ashida cabinet was a coalition, containing 
ministers from the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party and the National 
Cooperative Party.
Following this event, Shidehara formed a political party known as the 
Democracy Club with 36 other individuals, including Saitō Takao, who 
had also left the Democratic Party at that time. Only a few days later, on 
15 March, it merged with Yoshida’s Liberal Party. This was the birth of the 
Democratic Liberal Party (Minshu Jiyūtō). Apart from Yoshida, who served 
as president, leaders of the Democratic Liberal Party included such figures 
as Shidehara, who was appointed ‘supreme adviser’, and Yamazaki Takeshi, 
who was secretary-general. At its founding, the Democratic Liberal Party 
was the strongest party in Japan, boasting 152 members in the House of 
Representatives. Among those politicians who had followed Shidehara out 
of the Democratic Party and into the Democratic Liberal Party, there was a 
young lawmaker by the name of Tanaka Kakuei; he would become prime 
minister one day. When the second Yoshida cabinet was inaugurated in 
October that year, Tanaka would become the parliamentary vice-minister of 
justice on the basis of a recommendation from Shidehara.104
‘Those I Will Never Forget’
I would like to conclude this chapter by probing the relationship between 
elections and political parties in Japan at this time. Shidehara had faced the 
election of April 1946 as prime minister. Yet he remained a member of the 
House of Peers without having to run as a candidate. The House of Peers 
would later be abolished on 3 May 1947, as a result of the new constitution 
coming into effect. By then over 20 years had passed since Shidehara 
became a member in 1926. Following the enactment of constitutional 
reform, fresh elections were held for the House of Representatives and the 
new House of Councillors (the upper house) in April of the same year. 
Shidehara would run as a candidate for the House of Representatives and 
subsequently won election to the Diet for the first time.
Shidehara was voted into office a total of two times in his life: the first 
in the aforementioned election of April 1947, and the second in an 
election held in January 1949. While Shidehara ran as a representative 
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for the Third Ward of Osaka prefecture, he continued to live in Tokyo; 
his formal residence was in Sendagaya, and his actual residence was in 
Setagaya. Already over 70 years old when he first joined a political party 
and became president of the Progressive Party, Shidehara would have 
understood that he was not the type of politician who could count on 
popular support. He nevertheless sought to lead a political party late in 
life because he believed it necessary to stabilise Japan’s political situation 
with a conservative coalition. From Shidehara’s perspective, a bulwark was 
needed to shield the nation from the chaos that could arise in the wake 
of such challenges as the ongoing purging of public officials. However, as 
shown above, it was due to this same ‘conservative coalition theory’ that 
Shidehara lost his chance to lead the Democratic Party. Shidehara was not 
adept at the kind of manoeuvring necessary for a party politician.
Yet, after entering the world of party politics, Shidehara devoted a great 
deal of attention to both domestic affairs and diplomatic matters. There 
had long been an unwritten law among Foreign Ministry officials that 
they did not become involved in domestic affairs. This attitude was 
practically an article of faith for Shidehara in the prewar era. He also saw 
it as the price that needed to be paid for the centralisation of diplomacy 
under bureaucratic control. Hence, although implored by Hamaguchi, 
Shidehara had been entirely unwilling to accept the position of party 
vice-president. In his memoirs, he wrote:
I took the ideological position that the foreign minister must not 
be connected to a political party. At that time, I had no interest at 
all in getting involved in politics.105
However, under the conditions of postwar democracy, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was no longer in a position to fully control diplomatic 
efforts. In due course, political parties would begin to involve themselves 
in diplomacy. Thus, it became necessary to rethink the connection 
between domestic affairs and diplomacy. Shidehara’s position therefore 
gradually underwent a metamorphosis. Towards the very end of his life, 
upon becoming speaker of the House of Representatives, Shidehara soon 
became engaged in nonpartisan diplomacy. I will discuss this topic in the 
following chapter.
There is also the question of Shidehara’s reaction to the postwar era. 
In fact, by no means did he have a higher regard for it. In a 1951 essay, 
he wrote:
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These days I do not even have any interests … My greatest pleasure 
would simply be to have an interesting book to read. But even if 
I go and visit Maruzen [a major Japanese bookstore], I am unable 
to freely order foreign books like I used to. Things have become 
altogether inconvenient. 
Shidehara went on to say:
I think politicians of the prewar era were also most serious … 
Nowadays it has become common to say that people of the 
previous generation were entirely feudalistic in their thinking and 
so on. I have the impression that people who say such things are 
actually merely shallow. For example, whether it is freedom of 
thought, or whether it is democracy, I think there are more than 
a few people who do not look at such matters from the perspective 
of obligations or responsibilities; they simply believe that freedom 
and democracy mean being free to do as they please. This tendency 
is really worrisome, in my opinion. However, it may be that I am 
simply incapable of holding forth on postwar matters.
Shidehara reserved his highest praise for prewar politicians such as 
Itō Hirobumi and Saionji Kinmochi. In the case of foreigners, those he 
‘could never forget’ included names such as Denison, Hughes, Bryce and 
Morris. Although the country had paid a great price to get to the postwar 
era, Shidehara found it disconcerting. His preference was for people who 
selflessly ‘strived for the sake of the nation’. In this respect, he was very 
much of the prewar world.106
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Shidehara and the Tokyo Trial
When the Yoshida cabinet was inaugurated in May 1946, Shidehara 
was given the position of minister of state. In the previous chapter, 
I outlined some details of Shidehara’s engagement with party politics. In 
this chapter, I wish to focus on how an ageing Shidehara viewed Japan’s 
foreign relations and his perspective on history.1 For this purpose, the 
Tokyo Trial is particularly important. In fact, Shidehara himself appeared 
in court during the trials, and his testimony can provide us with some 
insight into his understanding of history.
The Tokyo Trial was a series of international war crimes trials that were 
carried out on the basis of the tenth article of the Potsdam Declaration. 
The target of these trials was Japan’s wartime leaders. Eleven foreign 
nations participated in all: the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, China, 
France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines 
and India. The official name for the trial was the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East. A total of 28 people stood accused as suspected 
A-class war criminals. The trials commenced in May 1946 in Ichigaya. 
The chief justice was William Flood Webb of Australia, while the chief 
prosecutor was Joseph Berry Keenan of the US. In the November 1948 
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judgement, seven defendants were sentenced to death by hanging: Tōjō 
Hideki, Dohihara Kenji, Itagaki Seishirō, Kimura Heitarō, Mutō Akira, 
Matsui Iwane and Hirota Kōki. A further 16 people were sentenced to 
life imprisonment, including Araki Sadao, Hata Shunroku, Hiranuma 
Kiichirō, Kido Kōichi, Koiso Kuniaki, Minami Jirō, Shiratori Toshio and 
Umezu Yoshijirō.
Few topics are as controversial as the Tokyo Trial. One frequent point of 
contention regards the application of the ex post facto charges of ‘crimes 
against peace’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. Needless to say, there was no 
questioning as to whether Allied actions such as the dropping of atomic 
bombs were themselves instances of such crimes.
For such reasons, the Tokyo Trial has been referred to as an example of 
‘victors’ justice’. In the debates surrounding the trial, the term ‘the Tokyo 
Trial view of history’ appears. Although there is no precise definition of 
‘the Tokyo Trial view of history’, it is used to criticise an interpretation 
that seeks to reject Japanese modern history. I suggest that it is more or 
less synonymous with the expression ‘a masochistic view of history’.2 
It must be added that ‘the Tokyo Trial view of history’ has a somewhat 
unusual ring to it to begin with. Certainly, the Tokyo Trial may have 
been a case of ‘victor’s justice’. However, while the trial operated with 
the premise that a conspiracy had taken place, they did not in fact reject 
modern Japanese history totally. Moreover, the Shōwa emperor was not 
prosecuted. This was an outcome that the various participants—from the 
Japanese government and Tōjō Hideki to MacArthur and Chief Prosecutor 
Keenan—had been most concerned to avoid.
If the Tokyo Trial view of history is not a rejection of modern Japan per 
se, then what exactly is it? One basic theme of the trial was the US’s 
perspective on Japan at that time, which was founded upon a good-
versus-evil dualism. According to this schema, moderates in Japan were 
confronted and overpowered by the militarists. Naturally, for the purposes 
of the occupation, the Shōwa emperor was classified as a moderate. 
If  there was an understanding of history that comprehensively rejected 
modern Japan, then that would be the official historical view of the Soviet 
Union. Although the Japanese zaibatsu (financial conglomerates) were 
not brought to account at the Tokyo Trial, the Soviet Union regarded 
them as having considerable responsibility for the war. It also believed that 
the ‘Tanaka Memorial’, which set out Japan’s invasion plans, was a real 
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document. In China, meanwhile, there was a tendency to distinguish 
between the Japanese people and the militarists. This can be considered 
a different kind of dualism than the US’s model.3
If we were to adopt an American-style dualistic model, then we would 
certainly have to categorise Shidehara as a representative of the moderate 
faction. Indeed, US Ambassador Grew had previously viewed Shidehara 
in such a manner. Shidehara was not the only Japanese official called 
to the witness stand who was viewed as a moderate. Figures such as 
Wakatsuki Reijirō, Okada Keisuke and Ugaki Kazushige were also viewed 
sympathetically. In fact, Keenan actually invited Wakatsuki, Okada, 
Ugaki and Yonai Mitsumasa to a cocktail party at his residence, where he 
cheerfully told them that ‘you four gentlemen are the true lovers of peace 
in Japan’.4 Reading such accounts may naturally generate doubts as to 
whether the US could truly distinguish between the so-called moderates 
and militarists. Yonai, after all, was navy minister during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War and one of the officials responsible for expanding 
that conflict.5
With these details in mind, I would now like to outline Shidehara’s final 
years. Shidehara was serving as minister of state in the Yoshida cabinet 
when he first appeared as a witness at the Tokyo Trial.6 He also testified 
on topics such as the Manchurian Incident when questioned by the 
international prosecution. Shidehara also helped in the reformation of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The following discussion addresses two 
important questions: How did Shidehara evaluate the prewar years and 
the lead-up to the collapse of the empire? And how did he view the 
international status of Japan in the postwar era?
As a Witness for the Prosecution
The Tokyo Trial began on 3 May 1946. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
established a satellite office in Ichigaya in order to maintain necessary 
lines of communication.7 The Shidehara cabinet had recently resigned, on 
22 April. Shidehara was now a minister of state in its successor, the Yoshida 
cabinet. The Yoshida cabinet was a coalition cabinet, containing ministers 
from Yoshida’s own Liberal Party, as well as Shidehara’s Progressive Party. 
On 18 June, the chief prosecutor, Keenan—who was visiting the US at 
the time—made some noteworthy comments on the Shōwa emperor. 
At a press conference in Washington, Keenan had stated that the emperor 
would not be prosecuted. News of this statement quickly reached Japan.8
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With a feeling of relief, Shidehara headed towards Ichigaya on 25 June. 
He was to appear as a witness for the prosecution. Taking the witness 
stand with a tense expression, Shidehara was flanked on his right side by 
10 court judges. In front of him, the prosecutors and the chief defence 
counsel faced each other, while to his left he was met with the stares of the 
assembled defendants. Sitting among the accused were some of Shidehara’s 
former subordinates: Hirota Kōki, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Tōgō Shigenori 
and Shiratori Toshio. However, Matsuoka Yōsuke and Ōkawa Shūmei 
were not present. On the edges of the courtroom were sections for the 
press corps and members of the public as well as booths for interpreters. 
At the beginning of the trial, the prosecutor read Shidehara’s affidavit 
out loud. The defence counsel for Ōshima Hiroshi then objected to the 
admission of Shidehara’s affidavit. However, the objection was overruled 
by Chief Justice Webb. Ōshima previously served as Japan’s ambassador to 
Germany, despite being from the army. Together with Shiratori Toshio—
who was then the ambassador to Italy—he had advocated a Tripartite Pact 
between Japan, Germany and Italy.
The focus of Shidehara’s affidavit was the Manchurian Incident. He stated 
that, just before the Liutiaohu Incident, he had received a ‘secret report’ 
stating that the Kwantung Army had assembled and had taken explosive 
materials with them. Therefore, Shidehara wrote, he had anticipated that 
the army intended to take ‘some kind of action’.9 Further, he claimed 
that although the Wakatsuki cabinet had worked to prevent further 
escalation following the incident, they were eventually left with no choice 
but to resign. In response, the defence counsel for Minami Jirō carried 
out a cross-examination (questioning conducted by the opposing party). 
As Shidehara had come to court to act as a witness for the prosecution, 
the defence counsel’s questioning of him constituted cross-examination.
Minami Jirō’s defence counsel carried out cross-examination concerning 
the source of Shidehara’s so-called secret report. While struggling with 
his words, Shidehara admitted that the source was actually no more than 
a ‘rumour’ heard from Japanese residents of Manchuria who were visiting 
Tokyo, and that he ‘did not mean to say he had received an official report’. 
Shidehara further testified that, at that time, War Minister Minami had 
‘cooperated to the extent that he could’ and that, while Minami had 
sought to have the Kwantung Army restrained through cooperation 
from the War Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was unable to 
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directly investigate the cause of the incident.10 Although he did not seek 
to sacrifice Minami, Shidehara emphasised that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was not at fault.
The defence counsel for Matsui Iwane would also not remain quiet. 
As a member of the military, Matsui had served as an army commander in 
the Central China Area Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War and 
had been charged with assisting in the attack on Nanjing. Matsui’s defence 
counsel cited a number of incidents that occurred during Shidehara’s 
time as foreign minister. These were the Nanjing Incident of 1927, the 
Wanpaoshan Incident and the Nakamura Incident. The Nanjing Incident 
of 1927 was discussed in Chapter 3. The Wanpaoshan Incident refers 
to a clash between Chinese peasants and Korean peasants that took 
place in Wanpaoshan, on the outskirts of the north-eastern Chinese city 
of Changchun. Finally, the Nakamura Incident refers to the murder of 
Captain Nakamura Shintarō of the Office of Army General Staff, who 
had been conducting a military geographical intelligence survey near 
Taonan in north-eastern China. Both the Wanpaoshan Incident and 
the Nakamura Incident took place in the summer of 1931 and were 
understood to have helped cause the Manchurian Incident.
With the defence counsel now attempting to assert Japan’s own 
victimhood concerning the events of the period, Shidehara was able to 
regain his composure. His response regarding the Nanjing Incident of 
1927 is particularly noteworthy:
Japanese residents [of the city] certainly suffered from looting, 
and some individuals were even wounded. However, I believe that 
there were no deaths … I think the impact on the U.K. and the 
U.S. in particular was actually more horrendous.11
There was also cross-examination from the defence counsel for Shiratori 
Toshio. Shiratori was director-general of the Intelligence Department 
during Shidehara’s second term as foreign minister and had also been 
a central figure among the reformist clique at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Yet surprisingly, Shidehara showed a more favourable attitude towards 
Shiratori. He asserted that Shiratori had ‘followed the peace policy line’ of 
the Wakatsuki cabinet.12 Here, Shidehara took a milder tone. In fact, he had 
absolutely no criticisms to make of former diplomatic officials, including 
Shiratori. This friendliness angered the prosecution, who argued that the 
cross-examination had turned into a direct examination (in other words, 
questioning by the side that called the witness).
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Further strengthening this tendency was the cross-examination by 
Shigemitsu’s defence counsel. Here Shidehara’s testimony practically 
amounted to a defence of Shigemitsu. According to Shidehara, 
Shigemitsu became Japan’s minister to China on his recommendation, 
and he was ‘completely satisfied’ with Shigemitsu’s performance in that 
role.13 However, Shidehara acknowledged that he did not receive any 
early information from Shigemitsu on the plotting by the Kwangtung 
Army. Shidehara also noted that after the Liutiaohu Incident, Shigemitsu 
proposed a meeting with Song Ziwen (Soong Tzu-wen). 
Shigemitsu’s defence counsel continued his cross-examination of Shidehara 
on 26 June. Reflecting upon the Manchurian Incident, Shidehara stated 
emphatically that ‘at that time, Minister Shigemitsu faithfully’ cooperated. 
Shidehara also stated that, given the supreme command authority 
of the emperor:
It was hardly possible for the cabinet to issue official reprimands to 
all of the army, not just the Manchurian army. This was not within 
the official authority of the government.14 
From Shidehara’s perspective, it was not Minami who was ultimately 
responsible for the Manchurian Incident. Rather, the root issues of the 
incident could be traced to the army officials in the field, together with 
flaws in the system relating to chain of command. 
Shidehara’s testimony clearly included some distortions; though a witness 
for the prosecution, he repeatedly made statements that benefitted 
Shiratori and Shigemitsu. Although Shidehara was ideologically opposed 
to these two individuals, he sought to protect them. His true motivation 
here may well have been less the protection of the individuals and more 
the protection of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an organisation. 
One passage in Shigemitsu’s diary states: ‘When he appeared in court as 
a witness, Shidehara’s testimony was beneficial to me’.15 It would seem that, 
standing before Minami and Shigemitsu, Shidehara acted as a witness for 
both the defence and the prosecution at the same time.
So it was that Shidehara offered his now quite distant memories as 
a form of testimony in the trials. As the accused, both Minami and Araki 
listened tensely to his answers. The manner of the proceedings would 
inform headlines in the Asahi Shimbun, such as ‘Unable to “Restrain” 
the Kwantung Army, the Manchurian Incident Expanded: Minister of 
State Shidehara Takes the Stand’ and ‘Responsibility for the Manchurian 
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Incident is with Army Minister Minami, Minister of State Shidehara 
Clearly Testifies’.16 Yet as noted above, Shidehara’s true intention was not 
necessarily to criticise Minami. According to other newspapers, such as 
the Yomiuri Shimbun, Shidehara ‘did not so much as smile, as though 
he had bitten into a bitter-tasting bug’. Here, too, the headline read, 
‘Responsibility for the Manchurian Incident with the Army Minister’.17
Let us now move forward roughly one year in time, to 24 June 1947. 
On that day, Shidehara was questioned by the international prosecution 
at the National Diet Building. Here, too, the focus of the questioning was 
the Manchurian Incident. The international prosecution wanted to know 
how much Shidehara had guessed about the scheming of the Kwantung 
Army on the basis of information received before the incident from 
Hayashi Kyūjirō, former consul general in Fengtian (Mukden). They also 
wanted Shidehara to tell them more about the respective positions of War 
Minister Minami Jirō, Fengtian Special Service Agency Chief Dohihara 
Kenji and Kwantung Army Commander-in-Chief Honjō Shigeru.18 They 
were particularly persistent with their questions on Minami.
Concerning what the Liutiaohu Incident foreshadowed, Shidehara 
responded that the information he received came not from Hayashi but 
from Japanese merchants who had temporarily returned to Tokyo. When 
he then called for Minami after hearing this information, the war minister 
informed him that, while he was to respond to the situation, he also ‘could 
not carry out strict punishments in order to maintain discipline, due to 
his concerns about potential disorder’.19 When questioned about Honjō 
and Dohihara, Shidehara replied he was not the only one insufficiently 
aware of the scheming taking place in the field; Minami, he said, was also 
relatively in the dark. In this case, however, Shidehara criticised Minami 
for being weak-willed. The international prosecutors were sceptical of 
Shidehara’s testimony that day, particularly with regard to the claim that 
he did not receive sufficient information from Consul General Hayashi. 
Yet it was not Shidehara who was a defendant at the Tokyo Trial but 
Minami and Dohihara. It seemed as if the international prosecutors and 
Shidehara had reached an unspoken agreement to collaborate in laying 
most of the responsibility for the Manchurian Incident and its aftermath 
at the feet of the army.
Nevertheless, Shidehara’s criticisms of Minami were not unusual. 
For  example, Hirota Kōki, though he did not take the witness stand 
in court, indicated during questioning that he thought Minami had 
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a great deal to answer for regarding the Manchurian Incident.20 It must 
be admitted that aspects of Shidehara’s testimony were not much more 
than excuses. We know that Consul General Hayashi was actually aware 
of the Kwantung Army’s plans before the Manchurian Incident, due to 
a warning from Kimura Eiichi, the director of the South Manchuria 
Railway. Further, Hayashi had passed this information on to the central 
authorities. Immediately after the incident, he also informed Shidehara 
that it was highly likely to have been a false-flag attack. As I discussed in 
Chapter 5 (Section 3), during a cabinet meeting held the day after the 
Liutiaohu Incident, Shidehara revealed that he had received a telegram 
from Hayashi. This was the reason that War Minister Minami did not 
receive the go-ahead to send the Japanese Korean Army as reinforcements.21
As a Witness for the Defence
In February 1947, the defence counsel began to present its counterevidence. 
On this occasion Shidehara was again called to testify, only this time as 
a witness for the accused. In July that year, Shidehara prepared the affidavit 
required for his appearance in court as a defence witness. Compared to 
the affidavit prepared in July the previous year, this affidavit went into 
more detail on Shidehara’s relationship with Minami at the time of 
the Manchurian Incident. Shidehara claimed that he and Minami had 
cooperated to try to prevent the Manchurian Incident from expanding, 
and described the claim that they were at odds over the incident as no 
more than an ‘empty rumor’.22 This statement appears to have been aimed 
at rebutting testimony from prosecution witness Tanaka Ryūkichi, who 
had claimed that Shidehara and Minami were at odds with each other.
As the day of the court hearing drew closer, however, Shidehara began 
to experience difficulty walking. Unable even to rise from bed due to 
extreme pain, he was taken to St Luke’s International Hospital, where 
he was diagnosed with psoas muscle pain. The hospital medical report 
stated that, ‘for the time being, he should remain warm and rest in bed, 
and receive ongoing medical care’.23 He was now almost 77 years of age, 
and years of fatigue had finally caught up with him. With Shidehara in no 
condition to appear in court, the defence counsel was forced to visit his 
residence to question him.
Shidehara’s residence was in Okamoto, in the Setagaya ward of Tokyo. 
In the early afternoon of 11 November 1947, a judge, three prosecutors 
and three members of the defence counsel arrived at the residence. 
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The head prosecutor was the Britain Arthur S. Comyns-Carr, who was 
accompanied by two other individuals. The defence counsels were those 
responsible for defending Koiso Kuniaki, Shigemitsu Mamoru and 
Minami Jirō, respectively. Of course, a stenographer and a member of 
the secretariat were also in attendance. Apart from one member of the 
defence counsel, practically the entire group were foreigners. Receiving 
the go-ahead from the prosecutors and the defence counsel, Shidehara 
began to give his testimony in fluent English.
According to Shidehara, before the Liutiaohu Incident, several Japanese 
residents of Manchuria visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report 
that ‘something unusual was happening’. Upon hearing this, Shidehara 
summoned War Minister Minami and asked him to enforce military 
discipline. Minami replied that he would take the necessary steps to 
deal with the situation. After the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, 
Shidehara continued to disclose to Minami copies of all telegrams 
received from the area. That said, Shidehara did not assert that Minami 
alone was responsible. He noted that Minami had attempted to carry out 
the decisions of the Wakatsuki cabinet; however, his instructions were 
not carried out by subordinates in the field. He also did not press for 
the sending of reinforcements from the Japanese Korean Army. Shidehara 
added that, when Minami attempted to prevent further expansion of the 
incident by restricting military funding, ‘it appeared that members of the 
military might carry out a coup’, and so ‘Minami was forced to approach 
the problem in a more practical manner’.24 As can be seen, Shidehara also 
sought to defend Minami in certain respects.
The report on Shidehara’s testimony would be considered in court on 
19 November 1947. In response, the defence counsel for Dohihara raised 
an objection. Even though Shidehara’s testimony was of real significance 
for Dohihara, his defence was not warned beforehand that it would be 
considered that day. On the following day, 20 November, Dohihara’s 
defence counsel made the same objection. Nevertheless, prosecutor 
Comyns-Carr somehow managed to have the cross-examination read out 
to the court. The court was also shown nine telegrams sent from Hayashi 
to Shidehara after the Liutiaohu Incident. These telegrams informed 
Shidehara of Dohihara’s manoeuvring with respect to Puyi, last emperor 
of the Qing dynasty and future ruler of the puppet state of Manchukuo. 
The contents of the telegrams thus constituted a blow for Dohihara rather 
than for Minami.25
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Yet from the perspective of the court, the discussions surrounding the 
report on Shidehara’s testimony had a negative impact on both Minami 
and Dohihara. In a diary entry dated to that time, Shigemitsu wrote:
The report on Shidehara’s testimony continues—after arguing 
his position, Prosecutor Carr was permitted to read out aloud the 
document that the witness has approved of. There were exchanges 
of telegrams between the consul general in Mukden and the 
foreign minister, and [this information] has been disadvantageous 
for both Minami and Dohihara.26 
The Yomiuri Shimbun reported on the developments under the headline 
‘Minami without Power to Control the Kwantung Army, Report on 
Shidehara’s Testimony’.27 That said, the defence counsel was certainly not 
going to overlook the potential utility of Shidehara’s testimony for their 
own ends. The defence counsel referenced Shidehara’s testimony in the 
closing statement that they gave on Minami. According to this statement, 
Shidehara and Minami had remained close friends up until the present-
day. Further, Minami had not proposed in cabinet meetings that Japan 
leave the League of Nations. Minami had also been cooperative during 
the Manchurian Incident. Finally, the information relating to the schemes 
of the Kwantung Army before the incident was unofficial.28
The Tokyo Trial concluded with a ruling in November 1948. The ruling 
itself consisted of an extremely long text that only Chief Justice Webb was 
permitted to read aloud. For this reason, the reading of the judgement 
alone took an entire week. Minami and Dohihara were sentenced to 
life imprisonment and execution by hanging, respectively. Were these 
rulings just? There is reason to doubt that they were. Even if we look 
only at a specific part of the ruling, namely Section 1, Chapter 5, Part B, 
which is titled ‘Invasion and Occupation of Manchuria’, there are some 
conspicuous contradictions. The entry titled ‘Foreign Minister Shidehara 
Continued Efforts at Mediation’ states that, although Shidehara heard 
rumours before the Liutiaohu Incident that the Kwangtung Army was 
plotting something, he did not have any conclusive evidence. The entry 
emphasises that Shidehara thus pressed Minami for answers directly after 
the incident. This information, however, conflicts with that presented in 
another entry. The entry titled ‘The Manchurian Incident Was Planned’ 
states that Hayashi sent Shidehara information prior to the incident. 
When Shidehara protested to Minami, Minami responded by dispatching 
Tatekawa Yoshitsugu to Manchuria in order to prevent the plot.29
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As noted earlier, a basic theme of the trial was the US view of Japan. 
More specifically, I mean the schemata by which the Americans divided 
the Japanese leadership into the moderates (which included the Shōwa 
emperor) and the militarists. Following these schemata, when individuals 
such as Shidehara, Ugaki Kazushige, Wakatsuki Reijirō or Okada Keisuke 
took the witness stand, there was a tendency to interpret their testimony 
as that of ‘moderate’ figures accusing the ‘militarists’.30 Certainly, there 
is some degree of truth to this interpretation. However, in Shidehara’s 
case at the very least, there was no desire to denounce the military. 
Indeed, the defence actually deployed Shidehara’s testimony in its closing 
statement because it helped to give a favourable impression. The criticism 
that Shidehara sought to shift blame to military figures is not necessarily 
accurate. This fact demonstrates just how ambiguous Shidehara’s position 
was regarding who was responsible for the war. As his testimony suggests, 
Shidehara disliked the rashness of Konoe Fumimaro far more than he did 
the military.31 In any case, what was crucially important for Shidehara was 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs be protected.
The Foreign Service Training Institute
Shidehara’s enduring commitment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
on display in contexts outside the Ichigaya courtroom as well. Among 
these, we cannot overlook the establishment of the Foreign Service 
Training Institute. This institute had a predecessor. As early as 1941, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had set up a centre to train its new hires. This 
training centre was maintained until the period immediately following 
the end of the war. However, the lack of a proper organisational basis 
hindered its operation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs organisation 
reform in February 1946 led to the formal establishment of the Foreign 
Service Training Institute. For a site to run the institute, the ministry 
borrowed a building from Tōhō Bunka Gakuin, located in Ōtsuka, which 
is in Tokyo’s Bunkyō ward.
Along with Yoshida, Shidehara was instrumental in pushing for the 
opening of this institute. The first director was Vice-Minister Matsushima 
Shikao. At an opening ceremony held on 1 March, Shidehara had 
attended in his role as prime minister. Foreign Minister Yoshida was 
also in attendance. Upon rising to give his welcoming address, Director 
Matsushima ‘pointed out that the establishment of the institution was 
entirely thanks to the efforts of Prime Minister Shidehara’. Shidehara 
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then gave his own congratulatory speech, in which he ‘touched upon the 
indispensability of cultivating one’s character and improving one’s foreign 
language capabilities. Overflowing with genuine feeling, it deeply moved 
the assembled juniors’.32 The institute library contained some 17,000 
volumes, including the collections of Ishii Kikujirō and Yamakawa Tadao. 
Naturally, there were foreign language classes available, but there were also 
classes on typing. The training period for new hires was set at six months.
The director who eventually succeeded Matsushima, Terasaki Tarō, was 
also vice-minister for foreign affairs. Although it was not unusual for the 
directorship to be handled by vice-ministers, having somebody work as 
director in name only did limit the training that new hires would receive. 
Hence it was recognised that the best possible outcome would be for 
a full-time director who could focus entirely upon the job. Shidehara and 
Yoshida both had the same person in mind for this role: Satō Naotake. 
At  that time, Satō was still serving as Japan’s ambassador to the Soviet 
Union. He would finally return in May 1946. As noted above, this was 
the time when the Shidehara cabinet resigned. Asked if he would be 
interested in directing the institute, Satō responded cautiously. Only after 
he had confirmed with GHQ that he was not a potential target for the 
purges from public office did he finally accept. Hence, in August of that 
same year, Satō became the third director of the institute. He was the 
institute’s first full-time director, and, in a sense, he was also the first real 
director. Indeed, Satō also viewed himself in this manner.33
Now a minister of state, Shidehara gave a speech at the ceremony for Satō’s 
inauguration. With Satō sitting before him, Shidehara recalled the days 
of his friendship with ministry adviser Denison and told the assembled 
institute trainees: ‘In my opinion, honesty is truly the best possible 
diplomatic policy’.34 Prime Minister Yoshida, who at that time was also 
serving as foreign minister, was also in attendance. Elder ministry figures 
such as Obata Yūkichi and Matsudaira Tsuneo were also hired to help as 
advisers to the institute. From Shidehara’s perspective, Yoshida and the 
others were all once his subordinates. A famous specialist in diplomatic 
history would also come to give some lectures as a form of special training.
Why did Shidehara and Yoshida seek to establish the Foreign Service 
Training Institute at this time? After all, the occupation by the Allied 
forces had only just started, and even neutral countries had more or less 
cut off their diplomatic relations with Japan.35 The prospects for regaining 
sovereignty in the near term were hardly bright. Under the occupation, 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was relegated to handling communication 
and negotiation between the Japanese government and the occupying 
force. For this reason, it had established an external bureau called the 
Central Liaison Office. Numerous ministry staff were sent to work in this 
bureau at the time.
Japan’s overseas diplomatic establishments also remained closed, with 
a continuous stream of ministry officials withdrawing from the field and 
returning home. The ministry was also forced to make severe personnel 
cuts, causing a great deal of concern about the loss of talented staff. 
Numerous ministry officials began to seek out alternative employment as 
interpreters or lawyers. That said, Shidehara and Yoshida well understood 
that the day would come when Japan would regain its sovereignty and 
resume diplomatic relations with other countries. In preparation for the 
restoration of these relations, it was essential that the ministry retained 
a core of properly trained staff. Once, during his time as prime minister, 
Shidehara made the following remarks:
With a country such as ours that has many of its own peculiarities, 
the training of diplomatic officials necessarily differs from how it 
is carried out in, for example, the Western nations. It is extremely 
arduous and time-consuming. It is not something that can be 
done overnight. In order to be prepared for the future, therefore, 
it is necessary to devote ceaseless effort to cultivating and training 
[our future diplomats].36
This is all to say that Shidehara understood that diplomats could not be 
properly trained in a short time. I note that the political power of those 
supporting the ministry was also essential for halting the loss of talented 
officials. Shidehara and Yoshida established the training institute for this 
very reason—to ensure that the ministry would have adequate numbers 
of able staff in the future. Yoshida also enjoyed looking out for young and 
upcoming staff, and, once a year, he would give instructional lectures at 
the institute. For Shidehara and Yoshida, therefore, the institute was no 
mere training facility.37
It should be noted that the Demobilization Agency was also established 
under the Yoshida cabinet, in June 1946. Shidehara, who at that time 
was serving in the cabinet as a minister of state, was chosen as director 
of the agency. Shidehara also became the chairman of the Kasumigaseki 
Association, an informal social organisation for people associated with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.38
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The UK and China
A high-priority task during the occupation was the restoration of the 
Japanese–American relationship. At that time, anyone in a position of 
responsibility was well aware of the overwhelming importance of the US. 
Upon forming a new cabinet as prime minister, Shidehara had once said 
to Prince Higashikuni:
Going forward, I aim to ensure that Japan–U.S. diplomacy 
proceeds in a measured manner. We will focus on coordinating 
with the U.S. to the best of our ability, with an eye towards the 
eventual revival of Japan’s position.39
To this end, Shidehara would frequently write correspondence not only 
to MacArthur but also to former US ambassadors to Japan such as Castle, 
Grew and Forbes.40
Of course, Shidehara was not merely a pro-American politician. While his 
actions were very friendly toward the US, it had long been British-style 
diplomacy that had furnished him with his ideals. This did not change 
under the occupation. A particularly illuminating event in this respect was 
the December 1949 roundtable discussion between Shidehara, Yoshida 
Shigeru and Satō Naotake. While Yoshida was famous for his pro-British 
tendencies, Shidehara and Satō were hardly to be beaten in this regard. 
When Shidehara would praise Bryce or Grey during their talk, Satō would 
respond by citing British foreign ministers such as John Allsebrook Simon 
or Anthony Eden. The recollections shared by the three elder statesmen 
on this occasion invariably centred on the UK. In fact, the US did not 
come up at all.41
It should be noted that Shidehara did not have a rosy view of Japan’s 
relationship with the UK. Once, in January 1946, when Shidehara was 
serving as prime minister, he met with his old acquaintance Sansom. 
Sansom, as noted in the previous chapter, was visiting Japan at that 
time in the role of the British representative to the Far Eastern Advisory 
Commission. At their meeting, Sansom informed Shidehara that in the 
UK, ‘opinion was still very bitter by reason of Japanese atrocities, and 
that the Japanese Army had perhaps done more damage to Japan by their 
cruelties than by losing the war’.42 Shidehara must have been shocked 
by these words, for he subsequently relayed them to the Shōwa emperor 
and arranged for him to meet with Sansom. However, this meeting 
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never took place. As it happened, Sansom himself declined the offer of 
an audience with the emperor, citing his ongoing role as a member 
of an international delegation.
While Shidehara considered Japan’s relationship with the UK and the US 
highly valuable, he did not ignore Asia. In March 1946, while serving 
as prime minister, Shidehara gave a lecture titled ‘Watashi no Shina-
kan’ (My  perspective on China). The audience was the Sino-Japanese 
Friendship Society of the Industry Club of Japan. In this lecture, Shidehara 
noted that:
From the time I arrived at Kasumigaseki [the district in central 
Tokyo where most of the major government ministries are located] 
… I firmly believed that when it came to relations between 
China and Japan, what was needed was goodwill, cooperation, 
and understanding.43
Yet, he added, the Chinese government and domestic (Japanese) public 
opinion remained unsympathetic. As for the present moment, Shidehara 
expressed his admiration for Chiang Kai-shek, who had said that China 
ought to ‘turn bitterness into benevolence’. He added, ‘I am extremely 
pleased to see how Mr. Chiang Kai-shek is dealing with the situation’.44
However, Shidehara noted, if Japan were to urgently seek amicable 
relations with China at the current time, with the war only recently 
ended, it could place the Chinese government in an awkward position. 
Any immediate restoration of good relations would therefore be difficult. 
Nevertheless, Shidehara commented:
I am truly thankful, from the bottom of my heart, that Mr. Chiang 
Kai-shek has provided as much protection as possible to those 
Japanese citizens who remain residents in China. I believe that it is 
with just such actions that the foundation for future Sino-Japanese 
relations can be secured.45
It would seem that, in the long-term at least, Shidehara was optimistic 
about Sino-Japanese relations.
In any case, the situation in China and Korea remained too fluid to 
make predictions. So, at this point, Shidehara did not prioritise plans for 
improving relations with Asia. Instead, he sought to assist with the more 
modest undertaking of academic research—specifically the rebuilding 
of Tōyō Bunko (the Oriental Library).
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Tōyō Bunko was an Asian research institution known around the world. 
Shidehara had long been connected to this institution, from as far back as 
the period following the Great Kantō Earthquake. As mentioned earlier, 
Shidehara lost his home in one of the fires that broke out in the aftermath 
of the earthquake. It was at this point that the Iwasaki family gifted him 
the residence at Rikugien to serve as his new home. When Shidehara 
began to live at Rikugien, which is located in Komagome, Tōyō Bunko was 
just finishing the construction of its new building. In fact, it was directly 
opposite Shidehara’s Rikugien residence. This was no coincidence. Tōyō 
Bunko was established by Iwasaki Hisaya, who was Iwasaki Yatarō’s eldest 
son and the founder of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. The Iwasaki family, which 
had turned part of the Rikugien gardens into grounds for their villa, had 
also allotted a south-eastern part of the original land area to Tōyō Bunko.46 
The chief director of Tōyō Bunko at the time was Inoue Junnosuke, who 
would later become minister of finance in the Hamaguchi cabinet.
In 1932, Shidehara’s old acquaintance Hayashi Gonsuke became chief 
director of Tōyō Bunko. Then, in November 1935, Shidehara himself 
became councillor of Tōyō Bunko. Shidehara would be promoted to 
director in December 1939, after Chief Director Hayashi passed away 
in June that year. Later, in February 1941, Shidehara had his brother 
Shidehara Taira donate his collection of books to Tōyō Bunko.47
Shidehara became chief director of Tōyō Bunko in October 1947. This 
directorship was more than an honorary post for Shidehara. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, Shidehara had always been particularly fond of books. 
Unfortunately, the destruction wrought by the war had effectively led 
to the Tōyō Bunko shutting its doors for several years. Shidehara had 
also just become a member of the House of Representatives at this time. 
The president of the House of Councillors was Matsudaira Tsuneo, who 
was later followed by Satō Naotake. From Shidehara’s perspective, both 
were still the equivalent of his juniors from their days at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Making use of his status, Shidehara poured his energy 
into negotiations with the National Diet Library and succeeded in having 
Tōyō Bunko re-opened as a branch of the National Diet Library. As chief 
director of Tōyō Bunko, Shidehara himself would sign the eventual 
agreement with the National Diet Library in August 1948.48
Further, in the same year, Shidehara also became the chairman of the newly 
established Tōhō Kenkyū-kai (the Oriental Research Association). The 
purpose of this association was to sponsor informal gatherings to discuss 
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matters relating to China. It was attended by former diplomatic officials 
such as Ishii Itarō and Hayashide Kenjirō. Tōhō Kenkyū-kai is also known 
for publishing Gendai Tōa-Jin Meikan (Directory of contemporary East 
Asians). In the foreword that he supplied for this book in his capacity as 
chairman, Shidehara wrote: ‘Today, understanding the various nations of 
East Asia must be our urgent undertaking. Tōhō Kenkyū-kai was formed 
just after the war as a result of this very realization’.49 In fact, the editing 
of the directory was effectively undertaken by the First Division of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research Bureau.
Nonpartisan Diplomacy and National 
Security
Nonpartisan Diplomacy
During this period, the executive branch of the Japanese government 
also underwent a series of transitions—from the first Yoshida cabinet to 
the Katayama cabinet and, subsequently, to the Ashida cabinet. Then, 
in October 1948, the Ashida cabinet also resigned en masse. The cause 
for this resignation was a corruption scandal relating to financing for 
Shōwa Denkō, a large chemical firm. The result was the formation of 
the second Yoshida cabinet. This cabinet would last for a long time, 
until the end  of 1954. Meanwhile, Shidehara was re-elected in the 
general election of January 1949 and, in February, became the speaker 
of the House of Representatives. That is to say, rather than being made 
a minister of  state again in the Yoshida cabinet, he was kicked upstairs 
to an honorary position.
At this time, in preparation for the conclusion of the peace-making 
process,  Shidehara tasked himself with the development of a new 
diplomacy that would transcend party lines. I am speaking here of 
nonpartisan diplomacy. Of course, Shidehara had argued for many years 
that diplomacy and domestic politics ought to be separated. Yet his 
efforts to establish a new nonpartisan diplomacy were directly triggered 
by the June 1950 visit to Japan of John Foster Dulles, the special peace 
envoy. President Truman had entrusted Dulles with the handling of peace 
negotiations with Japan.
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It should be noted that this was not Dulles’s first time in Japan. He had 
visited Japan and China in February and March 1938. In preparation for 
his upcoming visit to Japan, which would last 10 days, Dulles had asked 
Ambassador to the US Saitō Hiroshi to write him numerous introductory 
letters. In Tokyo, he would meet with moderates such as Vice-Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Horinouchi Kensuke, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Makino 
Nobuaki, Kabayama Aisuke and Shidehara himself. Dulles had formed 
a  positive opinion of these moderate-faction politicians at the time. 
It should be noted that because Shidehara met with Dulles only briefly, 
Dulles did not come away with a particularly strong impression of 
Shidehara.50 It was US Ambassador Grew who had strongly recommended 
to Shidehara that he meet with Dulles. In his letter to Shidehara, Grew 
said that Dulles, ‘an old friend of mine’, was investigating the Far East 
and wanted very much to meet with Shidehara.51 There is reason to 
question whether Dulles was really as eager to meet Shidehara as Grew 
stated. It may instead have been that Grew himself thought Shidehara 
was the kind of person whom Dulles ought to meet. In any case, Grew’s 
enthusiasm for Shidehara did not infect Dulles in 1938.
Yet, as it turned out, Grew’s efforts would bear fruit over 20 years 
later. When Dulles visited Japan in June 1950, Shidehara had earned 
a reputation as a liberal politician. This was when Shidehara began to 
push for the development of nonpartisan diplomacy, and it seems that he 
received some prompting from Dulles. It should be noted that Dulles had 
been involved with foreign policy as far back as before the war, when he 
was working as a Republican Party–affiliated lawyer.52
Shidehara’s first step was to reach out to figures such as Tomabechi Gizō, 
the Democratic Party of Japan’s supreme committee chairman, and 
Asanuma Inejirō, the Socialist Party of Japan’s chief secretary, to sound 
them out on the idea of nonpartisan diplomacy. While Tomabechi was 
receptive to the idea, the Socialist Party declined Shidehara’s proposal. 
In June 1950 Asanuma had already told Dulles, who was then in Japan, 
that ‘the Socialist Party is unable to accept the nonpartisan diplomacy 
of the Liberal Party’.53 It may have been that Shidehara’s ties to the 
Socialist Party leaders were not strong enough to win them over to such 
plans. Nevertheless, Shidehara was so enthused about the prospects of 
nonpartisan diplomacy that it seemed rash to Prime Minister Yoshida and 
Ashida of the Democratic Party.
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If that was the case, what exactly did Shidehara’s nonpartisan diplomacy 
consist of? In fact, there was nothing special about it. It was simply about 
not allowing diplomacy to be used as a political football. More details on 
this point can be found in a speech Shidehara gave in November 1950. 
According to this speech, Shidehara had been motivated by a  ‘bitter 
experience’ that he underwent during his time in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. ‘Diplomatic problems were frequently turned into fodder for 
political disputes’, he noted. ‘Caught between the political parties, our 
ministry, which was tasked with actually raising diplomatic problems 
[with the politicians], often ended up being worked half to death.’ Having 
once undergone such experiences firsthand in the days before he become 
a politician, Shidehara took a certain pride in believing he was the right 
person to promote nonpartisan diplomacy. Shidehara’s model for this new 
form of diplomacy was the UK. He argued that ‘in the U.K. they speak of 
the continuity of prior diplomacy … I [therefore] received the impression 
that the U.K.’s diplomacy was the most trustworthy’. Conversely, in the 
US even the Treaty of Versailles was rejected in Congress. Only in recent 
years had the US begun to recognise the importance of nonpartisan 
diplomatic efforts. It was for this reason that Shidehara ‘argued for the 
need to remove diplomatic problems from the sphere for party conflicts’.54
Hence Shidehara sought to promote the continuity of diplomatic policy 
within the party politics system. Certainly, Shidehara’s convictions 
about nonpartisan diplomacy were right. It could even be said that he 
demonstrated considerable discernment in this regard. It is also clear 
why he saw the UK as a model for such diplomacy. However, the kind 
of nonpartisan diplomacy that Shidehara envisaged presumed a certain 
maturity among opposition politicians, the general public and the mass 
media. It is highly doubtful that such a style of diplomacy could have 
been promptly applied in Japan at that time. In the end, Shidehara’s 
proposed nonpartisan diplomacy was ignored not only by the political 
opposition but also by Prime Minister Yoshida and the secretary-general 
of the Liberal Party, Satō Eisaku. The possibility that the Socialist Party 
would agree to support nonpartisan diplomacy was also slim.55
National Security
Nevertheless, during this period Shidehara’s diplomatic stance continued 
to evolve. Before the war, he saw the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs as only natural. After the war he came to recognise that the 
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governing party had a role to play and even busied himself with attempts 
at bringing the opposition on board. Given this new stance, what kind of 
foreign policy issues was Shidehara seeking to have addressed?
Major issues of contention included Japan’s rearmament and the stationing 
of US forces. From the beginning, Shidehara did not have any clear 
plans regarding Japan’s national security in the postwar era. In a meeting 
with Yoshida Shigeru, Satō Naotake and Matsudaira Tsuneo, Shidehara 
recognised that Japan was defenceless against possible invasion but still 
trusted in a vaguely defined ‘world public opinion’. At the same time, 
Shidehara also asserted that he was ‘absolutely opposed to joining the 
United Nations’.56 In his view, such an international body could not be 
relied upon for national defence and should not be permitted to erode 
Japan’s ability to undertake its own independent diplomatic efforts. 
Shidehara’s perspective here appears to have hardly changed from the 
days when he was angered by the intervention of the League of Nations 
in East Asia. During a different roundtable discussion, when questioned 
about permanent neutrality, Shidehara disdainfully replied: ‘What benefit 
would doing something like that have?’57
Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Shidehara 
began to think more seriously about national security. It should be noted 
that, in those days, the biggest concern was domestic political stability. 
A July 1950 report by Dulles is quite informative in this regard. According 
to Dulles, who had just concluded his visit to Japan, Shidehara was far 
franker than the ambiguous Prime Minister Yoshida. Shidehara had told 
Dulles that, because ‘any rearmament would be far too expensive’, he very 
much wanted the US to continue to station its soldiers in Japan. Dulles 
said Shidehara had told him that ‘the Communists had been allowed 
too much liberty and that if American forces were withdrawn at once, 
the Japanese would not be able to contain possible Communist activity’. 
Shidehara had further told Dulles that ‘there was strong sentiment 
against Russia among the Japanese’. Therefore, even if Japan were one 
day occupied by the Soviet Union, they would never cooperate with the 
Soviets in the way that they currently cooperated with the Americans. 
Hence, he argued, ‘in the end their military victory would prove a failure’. 
According to Dulles, ‘Baron Shidehara was the only one with whom we 
talked who expressed this rather extreme view’.58
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As this report shows, Shidehara was even more enthusiastic than Yoshida 
about the potential of keeping Japan only lightly armed and focusing on 
economic development. Shidehara’s thinking on the Soviet Union also 
seems to have changed somewhat from the prewar years. After all, before 
the war, Shidehara had been relatively uncommitted to the fight against 
communism. It may be that as the Cold War progressed, he revised his 
opinions on the matter.
As the turmoil of the Korean War deepened, Shidehara became the 
chairman of a joint council for considering problems of national defence. 
Members of the council included figures such as Satō Naotake, president 
of the House of Councillors; Uehara Etsujirō, chairperson of the Liberal 
Party’s House of Representatives Diplomacy Committee; Tomabechi 
Gizō, chairperson of the Democrat Party’s Supreme Committee; and 
Baba Tsunego, president of the Yomiuri Shimbun Company. Shidehara 
had apparently come to recognise the necessity of rearming Japan, despite 
the dilemmas presented by Article 9 of the constitution. On the other 
hand, Shidehara also informed Matsumura Kenzō—still purged from 
public office—that ‘the U.S. will not force us to rearm’.59 Such statements 
indicate the extent to which Shidehara valued the US army forces 
garrisoned in Japan.
Last Writings
Fifty Years of Diplomacy
In the summer of 1950, Shidehara began to feel that Japan–US relations 
were improving—not only in politics and economics, but also in cultural 
matters. Shidehara noted:
Americans are particularly enthusiastic about Japan studies. 
They are also interested in traditional arts such as ikebana flower 
arrangement, tea ceremonies, and haiku and tanka poetry. I am 
exceedingly pleased to see that people are beginning to see Japan 
with fresh eyes.60
To Shidehara, it felt like the dawn of a new era. It was at this time that the 
US army invited him to Yokosuka. He also attended a play with members 
of the occupation forces: Madame Butterfly, a tragic love story about the 
relationship between a Nagasaki geisha and an US naval officer. However, 
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viewers from the occupation forces hated the play. One officer sitting 
alongside Shidehara grumbled: ‘I do not think any American would be 
as heartless as the man in this play’. Shidehara noted that the experience 
‘caused me to engage in some reflection’ about his own perceptions.61
Shidehara also criticised another play being produced at the time, titled 
Tōjin Okichi. This play was based on a fictionalised account of an actual 
person from Shimoda named Okichi, who had served as a waiting maid 
for US Consul General Townsend Harris near the end of the Tokugawa 
shogunate. Upon seeing the play, Shidehara could not help but voice his 
displeasure. In his words, Tōjin Okichi mixed ‘Japanese-style sentimentalism 
with a hefty amount of sexual allure’, with the result that the play ‘slighted 
Harris’s integrity and caused the Americans to take offense’. In Shidehara’s 
view, the real-life Harris had ‘devoted himself to the opening up of Japan 
and to its culture’. Shidehara decided to express his criticisms in a piece 
for the New Year’s issue of Kaizō magazine. Quoting Harris’s biography, 
which had been published in New York, he pointed out that it painted 
a picture of a man who lived a ‘virtuous life, in complete opposition to 
the problems [shown] in Tōjin Okichi’. Shidehara concluded by noting 
that, given that the peace conference was now drawing near, ‘it may be 
necessary to reconsider, once more, the achievements of Harris, who had 
contributed so much to the opening up of Japan’.62 In fact, Shidehara 
wrote these words just a few months before his sudden passing.
The year 1950 was the last one that Shidehara would live out in full. 
Shidehara responded to a request from the Yomiuri Shimbun for a serialised 
dictation, which began in the autumn of 1950. He dictated a series of 
pieces that were then edited and appeared in the newspaper under the title 
‘Gaikō 50 Nen’ (Fifty years of diplomacy). Sixty-one instalments were 
published in all, with the Manchurian Incident covered from parts 39 
to 46. ‘Gaikō Gojūnen’ would later be published by the Yomiuri Shimbun 
Company as a standalone book, also titled Gaikō Gojūnen. Shidehara 
composed the foreword for this collection on 2 March 1951. In this 
foreword, he wrote:
The historical facts raised in this work have not been adulterated 
with imaginary hypothesis or dramatization. Rather, I have relied 
upon my memories of the events and have resolved to be as 
accurate as possible.63 
To edit the work, Shidehara received assistance from former diplomatic 
officials Mushanokōji Kintomo and Ishii Itarō.
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He also devoted part of this final year to the task of writing an essay in 
English. His aim was to make a contribution to the journal Foreign Affairs. 
This was not the first time that Shidehara had written a piece for a US 
magazine. As noted above, he took a similar step during the Washington 
Naval Conference.64 That said, it was certainly rare. On this occasion, 
Shidehara had begun to write at the direct request of John Gunther. 
In  1950, this well-known US journalist was covering MacArthur and 
other head staffs at GHQ. It was Gunther’s first time in Japan since 1938. 
After meeting with Shidehara, Gunther strongly recommended that he 
consider submitting an essay to Foreign Affairs. Gunther viewed Shidehara 
as an old liberal who had resisted Japanese proponents of war. He was also 
well disposed towards Shidehara’s secretary, Kishi Kuramatsu.65
With Gunther having been kind enough to offer this advice, Shidehara 
decided to follow through. He began work on an essay in English titled 
‘Genesis of the Manchurian Incident of 1931’. The recollections that 
it contained stretched back to before World War I. At that time Japan 
was a debtor nation. With the coming of World War I, it managed to 
become a creditor nation, to only then endure the disaster of the Great 
Kantō Earthquake. Another distinguishing feature of the 1920s was that 
it was a time of disarmament—so much so, in fact, that military men 
became disgruntled. As Shidehara pointed out, the Japanese military was 
desperate to recover some of the glory of the past. On the diplomatic 
side, Japan’s relationship with China had also been put under strain. 
In Shidehara’s view, this was because ‘the Chinese did not seem ready to 
grasp the hand of friendship which I, as Foreign Minister, was constantly 
holding out for them’.66 On the contrary, the Nationalist government 
had rejected Japan’s request for formal approval of the appointment of 
Obata Yūkichi as minister. There was also the Nakamura Incident and the 
Wanpaoshan Incident.
From here, Shidehara’s draft of the ‘Genesis of the Manchurian Incident’ 
reached its main conclusions. Shidehara noted that:
Whispers among our civilian population in Manchuria, hinting 
that some secret warlike manoeuvres were in the course of 
preparation by a clique of Japanese junior officers reached my ears 
towards the beginning of September, 1931.67 
Upon hearing this, Shidehara warned War Minister Minami. Yet, although 
Minami signalled that he would deal with the situation, the following 
weeks saw only further escalation. Upon learning of the Liutiaohu 
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Incident from the morning edition of a newspaper on 19 September, 
Shidehara rushed to call the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was informed 
that the ministry had received a telegram from Consul General Hayashi 
with the same information. Shidehara depicted Minami at the time 
of the Manchurian Incident as somebody who was, for the most part, 
cooperative. Shidehara also noted that Japan’s then minister to China, 
Shigemitsu Mamoru, attempted to negotiate directly with Song Ziwen. 
However, the Chinese government instead appealed to the League of 
Nations. Shidehara concluded his draft by arguing that China should have 
prioritised direct negotiations over such an appeal. In his view, the result 
of China’s course of action was that an early resolution to the Manchurian 
Incident was frustrated, and ‘the specter of an extensive and intensive war 
was fast approaching’.68
As can be seen from the above outline, Shidehara’s draft of the ‘Genesis of 
the Manchurian Incident’ for Foreign Affairs was hardly full of novel ideas. 
For the most part, it was a rehash of the testimony that he had given at 
the Tokyo Trial. Shidehara presumably wrote ‘Genesis of the Manchurian 
Incident’ with ‘Gaikō Gojūnen’ by his side for reference. The contents of 
‘Genesis of the Manchurian Incident’ were extremely similar to ‘Gaikō 
Gojūnen’. One thing the above details reveal is that the ‘Genesis of the 
Manchurian Incident’ was not merely a collection of reminiscences. 
This work can also be seen as including Shidehara’s attempts at self-
justification. It was necessary for Shidehara to present himself as the ‘old 
liberal’ that Gunther saw him as. The appearance of the essay in Foreign 
Affairs appeared to be just a matter of time.
Sadly, however, ‘Genesis of the Manchurian Incident’ would be Shidehara’s 
last work. On 10 March 1951, Shidehara suddenly passed away. Only 
eight days had gone by since he wrote the foreword for Gaikō Gojūnen. 
As a result, ‘Genesis’ never appeared in Foreign Affairs. However, the 
draft did catch the attention of the editors of Chūō Kōron. After receiving 
permission from Shidehara’s family, the literary magazine prepared the 
manuscript for publication. For this task they also received assistance from 
Shidehara’s former secretary, Kishi Kuramatsu. The work was published in 
the May 1951 edition of Chūō Kōron under the revised title ‘The Ghosts 
of War: Origins of the Manchurian Incident’. During this same period, 
Foreign Affairs published an essay by Yoshida Shigeru. While Yoshida did 
not use this opportunity to advocate the kind of nonpartisan diplomacy 
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that Shidehara desired, it did show the extent to which both he and Dulles 
were now beginning to look ahead to the era that would follow the peace 
settlement.69
What Did Shidehara Leave Unfinished?
In this chapter we have looked at Shidehara’s final years. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, Shidehara had struggled to deal with party politics. 
While he participated in the formation of the Democratic Party as 
president of the Progressive Party, he soon fell out with the Ashida clique 
and, in the end, led his own faction to merge with Yoshida’s Liberal Party. 
According to Nagai Matsuzō, who had served as vice-minister for foreign 
affairs during Shidehara’s second term as foreign minister, Shidehara 
ought to have withdrawn from politics following the dissolution of his 
cabinet, without coming into conflict with Ashida.70
There were some matters that Shidehara had left unfinished. The 
dissemination of the new constitution that he himself had worked on 
was one obvious example. Yet his largest concern was the future of Japan’s 
foreign relations. His diplomatic activities in his final years can be placed 
into four major categories. First, Shidehara was concerned about the fate 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the occupation and endeavoured 
to ensure it was revamped. Second, with an eye to the future conclusion of 
a peace settlement and Japan’s regaining of sovereignty, he advocated the 
development of nonpartisan diplomacy. Although Shidehara’s promotion 
of nonpartisan diplomacy was directly triggered by Dulles’s visit to Japan, 
its intellectual precursors can be found in the UK. Third, Shidehara was 
even more enthusiastic than Yoshida in hoping that the US forces would 
remain garrisoned in Japan. Fourth, as can be seen with his criticism 
of Tōjin Okichi, or his efforts to rebuild Tōyō Bunko, Shidehara also 
understood the importance of culture for foreign relations.
In particular, Shidehara’s feelings for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
concealed a fondness for the glories of the past. Although he had attended 
the Tokyo Trial as a witness for the prosecution, in truth, he sought to 
protect figures such as Shigemitsu and Shiratori, whom he considered 
as collateral family. Shidehara had also attended court as a witness for 
the defence. Indeed, his comments were referenced by Minami’s defence 
counsel in his closing statement, as they benefitted the client. This basic 
tone did not change in Shidehara’s final work, written for Foreign Affairs. 
Hence a degree of ambiguity remains in Shidehara’s thinking on wartime 
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responsibility. Of course, Shidehara was hardly unusual in this regard. 
In any case, as can be seen from his work in establishing the training 
institute, Shidehara saw his highest priority as the preservation of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The above points are also interesting when considered with respect to 
their continuity (or discontinuity) between the prewar and postwar eras. 
From Shidehara’s perspective, if we exclude Tanaka diplomacy and the 
Twenty-One Demands issued to China, Japanese domestic and foreign 
policy developed smoothly until the early 1930s. Starting with the 
Manchurian Incident, however, that policy went off the rails. Shidehara 
therefore considered it important that he use his own experience to benefit 
postwar Japan. In his view, what this experience showed was that two 
things needed to occur: first, economic-centred diplomacy needed to be 
established; second, a new order had to be created in East Asia that would 
be based upon cooperation with the US and the UK. Essential for these 
purposes was the restoration of trust in Japan’s foreign relations, and this 
in turn required the promotion of nonpartisan diplomacy.
Unfortunately, Shidehara had neither the authority nor the remaining 
years needed to fully achieve these goals. With Japan yet to recover its 
sovereignty, he would pass away in March 1951. In this sense, both 
the continuities and the discontinuities of Japanese diplomacy were 
encapsulated in Shidehara’s short postwar experience. And that is not 
all. Shidehara also had a secret wish that ultimately went unfulfilled. 
From the very beginning, Shidehara had had a fastidious and scholarly 
nature. He spent his final years surrounded by books, both foreign and 
domestic, and dreamed of writing his life’s work in English—a history of 
Japanese diplomacy. In practice, however, he spent the last of his years as 
a politician, an occupation for which he was ill suited. It might have been 
far better if he had devoted himself to writing. We may wonder whether, 
at the time of his death, Shidehara spared a moment to regret that he had 
to leave with this diplomatic history still unwritten.71
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A Legacy beyond 
War and Peace
A Peaceful Death
Until 8 March 1951, Shidehara had been attending the Diet in his 
capacity as speaker of the House of Representatives. However, according 
to his secretary Kishi Kuramatsu, on 9 March he was unable to rise for 
breakfast. On 10 March, as evening fell upon Setagaya, Shidehara quietly 
took his last breath. He died peacefully of a heart attack at the age of 78.1 
MacArthur promptly issued the following statement:
I wish to express my deepest condolences at the passing of 
House Speaker Shidehara. Mr. Shidehara’s insight and expansive 
knowledge has been of great service to Japan on its journey to 
recovery. With world affairs in their current tense state, Mr. 
Shidehara’s passing will certainly be a significant blow.2
Shidehara had helped to build an era in prewar Japan. After the war 
he served as prime minister during the occupation before assuming the 
position of speaker of the House of Representatives. Though he had 
once detested political parties, he eventually served as president of the 
Progressive Party. In time, Shidehara’s disagreements with Ashida led 
him to leave the Democratic Party and form the Dōshi Club. He would 
subsequently bring his supporters with him to merge with Yoshida 
Shigeru’s Liberal Party, and he became chief adviser to the Democratic 
Liberal Party. As  the Democratic Liberal Party had joined with the 
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coalition faction of the Democratic Party and established the Liberal Party, 
it was expected that the former Dōshi Club’s faction would be weakened 
by Shidehara’s passing.3
Ultimately, however, in Shidehara’s career, it is his time as foreign minister 
that looms the largest. When he passed away, it was seen, more than 
anything, as the loss of the Japanese diplomatic world’s eldest statesman. 
Former prime minister Ashida Hitoshi remarked: ‘In my opinion, the 
big stage upon which Mr. Shidehara strode as a diplomat was, more than 
anything else, the Washington Naval Conference on Disarmament of 
1922’.4 Similarly, President of the House of Councillors Satō Naotake 
immediately mentioned the London Naval Conference when discussing 
Shidehara’s achievements. Satō added: ‘Even at this age, I still cannot help 
but think of Shidehara as akin to my master; even in the Diet I was able 
to frankly ask for his advice’.5
On 12 March, two days after Shidehara’s passing, a farewell service was 
held at his residence in Okamoto, Setagaya ward. On that occasion, 
a copy of some English-language correspondence that had been found in 
his bedside box of papers was brought out. The letter was addressed ‘Dear 
Mr. Grew’. Its intended recipient was the former US ambassador to Japan, 
Joseph Grew. Grew had once agreed to a request from Shidehara that he 
write a message of hope for the youth of Japan, whose nation was now 
devastated. In response, Shidehara had written in English the following 
expression of thanks:
May I thank you ever so much for your welcome letter of 
February  12, enclosing a message of encouragement to the 
youth of Japan? The message is as impressive as it is edifying, 
and exactly fits the need of the times. I have sent it to the Tokyo 
Shimbun (an  influential Evening Daily) and the Nippon Times 
for publication.
The article immediately arrested the attention of the public. 
Numbers of people, both aged and young, have expressed to 
me verbally or in writing their profound appreciation of the 
communication. They have been moved by the singleness of heart 
and of purpose which has actuated the advice contained in your 
utterance. Emerging from the depth of misery into which they 
had been precipitated by the War, they are now beginning to find 
a way of hope ahead, enlightened by your inspiring word.6
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Shidehara’s correspondence to Grew was shared with the successive 
mourners of various walks of life who visited the residence on that day. 
According to the Tokyo Shimbun:
From this last piece of writing one has a sense of the friendship 
that [Shidehara] shared with Grew until his death, and of Mr. 
[Shidehara’s] sympathy and hopes for the youth of Japan, whom 
he did not forget until the very end; it conveys to us a vision of 
the deceased.7
The mourners who paid their respects starting the day before included 
not only Prime Minister Yoshida but also Chamberlain Irie Sukemasa, 
who had been sent on behalf of the Shōwa emperor.
A House of Representatives Funeral
While a continuous stream of mourners visited the Shidehara residence 
for the farewell service, the House of Representatives—now missing 
its speaker—held a meeting of the Assembly Steering Committee. 
The  topic of discussion was the holding of a state funeral, or, in this 
case, a ‘House of Representatives funeral’. Until then there had only 
been three instances of a house speaker dying in office and none of them 
had a House of Representatives funeral. Indeed, for a precedent it was 
necessary to look instead to the passing of the president of the House 
of Councillors, Matsudaira Tsuneo. Matsudaira had died in office on 
14 November 1949, and a ‘House of Councillors funeral’ was held the 
following day. Following this precedent, the committee decided to hold 
the first-ever House of Representatives funeral. The role of chairing the 
funeral organising committee went to the next speaker of the House of 
Representatives, while each of the Diet factions sent one person to assist 
as a committee member.
However, the ceremony differed from Matsudaira’s in certain respects. 
While Matsudaira’s House of Councillors funeral was held at the official 
residence of the president, this decision was unpopular due to the venue’s 
small size. For Shidehara’s funeral, even more mourners were expected. 
Taking into consideration matters such as the ongoing farewell service, 
it was decided to see if the funeral could be held at Tsukiji Honganji 
temple. After quickly confirming with the temple, it was determined that 
16 March was the only full day available.8 Thus, Shidehara’s House of 
Representatives funeral was held on 16 March at 1 pm at Tsukiji Honganji 
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temple. The chairman of the ceremony was Hayashi Jōji. Hayashi had 
been promoted by Prime Minister Yoshida and had only just been elevated 
from deputy prime minister to speaker of the House of Representatives 
following Shidehara’s passing. The House of Representatives itself was 
adjourned for the day as an expression of mourning.9
Of the many distinguished men who attended the funeral, the one who 
garnered particular attention was Shigemitsu Mamoru, still on parole 
following his release from prison, and who had been tasked on this 
occasion with burning the ceremonial incense. When the incense-burning 
was concluded, Speaker Hayashi and the heads of the three branches 
of government each gave their messages of condolence. These three 
individuals were Satō, president of the House of Councillors; Prime 
Minister Yoshida; and Tanaka Kōtarō, the chief justice of Japan.10
What were Shidehara’s last words as speaker of the House of Representatives? 
His last official statement was an address to the plenary session of the 
House of Representatives, held on 6 March. There were over 10 items 
on the day’s agenda, including the nomination of members for the 
National Capital Construction Committee. The item that generated the 
most debate was related to the securing of emergency imports following 
the outbreak of the Korean War. As it happened, Shidehara’s last official 
words as recorded in the session minutes were quite ordinary: ‘Those 
standing are the majority. Therefore, all three proposals have been passed 
in accordance with the chairman’s report. This concludes today’s agenda. 
The session is now adjourned’.11 Yet a close reading of the session minutes 
provides glimpses of Shidehara in his role as speaker, acting with his typical 
thoroughness. For example, when the Communist Party Diet member 
Kazahaya Yasoji opposed the resolution to secure emergency imports, 
Shidehara responded: ‘If any inappropriate language has been used in 
Mr. Kazahaya’s remarks, then I will take appropriate steps following an 
investigation of the stenographic records’.12 Even during lengthy speeches, 
Shidehara did not let anything get past him; his mind remained as sharp as 
ever. This session took place on 6 March, only 10 days before the funeral.
After the plenary session for that day had ended, Shidehara headed 
towards the Imperial Palace together with the president of the House 
of Councillors, Satō Naotake. Satō later remarked:
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When we visited the palace together on March 6, which was 
Her Majesty the Empress’s birthday, Mr. Shidehara quite easily 
consumed three or four of those red-lacquered cups worth of 
celebratory sake. I remember returning home and thinking to 
myself that he was still very much in good form.13
Satō continued:
When I first met Mr. Shidehara, I was still a student at 
Hitotsubashi Commercial College. Mr. Shidehara was living on 
the same road, near [the present-day] Nogi Shrine in Akasaka. 
In the middle of the Russo-Japanese War, Mr. Shidehara was the 
director of the Telegraph Division [sic.] of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. As such, he was very busy. I was up late at night myself 
those days, preparing for the diplomatic service exam, so I would 
hear when he returned from the ministry on a two-horse carriage. 
I still remember the sound of the driver’s voice as he called out 
‘Welcome home’ whenever they arrived.14
Satō also remarked that:
It was surprising just how much he read. He also had a remarkable 
encyclopedic knowledge … I would frequently go to speak with 
him, and Mr. Shidehara would also sometimes casually drop by 
the president’s office to pay me a visit.15
We have seen that Shidehara was in good health until just before his 
death. He had spent the coming of the new year of 1951 at his villa in 
the village of Kotsubo, in the Zushi region south of Yokohama. Shidehara 
would look forward to visits from old friends, and when guests arrived, he 
enjoyed regaling them with stories. He was always particularly talkative 
concerning the framed calligraphy of Saionji Kinmochi, which stated: 
‘Shūen Villa’ (聚遠荘, Shūen-sō). Saionji’s brushstrokes had an air 
of dignity about it. Those guests visiting the villa:
Were able to entirely forget the outside world and the wretched 
state it was in. Even the passing of time would go unnoticed while 
they were enthralled by Shidehara’s skillfully delivered stories.16
As he loquaciously spoke with his guests, Shidehara likely had little idea 
that his life was now nearing its end.
To identify Shidehara’s last actions in the realm of diplomatic affairs, 
we need to return to when Dulles visited Japan in June 1950. At that 
time, Shidehara elaborated upon his long-held view that diplomacy ought 
JAPAN AT WAR AND PEACE
330
to be kept separate from a nation’s domestic politics. He would speak 
with a number of individuals in an effort to convince them of the need 
for nonpartisan diplomacy, including not only Prime Minister Yoshida 
but also opposition figures such as Tomabechi Gizō and Asanuma Inejirō. 
The Yomiuri Shimbun noted: ‘It seemed as though Mr. Shidehara believed 
this work would be his last “public service” as the eldest statesman of 
[Japan’s] diplomatic world’.17 A Japanese saying notes ‘the tenacity of old 
age’. Certainly, Shidehara was the very embodiment of this saying when it 
came to his efforts in those days.
Reactions, Domestic and Abroad
There is another saying in Japanese: it is only when the coffin is sealed 
that a person’s worth can be assessed. Shidehara had continuously received 
both praise and censure while he was alive. But what did the various 
newspapers have to say after his passing? Of the editorials that appeared 
in the three major Japanese papers, the one with the most favourable 
assessment of Shidehara and his legacy was from the Mainichi Shimbun. 
This 11 March 1951, editorial stated:
We had only recently lost another elder statesman of the nation’s 
diplomatic world—Matsudaira, president of the House of 
Representatives. After all is said and done, however, Mr. Shidehara 
did not merely stand at the very peak of his field as it currently 
stands. As indicated by the term ‘Shidehara diplomacy,’ he also 
left a significant mark upon the landscape of Japan’s diplomatic 
history in the form of his own systematic approach. Frankly, if 
Japanese diplomacy had proceeded along the course indicated by 
Mr. Shidehara, then this nation may well have managed to avoid 
ending up in its current miserable state. If we contemplate the 
fact that there is neither a ‘Yoshida diplomacy’ nor a ‘Matsudaira 
diplomacy’ but that there was a ‘Shidehara diplomacy,’ then we 
may be able to appreciate that we have lost more than merely the 
eldest statesman of that world.18
Meanwhile, although the 12 March editorial in the Yomiuri Shimbun 
praised Shidehara for his diplomatic efforts, it was quite harsh in critiquing 
his insufficient self-awareness as a politician:
Mr. Shidehara’s political and diplomatic contributions to our 
nation may be numerous. Yet what draws our attention above all 
is the manner in which he took charge of an extremely difficult 
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situation following the loss of the war, while at the same time 
bringing about the establishment of a ‘new constitution’ that is 
unprecedented worldwide in its intelligence and cultural refinement 
… When compared with his achievements as a diplomat, which 
were so significant that he actually defined a new era with his 
‘Shidehara diplomacy,’ his work as a party politician, it must be 
admitted, was entirely ordinary … That Mr. Shidehara was more 
an individualist than a party man must be looked upon with some 
regret from the perspective of the development of our nation’s 
party politics.19
Then there was the 11 March editorial of the Asahi Shimbun, which even 
attacked Shidehara’s stance as a diplomat:
Mr. Shidehara was the very incarnation of a bureaucratic diplomat. 
He devoted his long life to diplomacy, and his achievements ought 
to be highly praised by the nation’s citizens. However, now that 
Japan has been reborn as a democratic country, it is necessary to 
find a way towards a new national diplomacy. For this purpose, we 
must find new leaders of national diplomacy who can help show 
us the way forward.20
Although the Asahi Shimbun editorial recognised Shidehara’s achievements 
as a ‘bureaucratic diplomat’, it looked forward to the coming of ‘new 
leaders of national diplomacy’, ones more suited to the democratic 
currents of the postwar era.
It should be remembered that Shidehara once made a name for himself 
on the international stage as well. It is worth examining how his passing 
was covered in the foreign press. First, let us look at the New York Times. 
An article on Shidehara’s death, accompanied by a photograph, appeared 
in this paper on 11 March. It stated that Shidehara was ‘among the few 
Japanese leaders who really understood the Western mind’ and that he 
had spent his final few months helping with preparations for the coming 
peace settlement. This article was followed by another that served as 
a kind of corroboration. It was a message of condolence from Dulles. 
Having just returned from his visit to Japan, Dulles noted that he had 
‘met often with Mr. Shidehara and came personally to appreciate [his] 
liberal and anti-militarist spirit’.21
The Washington Post also included an obituary with a photograph on that 
day. Later, on 13 March, the paper ran a sympathetic piece on Shidehara’s 
difficulties as foreign minister during the Manchurian Incident. A similar 
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view was expressed in a 21 March letter to the editor by former US 
ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew. In it, Grew looked back on the period 
following the Russo-Japanese War, and the friendship between Shidehara 
and ministry adviser Denison. According to Grew, a young Shidehara had 
diligently studied international law under Denison while also polishing 
his English. Denison responded to this show of dedication, eventually 
bequeathing him 35 years’ worth of diary entries and records of his official 
duties. Shidehara had also frequently written of Denison in his own diary. 
Tragically, both Shidehara’s and Denison’s diaries were destroyed in the 
bombing of Tokyo. As Grew recounted these anecdotes for the newspaper, 
he may well have been fondly reminiscing about the ‘good old days’ of 
Japan–US relations.
Grew was not the only one to pick up his pen upon seeing Shidehara’s 
obituary. Another letter to the editor appeared in the Washington Post 
on 25 March, this time from Castle. Castle, it may be recalled, had 
served as US ambassador to Japan during the London Naval Conference 
on Disarmament. In his letter, he noted how impressed he had been by 
Shidehara’s discernment. He further acknowledged that he had learned 
a great deal from Shidehara on the topic of China policy following the 
Northern Expedition. Castle concluded by noting that, in a postwar 
Japan where civil servants were now in control of politics, ‘the influence 
of Shidehara will not die with him’.22
The San Francisco Peace Treaty and 
Shidehara’s Legacy
History is concerned with facts, not counterfactuals. Yet it is hard not to 
wonder what might have happened if Shidehara had lived an extra half-
year. For it was during this time that the San Francisco Peace Conference 
took place. In the newspapers published in Japan on 10 March 1951—the 
day of Shidehara’s death—articles on Dulles made the front page. Having 
concluded his five-week tour of the Far East, Special Envoy Dulles had 
sent a report to the diplomatic committee of the US Senate. Dulles sought 
to obtain the support of the committee with an eye to bringing about an 
early conclusion to the peace accord negotiations with Japan. At the same 
time, Dulles had been making progress with a draft of the peace treaty 
itself, while taking pains not to forbid Japan from rearming.
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However, it was not only the US that needed to be convinced. Australia 
had shown some resistance to the idea of signing a peace treaty permitting 
Japan’s rearmament if there was no guarantee of a mutual defence 
treaty. In fact, the ANZUS treaty, signed later that year by Australia, 
New Zealand and the US, was just such a treaty. Nations such as the 
Philippines had also reacted negatively to Dulles’s policy of not requesting 
Japan to pay reparations. The UK, meanwhile, apprehensive of a return 
to competing with Japan in the areas of shipping and textiles, sought 
a treaty that would limit the nation’s economic activities. Then there was 
Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik, representative for the Soviet Union. Malik 
had told Dulles he would not even negotiate with him about a peace 
treaty with Japan.23
As a foreign minister, Shidehara had made a name for himself 
internationally. During the occupation, he had served as prime minister, 
and, at the time of his passing, he was still active as the speaker for the 
House of Representatives. If he had lived a little longer, therefore, he 
might have been a strong candidate as the plenipotentiary for Japan 
at the San Francisco Peace Conference. Indeed, the Yomiuri Shimbun 
noted that ‘there was word Prime Minister Yoshida had sought to make 
Mr. Shidehara the peace plenipotentiary’.24 After all, until just before his 
death, Shidehara remained healthy enough that he was still attending the 
House sessions.
Of course, as the Asahi Shimbun editorial pointed out, it was no longer 
the age of the ‘bureaucratic diplomat’. Likewise, Shidehara struggled in 
his attempts at promoting nonpartisan diplomacy. Yoshida Shigeru, who, 
like Shidehara, was a former diplomat, would also struggle politically 
following the conclusion of the peace treaty. Yoshida had to deal with 
difficult problems such as rearmament; however, more fundamentally, he 
may have been unsuited to party politics. This was a time when ‘leaders of 
national diplomacy’ were desired, and Yoshida was a poor retail politician. 
He was also not the type to give speeches in public venues.
In many cases, the key to diplomacy in postwar Japan was the leadership 
of the prime minister. A fitting example was Prime Minister Hatoyama 
Ichirō’s visit to the Soviet Union, which succeeded in normalising Japan–
Soviet relations. The foreign minister in the Hatoyama cabinet was 
Shigemitsu Mamoru. As a member of the generation after Shidehara’s, 
Shigemitsu was a representative diplomat of the Shōwa era. By contrast, 
Prime Minister Hatoyama was a party politician. As such, he was hardly 
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likely to be as familiar with the practice of diplomacy as Shigemitsu. 
Nevertheless, it was Hatoyama’s visit to the Soviet Union that secured 
the restoration of diplomatic relations. Simply put, it was Prime Minister 
Hatoyama who signed the Japan–Soviet Joint Declaration, not Foreign 
Minister Shigemitsu.
Other examples of diplomatic initiatives that were led by Japan’s prime 
ministers include the amendment of the US–Japan Security Treaty carried 
out under Kishi Nobusuke, the reversion of Okinawa to Japan under Satō 
Eisaku25 and the normalisation of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations 
under Tanaka Kakuei.26 While Foreign Ministry diplomats had never 
received a great deal of attention, now even the foreign minister himself 
was increasingly becoming eclipsed. That said, prime ministers such as 
Kishi Nobusuke, Ikeda Hayato, Satō Eisaku, Fukuda Takeo and Ōhira 
Masayoshi were all originally bureaucrats. The difference was that their 
shared background was in economics rather than diplomacy.
Following the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco, Japanese diplomacy 
increasingly moved away from the ideals once promoted by Shidehara—
those of centralisation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
nonpartisan diplomacy. That said, history is often full of ironies. It was 
under the occupation that former diplomats such as Shidehara, Yoshida 
and Ashida rose to the rank of prime minister. Even the posts of speaker 
and president of the two houses of the Diet were occupied by former 
diplomatic officials such as Shidehara, Matsudaira Tsuneo and Satō 
Naotake. However, once Japan regained its sovereignty, the authority 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its ‘supreme power’ over diplomatic 
affairs, appeared to wane. With his passing, only half a year before the 
conclusion of the peace treaty, it was almost as if Shidehara was alluding 
to this changing of the times. Most likely, there will never again be a figure 
whose own fate embodies the rise and fall of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to the extent that Shidehara’s did.
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In this book I have traced some of the details of Shidehara Kijurō’s life 
alongside the currents of Japanese diplomatic history. I would like to 
conclude with a look back upon Shidehara’s life and legacy.
Shidehara was born in Osaka, the second son of a wealthy farmer. Passing 
the diplomatic service exam, he began his career as a consular assistant 
in Incheon, Korea. He would subsequently move through positions such 
as consul in Busan, Telegram Division director, Investigation Bureau 
director-general, councillor at Japan’s embassy in the US, councillor at 
Japan’s embassy in the UK and minister to the Netherlands. In 1903, 
he would marry Masako, the youngest daughter of Iwasaki Yatarō, the 
founder of Mitsubishi, thereby becoming a brother-in-law to Katō 
Takaaki. The arrangement of his marriage to Masako was mediated by 
Ishii Kikujirō. Shidehara, who had been raised in fortunate circumstances, 
now also acquired influential connections. After Foreign Minister Katō 
ran into trouble with his issuing of the Twenty-One Demands to China 
during the Ōkuma cabinet, Katō was succeeded by Ishii. Under Foreign 
Minister Ishii, Shidehara became vice-minister for foreign affairs in 1915.
Shidehara would go on to serve as vice-minister for foreign affairs 
under Motono Ichirō, Gotō Shinpei and Uchida Yasuya. Later, with 
the formation of the Hara cabinet in 1919, Shidehara was selected for 
the important position of ambassador to the US. Representing Japan 
at the Washington Naval Conference as plenipotentiary representative, 
Shidehara succeeded in concluding a deal despite suffering at the time 
from kidney stones. Following his return to Japan, Shidehara would serve 
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as foreign minister for a combined total of over five years, beginning in 
the Katō Takaaki cabinet. In the 1920s, Shidehara entered the best years 
of his career. In 1930, he helped guide the London Naval Conference on 
Disarmament to a successful conclusion. However, he left the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs following the Manchurian Incident and, with increasing 
anguish, watched the country proceed towards the Pacific War. Yet defeat 
and occupation changed matters completely, with Shidehara becoming 
Japan’s forty-fourth prime minister in October 1945. In his final years, he 
assumed the office of speaker of the House of Representatives in the Diet.
What did Shidehara seek to achieve through diplomacy in the prewar 
era? In general, Shidehara’s diplomacy is considered to have been based 
on the ideal of international cooperation, with a corresponding emphasis 
upon maintaining an open door policy in East Asia. The reality is not so 
simple, however. While Shidehara accepted having an open door policy 
as a general principle, he sought to restrict its application in practice. 
Shidehara similarly had a narrow interpretation of the open door article 
included in the Nine-Power Treaty signed at the Washington Naval 
Conference. He saw it mainly in the context of equal opportunity—that 
is to say, the sense in which it was used in the first open door policy note. 
To put it another way, Shidehara was against other nations intervening 
in China’s domestic politics. There was a certain policy goal that formed 
the background to this interpretation: the protection of Japan’s interests 
in China. It was with an eye towards this goal that Shidehara wanted 
to recognise the ‘open door policy’ as a basic rule while also restricting 
its application. Japan was conscious of its special interests on the Asian 
continent, and, in his own way, Shidehara likewise wished to promote 
Japan’s national interest.
Shidehara’s guiding principle at this time was to respect the spirit of the 
Washington Naval Conference while also supporting China’s unification. 
As seen with the example of the Beijing Special Conference on Tariffs, 
for the most part, Shidehara’s conception of regional order remained 
within the framework established at the Washington Naval Conference. 
Shidehara’s approach is exemplified in his response to the Northern 
Expedition, where he emphasised economic benefits such as trade and 
freedom of residence and defended them on the basis of the spirit of the 
Washington Naval Conference. Yet there were also occasions where he 
promoted the expansion of Japan’s benefits in China, and not just their 
protection. We see this attitude in his approval of the construction of 
the Taoang Railway, despite the fact that this undertaking ran counter 
339
CONCLUSION
to the agreement reached with the New Four-Power Consortium. What 
this shows, I have suggested, is that even Shidehara was not free of the 
tradition of Japanese diplomacy.
What sets Shidehara apart from the above tradition most is that, following 
from his perspective that China’s unification ought to be accepted, he 
implemented a policy of non-intervention in that nation’s domestic 
affairs. Shidehara valued the promotion of political stability as well as 
economic diplomacy. In particular, when the Nanjing Incident of 1927 
occurred during the Northern Expedition, Shidehara believed it had 
been orchestrated not by Chiang Kai-shek but by the ‘communists’. 
To  support political stability in China, Shidehara argued that ‘peaceful 
and diplomatic methods’ needed to be used to help ‘a central figure such 
as Chiang Kai-shek’ restore order. At the basis of this judgement was an 
understanding of national benefit that prioritised economic benefits. 
Shidehara demonstrated enthusiasm for enhanced trade with southern 
China and was also well informed on issues such as Japanese immigration 
to the US. As a principle, Shidehara believed in pursuing an ‘honest 
diplomacy’ based on building relationships of trust.
From a present-day perspective, one could conclude that Shidehara’s 
policies were basically correct when viewed in the long-term. Yet, when 
viewed in the short-term, it is hard to see in them any concrete plans for 
protecting Japan’s residents and interests in China. Thus, it seems unlikely 
that such policies could have convinced domestic audiences. The truth 
was that Shidehara operated within the framework of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and did not pay much attention to the Japanese political 
context. If party politics in Japan had been more stable, then Shidehara 
might well have made an outstanding foreign minister. In this sense, his 
relationship with Prime Minister Hamaguchi represented the best-case 
scenario for Shidehara’s career. With the London Naval Conference on 
Disarmament during the Hamaguchi cabinet, cooperative diplomacy 
reached its peak under Japanese party-based politics. However, the success 
of the London Naval Conference did not directly lead to improvements in 
other areas, such as Japan’s relationship with the US. Instead, cooperation 
with the US on matters such as China policy and the revision of the 
Japanese Exclusion Act remained elusive.
Another side to Shidehara’s career at this time, as the Manchurian Incident 
demonstrated, was that he showed himself to be inept at handling crises. 
During the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, Mutsu 
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Munemitsu and Komura Jutarō had earned renown. By contrast, the 
Manchurian Incident led to the collapse of Shidehara diplomacy. This is 
a decisive difference. Of course, it would be unjust to blame this failure 
on Shidehara alone. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not fully 
respond to overseas crises and domestic criticism at the same time. Even 
if it was at the beginning of the Goken Sanpa cabinet that Shidehara was 
entrusted with the nation’s diplomacy, the next stage should have been 
for the political parties to seriously discuss the future direction of Japan’s 
diplomatic efforts.
After leaving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of 1931, Shidehara 
was soon largely forgotten. While in political opposition, the only time 
that he directly engaged in diplomatic efforts was for the Japan–Soviet 
Fisheries Interim Agreement. Shidehara nevertheless retained a sharp 
mind, as evidenced by his cooperation with the compilation of historical 
documents for the ministry’s Research Department. When World War II 
broke out, he also showed discernment when giving his views on how 
affairs might unfold. Yet Shidehara did not take the kind of decisive 
action that Yoshida Shigeru did. He argued for concluding an early peace 
when the Pacific War began, yet, in the maelstrom of the war’s final days, 
he embraced the doctrine of bitter end resistance.
Shidehara enjoyed a reversal of fortunes with the coming of the Allied 
occupation. As prime minister, he endeavoured to secure the continued 
existence of the emperor system and was involved in the related 
undertaking of creating a new constitution. Shidehara further worked 
to rebuild the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, anticipating that it would be 
important once Japan had regained its sovereignty. He also protected his 
diplomat colleagues Shiratori Toshio and Shigemitsu Mamoru during the 
Tokyo Trial. Last, by establishing the Foreign Service Training Institute, 
Shidehara sought to help the ministry retain the pool of talented staffs 
that it required.
In his final years, during his term as speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Shidehara sought to utilise his experience to improve 
postwar Japan’s foreign relations. Here, I refer first to his support for 
keeping Japan only lightly armed, so that more resources could be 
directed toward economically oriented diplomatic engagement with the 
surrounding region. Second, I refer to his promotion of cooperation with 
the UK and the US to foster political stability and development in East 
Asia. Shidehara was thus even more enthusiastic than Yoshida in wanting 
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an ongoing US military presence in Japan, a fact that was conveyed to 
Dulles. In Shidehara’s opinion, restoring trust between Japan and its 
foreign counterparts was essential, and for this he believed the promotion 
of nonpartisan diplomacy was indispensable.
In summary, Shidehara was an internationalist who most clearly 
embodied cooperative diplomacy with the US and UK at the time. 
The  reason Shidehara became a prime minister during the occupation 
period was because of the reputation he had built as a foreign minister 
before the war. But Shidehara had a different face when it came to Asia. 
He took the annexation of Korea for granted and was reluctant to abolish 
China’s unequal treaties, which had an imperialistic aspect from today’s 
perspective. In this sense, Shidehara was an internationalist with an 
imperialist dimension.
Dilemma between Diplomacy 
and Democracy
Shidehara’s trajectory highlights a certain dilemma with respect to 
conducting diplomacy in the age of party politics. I am speaking of the 
compatibility of democracy with stable (i.e. bureaucratically managed, 
nonpartisan) diplomacy. In a sense, this was a consistent theme in 
Shidehara’s life work. Here ‘democracy’ has a broad meaning, referring 
to the presence not only of party-based cabinets but also of a political 
opposition, public opinion and the press. If that is the case, what kind of 
relationship should there be between democracy and diplomacy? These 
are difficult bedfellows in any era. If diplomacy ignores the will of the 
people, it is bound to fail. Yet diplomacy will also run into difficulty if 
it panders to the public.
From Shidehara’s perspective, party-based politics was desirable. Yet he 
also believed that diplomatic continuity was essential. This was because 
diplomacy could affect a nation’s dignity. Diplomatic policy therefore 
ought not to be significantly swayed by the changing of governments. 
This is why Shidehara sought the centralisation of diplomatic efforts 
under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was also why 
he was not overly concerned with domestic politics. This was orthodox 
Kasumigaseki-style (i.e. bureaucratic-style) diplomacy. In truth, Shidehara 
had his own way of considering domestic and foreign public opinion. 
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One clear example of his concern would be his publishing of diplomatic 
documents at the time of the enactment of the Japanese Exclusion Act. 
Nevertheless, he always kept his distance when it came to dealing with 
the press.
Meanwhile, when the Kenseikai entrusted Japan’s diplomacy to Shidehara 
and thereby gained the trust of Saionji, the last of the genrō of the Meiji 
era, it gained recognition as a legitimate governing party. As a result, 
democratisation via a two-party system made considerable progress 
during the 1920s. As the successor to the Kenseikai, the Minseitō would 
eventually surpass the Seiyūkai. However, it should be noted that the 
Kenseikai cabinet’s very dependency upon Shidehara entailed a certain 
eschewing of party-based guidance of diplomacy. While the party did gain 
Saionji’s trust by leaving diplomatic decision-making to Shidehara, the 
next phase should have included a consideration of how political parties 
could involve themselves in this sphere. When Shidehara himself had 
a sense of impending crisis over the Tanaka cabinet’s policies on China, 
he began to lean more openly towards supporting the Minseitō. While 
he never joined the party, he did participate in activities such as the 
making of public statements on Minseitō foreign policy. When Prime 
Minister Hamaguchi was shot, Shidehara even took the role of acting 
prime minister.
By all rights, as the political parties became increasingly influential in 
national politics, there should have been a concurrent expansion of their 
leadership into the sphere of foreign affairs. In practice, Prime Minister 
Hamaguchi welcomed this new stage of party politics at the time of 
the London Naval Conference on Disarmament. Yet, to a significant 
extent, this attitude was due to Hamaguchi’s particular nature as a party 
politician. By comparison, Prime Minister Wakatsuki was quite powerless 
during the Manchurian Incident. Ultimately, the prewar party politics of 
Japan was unable to respond adequately to the aftermath of this incident, 
leading to its collapse. The greatest tragedy of ‘Taishō democracy’ is that, 
when the Manchurian Incident occurred, the political parties had yet to 
systematise the steering of diplomatic policy. For Shidehara as well, it was 
a time of continuous adversity.
Yet, eventually, Shidehara would become prime minister during the 
occupation and later serve as speaker of the House of Representatives. 
At this time, he further contemplated the nature of diplomacy and 
democracy, and the relationship between the two. In the prewar era, 
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Shidehara thought it only natural that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
should take the lead in foreign affairs. After the war, he began to recognise 
that the governing party had a role to play as well. Thus, Shidehara’s 
stance gradually evolved. Indeed, Shidehara even participated directly in 
the rebirth of party politics. He had expressed pride in Japan’s own prewar 
‘democratic currents’ and had persuaded MacArthur that the nation 
should be allowed to further develop its own ‘Japanese-style democracy’. 
As a party politician, he had also worked to help stabilise the domestic 
situation by promoting a ‘conservative coalition’.
However, just as in the prewar era, the opposition continued to turn 
diplomatic affairs into political capital. Public opinion and mass media 
also played a role here. Vexed by this state of affairs, and with an eye 
towards the future conclusion of peace negotiations, Shidehara turned in 
his final years to championing nonpartisan diplomacy. What he meant by 
nonpartisan diplomacy was that parties would abstain from attempting 
to make political capital out of diplomatic problems. To promote this 
ideal, Shidehara spoke with, and tried to persuade, members of both 
ruling and opposition parties. Nonetheless, for opposition parties such 
as the Socialist Party, diplomatic problems were material to be used for 
criticising the ruling party. Such parties had no reason to readily abandon 
their involvement in diplomatic problems. In particular, the futility of 
asking the Socialist Party to embrace nonpartisan diplomacy revealed 
the limits of Shidehara’s approach. Shidehara presumably felt the sting 
of this failure quite deeply. The mass media and public opinion were also 
quite critical of the foreign policy of the wider government and the ruling 
party, with deeply rooted support for a comprehensive peace treaty and 
for future demilitarised neutrality.
Therefore, the potential for realising the kind of nonpartisan diplomacy 
envisaged by Shidehara was actually extremely limited. This was because 
of the various assumptions that it depended upon. For example, a certain 
degree of maturity was required not only from the opposition party but 
also from the citizens of the nation and the mass media. The model for 
Shidehara’s diplomatic ideals in this case was the UK. The reality, however, 
was that conditions in Japan remained a far cry from those in the UK. 
Indeed, far from embracing nonpartisan diplomacy, in postwar Japan the 
Socialist Party and other factions turned foreign policy into an ideological 
battleground. Shidehara’s disappointment can well be imagined. What 
anguished him was the conflict that arose from attempting to reconcile 
diplomatic stability with democracy. This was the central dilemma of 
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Shidehara diplomacy. It should be noted that the Socialist Party would 
gradually move further away from becoming a potential ruling party, 
going in the opposite direction from the prewar Kenseikai. Perhaps 
ironically, this development would actually contribute to the stability of 
postwar diplomacy.
In the early spring of 1951, when he was 78, Shidehara’s life ended 
peacefully. He did not live long enough to see Japanese politics reach 
maturity. Although Shidehara was unable to achieve nonpartisan 
diplomacy during his lifetime, his pursuit of nonpartisan diplomacy 
under party politics at the end of his life left a legacy worth considering 
in Japanese politics.
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Appendix: Brief Chronology 
of Shidehara Kijūrō
1872 11 August Born in Kadoma, Osaka
1895 July Graduates from the School of Law, Imperial 
University of Tokyo
November Employed in the Bureau of Mining, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Commerce
1896 September Passes diplomatic and consular official exam
October Appointed consular assistant; sent to the consulate 
in Incheon, Korea
1897 January Arrives in Incheon
1899 May Returns to Japan; sent to a posting in London
August Arrives in London
1900 December Appointed consul, to serve in Antwerp
1901 September Returns to Japan
Appointed consul in Busan
1904 March Returns to Japan
April Sent to provisionally assist with office work at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1905 November Appointed foreign affairs secretary
Sent to take over as director of the Telegraph 
Division, Minister’s Secretariat
1908 October Asked to be the concurrent director of the 
Investigation Division
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1911 July Assigned to the director-general of Investigation 
Bureau
Concurrently foreign affairs secretary and Telegraph 
Division director
1912 May Assigned to the position of embassy councillor, 
to attend posting in the US
September Arrives at posting in Washington
1913 November Relieved of responsibilities in the US, transferred 
to the UK
1914 June Sent to carry out the role of minister extraordinary 
and plenipotentiary
Sent to posting in the Netherlands
Concurrently responsible for diplomacy with 
Denmark
July Arrives at posting in The Hague
1915 October Returns to Japan; given the position of vice-minister 
for foreign affairs
1919 September Appointed ambassador extraordinary and 
plenipotentiary to the US
November Arrives in Washington, DC
1920 September Made a baron
1922 April Returns to Japan
December Relieved of ambassador extraordinary and 
plenipotentiary to the US to provisionally assist the 
ministry
1924 April Relieved of provisional position; awaits new role
June Appointed foreign minister (until April 1927)
1926 January Appointed member of the House of Peers by House 
of Peers Decree Article 1, no. 4
1929 July Appointed foreign minister (until December 1931)
1930 November Appointed acting deputy prime minister
1931 March Relieved as acting deputy prime minister
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1945 October Appointed prime minister (until May 1946)
December Concurrently minister for First and Second 
Demobilization Ministries
1946 February Appointed president of the War Research Institute
Appointed chairperson of the Food Measures 
Deliberative Council
May Appointed minister of state
June Appointed director-general of the Demobilization 
Agency (until May 1947)
1947 April Elected to the House of Representatives
1949 January Elected to the House of Representatives
February Appointed speaker of the House of Representatives
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